[Reader-list] J&K 2008: Let us not learn the wrong lessons

[Pawan Durani]

  J&K 2008: Let us not learn the wrong lessons         Ajay Chrungoo



http://www.vijayvaani.com/FrmPublicDisplayArticle.aspx?id=378

The 2008 elections are now over. A power shift has taken place. The
PDP-Congress alliance has been replaced in the state by the NC-Congress
alliance. The Chief Ministership has reverted back to a Kashmiri for full
six years, if the alliance lasts that long. All the major portfolios like
home, finance, planning, revenue and power have been retained by the
National Conference, signifying the retrieval of the status quo of power.
This status quo had marginally changed during the PDP-Congress alliance.


There are attempts to analyse the assembly verdict in Jammu & Kashmir
through the traditional 'secular' prism and draw inferences which are either
false or far-fetched. Wrong assessments will eventually affect the success
or failure of the 'government' which has been catapulted to power at a
critical time when a stand-off between India and Pakistan is building in
intensity.


*Understanding the failure of Boycott*


The turnout of voters in this election, particularly in the Kashmir valley,
has been phenomenal, more than 50% on average. It is a big victory for the
electoral process in the Kashmir Valley. Many an eminent Kashmir analyst in
New Delhi had prophesied that, "the government will be lucky if they get
more than 10 percent people to come out and vote."


Out of all segments of people living in Jammu & Kashmir, only Kashmiri
Pandits abstained from voting. Their vote percentage was less than 10% and
that too despite the fact that more than 43 Pandit candidates were in the
electoral fray and there was also no boycott call.


Both the factions of Hurriyat Conference campaigned for boycott of elections
well before the onset of elections. JKLF through its protracted
'Safar-e-Azadi' campaign focused eventually on poll boycott at the
conclusion of its rallies and interactions across the length and breadth of
the Valley. Mirwaiz Omar Farooq, Chairman of the All Party Hurriyat
Conference, had declared with confidence that "there will be 100 percent
poll boycott." Ali Shah Geelani, to enlarge the appeal of 'boycott slogan,'
even praised JKLF chief Yasin Malik and stated "we want boycott
Safar-e-Azadi way."


Analysts who conclude that the 2008 elections have been a decisive rebuff to
separatists essentially underline the 'boycott call' as the only
indispensable strategy of the separatists. The flexibility and the deftness
of the strategic interventions of Separatists in the Valley get overlooked
in this formulation. The Separatists' establishment does give consideration
to all such tactics which de-legitimise the democratic process in the state.
But they have always valued deepening of its entrenchment in the power
structures within the state.


Separatism in the Valley has always considered its reach and sway to
influence and control the elected governments in the state as its primary
support structure, perhaps as important as the support of Pakistan.
De-legitimising elections by labelling them as rigged or coerced process, or
by campaigning for boycott, are not simple black and white imperatives which
the Separatists pursue. They operate more in the grey area where they engage
directly or indirectly in the election process. They influence the election
manifesto and party policies of the political formations participating in
elections. They influence the selection of candidates; they throw up proxy
candidates. The most essential objective which is pursued is not to allow
any paradigm shift in state policy and ensure that subversive entrenchment
is only deepened, never eroded.


The entire spectrum of separatist strategies has evolved over a period of
time. Ali Shah Geelani got himself elected to the state assembly, but
relentlessly challenged the Indian constitution and debunked the election
process. Jamaat-i-Islami portrayed the National Conference as its
ideological rival in Kashmir and squarely blamed it for the accession of
Jammu & Kashmir to India. Anti-Jamaat rivalry manifested in the streets when
massive anti-Jamaat riots were led by NC cadres.


But this rivalry was not a black and while phenomenon. A symbiotic
relationship between the NC and Jamaat, particularly in the electoral
sphere, existed right till 2002. Jamaat cadres would mobilise voters for
NC,and NC would reciprocate by increasing Jamaat entrenchment in the
administration. Jamaat and other separatist formations built the same
symbiotic relationship with the newly formed PDP well before 2002, and
carried it right through the elections in 2008.


There was, of course, a conflict of interests between separatist formations
including Jamaat-i-Islami and PDP which came into the public domain in the
last few years. Separatists visualised PDP as a usurper of its agenda. The
stand off between PDP and separatist formations would have continued, but
the terrorist attack in Mumbai changed the course of events in the Valley.
Increased isolation of Pakistan and pressures on separatists' feeder
channels made Jamaat-i-Islami change track. Mufti, as per reports, had been
intensely campaigning for their support.


It is difficult to comment as to when exactly Jamaat decided to come out
whole hog in support of PDP, but its involvement in the elections started
manifesting right after the first phase, and rose to a crescendo in later
phases. Top Jamaat leaders were seen openly campaigning for PDP in Kulgam,
Shopian, Pulwama. Analysts read too much into the anti-election rhetoric of
Ali Shah Geelani, but ignored the traditional line of Jamaat-i-Islami which
maintained distance from boycott call and cautioned that in the prevailing
political scenario such a stance may prove 'counter-productive.' One thing
is very clear. The separatist establishment intervened in the election
process not to boycott as was their public stance, but actually to increase
the turnout of voters.


This assessment does not at all indicate that even if separatists would have
campaigned aggressively for boycott, they would have actually succeeded. In
that eventuality, voter turnout would have been less, but certainly an
improvement over the 2002 elections.


*Other factors*


The rural-urban divide in the Valley and developmental issues were a
dominant consideration for the people.  Sweeping inferences are being drawn
by some analysts in Delhi that the growth of PDP in the Valley is primarily
a reflection of rural-urban divide, rather than of a communal campaign. But
many credible analysts have come out openly to record that PDP campaign had
a brazen communal character. Noted columnist Parveen Swami states, "for the
PDP, the returns from the incendiary communal campaign it ran this summer,
as well as its efforts to reach out to secessionists have been
disappointing."


Immediately after the election results were declared, Dr. Farooq Abdullah
openly accepted that the PDP ran a campaign on 'Islamist agenda'. Many
residents of Kulgam area confided in their Pandit friends that Ms. Mehbooba
Mufti was openly telling voters to choose between a 'school or a mosque'.
"We are for Mosque. If you choose a Mosque, a school will automatically
come. But not the other way." PDP in its expositions has been identifying
with Muslim causes globally, more than NC. It has sought to project
'Self-rule" as more in consonance with the movement of pan-Islamism rather
than of Kashmiri aspirations.


However, underplaying the rural-urban divide as an important influence on
the elections will be equally incorrect. Rural-Urban divide has evolved in
the Kashmir Valley with the emergence of a large rural middle class over the
years, as reflected by the emergence of Mufti Mohd. Sayeed, late Abdul Gani
Lone, Jamaat-i-Islami and MuF.


This time PDP made significant inroads into North Kashmir. PDP won six seats
there, while the NC has done marginally better by winning seven seats.
Central Kashmir, extending between Kangan and Ganderbal with Srinagar as its
core, has been virtually swept by the National Conference. However, PDP
retained its stranglehold on South Kashmir where it won 12 out of 16 seats.
The better performance of PDP is a reflection of the urge of the rural
political class to control political power.


This rural-urban rivalry has deepened over the years and now spilled into
the public domain. Previously this divide was subdued, but now it has burst
into the open and its reverberations can still be heard. Recently, M.G.
Hassan Mukhtar, a freelance journalist, wrote in Kashmir Times: "The
original citizens of Srinagar treat all villagers as second class
irrespective of the language they speak. If a villager goes to moon the
urbanities would never digest it and rather pull his legs... In reality the
superiority complex (read inferiority complex of foolishness) of urban
fellows on the basis of nothing towards villagers is not a good thing." In
Srinagar this bitterness can be gauged by a cursory talk on politics at a
vegetable vendors' shop or a burger shop.


The increased developmental process in rural areas during the PDP-Congress
regime has heightened the divide. Mufti used the Prime Minister's Gram Sadak
Yojna to build extensive road connectivity, particularly in South Kashmir.
Any village with a population of 500 or more was connected by a metalled
road. A large portion of the 24,000 crore special aid package to Kashmir was
spent in rural areas. Creation of development authorities in Gulmarg,
Tangmarg Pahalgam, Sonmarg and many other places hastened the developmental
process in rural areas which translated into political benefits for Mufti.


Mufti has not only used the fundamentalist card and soft secessionist
slogans, but also the rural-urban divide and developmental slogans to
stabilise his party. The NC retained its previous number of 28 in the
assembly; PDP increased its tally from 18 to 21. In 2008 elections there has
been an overall swing of 5 percent in favour of PDP, which has shown a
tendency to grow all over the Valley and made a dent in certain areas of
Jammu. Chief Minister Omar Abdullah acknowledged this trend openly: "the
results definitely gave a fair idea that PDP is making inroads everywhere in
Valley. I think we need to take stock of it."


*Jammu results
*
Belittling the communal contours of PDP's rise, 'liberal' analysts infer a
rise of communal stridency in the Jammu region which columnists like Prem
Shankar Jha describe as 'historical,' as if it is integral to the attitude
of people in Jammu. Even a better informed journalist like Parveen Swami
does not contest such sweeping generalizations and comments that "despite
the apparently dramatic improvement in BJP's fortunes, which have taken it
from just one seat in 2002 to 11 now, Hindu chauvinism hasn't yielded
exceptional pay-offs." The massive support to the Amarnath agitation in
Jammu and heightened consciousness about the systematic and organised
discrimination meted out to Jammu is an expression of Hindu chauvinism for
'liberal' intellectuals in India. This is perhaps expression of a faulty
vision which recognises concessions to Muslim identity politics in J&K as a
secular imperative.


In Jammu province, Congress won 13 seats and BJP 11 seats. There was almost
a 3 percent negative swing against Congress and a 10 percent swing in favour
of the BJP. The latter was the runner-up in 13 seats and number three in 7
constituencies in Jammu region, which means it has now decisively staked its
claim for at least 30 constituencies in Jammu. But is the rise of BJP an
outcome of communal polarisation in the aftermath of Amarnath agitation?
Certain features of the election outcome in Jammu have to be recognised to
answer this question.


BJP candidates lost in most of the constituencies where the intensity of
Amarnath agitation was high. It suffered defeat in Kathua, Billawar, Samba
Vijaypur, Bishnah, Gandhi Nagar, Chhamb, Akhnoor Udhampur, Chenani and
Ramban. Mostly Congress candidates won from these constituencies, with one
each going to National Conference and JK National Panthers Party.


Congress lost to BJP in constituencies where the Amaranth agitation was
weak, like Reasi, Basohli and Bani. The defeat of Shilpi Verma, widow of
Kuldeep Verma, martyr of Amarnath agitation, is revealing. Also notable is
the fact that Congress candidates who won had a better record as MLA's or
ministers and also supported the Amarnath agitation. Sham Lal Sharma from
Akhnoor and Raman Bhalla from Gandhi Nagar are the best examples of this.


Almost all Congress ministers in the previous assembly lost this time, such
as Mangat Ram Sharma and Gulchain Singh Charak. They did not come out openly
in favour of Amarnath agitation. Even star campaigners of BJP like L.K.
Advani, Rajnath Singh, Narendra Modi, Arun Jaitly, Murli Manohar Joshi,
Navjot Singh Sidhu could not succeed in wooing voters against Congress
candidates who had performed well as sitting MLAs and unambiguously
identified with the sentiment of Jammu.


*Sidelights*

It may be pertinent to record some observations for the future. Sakina Itoo
won from South Kashmir against the tide of Islamists. Mohd. Yusuf Tarigami
of CPM defeated his PDP rival for whom Jamaat led a no-holds-barred
campaign. Mr. Tarigami, who at every opportunity supported the separatists'
cause and undermined the exodus of Kashmiri Pandits, seemed trailing almost
to the end of the counting process, only to sail across after a few hundred
Pandit votes cast in his favour were counted towards the end.


Kashmiri Pandit votes cast in small numbers showed preference for the NC
where the main choice was between NC and PDP. Dr. Shafi of PDP won from
Beerwah constituency by a mere 124 votes, which included 80 votes from KP's.
This may be an exception because he was favoured not for his party
affiliation and was considered a better person having close relationship
with the Pandits of his constituency.


Congress won 3 seats from Kashmir Valley, and did well in 5 more
constituencies. It has at least a clear demarcated chunk of 10 assembly
seats to work for in the next elections


*Conclusion*

The 2008 mandate can stabilise the situation if NC plays its cards well.
After 2002 elections, the NC adopted a policy line of mirroring or aping the
PDP line. It changed its policy on Pakistan and terrorism hoping to steal a
march ahead of the PDP. At election time, the fundamentalist establishment
and Pakistan made a choice in favour of the PDP, leaving it in the lurch.
Will NC ride the same ideological bandwagon?


Congress has survived on the edge. Will it ignore its legislative base as it
has done in the past and loose its relevance in Jammu?


BJP enthused by the response of the people during the elections, and hoping
to win around 25 seats, threw enough hints that it was ready to join hands
with the PDP or NC to come to power. It has shown willing to dispense with
its ideological baggage, for which it still has space in Jammu. Will it play
the power game or the role of an instrument to bring a fundamental change in
power balance in favour of Jammu?


CPM has survived as a sole presence in the present assembly from Kulgam
constituency in Kashmir Valley. Jamaat declared it a party of 'Kuffar' but
people still voted it to power in a stiff battle. Will CPIM still flirt with
Muslim communalism and separatism as it has done so far?


The future in J&K is pregnant with possibilities, good and bad.

*


Dr. Ajay Chrungoo is chairman, Panun Kashmir
*