[Reader-list] Socio-Cultural Empowerment of Indian Muslims

[Yogi Sikand]

Socio-Cultural Empowerment of Indian Muslims

  					Yoginder Sikand

(Paper presented at a conference on the Sachar Committee Report in
Kochi, 16th-17th June, 2007 organised by the Al-Ameen Educational
Trust and the Forum for Faith and Fraternity)

I have been asked to speak on the subject of the social and cultural
empowerment of Muslims in India. This is, of course, a very broad
topic and one cannot do justice to it in the course of a short
presentation. Rather than explore the reasons of Muslim
disempowerment, about which much has already been written, I think it
would be more useful to focus on certain practical measures that could
be undertaken in this regard. I will deliberately refer to the crucial
question of political empowerment only in passing as this is beyond
the scope of this presentation.

An important point to consider in discussing the question of Muslim
social and cultural empowerment is that of the internal diversity
among Muslims, which makes it difficult to make any but the most broad
generalizations. These diversities are of various types—class caste,
sect, language, region, ethnicity, gender and so on. Often,
discussions about Muslim social empowerment miss out, whether
deliberately or otherwise, these internal differences and variations,
based on a misleading and untenable assumption of a pan-Indian Muslim
monolith. It is striking to note how this notion of a Muslim monolith
(like that of the equally misleading notion of a Hindu monolith)
informs the discourse of both Hindu and Muslim right-wing forces and
of the state. It was this same misplaced notion of Hindus and Muslims
being two separate, monolithic and undifferentiated communities that
paved the way for the Partition of India, which benefited the ruling
elites of India and Pakistan, but made matters much worse for the
masses, Hindu as well as Muslim. It must be noted that demands for
resources or empowerment based on this notion of a Hindu or Muslim
monolith works essentially to promote the interests of the elites, the
so-called high caste, upper class Hindus and Muslims. Thus, for
instance, the demand by some Muslim elites for reservations for all
Muslims, based on this untenable assumption of a single Muslim
monolith, can be seen as reflecting the interests of these elites, for
it is obvious that such reservation would benefit essentially them,
leaving out in the cold the vast majority of the Muslim community.
This is similar in its implications to the case of Hindutva discourse,
where the equally untenable myth of a Hindu monolith is used as a
means to protect and promote the interests of so-called high caste and
high class Hindus, and to deny other Hindus—the vast majority—their
rights.  Hence, in discussing the issue of the empowerment of the
Muslim community, one must desist from speaking in terms of a Muslim
monolith, and focus particularly on the question of the empowerment of
the marginalized sections within the Muslim community, who, in many
parts of India, happen to form the vast majority of the community,
most of them being of indigenous so-called low caste background.

It is a striking comment on the existing Muslim leadership that often
their demands are couched in terms of a Muslim monolith, rarely
referring to the specific problems of these marginalized sections, in
whose marginalization, historically as well as now, Muslim elites, in
addition of course to Hindu elites and the state, have had a crucial
role to play. Muslim politics, particularly in north India, has been
largely the politics of symbolism, with political elites raising such
issues as the question of Urdu, the Muslim Personal Law, the Aligarh
Muslim University, the Babri Masjid and so on. One can perhaps speak
of some sort of complicity here with right-wing Hindu political
elites, with both having a vested interest in focusing on such
communally divisive issues to boost their own political fortunes.
These issues are not unimportant in themselves. The point, however, is
that because these issues have overwhelmed north Indian Muslim
politics, the massive and growing social, educational and economic
problems of the Muslim masses have been ignored, deliberately or
otherwise.

This calls for the need for a new sort of grass-root based community
leadership from among the marginalized sections of the Muslims, which
can go beyond the symbolic politics that only further promote communal
polarization. This new leadership would focus on bread-and-butter
issues that affect these sections as well as other similarly
marginalized sections among other communities, such as Dalits,
Backward Castes and Adivasis. Efforts at uniting these groups are
underway, although, Hindu and Muslim elites do not regard this with
any enthusiasm, for obviously it undermines their claims to be
authoritative spokesmen and leaders of their communities. This means
that the empowerment of the marginalized sections of the Muslims
demands a dual process of democratization: gaining their rightful
share within the larger Indian society as well as within the Muslim
community itself.

Now, leaving aside the complex world of politics, a few practical
suggestions with regard to the issue of cultural empowerment. In this
regard, it is crucial to note that Muslims in India are not a cultural
monolith, although they share a common commitment to Islam, but even
here one needs to take into account the diverse interpretations and
expressions of Islam, as reflected, for instance, in the number of
different maslaks, many of which define themselves in opposition to
each other. There has been a tendency among Muslim elites in north
India to seek to impose their so-called ashraf feudal culture and the
Urdu language on the rest of the Indian Muslim population. Even in
north India itself, highly Persianised Urdu, which is sought to be
presented as the standard form of Urdu, has always been an elitist
language, historically the language of some north Indian Muslim and
Hindu elites. It was never the language of the Muslim or Hindu masses,
who spoke and continue to speak in various regional dialects,
incorrectly incorporated as Urdu or Hindi. The elitist strategy of
projecting north Indian ashraf culture as the culture of all Indian
Muslims is, in fact, no different from similar efforts on the part of
north Indian Hindu elites to impose Brahmincial culture and a highly
Sanskritised Hindi on the rest of the Hindu population, or what the
Pakistani establishment sought to do in the erstwhile East Pakistan
with disastrous consequences. Even the state has sought to present
Urdu as a particularly Muslim language, which is not the case. Efforts
to preserve and promote Urdu are surely welcome, but it must be
remembered that it cannot and must not be treated as a Muslim language
or as the language of all the Muslims of India. This will only further
reduce the chances of survival of the language. It would also keep
Muslims confined to their ghettos, unable to compete in the job market
because of lack of competence in other languages. It would also
further fortify barriers between Muslims and others, which can only
further strengthen the deep-rooted stereotypes that others have about
Muslims and Islam.

In this regard, the emergence of a number of Muslim publications in
languages other than Urdu is a welcome development. This can help
promote communication with other communities. It can also help
strengthen regional identities and cultures, in which Muslims, Hindus
and others can participate together, thus making for greater and more
positive inter-community interaction. North Indian Muslims have much
to learn from their counterparts in Kerala in this regard, where
Muslims, Hindus, Christian, Dalits and others all share a common
linguistic and cultural heritage, which has helped in fostering fairly
cordial inter-community relations.

The democratic revolution demands that the cultures of marginalized
communities be celebrated and promoted. These often contain rich
symbolic resources that reflect the pains and anguish of the oppressed
and their quest for emancipation, as well as a symbolic critique of
the culture of elites that is used to legitimize their oppression. The
retrieval of the cultures of the oppressed or subalterns is happening
today in the case of the Dalits and Adivasis. In the Muslim case, this
is less marked, for various reasons, but is reflected in some recent
efforts by so-called low caste Muslim groups, particularly in Uttar
Pradesh and Bihar, to celebrate their histories and heroes,
commemorating the liberative spirit of Islam, which, they argue, has
been sought to be watered down by Muslim elites. The tradition of
numerous Sufi saints who bitterly critiqued political and religious
elites for their oppression of the poor, and whose understanding of
Islam was ecumenical and broad, reflecting a concern for all of God's
creatures, and not just Muslims alone, was also a part of this broader
subaltern tradition. This crucial social aspect of India's rich and
varied Sufi traditions, of the non-elite variety in particular, needs
to be highlighted, in order to evolve a popular culture that
celebrates religious pluralism and at the same time speaks out against
oppression and hegemony, be it of the state, or of Hindu and Muslim
elites, and so on. This can play a vita role in the socio-cultural
empowerment of the marginalized, Muslims as well as others. In this
regard, it is pertinent to note how this tradition has been
considerably bruised by the ritualisation of popular Sufism, with the
transformation of Sufi shrines from centres of instruction and
provision for the needy to centres of mediation, being controlled by a
class of elites who claim to be religious intermediaries.

Indian Muslim history, as is taught in schools and madrasas, and as is
reflected in books on the subject by both Muslim and other scholars,
continues to be highly elitist, and, incidentally, rather north Indian
centric. This, too, is an issue that needs to be addressed in the
process of promoting the cultural empowerment of the marginalized
sections of the Muslims.  Books on the subject of Indian Muslim
history inevitably focus almost entirely on Muslim rulers, Sufis and
ulema, almost all of whom were from the so-called higher
castes—Sayyeds, Shaikhs, Mughals and Pathans, who form only a
relatively small minority of the Indian Muslim population. There are
hardly any books available on the literally hundreds of indigenous
Muslim communities, mainly those of so-called low caste background.
This, too, must change, if we are serious about a promoting democratic
culture that is biased in favour of the oppressed. This
democratization of Muslim historiography is as necessary as the
democratization of the official Hindu historical canon, which, like
its Muslim counterpart, is sternly elitist. Democratising Indian
Muslim history writing would also serve a very necessary political
purpose—to highlight the fact that the so-called period of 'Muslim
rule' in India, which is routinely talked about both by Muslim and
Hindu elites, was hardly that. It was actually the rule of Muslim
elites, almost entirely of foreign extraction, in collaboration with
sections of the Hindu elites. The vast majority of the Muslims, of
indigenous extraction, were as marginalized and oppressed by these
elites as their Hindu counterparts from the so-called low castes were.
Making this point in today's context of communal rivalry is extremely
significant in order to counter the political projects of Hindu as
well as Muslim right-wing forces.

In north India, as some surveys have shown, Muslims from so-called low
caste background do not have adequate representation in various Muslim
organizations. This is an issue that needs to be seriously addressed.
Demands for their adequate representation are sometimes dismissed as
'conspiracies' to divide the Muslims on the basis of caste, which is
said to be an un-Islamic institution, but I believe this argument is
untenable, reflecting a desire to preserve the status quo. In actual
fact, genuine and lasting unity can only be promoted if such
organizations, particularly at their leadership level, are more
socially inclusive in terms of class and caste. Keeping certain social
groups out or not providing them adequate representation, whether
consciously or unconsciously, can only further reinforce Muslim
disunity.

In this regard, the Muslim media has a very crucial role to play and
it would be interesting to do a survey on what space they devote to
the bread-and-butter issues of the Muslim poor. I do not suppose think
the conclusions of such a survey would be very heartening. Related to
this is the lack of serious empirical research on the marginalized
sections of the Muslim community. This, too, reflects a certain lack
of concern or indifference on the part of large sections of the Muslim
elite towards the crucial social and economic problems of the Muslim
masses. There is, to my mind, just one institution in the whole of
India, the Institute of Objective Studies in New Delhi, that sponsors
such research, although the quality of its research output leaves much
to be desired. Why, one must ask, did we have to wait for the
government-appointed Sachar Committee to produce a detailed report on
the social and economic marginalization of Muslims? Why have Muslim
organizations not been doing this sort of research, although this is
crucial for planning for practical intervention as well as for
lobbying with the state and working with NGOs? It is striking that
while there are literally thousands of institutions in India for
Islamic Studies, there is hardly any institution focusing on Indian
Muslim Studies, on the social, educational and economic conditions of
Muslims. This reflects the way in which Muslim elites view the
priorities of the community and their relative neglect of the manifold
problems of the Muslim masses.

Promoting empirical research on marginalized sections of the Muslim
community, and awareness-building, mobilisation and lobbying based on
this, is essential in empowering them socially as well as culturally.
I think the notion that an ideal career is that of a doctor, a lawyer
or an engineer, or, now, a computer scientist or a business manager,
needs to be challenged, and more Muslim youth need to go in for higher
studies and careers in journalism, the liberal arts, humanities and
the social sciences, to focus in their work particularly on
marginalized sections of the community. There is a pressing need for
the setting up of voluntary agencies to work among the Muslim poor.
While there are literally thousands of madrasas in India, and crores
of rupees are spent on fancy mosques, the number of Muslim NGOs which
are really doing sincere and constructive work for the educational and
social empowerment of the marginalized sections of the Muslims is
relatively meagre. Muslim organizations must make demands on the state
for adequate state investment in Muslim areas. In addition, however,
efforts must be made to mobilize the internal resources of the
community for the empowerment of the marginalized. In this regard,
there needs to be rethinking of the best possible use of zakat funds,
most of which now go to madrasas. The standard charity-based approach
has to give way to seeking to help empower the poor. There is also a
serious need for working on the issue of waqfs and dargahs and
exploring possibilities for increasing their revenues and using these
for the poor. This also calls for democratic management of the waqf
boards and dargah committees.

Another important issue in the context of the empowerment of the
marginalised sections among the Muslims is that of madrasa reforms.
The vast majority of madrasa students come from these sections of
Muslim society. The on-going debate on madrasa curricular reforms
needs to be taken further and efforts to include 'modern' subjects
need to be expanded. In addition, students must be familiarized with
the world around them and with contemporary affairs. This will enable
them to play a more constructive and socially engaged role in their
capacity of would-be religious specialists. This will also help widen
their career options and facilitate their joining colleges and
universities after they graduate.

The rigid dualism that characterizes Muslim education, between the
ulema and 'modern' educated Muslims, must be narrowed down and efforts
need to be made to promote greater dialogue and interaction between
the two to help in the process of the empowerment of the marginalized
sections of the Muslim community. In this regard, I would like to cite
the instance of a group of Muslim activists, mainly retired government
officers, in Bangalore which I recently came across. This group goes
every Friday to various mosques in the city and, after the imam reads
the Arabic khutba, they deliver sermons on the importance of education
and also on the salience of the findings of the Sachar Committee
report. After the prayer gets over, there is a question and answer
session, where people ask questions and advice is given on how to form
local groups, solve local problems and access various government
schemes. Another such interesting example is that of a group of ulema
in Bangalore, who are now doing a course in English, Computer
Applications and Social Sciences. They have got together to prepare
and publish Friday khutbas in Urdu that relate religious prescriptions
to the need for education, health provision and other forms of social
service.

Further in this regard, it would be useful if arrangements can be made
for madrasa managers and ulema, particularly from the younger
generation, to visit Christian seminaries and learn from their
example. There, would-be Christian priests learn not only about their
own religion, but also about other religions, as well as about social
work and social activism. Perhaps these subjects and skills could be
included in the madrasa curriculum as well. I also think that there is
much that madrasas and other Muslim organisations in the rest of India
can learn from the Kerala example, where Muslim organizations are much
better organized and socially engaged. It would serve a valuable
purpose if arrangements could be made for Muslim social activists and
younger ulema from other parts of India, who wish to work for the
empowering the Muslim poor, to visit various Muslim institutions in
Kerala to see the very interesting and creative work that they are
doing and to learn from their example. The somehow deeply-rooted
notion that north India must lead and south India must follow is
completely mistaken and there is much that the south Indian example
holds for north Indian Muslims to learn from.

Linked to this is the need for developing alternate understandings of
Islamic theology and jurisprudence that are rooted in and creatively
responsive to the Indian situation of religious pluralism, caste,
class and gender oppression and the fact of Muslims being a minority
in India. This needs to be reflected in the madrasa curriculum as
well. Such progressive understandings of religion can play a crucial
role in addressing the lived realities and concerns of the
marginalized, irrespective of community. Clearly, understandings of
religion, no matter what religion, that are exclusivist and
insensitive to the local context, particularly that of oppression,
betray the genuine core of true spirituality.

My last point relates to intra-community and inter-community
relations. It is obvious that the empowerment of the marginalized
sections among the Muslims requires an atmosphere of harmonious intra-
and inter-community relations. It is striking to note in this regard
the sharp inter-maslak divisions and strife that are promoted by
certain Muslim institutions, publishing houses, ulema groups and
madrasas. It is equally striking to note the absence of any organized
dialogue work to bring together ulema of different maslaks to enable
them to work together in a spirit of ecumenism. I think this is a
serious issues that urgently needs to be addressed.

On the inter-community relations front, obviously Hindu-Muslim strife
hurts the marginalized sections of the Muslims the most and so for
their progress and empowerment communal harmony is indispensable. In
this regard, the state and Hindu organizations and activists have a
crucial role to play. But so do Muslims. The ulema need to be
sensitized to the issue and need of inter-faith dialogue and undertake
suitable efforts in this regard. There is an urgent need to promote
inter-religious dialogue, and in this regard to go beyond the present
limited form of dialogue at the level of religious doctrines between
religious specialists—ulema and pundits—which, although important, is
clearly inadequate. Often, such dialogue is promoted simply by
missionary motives or in order to defend one's beliefs against those
of others. Generally, such dialogue at the level of theology stumbles
after a point because each religion, as interpreted by its religious
orthodoxy, has certain non-negotiable fundamentals. Hence, dialogue
efforts must go beyond simply theological exchange, which remains
limited to a small religious elite . Dialogue needs to be extended
beyond the narrow sphere of religious specialists to become more
democratic and socially inclusive, include people from different walks
of life, particularly social activists and media persons from
different religious backgrounds.

Inter-community dialogue should go beyond talking about one's religion
to focus on the possibilities of joint efforts to work for social
issues of common concern. This is the dialogue of social action, which
moves beyond mere theological exchange and polemics. There is an
urgent need for many more Muslims to be involved in social movements
on issues that are not limited just to the Muslim community, but,
rather, are of much wider concern, such as the environmental movement
or the struggle against so-called globalization and against caste,
class and gender oppression. The obsession with issues only concerning
the Muslims is, I feel, very stifling and also counter-productive from
the point of view of the Muslim masses. So, too, is the tendency to be
self-righteous, to ignore the serious need for introspection, to blame
others for all one's ills and to remain silent when, in some
situations, non-Muslims suffer at the hands of Muslims.

Of course there are several other things that must be done for the
empowerment of the marginalized sections of the Muslim community,
including, particularly, women. I will not go into this because much
has already been said and written about this, including in the
recommendations of the Sachar Committee Report. What I have presented
here are some stray and rather disjointed thoughts for your
consideration and I only hope that this would enthuse at least some
people here to seriously think of working on these issues.
==============================

Yoginder Sikand works with the Centre for Jawaharlal Nehru Studies,
Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi. He can be contacted on
ysikand at gmail.com