[Reader-list] Chomsky on Palestine

Rana Dasgupta rana_dasgupta at yahoo.com
Mon Apr 8 15:50:10 IST 2002


>Interview with Chomsky
>April 2, 2002
>
>Z: Is there a qualitative change in what's happening
now?
>
>I think there is a qualitative change. The goal of
the Oslo process 
was
>accurately described in 1998 by Israeli academic
Shlomo Ben-Ami just
>before he joined the Barak government, going on to
become Barak's 
chief
>negotiator at Camp David in summer 2000. Ben-Ami
observed that "in
>practice, the Oslo agreements were founded on a
neo-colonialist basis,
>on a life of dependence of one on the other forever."
With these 
goals,
>the Clinton-Rabin-Peres agreements were designed to
impose on the
>Palestinians "almost total dependence on Israel,"
creating "an 
extended
>colonial situation," which is expected to be the
"permanent basis" for
>"a situation of dependence." The function of the
Palestinian Authority
>(PA) was to control the domestic population of the
Israeli-run
>neocolonial dependency. That is the way the process
unfolded, step by
>step, including the Camp David suggestions. The
Clinton-Barak stand
>(left vague and unambiguous) was hailed here as
"remarkable" and
>"magnanimous," but a look at the facts made it clear
that it was -- as
>commonly described in Israel -- a Bantustan proposal;
that is 
presumably
>the reason why maps were carefully avoided in the US
mainstream. It is
>true that Clinton-Barak advanced a few steps towards
a Bantustan-style
>settlement of the kind that South Africa instituted
in the darkest 
days
>of Apartheid. Just prior to Camp David, West Bank
Palestinians were
>confined to over 200 scattered areas, and
Clinton-Barak did propose an
>improvement: consolidation to three cantons, under
Israeli control,
>virtually separated from one another and from the
fourth canton, a 
small
>area of East Jerusalem, the center of Palestinian
life and of
>communications in the region. And of course separated
from Gaza, where
>the outcome was left unclear.
>
>But now that plan has apparently been shelved in
favor of demolition 
of
>the PA. That means destruction of the institutions of
the potential
>Bantustan that was planned by Clinton and his Israeli
partners; in the
>last few days, even a human rights center. The
Palestinian figures who
>were designated to be the counterpart of the Black
leaders of the
>Bantustans are also under attack, though not killed,
presumably 
because
>of the international consequences. The prominent
Israeli scholar Ze'ev
>Sternhell writes that the government "is no longer
ashamed to speak of
>war when what they are really engaged in is colonial
policing, which
>recalls the takeover by the white police of the poor
neighborhoods of
>the blacks in South Africa during the apartheid era."
This new policy 
is
>a regression below the Bantustan model of South
Africa 40 years ago to
>which Clinton-Rabin-Peres-Barak and their associates
aspired in the 
Oslo
>"peace process."
>
>None of this will come as a surprise to those who
have been reading
>critical analyses for the past 10 years, including
plenty of material
>posted regularly on Znet, reviewing developments as
they proceeded.
>
>Exactly how the Israeli leadership intends to
implement these programs
>is unclear -- to them too, I presume.
>
>It is convenient in the US, and the West, to blame
Israel and
>particularly Sharon, but that is unfair and hardly
honest. Many of
>Sharon's worst atrocities were carried out under
Labor governments.
>Peres comes close to Sharon as a war criminal.
Furthermore, the prime
>responsibility lies in Washington, and has for 30
years. That is true 
of
>the general diplomatic framework, and also of
particular actions. 
Israel
>can act within the limits established by the master
in Washington,
>rarely beyond.
>
>
>Z: What's the meaning of Friday's Security Council
Resolution?
>
>The primary issue was whether there would be a demand
for immediate
>Israeli withdrawal from Ramallah and other
Palestinian areas that the
>Israeli army had entered in the current offensive, or
at least a
>deadline for such withdrawal. The US position
evidently prevailed: 
there
>is only a vague call for "withdrawal of Israeli
troops from 
Palestinian
>cities," no time frame specified. The Resolution
therefore accords 
with
>the official US stand, largely reiterated in the
press: Israel is 
under
>attack and has the right of self-defense, but
shouldn't go too far in
>punishing Palestinians, at least too visibly. The
facts -- hardly
>controversial -- are quite different. Palestinians
have been trying to
>survive under Israeli military occupation, now in its
35th year. It 
has
>been harsh and brutal throughout, thanks to decisive
US military and
>economic support, and diplomatic protection,
including the barring of
>the long-standing international consensus on a
peaceful political
>settlement. There is no symmetry in this
confrontation, not the
>slightest, and to frame it in terms of Israeli
self-defense goes 
beyond
>even standard forms of distortion in the interests of
power. The
>harshest condemnations of Palestinian terror, which
are proper and 
have
>been for over 30 years, leave these basic facts
unchanged.
>
>In scrupulously evading the central immediate issues,
the Friday
>Resolution is similar to the Security Council
Resolution of March 12,
>which elicited much surprise and favorable notice
because it not only
>was not vetoed by the US, in the usual pattern, but
was actually
>initiated by Washington. The Resolution called for a
"vision" of a
>Palestinian state. It therefore did not rise to the
level of South
>Africa 40 years ago when the Apartheid regime did not
merely announce 
a
>"vision" but actually established Black-run states
that were at least 
as
>viable and legitimate as what the US and Israel had
been planning for
>the occupied territories.
>
>Z: What is the U.S. up to now? What U.S. interests
are at stake at 
this
>juncture?
>
>The US is a global power. What happens in
Israel-Palestine is a
>sidelight. There are many factors entering into US
policies. Chief 
among
>them in this region of the world is control over the
world's major
>energy resources. The US-Israel alliance took shape
in that context. 
By
>1958, the National Security Council concluded that a
"logical 
corollary"
>of opposition to growing Arab nationalism "would be
to support Israel 
as
>the only strong pro-Western power left in the Middle
East." That is an
>exaggeration, but an affirmation of the general
strategic analysis,
>which identified indigenous nationalism as the
primary threat (as
>elsewhere in the Third World); typically called
"Communist," though it
>is commonly recognized in the internal record that
this is a term of
>propaganda and that Cold War issues were often
marginal, as in the
>crucial year of 1958. The alliance became firm in
1967, when Israel
>performed an important service for US power by
destroying the main
>forces of secular Arab nationalism, considered a very
serious threat 
to
>US domination of the Gulf region. So matters
continued, after the
>collapse of the USSR as well. By now the
US-Israel-Turkey alliance is 
a
>centerpiece of US strategy, and Israel is virtually a
US military 
base,
>also closely integrated with the militarized US
high-tech economy.
>
>Within that persistent framework, the US naturally
supports Israeli
>repression of the Palestinians and integration of the
occupied
>territories, including the neocolonial project
outlined by Ben-Ami,
>though specific policy choices have to be made
depending on
>circumstances. Right now, Bush planners continue to
block steps 
towards
>diplomatic settlement, or even reduction of violence;
that is the
>meaning, for example, of their veto of the Dec. 15
2001 Security 
Council
>Resolution calling for steps towards implementing the
US Mitchell plan
>and introduction of international monitors to
supervise the reduction 
of
>violence. For similar reasons, the US boycotted the
Dec. 5 
international
>meetings in Geneva (including the EU, even Britain)
which reaffirmed
>that the Fourth Geneva Convention applies to the
occupied territories,
>so that critically important US-Israeli actions there
are "grave
>breaches" of the Convention - war crimes, in simple
terms - as the
>Geneva declaration elaborated. That merely reaffirmed
the Security
>Council Resolution of October 2000 (US abstaining),
which held once
>again that the Convention applied to the occupied
territories. That 
had
>been the official US position as well, stated
formally, for example, 
by
>George Bush I when he was UN Ambassador. The US
regularly abstains or
>boycotts in such cases, not wanting to take a public
stand in 
opposition
>to core principles of international law, particularly
in the light of
>the circumstances under which the Conventions were
enacted: to
>criminalize formally the atrocities of the Nazis,
including their
>actions in the territories they occupied. The media
and intellectual
>culture generally cooperate by their own "boycott" of
these unwelcome
>facts: in particular, the fact that as a High
Contracting Party, the 
US
>government is legally obligated by solemn treaty to
punish violators 
of
>the Conventions, including its own political
leadership.
>
>That's only a small sample. Meanwhile the flow of
arms and economic
>support for maintaining the occupation by force and
terror and 
extending
>settlements continues without any pause.
>
>
>Z: What's your opinion of the Arab summit?
>
>The Arab summit led to general acceptance of the
Saudi Arabian plan,
>which reiterated the basic principles of the
long-standing 
international
>consensus: Israel should withdraw from the occupied
territories in the
>context of a general peace agreement that would
guarantee the right of
>every state in the region, including Israel and a new
Palestinian 
State,
>to peace and security within recognized borders (the
basic wording of 
UN
>242, amplified to include a Palestinian state). There
is nothing new
>about this. These are the basic terms of the Security
Council 
resolution
>of January 1976 backed by virtually the entire world,
including the
>leading Arab states, the PLO, Europe, the Soviet
bloc, the non-aligned
>countries -- in fact, everyone who mattered. It was
opposed by Israel
>and vetoed by the US, thereby vetoed from history.
Subsequent and
>similar initiatives from the Arab states, the PLO,
and Western Europe
>were blocked by the US, continuing to the present.
That includes the
>1981 Fahd plan. That record too has been effectively
vetoed from
>history, for the usual reasons.
>
>US rejectionism in fact goes back 5 years earlier, to
February 1971,
>when President Sadat of Egypt offered Israel a full
peace treaty in
>return for Israeli withdrawal from Egyptian
territory, not even 
bringing
>up Palestinian national rights or the fate of the
other occupied
>territories. Israel's Labor government recognized
this as a genuine
>peace offer, but decided to reject it, intending to
extend its
>settlements to northeastern Sinai; that it soon did,
with extreme
>brutality, the immediate cause for the 1973 war. The
plan for the
>Palestinians under military occupation was described
frankly to his
>Cabinet colleagues by Moshe Dayan, one of the Labor
leaders more
>sympathetic to the Palestinian plight. Israel should
make it clear 
that
>"we have no solution, you shall continue to live like
dogs, and 
whoever
>wishes may leave, and we will see where this process
leads." Following
>that recommendation, the guiding principle of the
occupation has been
>incessant and degrading humiliation, along with
torture, terror,
>destruction of property, displacement and settlement,
and takeover of
>basic resources, crucially water.
>
>Sadat's 1971offer conformed to official US policy,
but Kissinger
>succeeded in instituting his preference for what he
called 
"stalemate":
>no negotiations, only force. Jordanian peace offers
were also 
dismissed.
>Since that time, official US policy has kept to the
international
>consensus on withdrawal (until Clinton, who
effectively rescinded UN
>resolutions and considerations of international law);
but in practice,
>policy has followed the Kissinger guidelines,
accepting negotiations
>only when compelled to do so, as Kissinger was after
the near-debacle 
of
>the 1973 war for which he shares major
responsibility, and under the
>conditions that Ben-Ami articulated.
>
>Official doctrine instructs us to focus attention on
the Arab summit, 
as
>if the Arab states and the PLO are the problem, in
particular, their
>intention to drive Israel into the sea. Coverage
presents the basic
>problem as vacillation, reservations, and
qualifications in the Arab
>world. There is little that one can say in favor of
the Arab states 
and
>the PLO, but these claims are simply untrue, as a
look at the record
>quickly reveals.
>
>The more serious press recognized that the Saudi plan
largely 
reiterated
>the Saudi Fahd Plan of 1981, claiming that that
initiative was
>undermined by Arab refusal to accept the existence of
Israel. The 
facts
>are again quite different. The 1981 plan was
undermined by an Israeli
>reaction that even its mainstream press condemned as
"hysterical,"
>backed by the US. That includes Shimon Peres and
other alleged doves,
>who warned that acceptance of the Fahd plan would
"threaten Israel's
>very existence." An indication of the hysteria is the
reaction of
>Israel's President Haim Herzog, also considered a
dove. He charged 
that
>the "real author" of the Fahd plan was the PLO, and
that it was even
>more extreme than the January 1976 Security Council
resolution that 
was
>"prepared by" the PLO, at the time when he was
Israel's UN Ambassador.
>These claims can hardly be true, but they are an
indication of the
>desperate fear of a political settlement on the part
of Israeli doves,
>backed throughout by the US. The basic problem then,
as now, traces 
back
>to Washington, which has persistently backed Israel's
rejection of a
>political settlement in terms of the broad
international consensus,
>reiterated in essentials in the current Saudi
proposals.
>
>Until such elementary facts as these are permitted to
enter into
>discussion, displacing the standard misrepresentation
and deceit,
>discussion is mostly beside the point. And we should
not be drawn into
>it -- for example, by implicitly accepting the
assumption that
>developments at the Arab summit are a critical
problem. They have
>significance, of course, but it is secondary. The
primary problems are
>right here, and it is our responsibility to face them
and deal with
>them, not to displace them to others.
>

>
>Michael Albert
>Z Magazine / ZNet
>sysop at zmag.org
>www.zmag.org


__________________________________________________
Do You Yahoo!?
Yahoo! Tax Center - online filing with TurboTax
http://taxes.yahoo.com/



More information about the reader-list mailing list