[Reader-list] Operation Gibraltar & the Indo-Pak War of 1965

[Pawan Durani]

*Operation **Gibraltar** & the Indo-Pak War of 1965*

* *

*By J.L. Tiku*

*“Ayub Khan may have a lot to answer for authorizing Kashmir Operation, but
in agreeing to ceasefire he acted with...realism....patriotism...., though
he had to pay a terrible price in personal term” Altaf Gauhar* probably, the
successful encounter of the Pakistan army with Indian forces in the Rann of
Kutch area had reinforced Ayub Khan’s rising faith in the military
superiority of his forces. The Rann of Kutch conflict was a low cost test of
Indian will & capabilities. Ayub khan in his autobiography *Friends Not
Masters *published in 1967 had left the important event of the 1965 war
untouched intentionally. Now his son Gauhar Ayub Khan is trying to fill this
gap in his reported forthcoming book. The book may be an attempt to salvage
the lost position of his father *Field Marshal *Ayub Khan as President of
Pakistan after 1965 debacle.

Rann of Kutch was one of the areas left undemarcated by Radcliffe award
during partition. Pakistan laid claim to whole of Rann, contrary to India’s
position. The clash started between border police force and soon involved
the armed forces of both sides. Pakistan did make local gains, it seems they
were prepared for the battle. India didn’t want to engage extensively in the
sticky area thinking it may have been Pakistan’s diversionary tactics. The Rann
of Kutch operation also bolstered Pakistan official *General *Musa’s morale.
His assessment of the inherent strength of army rose in tandem to Ayub
Khan’s perception on the subject.

Pakistan’s army was persuaded to produce a plan for a bolder course of
action. The task was entrusted to *Maj. Gen. *Akhtar Hussain Malik, the
General Officer Commanding, 12th Division, who was responsible for the
defence of Pak Occupied Kashmir. The plan reflected his outlook and
character - supposedly bold and imaginative. Thus was *Operation Gibraltar *
born.

Highly    trained    30,000    strong    *non-Kashmiri *guerilla force
labeled *Gibraltar Forces *was to be raised at Murree under the charge of *Maj.
Gen. *Akhtar Hussain Malik. The *Gibraltar Forces *bearing romantic names
comprised of ten forces. These would be infiltrating whole of Jammu &
Kashmir for mobilising mass scale uprising against India. Then the
Pakistanarmy would march in to protect the ‘revolutionaries’.

The decision for *Operation Gibraltar *was primarily based on three
important premises. It was assumed that widespread support existed within
Kashmir to make a guerilla campaign a success. It was considered unlikely
that as a consequence of this action India would be inclined to attempt a
large-scale military offensive against Pak Occupied Kashmir territory.
Lastly  the possibility of India crossing the international border either in
then East or West Pakistan was ruled out.

The several groups of *Gibraltar Forces *that infiltrated into Kashmir were:
*Salaudin force *headed for Srinagar and Valley; *Ghaznavi force *operated
in Mendhar-Rajouri; *Tariq force *was to strike Dras and Kargil; *Babbar
force *Bhimber, Kalidhar; *Qasim force *Bandipora; *Khalid force
*Qazinag; *Nasrat
force *Tithwal area. The operation was launched as hurriedly as it had been
conceived. It was not gradual enough to give it the character of an internal
uprising.

Whereas it was true that goodwill for Pakistan existed in some pockets of
Kashmir, it was unrealistic to expect that this feeling of resentment
against India could be mobilized all over Jammu & Kashmir and thereby make
the execution of large-scale operation within Indian borders possible. They
were not successful in establishing the necessary rapport with local
populace. Few of them were turned over or revealed to the Indian army. With
their self styled liberators and ‘freedom fighters’ who apart from doing
some damage to public property and inflicting much suffering on the people
by burning their homes got nowhere close to capturing the Srinagar Radio
Station for their historic broadcast on 9lh August proclaiming that *war of
liberation *was on.

When faced with a rapidly escalating situation, which endangered India’s
position in Kashmir, army persuaded to retaliate in an area in Pak Occupied
Kashmir, which would be strategically important. The Haji Pir salient, which
provided Pakistan with a link between the northern and southern sectors of
Pak Occupied Kashmir, was a natural region, which fitted this pattern. Also,
it had become important gateway for infiltrators and had to be closed. On
27th August the Indian army launched a strong attack on POK positions in the
area, which were relatively lightly held, and by 28th August we were in
control of strategic territory to cut the line of communication between
Muzaffarabad, the capital of POK and Kotli, a major town in the southern
POK. On 10th September Indian force advancing from Poonch completed the
control of Uri-Poonch link, thus straightening the bulge.

Pakistan retaliatedin vulnerable area of Chamb-Akhnur It is the only sector
along the ceasefire line (LoC) where tanks could be used effectively during,
offensive. Pakistan ordered its infantry division located South of Lahore to
move to the Chamb area. Initially the attack was to be carried out by Maj.
Gen. Akhtar Hussain Mulik of 12th Division. As formations of Pakistan's 12th
division moved swiftly towards Akhnur, India was faced with a difficult
military situation. The capture of Akhnur by Pakistan would provide them a
base, seriously threaten the lines of communication between India and the
Kashmir valley and it could result in the loss of a large portion of the
Indian army in northern and central Kashmir.

Indian was left with little choice but to remove this threat to the security
of their vital strategic area. Rather than confining the contest to Pak
occupied Kashmir, it was decided to widen the area of conflict to then West
Pakistan. *Operation Riddle *was code word for all out attack on West
Pakistan. The plan was prepared after Rann of Kutch incident. Of all the
places in West Pakistan Lahore was the natural choice. *“I want to reach **
Lahore** before they take **Srinagar**” *were the strong words of then Prime
Minister Shastri to army chief. A threat to its security could not fail to
draw forces to Lahore’s defence, and this could well remove the threat to
Jammu and Akhnur. The offensive was with this limited objective only.

On 2nd September, just about thirty-six hours after the Chamb offensive
launched by 12th Division, Pakistan completed the movement of their 7th
Division to the Chamb area. On the very same day, *Maj. Gen. *Yahya Khan,
GOC 7th Div. was given command of this sector and *Maj. Gen. *Akhtar Malik
was ordered to return to his earlier location further north. The decision to
change commanders in the midst of the Chamb battle was clearly based on the
assumption that the Indian retaliation to an attack on Akhnur would come in
the Pak Occupied Kashmir area in the North and not against
Pakistanterritory in the South.

As Pakistan changed horses in mid-stream, India began to make a last bid to
strengthen her crumbling defences in the Akhnur area. The change of
formation slowed down Pakistan’s advance sufficiently to allow the Indians
to consolidate their position. And as our forces crossed Pakistan borders in
Punjab on 6th September at dawn, the morale of the Indians in the
Chamb-Akhnur sector began to recover.

Neither country won the 22 day war. It was inconclusive war. It is equally
true that Pakistan lost the war in that the she failed to  win her military
and political objectives. Pakistan's blunder was her over-confidence and
arrogant underestimation of its adversary’s strength and competence.
Pakistan having convinced themselves that they would win the war in a week's
time on paper, had put everything they had all at once in full force their
armour, artillery, and air power. With the result Pakistan army was short of
supplies, it was running out of ammunition and had lost heavily in equipment
and trained men. It had to seek help from friendly countries, Indonesia,
China. Pakistan lost most decisive battles of the war-Assal Uttar in the
Khem Karan sector and the tank battle in Sialkot sector. Pakistan lost half
of their American gifted Patton tanks. Their strike power was crippled and
humbled. The psychological impact of loss upon the Pak army and the military
leadership couldn’t be underestimated. To continue to fight under these
circumstances and with principle fighting concentrated in Pakistan would
bring the risk of further heavy losses without immediate hope of gain.
Pakistan finally had to accept conditions for truce which settled none of
the issues which had precipitated war.

It can be concluded from the course of events that steered the 22 day war,
Pakistan had misjudged Indian psyche to its misadventure. If Pakistan’s army
leadership had got hold of the war plan from Indian army official as
reported by Gauhar Ayub, why did they leave *Haji-Pir *salient lightly held
and then move 12th Division from South to Chamb sector so as to leave
Lahorevulnerable for Indian attack. It is reported that Zulfikar Ali
Bhutto had
assured Ayub Khan that Indians would never violate the Indo-Pakistan border.
On what basis Bhutto had given the assurance would require to be elaborated.
These are few unanswered questions, which, Gauhar Ayub Khan has to throw
some light on.

*References*:

1 Altaf Gauhar was at the time of conflict, *Secretary, Ministry of
information & Broadcasting, Government of **Pakistan**, *who worked closely
with Ayub Khan for five and a half years.

2  Courtesy Times Of India,  Bombay monograph dated November 10th
1965,    *India
Answers Pakistan *by *B. G. Verghese*

**

*Source:* Kashmir Sentinel