[Reader-list] BEYOND KILVENMANI: SUBALTERN IDENTITY, CASTE VIOLENCE AND THE STATE

[SUNDARA BABU]

*BEYOND KILVENMANI: SUBALTERN IDENTITY, CASTE VIOLENCE AND THE STATE: AN
ANALYSIS OF
 ANTI-DALIT VIOLENCE IN TAMIL NADU*

* *

*                               * BAHU VIRUPAKSHA



Caste violence has become an important element in the political life of
contemporary Tamil Nadu. We may define caste violence as systematic,
organized and sustained acts of physical and cultural violence directed
against the less powerful, marginal, and in a hierarchical sense lower
social groups by members of the dominant landed groups. Though the latter
are classified as Backward Castes and Most Backward castes in the case of
northern Tamil Nadu, the BCs and MBCs are by far the most powerful social
groups in the political and agrarian structures of rural Tamil Nadu. Both
NGOs and the academic interpreters of the endemic caste violence in the
countryside, conceptualize the growing social distance between Dalit castes
and the BCs and MBCs as instances of “caste” conflict implying thereby that
caste identities and loyalties are at the root of this problem. Such an
interpretation while not inaccurate, skirts the more potent question
pertaining to the structural linkages between the politically organized
sections of the Backward landed communities and the violence directed
against the Dalits in different parts of the Tamil region.



Rural violence is not a new and novel feature. Medieval inscriptions record
numerous instances of burning down of entire villages in the fifteenth
century during clashes between the idankai and valankai groups. Caste
hierarchy was reinforced through a range of measures that included dress
codes, restrictions on the use of certain musical instruments, habitat ional
exclusion by creating *tindacheris* in which particular social groups were
sequestered, limited access to common areas such as the sacred space of the
temple, educational institutions and the like. Indeed the social history of
the Tamil region can be plotted along the axes of caste, community and sect,
though the boundaries between the three conceptual categories were always
fluid and permeable. In the nineteenth century we find identity formation
crystallizing itself around the twin poles of caste and race with the ethno
linguistic category of Dravidian glossing over the different castes and sub
castes of the society. Uniting in the divided population in the name of
language, the concept of Dravidian defined the Tamil identity in terms of
the cultural practices of the dominant non Brahmin castes thereby excluding
the dalits and other communities.



       Dalit intellectuals have in recent years mounted a serious challenge
to the hegemonic claims relating to the libratory potential of the
Aryan/Dravidian dichotomy in which the discourse on Dalit liberation and
political praxis takes place. The literaey critic Raj Gauthaman in his
excellent work entitled *Dalit Parveyil Tamil Panpattu *has shown that even
in the earliest corpus of Tamil bardic poetry there is a stratum of communal
and caste consciousness which effectively marginalized tribal groups which
came to form the basis of dalit caste of the historical times. This
interpretation alters the framework in which the emergence of caste
consciousness is placed by conventional historians in that it situates caste
in the context of autochthonous social trends.  The importance of Raj
Gouthamn’s work lies in his effort to reclaim the historical memory of the
Dalits in order to assert an identity that is distinct from the one existing
in the dominant Dravidian discourse. In his counter reading of Tamil
literary and social history, Raj Gauthman is infact re interpreting the
claims of Iyothee Das that Tamil cultural practices as depicted in the early
bardic works are just as oppressive as that of the Aryan/Sanskrit other. He
goes on to add that the ethic of valor and conquest enshrined in the
*puram*genre of poems are mere ideological shibboleths to validate and
legitimize
the appropriation of agricultural surplus from the tribal sections of Tamil
society, who he says were the ancestors of the present day dalit population.
While this interpretation may not have all the sophistication of a well
thought out historical thesis, it certainly points to a rupture in the
dominant paradigm.



In this paper we attempt an analysis of the violence in the Tamil region in
which the caste conflict between the BCs and the Dalits are contextualized
in terms of (a) the groups inv9lved and (b) the reaction of the state. We
examine the frequent outbreak of social conflict in terms of the denial of
the dominant discourse of the very basis of this conflict. We examine the
issue of the Kilvenmani Massacre in terms of the response of the state as
well as the social groups which took part in the massacre. I also examiner
the response of Dalit intellectuals and political leaders such as Comrade
Tirumavalavan to the growing instances of anti Dalit violence.



On Christmas Day 1968, when C N Annadurai was the chief minister of Tamil
Nadu, an incident took place that is regarded today as emblematic of caste
relation in this part of India. A few days prior to this incident, a group
of farm workers began agitating for more wages. 1967 had been a particularly
bad year for the region because of the sustained drought. The workers of the
CPI felt that it was an opportune moment to organize the peasants,
particularly the landless pallan and other castes in view of the collapse of
the communist led insurrection in the Tanjavur district led by Jeevanandham
and other leaders. A day prior to the Kilvenmani Incident one of the petty
land owners was assaulted and killed, allegedly by the organized group of
landless workers. An armed gang was sent to the *cheri* where the landless
laborers resided. However they had by that time taken refuge in a barn along
with their wives and children. In a gruesome act of retaliation the building
was burnt down killing 44 men, women and 8 children. The DMK government
which was in power in the state was reluctant to register the case and even
the news of the horrific massacre reached the public only through the
questions raised in the Assembly by the CPI MLA of the neighboring
Nagapattinam constituency. Left and Secular liberal hagiography sees the
Kilvemanni Massacre as a mere class oppressor versus worker issue. In fact
the CPM has even appropriated for itself the memorial for the 44 victims of
the December 25 Incident and is reluctant to admit the caste identity of the
victims. In short, the incident itself has become a bone of contention
between those who prefer to see it as the Dravidian Movements ambiguity with
regard to the question of Dalit identity and human rights and those who view
it in ideological terms.Social conflict is also predicated upon the very
morphology and distribution of social groups across the territorial limits
of the region. The great historian, Burton Stein has argued that the
territorial segmentation, a structural feature of South Indian Tamil
society, reinforces the dominance of certain groups in specific regions and
sub-regions. The introduction of Panchayati Raj in this kind of a
socio-political configuration through the 73rd Constitutional Amendment
introduced yet another volatile arena of conflict and violence.





*                                       II* *VIOLENCE AND THE STATE*

*The Kilvenmani* Incident is just one of a whole litany of violent
encounters between socially dominant landed groups and lower status landless
and marginal social sodalities such as dalits. After Independence the Tamil
region has seen episodes of violent upsurge against dalit societies in
alarming propotions. Given below are a few of the more prominent incidents:

   1. Mudalukathur Massacre of 1957
   2. Melvalavu Massacre of July25,1997
   3.  Gundupatti Incident of 1998
   4. Tambraparini River Massacre of July 23, 1999
   5. Kodiyankulam Incident of 31 August, 1995
   6. Thinniyan Incident of October 25, 2002

In all these and other incidents the local dominant group was clearly
involved in and complicit in acts of unspeakable cruelty and violation of
human dignity, and in all these case there was hardly any action/reaction
from the state. In one case however, the Tambraparini River Massacre, the
then DMK regime was seen as the main instigator of the violence in which 17
people were killed.. The State appointed the Justice Mohan Commission of
Inquiry and it camr to the magnificent conclusion that the “police were not
at fault”and that the victime drowned because they “did not know how to
swim”. The irony of the situation is that the very parties that soundly
condemned the violence against the workers of the Majoli Tea Estate are
today local allies of the very regime that perpetrated the massacre. Once
again this reinforces the point I am arguing that there is considerable
ambivalence with regard to the issue of state violence directed against the
dalits. The Kudiyankulam Incident fared no better at the hands of the rival
ADMK regime. The Gomathinayakam  Inquiry declared the police innocent of any
act of violence and thereby the state machinery that was deployed so
ruthlessly against the dalits was absolved of all blame. It may be pointed
out that even in the case of the Kilvenmani Massacre the state was at pains
to absolve the perpetrators of any guilt. And the naidu landlord was
declared innocent by the Madras high court after a lackadaisical trail. Shri
Tirumavalavan,a noted dalit politician of the region has observed. “Only the
explanation given by the court for releasing Gopalakrishana Naidu who
committed such horrid murders is amusing and strange. It was: It is not
possible to accept that a mirasdar who was very highly respected in the
society could have involved directly in the murders”. He goes on to say that
*without a shred of evidence, and based on this conjecture, the court
pronounced its judgement that day*.From this we can say with some conviction
that a general consensus with regard to violence against dalits had also
infected the judiciary which by 1968 had come under the stress of Dravidian
politics. The sad fact that the SC&ST Atrocities Suppression Act in Tamil
Nadu has secured so far a single conviction shows that the administrative
and political will to enforce compliance is lacking.



            The introduction of Panchayatiraj government at the local level
through the 73rd Amendment has resulted in the opening of yet another level
of inter societal violence and there is no let up in the intensity of the
attacks. The position of the president of the village governing council
inappropriately called the panchayat, after the gandhian metaphor for the
Indian version of village democracy,is increasingly becoming a contested one
between sections of the dominat castes groups and the dalit groups in the
case of reserved seats. It is obvious that a great deal of government
contracts are routed through the Panchayats and hence the competition for
the post. The murder of Leelavathi, a councilor of Madurai by DMK workers
was direct fallout of the war over government funds and local development
that ruffled the feathers of vested interests. In this case too the response
of the then DMK government was luke warm and no one was either arrested or
prosecuted for the murder.



Certain features of Dravidian political culture are deeply implicated in the
rise of anti-dalit violence in parts of the state. Competitive electoral
politics between the DMK and AIDMK has resulted in a situation wherein the
two major formations account for nearly 56% of the votes polled, with an
average electoral strength ranging from24% to 26% for each of the two
parties. This polarized electorate has made it possible for weak political
actors like the Congress and the BJP to forge alliances with the two giants
of Dravidian politics. Further, the social morphology of the Tamil region,
already alluded to with dominant castes and communities concentrated in
specific regions of Tamil Nadu such as the vanniyars in the north, the
mukkulathors in the south and specific zones in which the kallars and
maravars are numerically dominant in areas of Madurai, Puddukkotttai and
Ramanathapuram, has provided a fertile soil for the proliferation of caste
and clan based political parties. We may add here while the political
rhetoric of such parties in couched in the language of egalitarianism with
regard to the elites in the areas where they operate, the practice of social
and personal discrimination is prevalent in the context of dalit groups.
Social domination and the resultant caste violence is predicated upon the
situational strategy of asserting equality towards the upper castes and
enforcing the ‘inferior” status of the lower castes, particularly that of
dalits. Dravidian political ideology has not been able to bridge the yawning
chasm between the imagined ideal of social justice and equality and the
appalling reality of caste division and hierarchy that operates at the local
panchayat levels.



The social scene of village Tamil Nadu is riven with the visible symbols of
identity and oppression. The flourishing industry of human rights activism
has already documented the existence of the “two tumbler” system in most
parts of rural Tamil Nadu. The enforcement of the two tumbler system in
parts of Madurai and Ramanathapuram and in the vanniyar dominated regions of
South Arcot and Dharmapuri districts is a constant source of tension and
violence. Along with this there are other visible markers of status that are
enforced.  In the habitation areas of the dominant castes the dalits are
forbidden to wear footwear and the men folk are made to tie their upper
cloth round their waists. Such conventions become the cause of violence,
when educated youth resist such display of deference to the higher castes
they invite serious retribution. The temple festival is yet another arena
that generates conflict. In fact the southern districts see a spate of
violence particularly during the annual festivals of the *amman** *shrines
or clan temples. Status assertions vis-à-vis the higher castes and its
negation is another reason for the outbreak of conflict and in such
conflicts the local police and the administration side with the dominant
groups. Given the highly politicized nature of the society with caste
factionalism and party based rivalries any local issue can become the
starting point of a caste conflict.





The Ministry of Home Affairs in its Annual Report for the year 1996-97 has
reported  282 violent castes conflicts in Tamil Nadu, and out of this figure
238 or 84% involved conflict between dalit groups and powerful landed groups
such as the Maravars, the Kallars (often clubbed together as Thevars),
Nadars, Vanniyars and Pallans and other SC communities. The table given
below from the *Justice Mohan Inquiry *Report provides an index of caste
violence in contemporary Tamil Nadu:

*District*

*Number of violent anti-dalit incidents*

*Number killed in clashes*

Madurai

18

9                     3

Theni

41

NA             NA

Dindigul

NA

NA             NA

Virudhanagar

382

12                 24

Ramanathapuram

18

2                 NA

Sivagangai

NA

NA             NA

Tirunelveli

60

14               NA

Tudikudi

1

1                  Nil



* *

*III  PANCHAYAT ELECTIONS AND VIOLENCE*



The violence unleashed against Dalit aspirants to the post of President of
the Panchayat is symptomatic of the larger issue of dalit empowerment under
the Dravidian political dispensation. A problem that considerably complicate
the issue is that the Tamil communities referred to as *Adi-dravidas* are
themselves divided along lines of hierarchy and there is ethnographic
and  anecdotal
information to show that the practice of social exclusion permeates even to
the door step of communities that bear the brunt of anti-dalit violence.
Thus arundhitiyars are generally regarded with a degree of socil distance by
other members of the dalit communities. In the case of panchayats that are
revered for the SC communities the dominant landed groups are quite willing
to support an arunditiyar candidate and make him virtually a rubber stamp of
the local vested interests. Thus the differences within the dalit
communities are exploited by the dominant landed backward caste groups,
supported by the political parties across the Dravidian spectrum. Shri P
Jaggaiyyan, an* arunditttiyar* who was elected to the Presidentship of
Nakkalamuthanpatti in Tirunelveli was killed by the dominant Maravar group
when he refused to let his Vice President, a Maravar himself, to preside
over the Panchayat meetings. This case has not been solved and the DMK
regime is currently trying to arrange a compromise. Similarly, Shri M
Servanan, President of Maruthankinaru village Panchayat was killed when he
refused to allow the husband of the Panchyat vice president, a kallar, to
act as [president in all but name. In this case also no arrest has been
made. In Tirulelveli 10 Panchyat presidents have complained to the
Government about threat to their lives, and all of them are arundittiyars.
The State Government is yet to act. In the case of Shri Chinnan, President
of Vakarai village in Dindigul district, even as President he could not
occupy his chair and made to sit on a stool when the meetings were
conducted. The compromise worked out by the state government when the dalit
presidents complain of being threatened or humiliated involved getting the
president accept his own subordination to the Vice President from the
dominant castes. This unfortunate aspect of Panchayat Raj in Tamil Nadu
needs to be investigated further. In the report of Vishwanathan in Frontline
of May 5, 2007 is the following observation and it is certainly woth
quoting: “The ill treatment meted out to elected dalit panchayat presidents
indicates that untouchability is still practiced in Tamil Nadu villages, 60
years after the constitution abolished it.”. We may add that 40 of those 60
years were under the rule of parties representing the forces of landed
castes classified in the argot of Tamil Nadu as BCs and MBCs. Therefore we
may be right in being cynical about the claims that these parties represent
the forces of equality and social justice. It is well worth exploring
whether the competitive electoral politics in India, with its
first-past-the-winning-post system servers to increase rather than decrease
caste tension and its consequent violence.



The most horrific case of anti dalit violence engendered by the Panchayat
election is the Melavalavu massacre of the dalit president and 6 of his
associates on June 29, 1997.Melavalavu was a maravar dominated village that
was reserved for the SC caste. Dalits who had earlier filed their nomination
for the post of the President of the Panchyat had withdrawn their nomination
when intimidated by the locally dominant groups who were also patronized by
the ADMK. In spite of booth capturing and other acts of electoral
malpractice, Shri K Murugesan was elected President. As has become routine
in Tamil Nadu he was prevented from taking charge of his office and offered
a representation to the government. A small police picket was posted at the
village. Shri M Karunanidhi the Chief Minister of the state was informed of
the threat to the lives of dalit presidents but no action was taken.  On a
bus on the way to Madurai Shri K Murugesan and 6 of his followers were
killed in a brutal manner.



In the violence that followed several buses of the state transport
corporation were burnt. The real cause for tension in the region was the
decision of the Government to name a road transport corporation after Shri
Veeran Sundranarlingam, a noted dalit leader. In the mayhem that followed
caste violence was unleashed all across the southern districts.These
instances show quite clearly that caste tension is simmering under the
surface and that the political parties exploit cast in order to create
disturbances that can be used to generate cast blocs and thereby consolidate
the political base.



*IV Conclusion*

In this paper we have argued that contrary to popular perception, the
political mobilization in the Tamil region takes place along caste lines and
the Backward caste that form the backbone of the political support base for
the 2 dravidian parties are not above using violence in order to generate
electoral gains. We have also documented that the social morphology of the
state with its layered and concentrated distribution of dominant castes
allows for the exploitation of caste as a political resource. It may be said
that the shift to proportional representation will considerably reduce the
dependence of political parties on organized violence as a strategy for
capturing political power.


We have examined the several instances of caste violence starting from the
Kilvanmani Incident of December 25, 1968 to the more recent instances of
such violence and have shown that there is little possibility of anti dalit
violence declining as it is predicated upon the very logic of the political
parties that compete for power. In a larger theoretical sense we can even
argue that the post colonial nation state is in reality an engine of
destruction in which innocent lives are lost.

© Bahu Virupaksha., all rights reserved.Source:
http://bahu-virupaksha.sulekha.com/blog/post/2008/04/beyond-kilvenmani-the-dialectics-of-anti-dalit-violence.htm