[Reader-list] The War: A view from a form Reagan official

[Ravi Sundaram]

This is interesting since its not from counterpunch.org, but from an former 
Reagan admin official. And its so early in the conflict.
Ravi

The War in Iraq Turns Ugly. That's What Wars Do.
By JAMES WEBB

March 30, 2003, New York Times



ARLINGTON, Va. — This campaign was begun, like so many others throughout 
history, with lofty exhortations from battlefield commanders to their 
troops, urging courage, patience, compassion for the Iraqi people and even 
chivalry. Within a week it had degenerated into an unexpected ugliness in 
virtually every populated area where American and British forces have come 
under fire. Those who believed from intelligence reports and Pentagon war 
planners that the Iraqi people, and particularly those from the Shiite 
sections of the southeast, would rise up to greet them as liberators were 
instead faced with persistent resistance.

Near Basra, as The Financial Times reported, "soldiers were not being 
welcomed as liberators but often confronted with hatred." In the 
increasingly messy fights around Nasiriya, Marine units, which earlier were 
ambushed while responding to what appeared to be a large-scale surrender, 
had by the end of the week destroyed more than 200 homes.

Visions of cheering throngs welcoming them as liberators have vanished in 
the wake of a bloody engagement whose full casualties are still unknown. 
Snippets of news from Nasiriya give us a picture of chaotic guerrilla 
warfare, replete with hit-and-run ambushes, dead civilians, friendly fire 
casualties from firefights begun in the dead of night and a puzzling number 
of marines who are still unaccounted for. And long experience tells us that 
this sort of combat brings with it a "downstream" payback of animosity and 
revenge.

Other reports corroborate the direction that the war, as well as its 
aftermath, promises to take: Iraqi militiamen, in civilian clothes, firing 
weapons and disappearing inside the anonymity of the local populace. 
So-called civilians riding in buses to move toward contact. Enemy 
combatants mixing among women and children. Children firing weapons. 
Families threatened with death if a soldier does not fight. A wounded 
American soldier commenting, "If they're dressed as civilians, you don't 
know who is the enemy anymore."

These actions, while reprehensible, are nothing more than classic guerrilla 
warfare, no different in fact or in moral degree from what our troops faced 
in difficult areas of Vietnam. In the Fifth Marine Regiment area of 
operations outside Da Nang, we routinely faced enemy soldiers dressed in 
civilian clothes and even as women. Their normal routes of ingress and 
egress were through villages, and we fought daily in populated areas. On 
one occasion a smiling, waving girl — no more than 7 years old — lured a 
squad from my platoon into a vicious North Vietnamese crossfire. And if a 
Vietcong soldier surrendered, it was essential to remove his family members 
from their village by nightfall, or they might be killed for the sake of 
discipline.

The moral and tactical confusion that surrounds this type of warfare is 
enormous. It is also one reason that the Marine Corps took such heavy 
casualties in Vietnam, losing five times as many killed as in World War I, 
three times as many as in Korea and more total casualties than in World War 
II. Guerrilla resistance has already proved deadly in the Iraq war, and far 
more effective than the set-piece battles that thus far have taken place 
closer to Baghdad. A majority of American casualties at this point have 
been the result of guerrilla actions against Marine and Army forces in and 
around Nasiriya. As this form of warfare has unfolded, the real surprise is 
why anyone should have been surprised at all. But people have been, among 
them many who planned the war, many who are fighting it and a large 
percentage of the general population.

Why? Partly because of Iraq's poor performance in the 1991 gulf war, which 
caused many to underestimate Iraqi willingness to fight, while overlooking 
the distinction between retreating from conquered territory and defending 
one's native soil. And partly because protection of civilians has become 
such an important part of military training. But mostly, because the notion 
of fierce resistance cut against the grain of how this war was justified to 
the American people.

The strategies of both Iraq and the United States are only partly, some 
would say secondarily, military. The key strategic prize for American 
planners has always been the acceptance by Iraq's people of an invasion 
intended to change their government. If the Iraqis welcomed us, the logic 
goes, it would be difficult for those on the Arab street, as well as 
Americans and others who questioned the wisdom of the war, to condemn our 
presence.
Thus, throughout the buildup to war, the Iraqis were characterized to 
America — and to our military — as so brutally repressed by Saddam 
Hussein's regime that they would quickly rise up to overthrow him when the 
Americans arrived. This was clearly the expectation of many American 
fighting men as they crossed into Iraq. "Their determination was really a 
surprise to us all," said Brig. Gen. John Kelly of the Marines on Friday. 
"What we were really hoping for was just to go through and everyone would 
wave flags and all that."

On the other side, the Iraqi regime has used both its ancient history and 
American support of Israel in appealing to the nationalism of its people to 
resist an invasion by an outside power. It is as yet unclear which argument 
is succeeding, although early indications are that the American invasion 
has stirred up enormous animosity.

The initial bombing campaign was political, aimed at Iraqi leaders. The 
current effort appears to be increasingly strategic, designed to damage the 
Iraqi military's better units. After that, the next step is likely to be a 
series of conventional engagements matching American armored and infantry 
forces against Iraq's Republican Guard. The United States hopes to force 
Iraq into fixed-position warfare or even to draw them into a wild attack, 
where American technological superiority and air power might destroy Iraq's 
best fighting force.

But Iraq's leaders have reviewed their mistakes in the first gulf war and 
have also studied the American efforts in Somalia and Kosovo. They will 
most likely try to draw American units into closer quarters, forcing them 
to fight even armored battles in heavily populated areas nearer to Baghdad. 
This kind of fighting would be designed to drive up American casualties 
beyond the point of acceptability at home, and also to harden Iraqi resolve 
against the invaders.

If American forces are successful in these engagements, the war may be over 
sooner rather than later. But if these battles stagnate, guerrilla warfare 
could well become pandemic, not only in Baghdad but also across Iraq. And 
even considering the strong likelihood of an allied victory, it is hard to 
imagine an end point without an extremely difficult period of occupation.
In fact, what will be called an occupation may well end up looking like the 
images we have seen in places like Nasiriya. Do Iraqis hate Saddam 
Hussein's regime more deeply than they dislike the Americans who are 
invading their country? That question will still be with this 
administration, and the military forces inside Iraq, when the occupation 
begins, whether the war lasts a few more days or several more months.

Or worse, the early stages of an occupation could see acts of retribution 
against members of Saddam Hussein's regime, then quickly turn into yet 
another round of guerrilla warfare against American forces. This point was 
made chillingly clear a few days ago by the leader of Iraq's major Shiite 
opposition group, who, according to Reuters, promised armed resistance if 
the United States remains in Iraq after Saddam Hussein is overthrown.
Welcome to hell. Many of us lived it in another era. And don't expect it to 
get any better for a while.

James Webb, secretary of the Navy in the Reagan administration, was a 
Marine platoon and company commander in Vietnam. He is an author and filmmaker

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