[Reader-list] A post-national space opens.

[Shuddhabrata Sengupta]

Dear All,

It has been a pleasure to witness the maturation of the debate on  
Kashmir, India and Azaadi on this list. Compared to where we were,  
even some months ago, the propensity towards name calling and abuse  
has gone down compared to the actual willingness to engage with the  
issues at hand,despite serious differences and disagreements. I would  
personally like to thank Sanjay Kak, Jeebesh Bagchi, Junaid Mohammed,  
Rahul Asthana, Kshmendra Kaul, Inder Salim, Partha Dasgupta, Tapas  
Ray, Radhikarajen, Radhakrishnan,  Wali Arifi and Sonia Jabbar for  
all their contributions, I have gained a lot by listening and  
reading. I think we also need to thank, Arundhati Roy, Mukul Kesavan,  
A.G.Noorani and Umair Ahmed Muhajir, whose texts (forwarded on to  
this list by list members) have contributed to the depth and  
intensity of the exchanges. In all of this, one can see the Reader- 
List emerging, not just as a space for grandstanding, and the  
performance of rehearsed rhetorical routines, but as an actual space  
for thought and questioning. If this contributes in even a small way  
towards helping people think through the apparent intractability of  
the political relationships between all the peoples of Kashmir, India  
and Pakistan, then it will have redeemed its promise as a space for  
creative and imaginative discursivity in great measure.

Apologies in advance for what will be a long posting.

Having said all this, I would like to come back to the question that  
lies at the heart of the debate between the two positions representd  
by Roy and Muhajir.

For let's look at what Roy is saying:

1. Roy's core argument can be summarized as follows : An end to the  
occupation of Kashmir by India is a price well worth paying if it is  
the means by which the dismantling of the violence that accompanies  
this occupation can be brought about. As she says towards the  
conclusion of her text "At the heart of it all is a moral question.  
Does any government have the right to take away people's liberty with  
military force?"

Roy points out that too many people have died, or have been  
imprisoned, tortured or been made to disappear for us to pretend any  
longer that the continued and enforced attatchment of Kashmir to the  
project of the Indian nation state has any ethical basis.

2. Interestingly, Roy does not at any point suggest that she actually  
endorses any of the 'Islamist' or 'Secular' visions of a possible  
future Kashmir. And anyone who reads that endorsement into her text  
confuses her faithful reportage of what people may be saying on the  
streets of Kashmir with what she herself may feel.

3. Her doubts and reservations about the directions that the struggle  
for Azaadi is taking, which are listed at least 9 separate times in  
her essay (encompassing doubts about the treatement of all kinds of  
minorities, doubts about the consequences of not accounting for the  
exodus of Kashmiri Pandits, doubts about the nature of a so called  
Islamic state and so on) seem to suggest that she is amply sceptical  
of a great deal of the content of what is on offer by way of Azaadi  
in Kashmir. What she does not doubt is that people passionately  
believe that this Azaadi, (which they are either unable or unwilling  
to elaborate on) is desirable. She takes a stand which should be  
understandable to anyone with the slightest commitment to the virtues  
of democracy - if a majority of the people want something, you can  
argue with (and against ) what they want, but not with the fact that  
their is a reality to their desire. It is clear that the majority of  
people in the Kashmir valley do not want to remain committed to the  
Indian nation state. To insist that they stay committed is to ignore  
and destroy the reality of their desires.

4. Her criticism of India holding on to Kashmir may have one very  
simple point at its centre - the deeply unethical and brutal  
consequences of enforcing a form of governance on to an unwilling  
people, but her criticism of the unthought out nature of the  
intellectual response to this brutality by Kashmiris has at least 9  
nuanced positions. These 9 positions need not be seen as signs of her  
hostility to the people of Kashmir, rather, they could be read as the  
criticism that stems from a committed, unpatronising solidarity. She

5. Personally, i found her most trenchant critique contained in the  
fragment that says  (while considering what she found painful in the  
layered import of the slogan - "Nanga bhookha Hindustan, jaan se  
pyaara Pakistan (Naked, starving India, More precious than life itself 
—Pakistan). Roy says - "it was painful to listen to people who have  
suffered so much themselves mock others who suffer in different ways,  
but no less intensely, under the same oppressor. In that slogan I saw  
the seeds of how easily victims can become perpetrators."

Seeing 'the seeds of how easily 'victims can become perpetrators' is  
seeing what nationalism, and the dream of national liberation  
actually means. And the one thing that Roy cannot be faulted for, at  
least in this article, is an inability to see and countenance the  
possibility of 'victims becoming perpetrators'. All nationalism,  
anchors its moral legitimacy in the idea that 'yesterdays victims,  
cannot do to others what has been done unto them'. Roy does not share  
in this delusion, and her essay while it is being read in India as a  
critique of the Indian state (which it no doubt is) would also no  
doubt be read in Kashmir as a critique of the painful limitations and  
narrow bandwidth of imagination of Kashmiri nationalism (and indeed  
of all nationalisms, of all ideologies that speak for and on behalf  
of 'nations in waiting')

Now let us turn to the core of Muhajir is saying. I go along with  
much of what Muhajir says, and I find his arguments against  
'nationalism' per se. compelling. Things turn a bit different  
however, the moment when he begins to qualify 'nationalisms' and  
weigh different kinds of nationalism as 'lesser' and 'greater' evils.

After much ado, Muhajir's basic premise is  as follows  - the  
continuation of the occupation is a price well worth paying for the  
sake of the sake of the lesser of two evil's in so far as types of  
nation state are concerned. Muhajir believes that an independent  
Kashmiri Nation-State would inherently tend towards affirming an  
exclusionary principle, and that the Indian model of the nation  
state, for all its flaws, still retains the value of being an  
'inclusive, pluralistic' (albeit imperfectly inclusive and  
pluralistic)  model for a nation-state building.

"they (nation states) are not all inhuman in precisely the same way;  
nor are  they all equally inhuman, by which I simply mean that they  
are not all  equally incapable of accommodating human difference,  
whether communitarian or otherwise."

Let us ask, precisely how the Indian nation state has proved to be  
'capable' of accomodating human difference? Without going into a  
great deal of detail, I would like to focus on the simple fact that  
the continued operation of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act, in  
Kashmir, and parts of the North East takes away the constitutional  
guarantee that the state provides to its citizens that they will not  
be deprived of life and liberty without due process of law. The AFSPA  
empowers Armed Forces Personnel to kill, detain and destroy the  
property of the people who happen to be under its jurisdiction with  
impunity.

This means, that at least insofar as the basic guarantee of life is  
concerned, the areas where the AFSPA operates are not instances where  
the state demonstrates an 'equal capability to accommodate human  
difference'. For a Kashmiri, (and for someone in the North East) who  
has had to deal with death and disappearance as sanctioned under the  
AFSPA, the difference between being a Kashmiri, A Naga, a Manipuri  
and some other kind of 'Indian' can mean the difference between life  
and death.

That this situation has continued to be sustained by the Indian state  
for 18 years in Kashmir, and 50 years in the North East, means that  
the Indian state does view the people who happen to live in these two  
vast swathes of territory in a somewhat different light. This is no  
longer something that can be viewed as an 'aberration' or as state  
excess. It is the way in which the Indian state functions 'normally'  
in Kashmir and in the North East. It 'accommodates' the difference of  
their people by maintaining the highest 'military to civilian' ratio  
in Kashmir and by the daily humiliations that it visits on a people  
it treats as its 'subjects' as a matter of stable policy because they  
happen to inhabit tracts of territory that are 'strategically'  
important for reasons of state.

I have no doubt at all about the fact that the resistance to the  
Indian state that crystallizes in these areas, (whether in the form  
of the NSCSN (IM) or (K) or the PLA or the different factions of the  
miltiant resistance and their overground supporters in Kashmir) often  
occupy a space that is as auhoritarian as that occupied by the Indian  
state. But the people who inhabit these areas cannot be expected to  
rely on one form of authoritarianism to protect them from the  
depredations of another.

In fact there is a rough equivalence in the two apparently  
diametrically opposite positions that say either 'no discussion and  
debate about what exactly 'independence' means until the Indian state  
vacates the territory' and 'no withdrawal of armed forces and special  
laws until the end of the insurgency'. Both of these positions need  
to be rejected. Roy does not fall into the trap of endorsing one in  
order to battle the other, in fact her explicit demand to her  
Kashmiri audience is to actually wrestle with the necessity of  
articulating the contours of the future that they desire for  
themselves. She says -

"it is time for those who are part of the struggle to outline a  
vision for what kind of society they are fighting for. Perhaps it is  
time to offer people something more than martyrs, slogans and vague  
generalisations. Those who wish to turn to the Quran for guidance  
will no doubt find guidance there. But what of those who do not wish  
to do that, or for whom the Quran does not make place? Do the Hindus  
of Jammu and other minorities also have the right to self- 
determination? Will the hundreds of thousands of Kashmiri Pandits  
living in exile, many of them in terrible poverty, have the right to  
return? Will they be paid reparations for the terrible losses they  
have suffered? Or will a free Kashmir do to its minorities what India  
has done to Kashmiris for 61 years? What will happen to homosexuals  
and adulterers and blasphemers? What of thieves and lafangas and  
writers who do not agree with the "complete social and moral code"?  
Will we be put to death as we are in Saudi Arabia? Will the cycle of  
death, repression and bloodshed continue? History offers many models  
for Kashmir's thinkers and intellectuals and politicians to study.  
What will the Kashmir of their dreams look like? Algeria? Iran? South  
Africa? Switzerland? Pakistan?"

The discussion on this list has extended the logic of this demand. We  
have had people, especially Jeebesh, talk of the possibility of 'post  
national' paths as concrete possibilities, Sonia Jabbar has spoken of  
'confederal South Asia', Rahul Asthana has spoken of a 'Hong Kong'  
like arrangement. All of these are as valid options as  
'independence', and need to be considered in turn.

Muhajir's text, actually does not offer us this range of  
possibilities. In the end, it asks Kashmiris to reconcile themselves  
to the brutality of the Indian occupation simply on the basis of the  
fact that it comes garbed in a normatively 'inclusive' form of  
nationalism. Actually, when a boot kicks your face in, it is a bit  
odd to console oneself with the fact that the boot happens to be a  
happily 'secular' one. I don't quite see how doing so could possibly  
relieve the agony of having your face kicked in. Even so, I welcome  
the fact that it has acted as a catalyst in terms of leading us  
towards the possibility of hinking this through outside the familiar  
and exhausted tropes of nation states.

So, what might a future Kashmir be. Let me throw my own two bits into  
the ring, following on the lines sketched out by Jeebesh. In doing  
this, I take the term 'Azaadi' seriously, and interpret it to mean  
the liberation, not only from external, but also 'internal'  
domination, and it is this that colours my perspective on possible  
futures for Kashmir.

1. Demilitarization of Jammu and Kashmir. The 700,000 Indian soldiers  
in Indian Occupied Kashmir to withdraw, (south of Jammu) the 50,000+  
Pakistani soldiers in Pakistani Occupied Kashmir to withdraw (west of  
POK and Northern Areas). All militias (insurgent or counter  
insurgent) and paramilitaries to decommission weapons and demobilize  
under international observation (as happened in Northern Ireland) .  
The process of withdrawal, decommissioing and demobilizing to take  
place under the auspices of an international body within a UN mandate  
(as happened in East Timor and Bosnia). A UN peacekeeping force to be  
stationed in Kashmir, paid for by the Governments of India, Pakistan  
and China (as reparations)  This could have peacekeepers from Bosnia,  
East Timor, Iraqi Kurdistan, Norway and Lebanon.

2. A cooling period of five to seven years, during which Jammu and  
Kashmir (including present day 'Azad' Kashmir, Northern Areas in  
Pakistan and Ladakh in India as well as the Aksai Chin and Karakorum  
regions ceded or annexed by China) is governed as a UN mandated  
territory, with full local autonomy, with the presence of the UN  
Peacekeeping Force at limited levels. Normal, unrestricted political  
activity, complete freedom of speech and association and local  
governance to determine quesitons of local importance. Free movement  
of people, and free trade, across the LOC. People of J&K to be issued  
special travel documents for 'stateless people'. People of India,  
Pakistan, Afghanistan, Tibet and Central Asian republics can travel  
without visas to J&K. All others to receive visas on arrival,  
Adminstered by the UN administration. Eventually, people in J&K to be  
given the freedom to opt for cascading forms of dual citizenship. J&K  
to have a twenty year tax holiday, fiscal burden of administration to  
be on the UN. People not domiciled in J&K not to have the right to  
own property in land in the region.

3. All displaced people (including those displaced in 1947, 1965,  
1971, 1989 and after) of all denominations (Hindu, Muslim, Buddhist  
and others) to be allowed right of honourable return, with  
reparations in the event of loss or destruction of property.  
Indigenous Nomadic peoples to have freedom of movement across the  
entire territory of J&K.

4. A constituent assembly to be set up during the five year cooling  
period on the basis of universal adult franchise, to discuss the  
future constitutional arrangements for J&K. Plebiscite to be held,  
under UN auspices, with the presence of international observers,  
after five years to determine the exact nature of constitutional  
arrangements. The constituent assembly is to be guided to develop  
models of statehood without the necessity of a standing army,  
(Japan's post war constitution can be a basis for a state which gives  
up the right to conduct war and maintain a standing army) so that a  
future free territory of Kashmir does not represent a threat to any  
of its neighbours. India. Pakistan and China, to give guarantees to  
protect the independence and sovereignty of Kashmir, to undertake not  
to invade or station their armed forces in J&K. J&K to be declared a  
'zone of peace' with special heritage protection for all religious  
and culturally important sites and environmentally fragile zones.

5. I am not averse to an EU style South Asian Union, especially if it  
provides for freedom of movement between the different parts of South  
Asia, and makes borders and border controls in the region irrelevant.  
In some ways, I think that this will be inevitable. But the terms for  
participation in this union need to be democratic and equitable. It  
hardly matters to me as to whether the people of J&K participate  
within this arrangement as 'Indians', 'Pakistanis' or as  
'Independent' or as 'members of a 'post national entity'. The crucial  
thing is, if they do not want to participate in this arrangement as  
'Indians', nothing should compel them to do so.

I see all of the above as practical and realizable goals. The most  
important obstacle is the presence of large bodies of official and  
informal armed men, once those are removed, anything is possible.  
There are many territories in the world, ranging from the Aaland  
Islands, to Andorra, to Northern Ireland, to Hong Kong, to South  
Tyrol whose constitutional contours contain elements that may be  
useful for thinking 'out of the box' solutions to the Kashmir  
dispute. In fact the so called step by step formula put forward by  
Musharraf during the Agra Summit had a lot that could have been  
thought through

Siddharth Varadarjan, writing in 'Newsline' has provided a useful  
summary of some of these possibilities, see -
http://www.newsline.com.pk/NewsNov2004/cover3nov2004.htm

Whatever be the possibilities, they will probably need a  
comprehensive measure of demilitarization to become workable.  
Demilitarization, in its simplest and most effective sense means the  
'abolition of the standing army'.

It needs to be remembered, that for about fifty odd years, the  
'abolition of the standing army' was the standard demand of every  
respectable socialist, social democratic, anarchist and working class  
party in the world from the mid nineteenth century onwards. The  
abolition of standing armies was a mainstream, respectable slogan, it  
had nothing dreamy or utopian about it. The first world war put an  
end to this vigorous tradition of practical pacifism in the  
International Working Class Movement. Perhaps the future of Kashmir  
can bring this utterly human demand back on the agenda for the rest  
of the world in a real sense. If Kashmiri people, and their  
leaderships seize this opportunity to demand an abolition of standing  
armies on their territory they will have made a fundamental  
contribution to world history. I sincerely hope that they respond  
positively to the challenge that this opportunity represents.

---------------------------------
Finally, a word about the confessional character of a state, or its  
secular, or non secular basis. As a person with no interest  
whatsoever in perpetuating the nation state as a form of human  
organization, I refuse to make the case for 'secular' states as being  
necessarily better or worse than 'non secular' ones. I think that  
states need to be judged, not on their formal accotrements, but on  
their actual conduct.

Technically, the United Kingdom is not a secular state. The United  
Kingdom has a an official state church, and the head of state is also  
the head of the Church of England. Yet, it treats its minorities  
better than say, Turkey, or France, both of which are secular state.  
Saudi Arabia is a nightmare of a non secular state, and China is a  
nightmare of a secular state, insofar as issues pertaining to the  
freedom of conscience is concerned. IN our own neighbourhood, the  
Indian state has lived quite happily with the fact that until  
recently, Nepal was an autocratic, theocratic monarchy within the  
hands of a single corrupt dynasty. This dynasty also bankrolled Hindu  
fundamentalist outfits in India, and at one time offered refuge (as a  
fleeing tyrant) to Indira Gandhi after she had been defeated in 1977.  
I have never heard anyone say that Nepal's theocratic, corrupt,  
autocratic monarchy was a problem for anyone other than the people of  
Nepal (and they have quite competently got rid of that problem). I do  
not hear people say that where a revived Lama State in Tibet to  
exist, it would be a problem for India. Why then would the  
possibility of an Islamic, or even an Islamist state in Kashmir (if  
at all that came to pass, which may or may not be likely) be a  
necessary problem for India, If anything, it should be a problem (if  
it were to be a problem) that the people of Kashmir would have to  
deal with, in their own fashion, in their own time.

Those of us who believe that the state should not interfere in the  
private lives of people, and in matters of faith, conscience and  
doubt, would find ways of supporting that struggle, if it were to  
take place, in a possible future Kashmir. If it were not to take  
place, I would advise that we reconcile ourselves to the presence of  
an Islamic Kashmir in our neighbourhood, exactly as we have  
reconciled ourselves to a Hindu State in Nepal all these decades. I  
cannot see how one can be worse than the other.

regards,

Shuddha