[Reader-list] Open letter to MPs from CPI(M)

[Pawan Durani]

An intresting article on the same topic......

http://mutiny.in/2007/09/01/response-to-cpim-objections-against-the-indo-us-nuclear-deal/




On 9/17/07, prakash ray <pkray11 at gmail.com> wrote:
>
> *AN OPEN LETTER TO MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT** *
> *from Central Committee, CPI(M) *
>
> *
> September 8, 2007 *
>
> *Dear Member of Parliament,**  *
>
> *The Indo-U.S. bilateral agreement on nuclear cooperation has raised a
> number of issues which are of vital importance to the nation. Through this
> open letter we wish to place before you the considered views of the
> Communist Party of India (Marxist).**  *
>
> *Ever since the Joint Statement issued in July 2005 during the Prime
> Minister's visit to Washington in which the civilian nuclear cooperation
> agreement was announced, there has been a debate in the country about the
> merits of such an agreement. Political parties, nuclear scientists, the
> media and concerned citizens have been expressing their views. Parliament
> has also discussed the agreement at various stages.  However, the current
> debate is crucial as the bilateral text has been finalised and the
> Government is planning to take the next steps to operationalise the
> agreement. **  *
>
> *It is our contention that the nuclear cooperation agreement should not be
> seen in isolation from the overall context of India-US strategic
> relations,
> its impact on our foreign policy and our strategic autonomy. Further, the
> nuclear cooperation agreement must be seen in the context of our energy
> security, access to technology and the development of the three stage
> nuclear programme. *
>
> *The bilateral "123" agreement has also to be seen also in the light of
> the
> assurances given by the Prime Minister in his statement to Parliament on
> 17
> August 2007. *
>
> *The Left parties have asked the Government not to proceed with the next
> steps to be taken to operationalise the agreement. *
> *Implications of the Hyde Act *
>
> *Members of Parliament will recall that in August 2006, there was a debate
> on the draft law being discussed by the US Senate and the House of
> Representatives to amend the US Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to give
> exemption
> for the proposed  nuclear cooperation agreement  with India.  The two
> draft
> legislations before the House of Representatives and the Senate contain
> many
> provisions which were detrimental to India's interests. *
>
> *The Prime Minister  had given certain categorical assurances on the
> points
> raised regarding this draft legislation.  The nine points which the Left
> parties had raised were covered by the Prime Minister's statement.
> However,
> subsequent to that, the Hyde Act (Henry J. Hyde United States-India
> Peaceful
> Atomic Energy Cooperation Act" was adopted by the US Congress in December
> 2006. *
>
> *Many of the provisions of the Hyde Act go contrary to the assurances
> given
> by the Prime Minister in August 2006.  What are these? *
>
> *·        Under the terms set out by the Hyde Act, it is clear that the
> Indo-US nuclear cooperation would not cover the entire nuclear fuel cycle.
> It denies cooperation or access in any form whatsoever to fuel enrichment,
> reprocessing and heavy water production technologies.  *
>
> *·        The denial extends to transfer of dual use technology and covers
> items which could be used in fuel enrichment, reprocessing or heavy water
> production facilities.  Thus, dual use restrictions remain on technology
> transfers to India.  Hyde Act section 102 (13) states, "The US should not
> seek to facilitate or encourage the continuation of  nuclear exports to
> India by any other party if such exports are terminated under US law".  *
>
> *·        Section 103 (a)(6) of the Hyde Act says US policy shall be "Seek
> to prevent the transfer to a country (India, in this case) nuclear
> equipment, materials or technology from other participating governments in
> the NSG or from any other source if nuclear transfers to that country
> (India, in this case) are suspended or terminated pursuant to this title
> (Hyde Act), the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 or any other US law".  *
>
> *The Act concerns itself with areas outside nuclear cooperation and
> contains
> objectionable clauses to get India to accept the strategic goals of the
> United States.  These issues are: *
>
> *·        Annual certification and reporting to the US Congress by the
> President on a variety of foreign policy issues such as India's foreign
> policy being "congruent to that of the United States" and specifically
> India
> joining US efforts to isolate and put sanctions against Iran [Section
> 104g(2) E(i)] *
>
> *·        Indian participation and formal declaration of support for the
> US'
> highly controversial Proliferation Security Initiative including the
> illegal
> policy of interdiction of vessels in international waters [Section 104g(2)
> K] *
>
> *·        India conforming to various bilateral/multilateral agreements to
> which India is not currently a signatory such as the US' Missile
> Technology
> Control Regime (MTCR), the Australia Group etc  [Section 104c E,F,G] *
>
> *It is on the basis of the Hyde Act that the United States has negotiated
> the bilateral "123" agreement with India.  Some of the harmful provisions
> of
> the Hyde Act are reflected in the bilateral agreement.  *
>
> *·        The bilateral agreement, while superficially using the original
> wording of the joint statement of 2005, "full civilian nuclear
> cooperation"
> actually denies cooperation or access in any form whatsoever to fuel
> enrichment, reprocessing and heavy water production technologies. The
> statement of intent in the agreement that a suitable amendment to enable
> this access may be considered in the future has little or no operative
> value. *
>
> *·        Further, this denial (made explicit in Art 5.2 of the agreement)
> also extends to transfers of dual-use items that could be used in
> enrichment, reprocessing or heavy water production facilities, again a
> stipulation of the Hyde Act. Under these terms, a wide range of sanctions
> on
> a host of technologies would continue, falling well short of "full
> civilian
> nuclear co-operation". *
>
> *·        It is also important to recognise that the fast breeder reactors
> under this agreement would be treated as a part of the fuel cycle and any
> technology required for this would also come under the dual use technology
> sanctions. This would be true even if future fast breeder reactors were
> put
> in the civilian sector and under safeguards. Thus, India's attempt to
> build
> a three-phase, self-reliant nuclear power program powered ultimately by
> thorium would have to be developed under conditions of isolation and
> existing technology sanctions.  *
>
> *·        Another key assurance that had been given by the Prime Minister
> was that India would accept safeguards in perpetuity only in exchange for
> the guarantee of uninterrupted fuel supply. While the acceptance on
> India's
> part of safeguards in perpetuity has been spelt out, the linkage of such
> safeguards with fuel supply in perpetuity remains unclear.  *
>
> *The assurance that the United States would enable India to build a
> strategic fuel reserve to guard against disruption of supplies for a
> duration covering the lifetime of the nuclear reactors in operation
> appears
> to have been accepted in the agreement. However, whether the fuel supply
> will continue even after cessation or termination of the agreement depends
> solely on the US Congress. The Hyde Act explicitly states that the US will
> work with other Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) countries to stop all fuel
> and
> other supplies to India if the agreement is terminated under US laws.
> Since
> this agreement explicitly incorporates domestic laws, it appears that fuel
> supply from the US will not only cease in case the US decides to terminate
> the Agreement but they are also required under the Hyde Act to work with
> NSG
> to bar all future supplies. The clause 5.6 on disruption of supplies
> therefore seems to be limited to "market failures" and not to cover a
> disruption that takes place under the clauses of the Hyde Act. In such an
> eventuality, the US will have to pay compensation to India but all future
> fuel supplies would stop. Therefore, the 123 agreement represents the
> acceptance of IAEA safeguards in perpetuity for uncertain fuel supplies
> and
> continuing nuclear isolation with respect to a substantial amount of
> technological know-how. *
>
> * **The Hyde Act and Supremacy of National Law *
>
> *The government has asserted that the Hyde Act is not binding on
> India.  The
> relevant issue is that it is binding on the United States and this has
> been
> repeatedly stressed by US spokespersons. *
>
> *Article 2 (1) of the 123 Agreement states, "The parties shall cooperate
> in
> the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in accordance with the
> provisions of this agreement. Each party shall implement this agreement in
> accordance with its respective applicable treaties, national
> laws,regulations, and license requirements concerning the use of
> nuclear energy
> for peaceful purposes".   *
>
> *If the argument is that the reference to national laws is simply the case
> of binding towards the law, that will have a bearing on the conduct of
> different transactions under the 123 agreement, then what do we make of
> the
> reference to national laws in other places in the 123 agreement?  *
>
> *Thus, for instance, Article 5 (6) (a) in part states  that "As part of
> its
> implementation of the July 18, 2005, joint statement the United States is
> committed to seeking agreement from the US Congress to amend its domestic
> laws…to create the necessary conditions for India to obtain full access to
> the international fuel market…..".  Article 5(6) (b) (i) states that "The
> United States is willing to incorporate assurances regarding fuel supply
> in
> the bilateral US-India agreement on peaceful uses of nuclear energy under
> Section 123 of the US Atomic Energy Act,  which would be submitted to the
> US
> Congress".  These clauses show that the need for conformity with "national
> laws" is not superfluous. If there is no direct reference to the Hyde Act
> in
> the 123 agreement, it is simply because and this is worth reiterating that
> the Hyde Act is the `Act to exempt from certain requirements of the Atomic
> Energy Act of 1954 a proposed nuclear agreement for cooperation with
> India.
> *
> *Nuclear Power and Energy Security *
>
> *It is said that the Indo-US nuclear deal is central to our future
> electricity and energy requirements.  At present, nuclear power generation
> capacity in India stands at  4,120 MW which is a little less than 3 per
> cent
> of our installed capacity of all power plants.  One reason has been the
> nuclear isolation imposed on us resulted in the slow development of our
> civilian nuclear energy programme. However our scientists overcoming many
> hurdles did very well in indigenising the Pressurised Water Reactors, and
> then developing it further to 540 MW. The next stage is the fast breeder
> reactors, in which the Indian scientists are leading the world. The
> planned
> three stage nuclear programme would depend largely on technologies based
> on
> fast breeder reactors, and in the future, thorium as fuel. This programme
> requires far less uranium and lower dependence. Instead, the imported
> reactor route would focus much more on Light Water Reactors, which require
> much more uranium and are more expensive. Thus even the technology being
> offered will not necessarily be the best choice for India.  Significantly,
> the mainstay of our nuclear power program – the fast breeder reactors –
> will
> still be under technology sanctions, as they would be considered a part of
> the fuel cycle. *
>
> *The other reason is the techno-economics of nuclear power and its
> relatively high cost.  Nuclear power plants are about 50% per cent more
> expensive, even when using domestic technology and equipment.  If imported
> reactors for nuclear power are considered, the situation becomes worse: it
> will cost about three times as much to set up nuclear plants with imported
> reactors than coal based ones. It will also cost twice as much per unit –
> Rs. 5.10-5.50 as against Rs. 2.50 from coal fired plants. *
>
> *According to the Planning Commission's study, the most optimistic
> scenario
> of nuclear power is 15,000 MW by 2015 and 29,000 MW by 2021.  These
> targets
> includes 8,000 MW of imported reactors.   Even then, nuclear energy will
> only add up to about 7 per cent of our total installed capacity.  *
>
> *Going ahead with such an ambitious power programme dependant on imports
> will come at a high cost and will dry up investments in other sectors.
> Interestingly enough, nuclear power is not the energy of choice for most
> advanced countries. The US itself has commissioned its last reactor in
> 1996!
> Members of Parliament may recall the fiasco of Enron and its Dabhol power
> plants.  *
> *Implications for Foreign Policy and Strategic Autonomy *
>
> *The United States does not see the nuclear cooperation agreement as a
> stand-alone. It is part of American design to try in India a wide ranging
> strategic alliance which will adversely affect the pursuit of an
> independent
> foreign policy and our strategic autonomy.  The facts speak for
> themselves.
> *
>
> *·        Two weeks prior to the joint statement which announced the
> Indo-US
> nuclear cooperation agreement, India signed a ten-year Defence Framework
> Agreement with the United States in June 2005.  This is being cited by the
> Bush administration as India's commitment to cooperate with the United
> States furthering its strategic interests in Asia.  *
>
> *·        Two months after the nuclear cooperation agreement was announced
> in September 2005, India voted against Iran in the  International Atomic
> Energy Agency, contrary to its stance earlier that Iran, as an NPT
> signatory, has every right to develop its nuclear technology for civilian
> purposes.  *
>
> *·        This was followed by a second vote against Iran in February on
> the
> eve of President Bush's visit to India. *
>
> *·        Nicholas Burns, US Under Secretary of State, in his "On record
> briefing" after the finalisation of the 123 agreement said on July 27:
> "And
> I think now that we have consummated the civil nuclear trade between us,
> if
> we look down the road in the future, we're going to see far greater
> defence
> cooperation between the United State and India: training; exercises; we
> hope, defence sales of American military technology to the Indian armed
> forces."  The United States is exercising tremendous pressure on India to
> buy a whole range of weaponry including the 126 fighter planes, radar,
> helicopters,
> artillery etc. worth multi-billion dollars.  *
>
> *Is the nuclear cooperation agreement going to bind India with the United
> States in a relationship which goes contrary to our cherished goals of
> national sovereignty and independent foreign policy and an economic
> development based on the priorities of our people?  *
>
> *The objections and the apprehensions raised by the Left parties and other
> parties, organisations and concerned scientists and citizens need to be
> examined before proceeding further.  All we are asking the government to
> do
> is not to rush through with the next steps which are necessary to
> operationalise the deal.  *
>
> *We hope that you, as a Member of Parliament, which is the sovereign
> representative institution of the Indian people, will seriously consider
> these issues on this vital matter affecting our country's future.  *
>
> *CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDIA (MARXIST) *
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