[Reader-list] Theoretical Correctness : From Habermas to Leslie Green

[inder salim]

Tnor can we gain knowledge of any feeling by introspection, the
feeling being completely veiled from introspection, for the very
reason that it is our immediate consciousness. Possibly this curious
truth was what Emerson was trying to grasp — but if so, pretty
unsuccessfully — when he wrote the lines,

The old Sphinx bit her thick lip —
Said, »Who taught thee me to name?
I am thy spirit, yoke-fellow,
Of thine eye I am eyebeam.
»Thou art the unanswered question;
Couldst see thy proper eye,
Always it asketh, asketh;
And each answer is a lie.«  )
Needless to say that Aranab is truly a Muse on the List, and Vivek has
all the reasons to agree with and celebrate.
Today is a Language day, and today, after  reading your piece 'on
feelings', i believe a lot of

people ( muses )  on the list would agree that to say a thing one
needs a little more than a good arrangement of words…. So influenced,
that I want to write a poem to talk further on that, but that too
happens, it may happen or not, who knows. And even if it happens, it
may be less than a simple prose piece. What to do ?
Given the nature of complexity, it is not surprising that 'muses'
always try to find it difficult to put full stop on their outbursts.
On the contrary, some one who is less than a muse, always finds it
easy to put the thought in words, crisply, usually to a lethal effect.
 But who is less than a Muse ?  None again. I see from my balcony,
domestic  sparrows and crows driving away colourful birds and
koels, which often irritates me, but I then educate my choices.
As one can see, I am theoretically correct, but politically incorrect.
Who is theoretically 'a

not-muse' None. But I have found the art of living with paradoxes and
so may be I am wrong,  but who really cares about the truth. Not only
Arnab but there is a river of text in the world that speaks about the
non-existence of truth, and yet that truth…. In fact it must be there
simply, but as we know, we don't have the necessary tools at our
disposal to convey it accurately. We are simply without the absolute.
But to say that even, Peirce rightly uses the expression , 'pretty
unsuccessfully' while quoting a gem like Emerson stanza.
If I the essay by Arnab has that quality of bringing theatre closer to
philosophy, as we see how Derrida while talking about deconstruction
as performativity, then  then it becomes a little easier than
otherwise.

First  I quote : Deconstruction is a theory that posits that
signifiers and signifieds are

continually breaking apart and reattaching in new combinations, indeed
there is no fixed distinction between  signifier and signified. The
deconstruction process is not only infinite but also somehow circular.
Signified keeps
transforming into sigfnifiers and vice versa, and you never arrive at
a final sign that is not a
signifier itself. Deconstruction is not simply a strategic reversal of
categories.
Deconstruction is an attempt to dismantle the logic by which a
particular system of thought is grounded as well as how a whole system
of political situation and social control maintains its force.
Deconstruction is a theme of the absent centre. The post-modern
experience is widely held to stem from a profound sense of ontological
uncertainty.

For Judith Butler performative is understood as a stylized repetition
of acts that like Derridian citation—" always a reiteration of a norm
or set of norms, which means that the act that one does , the act that
one performs it, in a sense, an act that has been going on before one
arrived on the scene.So in that sense, we are condemned to repeat to
say and act what has been going on before we arrived on the scene. We
can say ' theoritically incorrect' as well, because it was uttered
before as well, and only some performativity can mix its theory and
practice together, to unleash that unpridictable....Thus what was not
uttered too can get its wings to contribute to " The Architecture of
Deconstruction"

Here, I am writing all this, not because people don't know, but to
repeat, and repeat it like a
performance, to see it again, to realize it again. I shall do it
again, and that I guess is the job of a reasonable muse. I am trying
to be one.
In the above quoted passage from Derrida, there is a phrase '
ontological uncertainty'. I  hope Arnab can give us more on that  than
I can….. I remember, that how  surrealists once used a term ' critical
paranoia: a state of mind that brings madness closer to consciousness
without falling into its abyss.

So, I guess one has to keep on talking about all the interesting
things and also uninteresting things. We really don't know how to
decipher the ontology of our uncertainties. They were not
uncertainties in the first place if we know  them, and that is why I
am not even writing about that
.
For example, the debate on sexuality which Aranab initiated around a
post on Taslima. I once  read a line " Sexuality is not innate but a
product " and I thought that I know enough about the word sexuality
and its politics etc,  but from feminist readings I am too narrowly
positioned on the discourse on sexuality. Similarly about politics, I
looks it is dead, but it is not. May I am dead or may be not kind of
thing…

 The question is really about 'the present'  which encompasses all the
thought in one go, which somehow ejects out our beings from the
tightly held structures, not only of  languages, but other contrived
corridors of thinking.  We can move from written word to oral and come
back to photography. From there we can move to painting, and then do
some theatre. From there we can reflect a piece on the Sarai reader
list, and wash our socks. Then go to bazaar to buy some vegetables and
pay the telephone bill. The list is long, as long as life itself,  and
that is how it is….

Before, coming back to Taslima, I think of Teesta.  When I heard about
Teesta, I got a carpenter's call who had this Pakeeza ringtone in a
mobile. Inhee Logoon nay… sipayan say poocho,  jis nay bazarya mein
cheena dupta mera.  ( These are the people who snatched my head scarf…
Don't ask me, ask the policeman who snatched my headscarf in the
market ) song of a prostitute in the film.

Some one is there who provoked CJI, otherwise a lot of such stuff gets
published in the country. That is that, but the fact has come to the
fore, that the  law can not compromise on the dissent when it comes to
direct criticism of law itself. That is the message. Now if someone
questions about the delayed justice in India, or about the millions of
pending cases then what will be his excuse,
except that judiciary is structurally inadequate and only some quick
governmental remedy can save the judiciary from committing mistakes
unwittingly.

Some 17 or 18 years back I read in newspaper that how an under trail
threw his shit ( ) on the face of a judge because he was poor and was
languishing in jail for years.
His name was Rakesh. I had that paper cutting preserved somewhere, I
must find it. That was performance. What do you think?

With love and regards
indersalim





On Thu, Feb 21, 2008 at 2:39 PM, ARNAB CHATTERJEE
<apnawritings at yahoo.co.in> wrote:
>
>
> Dear Shuddha and others,
>                                     Your question in
> resonse to my Beyond : Taslima's mimesis and feminist
> Theory(what on earth is  'theoretically incorrect'?
>  Can theory be 'correct' or 'incorrect'?) is
> intriguing, interesting and enabling  enough so much
> so that I might just begin by a provocative counter
> question: if all theories are correct and  no theory
> is incorrect or false, then   the theory of error
> itself is   erroneous and so on and so forth. In fact
> you are not keen to recognize that the theory of truth
> itself might not be true. When we argue we are
> actually into debating this contrary correctness and
> determined by the "force of the better argument" often
> there could be just one true correct answer. This
> apart there are a few didactic ruses for me by which
> my usage, purposively, could be meant : I'll urge that
>  the current assumptions in sexual harassment
> discourse --  in which tactile sense data of touching
> and the question of sexual feeling is absolutely
> expelled or rooted out ( except the revolting feeling
> ( feeling still) of the respondent) to make a
> normative point, be contrasted with the theoretical
> discussion of feeling and here I give  a precise
> reference instead of just citing a high sounding
> phrase like  "phenomenology of feeling" in
> understanding sexual commitment in groping behaviour
> in public places. I will primarily refer to this text
> by CS Pierce  http://www.textlog.de/4298.html   and
> request the readers to inquire why the feminist
> discussion of sexual violence ( or sexual ethics)
> bypasses several theoretical-and philosophical
> objections—even schools in order to engage in what is
> known as 'feminist reductionisms." Avoidance of this
> deep, inward critique is more visible in newspaper
> articles : have a look at that and you'll understand
> what is gender, caste or class sensitive but
> theoretically   incorrect and incoherent  standpoint.
> A theoretically correct standpoint can take all
> challenges, it doesn't take recourse to cunning or
> makes practical excuses. Leslie Green similarly talks
> about Dworkin and Mackinnon et. al for making such
> theoretically incorrect arguments to ban pornography
> in Canada; but even though theoretically incorrect,
> they were practically enough and who knows –socially
> required too. Today's feminisms are full of such
> vacuous muscle flexing.
>
>        Now, to the main point : what on earth is
> "theoretical correctness?" There is a huge literature
> on all of this so I'll be limited and sketchy for the
> time being  but promise more  if required.
>
> Let me tell you my source first : I owe much to
> Habermas when I use this phrase; owe but with a
> difference. Today I shall state this while not going
> into the details of my adoption with qualification.
>            We can start with an offhand approach by
> taking theoretical correctness in scientific ( or
> empirico analytic) discourses. There a theory is
> incorrect if the axioms it proposes  is invalidated
> say—in experiments or other forms of self -referential
> 'methodological' moorings peculiar to science. In
> other forms of human ( historical-hermeneutic)
> sciences, the question of  theoretical correctness has
> been debated for the last 200 years or so. But to ease
> this trouble let us take a simple approach. Marx
> himself never believed that all theories could be
> equally true or correct or otherwise he would not have
> laid emphasis on practical-critical sensuous activity
> where theory has to prove itself and vice versa. But
> these are old debates and Shuddha and all others are
> well aware of this; my point here is  to hint at the
> availability of  the option of true theory  in older
> discourses also. So there you have the precursors. In
> between you can throw in the fact that theory
> consistently has been held to have been generating or
> relying upon abstract universals  ( supposedly  immune
> to interests) while  practice is concrete, particular
> and interested. Much of this has been refuted. But
> what has not been refuted is that  truth is simply not
> discursive : that we sit and talk and come to a
> consensus that this is true and it becomes true. There
> are statements or propositions which are true or
> false. There are such things as true, false, right,
> good and correct.There is an internal justification
> that is necessary other than an external one.
> Starting from this assumption and using Habermas's
> insights, we can make a clear departure here. The
> erstwhile discourse of practice didn't admit of  truth
> or correctness (I'm  overriding for simplicity's sake
> the little hiatus of levels  between declarative claim
> to truth and the normative claim to correctness—as in
> late Habermas.). For example that  women should go out
>  and vote or wear a particular sign when they are
> married or who will love whom was not considered akin
> to statements that  could be true or false. But the
> moment the feminists started debating these rules,
> norms, or customs—it could be said that the question
> of correctness was brought about in the realm of
> practice through their argumentation. That social
> norms could be debated for their validity claims has
> been emphatically made by Habermas. Why child marriage
> should be shunned became  a matter of   argumentative
> justification and thus particular norms or customs
> were not simply in-appropriate, they were incorrect.
> "Practical questions admit of truth ..and correct
> norms must be capable of being  grounded in a way
> similar to true statements." Validity involves a
> notion of correctness analogous to the idea of truth.
> And this applies to all those harassment norms,
> groping forms  and all that we were discussing. And if
> there is a debate ( moreover  if they are to be
> justified) then it must be intersubjectively
> validated, agreed? Now,  to examine a validity claim
> in a discourse, one stops conveying information or
> experiences from the empirical standpoint ( i.e.,
> variety in difference), and brackets or suspends all
> judgment to examine a problematised validity claim.
> This is extrication from all claims to action or
> practical rationality and is absolutely self reflexive
> or theoretical. A "critique of knowledge" is the aim
> of theoretical discourse; "political will formation "
> is the aim of practical discourse. Therefore, it is
> easy and obvious now : what is politically incorrect
> may be  theoretically correct and what is
> theoretically incorrect may be politically correct.
>
>        Let me try to explain this a bit. And this
> though I first wrote as a post edit article in
> Anandabazar Patrika in 2000, I  still hold that point
> as unrefuted. Consider the anti harassment legislation
> initiated by the Supreme Court which it calls 'norms'
> and must be instituted in all offices. It catalogues a
> list of 'unwelcome sexual behaviour'which ranges  from
> sexual propositions to showing pornography and so and
> so forth. My question was, why don't they give a list
> of welcome sexual behaviour, all men/women will act
> accordingly and there will be no problems. But
> everybody knows that that is ridiculous. Hence if you
> cannot bring that list, how come you bring the list of
> unwelcome sexual behaviour and catalogue hilarious
> items? If sexual propositioning in workplace is
> harassment, then where there are so called 'sex
> workers' -who are looking forward and waiting badly
> for  those sexual propositions, what will happen to
> the norm?. Sexual harassment in workplace is
> ridiculous when sex itself is work. But couldn't the
> sex workers be harassed ? Ofcourse, but there  the
> harassment has to be non sexual in order to be outside
> of  work ( like sex here is considered external to
> work in office). For them    there will be  a separate
> list I guess. But my central tendency was
> theoretically considered such lists are not possible.
> In this, I remember having phoned Partha Chatterjee-
> when I was writing this article and I did include his
> point in the article. He simply discouraged me by
> saying that there is less use of theoretical
> objections here; a consensus is assumed and such norms
> should be put in place as protection -- is also
> warranted; it is practically useful. There was nothing
> for me not to agree.
> I'll argue  today—after seven years since that
> article, in the domain of  ordinary discourse
> feminist claims are still made in the context of
> everyday life, but  are not allowed to be
> problematised. Correctness here is  in accordance with
> the rules. The call for argumentative justification is
> overruled in favour of moral, practical or political
> propriety.  Let me tell you that I don't doubt the
> strategic essentiality in all this but reiterate again
> as above  that what is practically useful or
> politically correct may not be theoretically correct
> too. We have to live with this disjunction like people
> live with gonorrhea or AIDS. And this is why I use and
> often use 'theoretical correctness ( in the sense of
> truth)', and I only hope Shuddha now onwards will use
> that too.
>
>          Finally an exemplary reference :  Leslie
> Green—one of the greatest legal ( and social )
> philosophers of our time and now a philosopher of law
> at Oxford  has deployed the phrase theoretical
> correctness while he talks in this mode , "the central
> theoretical error thus lies……etc…." [ Leslie Green,
> Sexuality, Authenticity, and Modernity, Canadian
> Journal of Law and Jurisprudence, 8(1), January 1995,
> p.80].  I consider Leslie ( who is equally outspoken
> about "feminist reductionisms") one of my abstract
> gurus, so   if Shuddha goes to Leslie with this--- a
> bit sly entreaty, "What on earth is theoretical
> error?"  I'm sure Leslie will give a far  better
> answer.
>
> Till then
> Arnab
>
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>      Unlimited freedom, unlimited storage. Get it now, on http://help.yahoo.com/l/in/yahoo/mail/yahoomail/tools/tools-08.html/
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