[Reader-list] Beyond highway of peace

[inder salim]

For those who want to read and know more  ON KASHMIR BY A.G. NOORANI

PLEASE CLICK

http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl2515/stories/20080801251508400.htm


BOOKS

Why Kashmir erupts

A.G. NOORANI

Two books that illuminate Kashmir's past and offer insights into how
the problem can be resolved.

Even today, perhaps the best of us do not quite realise the depths of
Kashmir's alienation and are unready to ponder ways and means of
overcoming it.

- Professor Hiren Mukherji, February 25, 1994.

NOT long ago, people went on the rampage in Kathmandu over a Hrithik
Roshan film. Since June 10, Seoul has been rocked by protests over
beef imports from the United States. In truth, Nepalese ire was
directed at India, while fears of the mad cow disease were overladen
with resentment at South Korea's surrender to the U.S.' diktat on the
imports.

In their intensity of feeling and sheer range, the recent protests in
Kashmir have been compared with those in 1963 over the Prophet's
relic, found missing at Hazratbal, and the outbreak of militancy in
1990. But these are far worse. Unlike in the past, they have assumed a
communal colour, and the one person who imparted those revolting hues
was the State's Governor, S.K. Sinha. He was long at the game. His
patrons in the bureaucracy and sections of the Congress in New Delhi
had prevented his recall much earlier. Just 39.88 hectares of forest
land cannot inflame a populace. Insult alone can, especially if the
people are subjected to indignities daily and suffer from a deep pain
frozen over the decades with bitter memories of rigged elections and
denial of civil liberties. As The Hindu remarked (June 25), "The
Governor and his Principal Secretary let loose a barrage of
inflammatory polemics." Chief Minister Ghulam Nabi Azad had a whole
week's warning, time enough to nip the trouble in the bud. He
arrogantly refused.

The Governor is the Chairman of the Shri Amarnathji Shrine Board
(SASB). His Principal Secretary, Arun Kumar, is also its Chief
Executive Officer. Ever since he became Governor in June 2003, S.K.
Sinha locked horns with the government on the extension of the
Amarnath Yatra from a month to two and on other issues. Matters had
reached the court. In March 2005, Sonali Kumar, Forest Secretary and
wife of Arun Kumar, issued orders for the transfer of forest land
around the cave to the custody of the SASB. This was on a request from
Arun Kumar. He went to court when the government nullified the order.

Eventually, on June 2, 2008, the government passed the fateful order
diverting the lands at Baltal to the SASB on specified conditions.

In this charged atmosphere, Arun Kumar held a press conference on June
17, at which he made brazenly communal remarks and cocked a snook at
the legislature – it had no authority over the Board, though it was
set up by an Act of 2000. Politicians were playing "communal politics"
and "these were the people when the Shrine Board was approved and land
was transferred to the Board by the government" (Greater Kashmir; June
19; emphasis added, throughout). The local people created more
pollution than yatris. "Nobody interferes" in the affairs of the Waqf
Board headed by the Chief Minister. He mentioned the Haj pilgrimage,
the Dal Lake, and so on, and declared angrily: "Muslim pollution is
acceptable to you but not the Hindu pollution." Who were the "you" he
was addressing?

On June 28, he was simply transferred to the General Administration
Department and not suspended, though a committee found him prima facie
in breach of the All India Services (Conduct) Rules. As Isaac said,
"The voice is Jacob's voice, but the hands are the hands of Esau"
(Genesis; 27.22).

That he spoke for Governor S.K. Sinha became clear when the Raj Bhavan
issued a statement the very next day, backing him fully: "Statements
issued by us are twisted." On a crucial point, it gave the game away.
It admitted that "when he was asked about the duration for which the
land at Baltal had been diverted to [the] SASB he specified that no
time limit had been given in the Government Order". Why did this
trained official not say that the order was for two months, the
duration of the yatra? For an obvious reason. "Since the Forest
Department cannot sell the land to us, the government has permanently
diverted the 800 kanals land at Baltal to SASB. We have to pay Rs.2.5
crore to the Forest Department once the demarcation of the land
completes. We do not have to give it back to the Forest Department
after the yatra ends," Arun Kumar told Rising Kashmir on the sidelines
of the press conference on the Raj Bhavan lawns. On that very day,
June 17, a spokesman for Syed Ali Shah Geelani, chairman of the All
Parties Hurriyat Conference, said: "Geelani Saheb announced an
agitation on June 23 in a meeting."

In which other State could an official have dared to speak as Arun
Kumar did? On June 20, on the campus of Kashmir University, hundreds
of students staged massive protests "raising pro-freedom and
pro-Pakistan slogans" (Rising Kashmir; June 21). Fortunately, S.K.
Sinha was succeeded by a civil servant with a reputation for integrity
and moderation. Governor N.N. Vohra defused the crisis skilfully on
June 29 by asking the government to take over the yatra arrangements.

Meanwhile, precious time had been wasted because Ghulam Nabi Azad did
nothing. The three decades of his political career, begun as a protege
of Sanjay Gandhi, were spent outside the State. He fought his first
election to the Assembly only after he became Chief Minister in 2005.
His sights were always set on returning to New Delhi. For the first
time, Kashmir had a Chief Minister who had no presence in Kashmir's
politics and no empathy for its aspiration. Asked in November 2001 why
he was not in Kashmir, he replied, "I want to be in the mainstream."

"Malignant" conduct

Kashmir Times, founded by the veteran socialist Ved Bhasin, remarked
(June 28) that S.K. Sinha's conduct was "malignant for both the
interests of the State as well as the Union… a timely check by the
Chief Minister on the predatory ambition of an arrogant Governor"
would have averted the crisis. It was the deadly combination of a
malignant Governor and an inept Chief Minister that was responsible
for the upheaval. S.K. Sinha came out in his true colours by
denouncing Azad's predecessor Mufti Mohammad Sayeed as "anti-national"
a week after he quit as Governor (The Times of India; July 4). Only in
Kashmir was this possible. The Mufti has served in the Cabinet of
three Prime Ministers. Indira Gandhi superseded S.K. Sinha in the
appointment of the Chief of the Army Staff; in retrospect, wisely.

Nothing has changed since Hiren Mukherji's memorable lament in 1994 –
neither the lack of understanding of the alienation nor the lack of
any effort "to ponder ways and means of overcoming it". The truth is a
great liberating force and the truth is that there is no "alienation"
at all, for alienation implies earlier affection and most Kashmiris
were, and still are, against the State's accession to India. Hence
Indira Gandhi's candid letter to Jawaharlal Nehru from Srinagar on May
14, 1948: "They say only Sheikh Saheb [Sheikh Abdullah] is confident
of winning the plebiscite."

PTI

ALL PARTIES HURRIYAT Conference chairman Syed Ali Shah Geelani at a
rally against the killing of five local residents during protests
against the transfer of forest land to the Amarnath Shrine Board, in
Srinagar on June 30.

Evidently, he soon developed second thoughts though Pakistan's tribal
raid had initially secured his support for the accession. A file in
the British library reveals that very clearly (L/P&S/13/1341). It
contains a telegram from the British High Commissioner in India to
London (February 21, 1948) conveying details of the talks Patrick
Gordon-Walker, Under Secretary of State in the Commonwealth Relations
Office, had had with Nehru the day before. Nehru invited Sheikh
Abdullah to join them and left. "Just before Nehru left, Sheikh
Abdullah said he thought the solution was that Kashmir should accede
to both Dominions. He said Kashmir's trade was with India, that India
was progressive and that Nehru was an Indian. On the other hand,
Kashmir's trade passed through Pakistan and a hostile Pakistan would
be a constant danger. The solution, therefore, was that Kashmir should
have its autonomy jointly guaranteed by India and Pakistan and it
would delegate its foreign policy and defence to them both jointly but
would look after its own internal affairs…. I asked whether Nehru
would agree to this solution and he said he thought so. He had
discussed it with him." Nehru himself told Gordon-Walker later that
"he would be prepared to accept a solution broadly on the lines of
that proposed by Sheikh Abdullah" (paragraphs 7 and 10).

In September 1950, U.S. Ambassador Loy Henderson "had two secret
discussions" with Sheikh Abdullah in Srinagar at his request. He "was
vigorous in restating that in his opinion it [Kashmir] should be
independent".

Harsh truths

That is impossible, so is Kashmir's secession from India. Both truths
are part of the same grim reality – the people never wanted accession
to India and reject it to this day. Only last year, Sumeet Kaul, a
Kashmiri Pandit, reported: "I had read somewhere that your
preconceived notions of nationalism, of Indian nationalism, are
severely tested in the Valley. They were. And that, perhaps, was more
difficult to come to terms with than even the guns. Wherever we went,
we were almost invariably referred to as the 'guests from India', not
with malice, but casually, incidentally". (Hindustan Times; September
4, 2007).

The other harsh truth is for Kashmiris to grasp. A Pakistan which
tried to grab Kashmir by recourse to war in 1965 has no right to
secure it by plebiscite. Long before Pervez Musharraf, indeed since
1958, when Firoz Khan Noon was its Prime Minister, Pakistan had given
up plebiscite. Musharraf has been more honest, daring and creative.
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and he have arrived at a solid consensus
on the broad outlines of a settlement that reckons with both the
truths. It awaits Kashmiri inputs before it is given final shape as an
accord (see the writer's article "A step closer to consensus",
Frontline, December 15, 2006).

That accord will work only if public opinion is educated. The
documents in Sardar Patel's Correspondence (Volume 1) alone suffice to
bring home those harsh truths. We find both Nehru and Sheikh Abdullah
pleading with the Maharaja, on December 1, 1947, and August 5, 1948,
respectively, that Muslims in the Valley needed to be won over (pages
103 and 215). "If the average Muslim feels that he has no safe or
secure place in the Union, then obviously he will look elsewhere,"
Nehru wrote, referring politely to events in Jammu. The Maharaja,
however, enjoyed full support from Vallabhbhai Patel. Nehru wrote to
Patel pointing out bluntly how the arms meant for the government were
"distributed to [the] RSS [Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh". Sheikh Saheb
also wrote to Patel on October 7, 1948, describing how the Maharaja
had presided over "the killing of Muslims all over the province" of
Jammu.

The great historian E.H. Carr aptly said that "the function of the
historian is neither to love the past nor to emancipate himself from
the past, but to master and understand it as the key to the
understanding of the present". We need to reconcile the two truths –
the people's rejection of accession and the impossibility of accepting
this demand. Nationalists deny the first truth; idealists, the second.
They are, however, reconcilable and only such a reconciliation will
make an accord possible and viable.

Unique insights

These books help us enormously to understand the not-so-distant as
well as the recent past and to reflect on how best to resolve the
problem. Wajahat Habibullah, IAS, served in the State from 1969 to
1982, when he moved to the Centre. In 1990 he returned as Special
Commissioner, Anantnag. In 2000 he was head of the Lake and Waterways
Development Authority. As the son of the famous Major General E.
Habibullah, who set up the National Defence Academy in Khadakvasla, he
acquired an understanding of the Army's ethos. No civil servant
enjoyed so universal a respect as he did among all sections of the
people. He has won high credibility as the Chief Information
Commissioner. His reportage and insights are unique. He exposes many a
myth and lie.

Integrity is also the hallmark of Andrew Whitehead's work. He was the
BBC's correspondent in India. He pursued people in the know, far and
wide, and consulted the archives extensively. "A necessary step to
resolving any crisis, however, is gaining an understanding of how it
started. Not to indulge in recriminations, but to appreciate the
sequence of actions, and the jumble of claims and grievances, that
tangle and snag moves towards compromise. If ever there could be an
agreed narrative of Kashmir's modern history, other forms of accord
should not be far away.

"The main purpose of this study has been to illuminate the origins of
the Kashmir crisis by retrieving the personal stories of those who
lived through the events of October and November 1947. The facts and
perspectives unravelled through this research challenge the official
narratives of both India and Pakistan about the genesis of the Kashmir
conflict. In particular, they question Pakistan's often-stated denial
of instigating or organising the Lashkar's invasion of the Kashmir
Valley, and they cast doubt on the Indian account of Kashmir's
accession."

Pakistan's devotees in Kashmir should read his definitive account of
the ruin its tribesmen wrought in Baramula. Indians should read his
account of Kashmir's accession to India, on which a lot yet remains to
be told. He has unearthed an important letter by the Maharaja written
three days before he signed the Instrument of Accession on October 26.
"The unevenly typed letter, on headed paper is dated 23 October 1947:
'I hereby my Deputy Prime Minister, R.B. Ram Lal Batra to sign the
document of accession of the State with the Indian Union on my behalf,
subject to the condition that the terms of accession will be the same
as would be settled with H.E.H. the Nizam of Hyderabad.' The letter is
signed by Hari Singh in his own hand and underneath is typed MAHARAJA
OF JAMMU & KASHMIR."

Whitehead holds that "the most obvious lasting answer to the Kashmir
dispute is to heed the voice of the people of Kashmir, and to allow
them to decide their own destiny. The national interests of India and
Pakistan – and particularly of India, the nation in power in the
Kashmir Valley – will determine whether, when and how this is done."
And, realistically, how far it can be done. Given goodwill, that is
possible.

Habibullah also relates the past to the present and makes useful
suggestions on approaches to an accord. But the greatest value of his
work is the shocks it administers to the very many in India who revel
in a state of denial. The attitudes of the bureaucracy, the Army, and
their mentors in Delhi and the deep injuries inflicted on the people
of Kashmir are laid bare in a matter-of-fact manner.

There was Brigadier General Randhawa, Deputy Inspector General of the
Border Security Force, who declared to the people of a town in his
presence that "there were traitors among the people and that to
protect citizens, the BSF would start patrolling nearby villages. At
any time of day or night, the BSF might enter people's homes and shoot
anyone they suspected of intending mischief. He emphasised that this
was not his voice but God's speaking through him, because he was
protecting the right and combating the wrong.

"I was chilled. I stepped forward to reason with him. I pleaded that
his soldiers not bear arms, even though under the law I was within my
rights to order that they not do so – or even that they not patrol
without the orders of the civilian authority. But the Brigadier would
brook no argument." That was in 1970. Plus ca change, plus c'est la
meme chose (The more things change, the more they remain the same).

Truth about an encounter

In April 1993, Dr. Abdul Ahad Guru was kidnapped and murdered by a
Hizbul Mujahideen militant, Zulqarnain. Guru commanded wide respect as
a reasonable face of separation. He was therefore an inconvenience.
"The police made an arrangement with the terrorist Zulqarnain, then in
custody, who agreed to kill Guru in exchange for his release. But to
ensure that this collusion remained secret, Zulqarnain was killed
shortly thereafter, and the Director General of Police, B.S. Bedi,
trumpeted his death as a triumph for the security forces, who had
killed a dangerous terrorist in an armed encounter. But the truth was
somewhat different. Instead of killing Zulqarnain in an armed
encounter, the police stormed the home where, under the mistaken
presumption that he was safe after having fulfilled his end of the
bargain, he was consorting with a lady friend."

Even in 2002, "Citizens, few if any of whom belonged to the security
forces, felt as if they were living in an occupied territory, living
with doubts, suspicions, and [the] fear of settlement of scores
between organisations and individuals using 'security interest' as an
excuse."

Exposing a whitewash

Habibullah renders a service by exposing the whitewash that was B.G.
Verghese's report on the rapes in Kunan Poshpura on February 23-24,
1991. "I had found the complaint exaggerated, although not necessarily
unfounded, and called for further inquiry. I mentioned in my report
that the village headman, or lumbardar, had given a certificate of
good behaviour to the troops departing from Kunan Poshpura, though the
lumbardar told me that he had not known of the alleged crimes against
the women. My report concluded: 'While the veracity of the complaint
is highly doubtful, it still needs to be determined why such complaint
was made at all. The people of the village are simple folk and by the
Army's own admission have been generally helpful and even careful of
security of the Army's officers… Unlike Brig. Sharma I found many of
the village women genuinely angry … It is recommended that the level
of investigation be upgraded to that of a gazetted police officer.'

"Because of the widespread media attention that resulted from the
report and protests by Justice Bahauddin (a Kashmiri and former Judge
of the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir), the report was investigated
in July 1991 by the Press Council of India, led by the eminent
journalist B.G. Verghese. The Verghese Committee, appointed in an
effort at damage control rather than because of any sincere interest
in reaching the truth, concluded that the complaint was 'invented'.
This ended any further pursuit of the investigation and led to an
abiding resentment among villagers in the area, particularly women.
The lack of an effective way to redress their grievances had continued
to blight the lives of the women of Kunan Poshpura." The shameful
exercise was conducted ostensibly as a Press Council inquiry. I write
ostensibly advisedly (see the writer's article "Exceeding the brief:
The tragedy of the Verghese report"; Frontline; October 12, 1991).

In our society victims of rape are stigmatised. The tragic aftermath
was reported in Greater Kashmir and Hindustan Times of February 23,
2007, and Rising Kashmir of March 13, 2008. Village elders had to
arrange the marriages of the victims, but only for some.

If the people are resentful and continue to be treated as they have
been, elections have to be rigged, lest they return an Assembly that
demands secession. The legal efficacy of such an Assembly might be
nil. Its moral force would be deadly. The Chief Election Commissioner,
J.M. Lyngdoh, "admitted to me…. [that] the Commission has remained
constrained regarding Jammu and Kashmir by the need to avoid
compromising national security" – an exquisite phrase. After 1953,
"all potential successor candidates were subjected to the Indian
government's fine-tooth comb of security concerning adherence to
India's national security interests. Individual competence, integrity
and even the measure of public support commanded were secondary
considerations."

Habibullah describes how crowds are arranged on Independence and
Republic Days. Pliable officers or those with "skills" were selected
to manage elections. If all else failed, "the ballot boxes could be
stuffed with ballots". It passed muster because Kashmir has a "special
status". "For years, India has tolerated the undemocratic governance
of the State by a favoured elite that skilfully played on fears that
full democracy in the State would lead the people to gravitate towards
Pakistan. This tragically unfounded suspicion lies at the root of what
went so wrong in the 1980s." No, since 1947. The polls held by Sheikh
Abdullah in 1951 were also rigged.

A request to the Sheikh

The writer would break a rule and mention a personal experience. It
was in April 1970, at the end of a seminar at the India International
Centre in New Delhi on National Integration, organised by its
Director, Romesh Thapar. An official attached to the Home Ministry
came over to see me at his request and asked me to advise Sheikh
Saheb, whom I was to meet an hour later at 3 Kotla Lane, to accept the
Indian Constitution. Else, he would be prevented from contesting
elections to the Lok Sabha and the State Assembly.

By rejecting the nomination papers, as in 1967? I asked. The answer
was chilling in its clarity. That was a technique of the 1960s. Now,
the Plebiscite Front's workers would be put in prison in such large
numbers as to incapacitate the party. Sheikh Saheb would not be
arrested. His colleague Mirza Mohammed Afzal Beg might be; or perhaps
not. Why was it necessary since we had the Army there and the
Governor? I asked. The answer was crisp. If the Assembly led by the
Sheikh were to pronounce on independence, where would India's case
rest, morally?

The message was instantly conveyed. Sheikh Saheb agreed to issue an
appropriately worded statement, to be drafted by me. Its aim was to
keep each side's stand open for resolution politically after the
polls. Plebiscite was dead in 1970, but acceptance of the Constitution
could not affect his stand because Article 370 permitted secession. It
was a political matter to be resolved politically. "Do not hurry," he
counselled, since I was due to visit him in Srinagar shortly. "It must
be a chiselled document."

That document was shown to Beg Saheb when we met on the lawns of the
Oberoi Palace Hotel in Srinagar on May 8, 1970. He shot it down saying
sternly, "You will ruin us." He was right. Lawyers tend to miss
political realities. The mere announcement of acceptance of the
Constitution then would have finished the Plebiscite Front.

In June 1970, the Unlawful Activities Act, 1967, was extended to the
State. A few months later, the scheme, as unfolded by the official,
was implemented to perfection. Both leaders were interned at 3 Kotla
Lane on January 9, 1971. The Front was banned. The law was amended to
bar members of banned bodies. There were massive arrests in the
Valley.

Will New Delhi take any risk now while it advises the separatists to
contest the polls? Habibullah writes: "To be seen as entirely 'free
and fair', elections cannot be conducted in a charged atmosphere with
heavy security deployment. Such deployment and its consequences have
given Kashmiris the feeling that if they vote, they are not exercising
choice. This point weighed heavily with dissidents who refused to
participate in the 2002 elections. During discussions with political
representatives in Srinagar, Lyngdoh found an overwhelming fear of
organisations such as the police task force and the Special Operations
Group, which had already begun bullying, intimidating and harassing
potential voters. Transparency was not forthcoming."

New Delhi refuses to allow foreign monitoring of elections though
Indians have served as election observers in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and
elsewhere.

Habibullah realistically remarks: "Until each citizen can live free
from fear, democracy can only be notional, no matter how elections are
conducted or who participates." Does such a situation exist now, in
2008? He is not without hope.

"I believe, based on my experience working in the State and with its
people, that a remedy for the Kashmir situation need not be elusive,
provided that all the stakeholders are sincere in their endeavour to
restore peace and that respect for the dignity of the Kashmiri people
is at the core of any resolution. Ignoring the self-respect of
Kashmiris – believing that they as a people could be bought – brought
on and fuelled the cycle of ruin."

For aught we know, truly free elections will be possible only as part
of a Kashmir accord – whether to facilitate or ratify it. Perhaps only
then will the tragedy end. Eighty years ago the historian Vincent H.
Smith wrote: "Few regions in the world can have had worse luck than
Kashmir in the name of government."•

________________________________
On Fri, Aug 22, 2008 at 4:45 PM, Shivam Vij शिवम् विज्
<mail at shivamvij.com> wrote:
>
> Beyond highway of peace
>
> Muzamil Jaleel
> Posted online: Monday, August 18, 2008 at 1012 hrs Print Email
> http://www.indianexpress.com/story/349899._.html
>
> The Amarnath land transfer controversy and the subsequent "economic
> blockade" seem to the apparent reason for the unrest. But the actual
> reasons are deeper and psychological and lie in the failure to resolve
> the Kashmir problem
>
> Srinagar, August 17: Muteeb Raja is eight. His voice cracked as he
> shouted. "Hum kya chahte hain?" (what do we want?). A crowd of adults
> around him responded: Azadi (independence). Ishtiyaq Rasool is six.
> His mother told him that he was far too young to go and protest. "I
> insisted. The protestors will be thirsty, we can offer them water," he
> said. His mother joined the slogan-shouting women, hiding her face
> with her blue scarf.
>
> The march on Srinagar-Muzaffarabad road flowed like a river of people
> covering the highway from Chanakhan in Sopore to Khanpora ahead of
> Baramulla. A generation of young men, who were toddlers in the 1990s
> when Kashmir exploded with massive public demonstrations, was leading
> the procession.
>
> The security forces had withdrawn after failing to halt this march at
> 10 different places. They had tried everything. They had fired
> hundreds of smoke shells. They had baton charged to disperse the mob.
> They had opened fire, killing one and injuring two dozen at Sangrama
> Chowk, a few miles away from Sopore.
>
> Furious, the people had pelted stones at the police and security force
> contingent. The security personnel retreated, abandoning their two
> vehicles, which were immediately set afire by angry protestors.
>
> This was the scene on August 11. All of Kashmir has erupted since
> then; 24 people have died in police firing. This phenomenon is
> extremely unusual for a place where two months ago, the only buzz was
> election rallies, a pleasant spring and thousands of tourists.
>
> Kashmir had returned to its glory as a favourite destination of the
> holidaymaker. The militant attacks were rare and whenever there were
> reports of encounters, the security forces launched a pre-emptive
> offensive to kill them. Pakistan's President Musharraf had withdrawn
> from his traditional Kashmir agenda, condemned militant attacks and
> even dropped demand for plebiscite in Kashmir. His democratic
> successors had publicly altered Pakistan's Kashmir-centric foreign
> policy; emphasised on friendly relations with New Delhi to boost
> bilateral trade.
>
> At ground zero in Kashmir, the chairman of Hurriyat's moderate
> faction, Mirwaiz Umar Farooq was planning to leave for the US on a
> fellowship, hoping to study conflict management in Belfin Centre at
> Harvard. Hurriyat hawk Syed Ali Shah Geelani was ill and disillusioned
> by Pakistan's "divorce" from Kashmir. Several separatist leaders were
> complaining that Kashmiris are fatigued and New Delhi had declared the
> "end game" in Kashmir.
>
> After successfully fighting militancy for 18 years, the Centre was
> looking at the "free and fair" 2008 Assembly polls as the last dose of
> its policy prescription to fully recover Kashmir.
>
> The people's march on Srinagar-Muzaffarabad road changed all that.
> Hundreds of trucks with young men sitting on their bonnets were slowly
> moving ahead. At the first Army camp ahead of Baramulla, the troops
> had abandoned their roadside pickets to avoid confrontation. "We will
> not stop. We have to cross the LoC. We have to re-unite Kashmir," said
> Abdul Rasheed War (26), a teacher in a private school. "Kashmir has
> woken up. The movement is alive again," he added.
>
> Why is anger spilling on Kashmir's streets? The Amarnath land transfer
> controversy and the subsequent "economic blockade" is the apparent
> reason. But the real answer lies in the people's march on the
> Srinagar-Muzaffarabad road.
>
> Ironically, this road was re-christened as the "highway of peace"
> between India and Pakistan on April 7, 2005, when for the first time a
> bus service connected the divided Kashmir. The slogans and flags in
> the march told another story. There was hardly any mention of the
> Amarnath land row or the blockade. The protests had transcended the
> issue of the Amarnath land transfer; it's only about separatism now.
>
> Professor Noor Ahmad Baba, who teaches political science at Kashmir
> University, articulated the reason behind this anger in Kashmir. He
> said the peace process had been slow and had failed to address any of
> the concerns of the Kashmiris. "There have been only superficial
> changes in the situation here. Kashmir was a problem yesterday and is
> a problem today," he said. Reacting to the question on why the
> Amarnath land row and the subsequent "economic blockade" became a
> tipping point, he added, "historically Kashmir had been at the centre
> of cultural and economic interaction. It was a meeting point for South
> Asia, China, Tibet and Central Asia. But since 1947 it has been pushed
> to the periphery."
>
> The way the Centre has been consistently avoiding facing the real
> problem in Kashmir and even refusing to react to any serious proposals
> from the mainstream and separatist political parties in Kashmir
> explains this added mistrust here. Prof Sheikh Showkat of Law
> Department in Kashmir University said New Delhi has contributed to the
> prevailing situation in more than one way. "They had a chance to
> resolve the problem during Musharraf's tenure. Once you lose the
> opportunity, you have to face the reality in a crude manner. They
> didn't even respond when Farooq Abdullah proposed autonomy that was
> passed by the Assembly. Peace in Kashmir was an illusion," he said.
>
> Concealed from vigilant eyes, Kashmir had been silently simmering and
> was just a trigger away from another explosion. And when the land
> transfer issue cropped up, it fit very well with the mistrust towards
> New Delhi. The subsequent blockade of the road connecting Kashmir with
> New Delhi — the only available road link for people and goods —
> created a mass feeling of choking. The issue was never limited to
> Kashmir's fruit growers losing their crop or the Valley facing
> shortage of food and fuel because of snipped supply lines, it was
> primarily psychological. The blockade reinforced a perception in
> Kashmir that New Delhi was not a reliable partner.
>
> National Conference president Omar Abdullah said the situation has
> gone out of control because the Centre did not pay heed to clear
> warning signs. "I had warned both PM Manmohan Singh and Congress
> president Sonia Gandhi that this movement to Muzafarabad will take a
> new dimension and go out of control if not handled urgently," he said,
> adding that the blockade highlighted "our weakness in the shape of
> dependence on a system to guarantee the safety of our economic and
> lifeline linkages with the rest of the country. It made people realise
> that the peace process has not delivered anything. Now what we see is
> the resurfacing of the old anger. Till now, we have blamed Pakistan
> for everything in Kashmir, this is the first time we have only
> ourselves to blame."
>
> Separatist Hurriyat leader Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, however, said the mass
> protests have not surprised him. "We always saw it coming," he said.
> "Amarnath land row might be the immediate cause, but the level of
> anger is the result of the long pent up disillusionment with New
> Delhi's status quo policies," he said.
>
> Mirwaiz alleged that the Centre talks of a dialogue only to exit a
> crisis situation. "New Delhi talks to us when the situation is really
> bad here. And when there is apparent peace, they ignore us," he said.
> "The Hurriyat joined the dialogue risking its own credibility. We lost
> people. But what was the result? As soon as New Delhi felt there was
> some peace in Valley, it abandoned the talks and left us in the
> lurch," he said, adding that the present crisis is the result of
> disillusionment. "A disillusionment born of the realisation that all
> talks on Kashmir were held for the sake of them, to buy time and to
> buy interlocutors, rather than work out a solution," he said.
>
> It is a fact that the Centre and its various agencies on ground in
> Kashmir had been extremely complacent after the recent drop in
> militant violence and a surge in mainstream political activity. The
> Government's understanding was simple: the problem in Kashmir is
> militancy and an iron fist response from the security agencies would
> bring the situation to normal. There was this skewed understanding
> that militancy and not the denial of political aspirations was the
> main problem. Then the establishment was emboldened by the drastic
> changes across the world after 9/11 when Pakistan was forced to change
> its tact and abandon Kashmir's militant movement. The line dividing
> terrorism and armed political movements had blurred to an extent where
> military solutions became increasingly acceptable to every violent
> movement. Thus in a way, the Government emphasised the symptom and not
> the disease and was happy to declare the lack of violence as permanent
> peace in Kashmir.
>
> Peoples Democratic Party's Mehbooba Mufti said the anger and
> alienation have increased manifold. "The situation is worse than 2002
> when we took over. There is a lack of understanding of the real issue
> and we have been trying to make the Centre realise this," she said.
>
> Separatist leader Sajjad Lone went a step further. "While I would say
> that New Delhi underestimated the potency of the sentiment in Kashmir,
> it also exhibited an arrogant triumph over the relative peace in
> recent past. But now the reality has blown up on everybody's face. And
> it has torn through the lies piled up over the years that whatever was
> happening in Kashmir was Pakistan-sponsored," he said. He added that
> there is only one lesson to be learned: "this place has a real problem
> and it needs a real solution".
>
> It is, however, for the first time that the Government does not have
> to deal with the resurgence of the separatist sentiment in Kashmir
> alone. The Hindu majority districts in Jammu are up in arms too,
> seeking the cancellation of the revocation of the Amarnath land
> transfer order. This has complicated the situation because this time
> any confidence-building measure aimed at calming Kashmir will have an
> adverse impact on the situation in Jammu.
> _________________________________________
> reader-list: an open discussion list on media and the city.
> Critiques & Collaborations
> To subscribe: send an email to reader-list-request at sarai.net with subscribe in the subject header.
> To unsubscribe: https://mail.sarai.net/mailman/listinfo/reader-list
> List archive: &lt;https://mail.sarai.net/pipermail/reader-list/>


--

http://indersalim.livejournal.com