[Reader-list] India and Pakistan - The dance of the courtesans
Harsh Kapoor
aiindex at mnet.fr
Wed Jul 2 05:03:34 IST 2003
Dawn (Pakistan)
June 27, 2003
The dance of the courtesans
By Ayaz Amir
For all their differences and minor jealousies it's heart-warming to
see the two great self-respecting republics of India and Pakistan
agreed at least on one particular: their furious desire to worm
themselves into the good graces of the United States.
Balancing the scales between a willing Pakistan--let no one accuse us
of ever being unwilling--and a cantankerous India, that is when India
rode the high horse of moral rearmament, was tricky enough. How much
trickier when both parties are almost wrestling the US to the ground
in order to plant their favour upon it. Spare a thought for the
embarrassment of riches on America's hands.
When the Twin Towers of New York, hit by the fury of Al Qaeda (or so
the world has been told to believe), came tumbling to the ground,
both India and Pakistan tried to beat each other to the draw to win
American favour.
Without bothering about terms and conditions, Pakistan quickly said
yes when Colin Powell called (in these parts saying yes and not
haggling over details being called old-world chivalry). India too was
quick off the mark and even before anyone had raised the subject was
offering all kinds of assistance, including the use of military
bases, to the US.
Geography dictated America's choice. As the US got ready to make
Afghanistan safe for democracy--by first razing everything to the
ground, the same process that we are seeing at work in
Iraq--contiguity to Afghanistan is what it wanted, something which in
the best measure only Pakistan could provide. India's chagrin at its
advances being ignored (not rejected) should not be hard to imagine.
Hell hath no fury--you get the picture.
The US is facing a much trickier situation in Iraq, the occupation
and policing of Iraq proving far more difficult than anyone around
Secretary Rumsfeld's war table had envisioned. So difficult in fact
that the number one problem before the US right now is not to
undermine the ayatollahs, contain North Korea's nuclear programme or
discover weapons of mass destruction. All these can wait. The most
urgent problem is recruiting soldiers for hire, mercenaries who can
do its dirty work in Iraq. Thus freeing the US military from a task
beginning to tax its fortitude and resolve.
Colin Powell has gone to the extent of asking Bangladesh for hired
soldiery, the US capable of any stooping in a jam. While the BD
reaction is not known, the two great republics of India and Pakistan
have left few doubts about where they stand. It is not just that they
are willing; they seem desperate to be taken on board.
Pakistan's soldier-president being under no obligation to consult
anyone--this being the beauty of one-man rule--has said in no
uncertain terms that Pakistan was ready to send troops, for which
read mercenaries, to Iraq. His only condition is the UN flag or the
auspices of the OIC or the Gulf Cooperation Council. In other words,
he is not objecting to the thing in principle. The willingness part
is thus settled. He just wants the proper fig leaf.
India's position is not much different. Through winks and nods the
BJP government has signified its readiness to perform guard duty in
Iraq. In this it has the support of big business which thinks that
with troops in Iraq, India's chances of winning fat 'reconstruction'
contracts would improve. But there is stiff domestic opposition to
the idea of pandering to American wishes. Since the Indian government
lacks the advantage of Pakistan's soldier-president who has to
consult only his own wishes, a decision on this issue appears to be
stalled.
However, when it comes to bartering individual or national honour,
the key thing is the initial willingness. Once that is secured, only
the details remain to be sorted out. In other words, once you say
yes, the rest is negotiable.
This summer then there should be no spectacle more fascinating than
our two republics looking silly on the question of Iraq. Here's the
whole world saying the Americans have got themselves into a quagmire
and a mess. And here India and Pakistan, fretting to beat each other
at the game, and ignoring every aspect of honour or long-term
interest, are itching to fling themselves into the same mud. Courting
universal ignominy for a stash of dollars: more than being impressed,
even our American friends are likely to be bemused.
Far from smarting at Indian competition, Pakistan should feel happy
it has someone to give it company. All the more so when who should be
giving it company but high-minded India. Trafficking in the same
goods, vying for the same favours, walking up and down the same
promenade. Welcome to the club.
Meanwhile of course, the Camp David spectacle is behind us. Ah, what
to make of it. Our talent for selling ourselves cheap is by now so
well established that it's no use crying. Three billion dollars over
five years--which comes to about $600 million a year, divided equally
between military and economic lollipops. This is such a damp squib,
such an anti-climax to the pre-Camp David hype and hoopla, that even
Pakistani officialdom has been reduced to incoherent muttering if not
embarrassed silence.
Central Command itself--that is, where the gods reside-- has revealed
(in a report carried briefly on its website but then quickly
withdrawn when it was threatening to turn into a scandal) that the
economic loss to Pakistan for carrying America's bags in Afghanistan
came to roughly $10 billion. Far from getting anywhere near that
figure, Pakistan's soldier-president has been rewarded with another
bag of peanuts. But he got the visit to Camp David, didn't he? Lunch
and a bit of a chat at the US president's private mountain retreat.
Wow, what an honour. And then to be extolled by the US president for
"brave leadership".
The story line never varies. Pakistani leaders, right from the
Republic's infancy, have always fallen for morsels of comfort from
the US, small certificates of approval which very briefly puff up
their insecure egos. Two years ago, remember, when America was still
bombing Afghanistan, General Musharraf was almost lionized when he
visited New York. Soon thereafter when the Taliban melted away and
the pounding of Afghanistan stopped, much of that enthusiasm
evaporated. A brief moment in the sun soon gone.
Not that Musharraf's usefulness is over. By God, what sentry duty,
what yeoman service, the Pakistani military is performing along the
Afghan border. The American military command has only to murmur
something and a loud clicking of heels can be heard all across the
mountains. But aren't we getting paid for our pains and our smart
snapping to attention?
We are but, in truth, not much. Our load is heavy, our recompense
small. Actually, for no real fault of the Americans because right at
the beginning Pakistan's military rulers surrendered whatever
leverage they could have exercised.
Leverage comes from a gift deferred or a gift left hanging in
anticipation. It is the prospect of what you can give that defines
your worth and sets a price on your expected cooperation. But when
the gift - in this case, Pakistani assistance - is delivered without
any questions asked, precious little leverage remains.
But perhaps the whole point of such excursions as the visit to Camp
David has more to do with form than substance--with symbolism rather
than tangible benefits. Many Third World leaders feel themselves
blessed when they get a pat from an American president, feeling their
standing at home enhanced.
It never works like this and when storm waters rise no amount of
American backslapping is enough by itself to rescue a leader in
trouble. But Pakistani leaders, prey to infantile notions, have
always felt otherwise and if Musharraf is proving to be no exception,
if he feels washed and revivified by his helicopter flight to Camp
David, who's to blame him?
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