[Reader-list] News Items posted on the net on Multipurpose National Identity Cards-94

[Taha Mehmood]

http://www.indianexpress.com/news/the-guy-next-door/344514/0

The guy next door

Bibek Debroy


Measured in fatalities and injuries, the worst terrorist attacks have
been in New York, Al-Qataniyah (Iraq), Al-Adnaniyah (Iraq), Abadan,
Beslan, Bombay (1993), Nairobi, Dar es Saalam, Beirut, Ben Talha
(Algeria), Ami Moussa (Algeria), Mecca, Sidi Moussa (Algeria), Hais
Rais (Algeria), Kuta, Baghdad, Mumbai (2006), Moscow, Oklahoma,
Sophia, Anuradhapura, Karachi, Manila, Colombo, Kandahar and so on.
Within India, in addition to Mumbai, we have Coimbatore, Srinagar,
Delhi, Jammu, Varanasi, Malegaon, Hyderabad, Jaipur, Bangalore and
Ahmedabad, not to mention Surat. Given terrorist objectives, attacks
work when there is a concentration of people. The Akshardham temple,
Sankatmochan Mandir (Varanasi) and Mecca Masjid (Hyderabad) follow the
same logic. Barring planes and trains, terrorism is an urban
phenomenon. Naxalite violence is somewhat different. This is Carlos
Marighella in his1969 Mini-Manual of the Urban Guerrilla: "The
Government has no alternative except to intensify its repression. The
police networks, house searches, the arrest of suspects and innocent
persons, and the closing off of streets make life in the city
unbearable." There are reasons why cities evolved, all centred around
positive externalities — transport, other infrastructure and services,
security and protection, larger markets, economies of scale and scope
in production and distribution, labour markets.


After the recent round of attacks, there will be discussions on
cross-border effects, ineffectiveness of intelligence, under-manning
of police, the proposed federal counter-terrorism agency and
ineffectiveness of the judicial system. In its attempt to be fair to
the accused, the judicial system imposes collateral damage on the
innocent. Why should it be different when the accused are terrorists?
These points are extremely important. However, let's focus on the
urban aspect: any urban Indian resident will now be exposed to police
barricades and metal detectors. No bombs have ever been identified
through metal detectors, and no terrorists have ever been caught
through barricades. We will be told gathering preventive intelligence
in cities is impossible. Every individual is anonymous. Terrorists
have imbibed Mao Zedong's adage to guerrillas: they disappear like
fish in the sea. But that's not really true. An individual is
anonymous only if one looks at a city as a unified urban
agglomeration. No city is like that. The residential areas of every
city are nothing but modernised villages, connected to each other
through networks of the kind that made cities evolve. Am I, however,
anonymous to the centralised police system? I probably am, because no
one remembers police verification at the time of passport-issuance. Am
I anonymous to the local police station? I probably am, because data
collected at the time of passport-issuance has not percolated through
to local police.

I am probably even anonymous to my neighbours, because no one has time
for others. But that doesn't mean I am anonymous within my residential
community. Residents' welfare association, private security guards
employed by them, cable-TV provider, internet provider, newspaper
vendor, local taxi stand, neighbourhood shop, home-delivery food
outlets, electrician, plumber, parking attendant at shopping centre,
these are all instances of people who know who I am. It is impossible
to exist without leaving a trail and I am not anonymous vis-à-vis
them.  While the precise list may vary from one kind of residential
area to another, such facilitatory networks generate enough
information. It is just that this isn't factored into
intelligence-gathering. If we expect police or other centralised
counter-intelligence bodies to gather preventive intelligence, it
simply won't work. We will only have knee-jerk reactions of barricades
and metal-detectors. The state of high-alert will pass and we will
have another terrorist attack. There is a Model Police Act now, which
has an explicit provision for bringing in community-level
organisations. However, few states have implemented that particular
provision. In a similar vein, labour market and consumption networks
also generate enough information. Why isn't this gathered and
processed? This is more than the knee-jerk idea of requiring every
bicycle-purchaser to provide identity cards. Incidentally, no identity
card seems to be required for purchasing explosives. There is a
broader issue of the unorganised nature of many commercial
transactions. In a developing country that's inevitable. But while
small may be beautiful, beauty has nothing to do with business. Large
and organised, not government-induced smallness, is good for business.
It is also good for security.

What identity cards are bicycle-purchasers going to produce?  Forget
counterfeit versions of identity cards. Genuine ones like ration cards
and driving licences can be obtained through agents for payment of
fees. In other words, government-delivered systems of such cards are
ridden with corruption and don't help the cause of security. What
happened to the biometric national identity card that now goes by the
name of multi-purpose national identity card (MNIC)? It started in
2002 under the NDA, was mentioned by Abdul Kalam in his August 15,
2006 speech and has been quietly continued by the UPA since July 2004,
with pilot projects in 20 sub-districts. Most pilots are in border
regions; the only exceptions are Goa, Delhi, Andhra, Puducherry and
Tamil Nadu, of which, only Delhi and Goa are urban in any sense. Among
other things, MNIC will also link databases connected with admissions
in educational institutes, health/medical services, ticket booking,
SC/ST/OBC status, old-age pensions/disability, birth/marriage/death,
property transactions, PDS, NREGA and the financial sector. In
principle, this inter-connectivity should enable double-checks and
reduce fraud.

But there are questions. Why is the government so quiet about the
MNIC? This is so hush-hush that the website is still under
construction, after four years. If cities are the focus of terrorism,
why are Goa and Delhi the only urban centres for pilots?
Implementation should be easier in urban India. For instance, in
Murshidabad, according to reports, the pilot couldn't verify 90 per
cent of the population. Given government track records, why isn't one
outsourcing part of the identification function, including the use of
communities? PAN cards never took off until their issuance was partly
outsourced. Rather oddly, India provides IT services to the rest of
the world and this encompasses security too. But we don't use that
skill and expertise at home. We also need another POTA — Prevention of
Torpid Attitude.

The writer is a noted economist express at expressindia.com