[Reader-list] India: Let Kashmir go

[Wali Arifi]

http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/1229/p09s02-coop.html

India: Let Kashmir go Resolving the disputed territory would benefit all. *By
Bennett Ramberg*

from the December 29, 2008 editio

Los Angeles - It now appears unlikely that India will respond to last
month's attacks on Mumbai (Bombay) – its "9/11" – with a military strike on
Pakistan, the terrorists' haven. With three major wars behind them, neither
rival wants a repeat.

Unfortunately, the possibility of war may intensify in years to come if
India ramps up its "Cold Start" military doctrine.

Cold Start transforms New Delhi's traditional focus on defense and lumbering
mobilization of hundreds of thousands of troops to one that prizes nimble
strikes against its neighbor within hours of crisis onset. The strategy
assumes that occupation of limited Pakistani territory would be the
bargaining chip to force Islamabad to heel. It also assumes that it could do
this without crossing the nuclear threshold – not an easy feat where
rivalries run deep.

India has war-gamed this strategy since 2004. Adoption still must overcome
equipment and personnel deficiencies and interservice rivalries, but work
continues.

Rather than intimidate Pakistan to constrain militants or suffer the
consequences, Cold Start may do just the opposite by inadvertently putting
militants in the driver's seat. Previously, terrorist provocations would be
met with action only after deliberation and delay. Under Cold Start,
response would be much more immediate, effectively empowering radicals to
hold the subcontinent hostage to their crisis-initiating whims.

To avoid that outcome, the time has come for India to short circuit the most
critical incendiary, the disputed area of Kashmir. Despite some recent
Islamic militant clamor to dominate the entire subcontinent, Kashmir remains
the eye of the Indo-Pakistani vortex.

Removing its centrality will help pull the rug from under terrorist groups
that have used the dispute to target both the region and the heart of India.
Failure will only heighten the probability that Cold Start might someday
precipitate a nuclear conflict.

Recent history shows that it's not a far-fetched specter. On Dec. 13, 2001,
five Pakistani gunmen dressed in commando fatigues and driving a diplomatic
car entered the VIP gate of India's Parliament's compound armed with AK-47
rifles, grenades, and other explosives. Their audacious objective:
decapitate the Indian government.

An alert guard foiled their plans, and the ensuing shoot-out left 13 people
dead, including the assassins.

India demanded that Pakistan ban the responsible terrorist groups and arrest
their leaders. To press Islamabad, it mobilized half a million men. But the
intended impact stumbled as India's Army took three weeks to get to the
border. This allowed Pakistan sufficient time to ratchet up defenses.

Tension then bounced down and up. They relaxed with President Musharraf's
Jan. 12, 2002, televised address to the nation declaring his intention to
crack down on the militants. But the May 2002 attack on an Indian base in
Jammu that killed the wives and children of Indian servicemen renewed the
drumbeat for war.

By July 2002, intense American diplomatic pressure, coupled with subtle
Pakistan nuclear threats, caused the belligerents to stand their armies
down, leaving a sour taste for many Indians: Pakistan remained unpunished.

For some defense planners, Cold Start offered the answer in future crisis.
Now Mumbai gives the strategy renewed stimulus. But resolution of Kashmir is
where momentum should be building.

In recent years, India has sought to relax tensions by promoting
confidence-building measures – a bus line and commercial truck service
between Srinagar and Muzzafarrabad, regular meetings between Indian and
Pakistani local commanders, a crisis hot line, dialogue with moderate
Kashmiri separatists, and improvement in the region's economic and human
rights. These steps have tempered conflict but not Kashmiri objection to
Indian rule.

New Delhi's reluctance to let Kashmiris define their future – options
include independence, division along communal lines, comanagement by both
India and Pakistan, a UN trusteeship – butts against recent history
demonstrating that "letting go" more than holding on benefits politically
divided states. Witness the pacific and beneficial demise of the Soviet
Union, Czechoslovakia, and Serbia/Montenegro.

India's future rests not on maturing Cold Start but becoming a 21st century
economic power house. Hanging on to Kashmir does nothing to promote that
goal. Letting go not only will benefit New Delhi's modernization by reducing
the heavy military burden bad relations with Pakistan engenders, it also
will allow Islamabad to redirect its military resources to the tribal areas
benefiting Washington's position in Afghanistan.

By rattling South Asian relations, Mumbai's tragedy can give momentum to
resolving one of the 20th century's most confounding impasses. A fast
diplomatic start, not Cold Start, would benefit all.

• *Bennett Ramberg served in the State Department during the George H.W.
Bush administration. He is the author of three books and editor of three
others on international politics*.