[Reader-list] Operation Darind - A Lightening Raid: Counter-Insurgency Operations in Kashmir

[Pawan Durani]

Major Yoginder Kandhari was commissioned in Indian Army in 1976.
During his Army career, besides tenure as an instructor in Indian
Military Academy, Dehradun, he has had a varied experience of
insurgency situations having participated in counter insurgency
operations in Assam, Punjab and Jammu & Kashmir. During his tenure in
Kashmir Valley, from 1993 to 1997, Major Kandhari had a number of
successes, against insurgents, to his credit. Major Kandhari sought
premature retirement from Army in 1998. Since then he has been a
regular contributor of articles on defence matters to various
newspapers and magazines.
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Operation Darind - A Lightening Raid

Counter-Insurgency Operations in Kashmir

By Yoginder Kandhari
Militants in Kashmir Valley always framed their own rules of the
combat game. Their activities often subsided during winter months as
much for closure of passes as for severity of cold. Unfortunately,
security forces never exploited this combat procrastination, on the
part of militants, so as to seize tactical initiative which mostly
sides with the later in low intensity combat situations. Winter months
often gave one an impression of an undeclared truce between the two
sides, militants, on one hand, staying away from combat out of
tactical compulsion of conserving manpower and material, while, on the
other hand, there would be a virtual cessation of operations by
security forces with their higher echelons conspicuous by their
absence on ‘winter‘leave, almost en mass. During winter months, combat
management was left to the wisdom of junior commanders who were
unwilling to take any chances since their initiatives had been blunted
by confused higher commanders who refused to stand by their
subordinates in crisis situations conjured up by the third dimension
of insurgency, the human rights bogey. It may be pertinent to mention
here that security forces often reaped handsome dividends whenever
they kept up momentum of counter-insurgency operation through the
winter months. But such instances were very few to come by and the
raid launched by our troops in village Darind is one such instance to
substantiate this observation.

The month of February in year 1995 was no different since both
climatic temperature and militant activities had frozen. Even
intelligence inputs, through formal channels, had dried up. One could
keep himself abreast of only localized militant activities and that
too through local contacts. Our column of troops was located at Zakura
on Srinagar-Leh road. Right from the onset of militancy in 1990 and
upto 1994, Zakura was only a summer location for troops tasked to keep
Srinagar-Leh road open for winter stocking in Leh sector. However, in
1994 we were ordered to stay back in the area even after closure of
Srinagar-Leh road and were tasked to dominate the area during winter
months. Our area of responsibility included the highway stretch from
Zakura to Nunar in the North and the area to the east of this road
stretch. Area to the west of the road was under operational
responsibility of Border Security Force. Our area included notorious
places like Ganderbal, Malshahi Bagh, Darind, Rangil and the
mountainous range to the east of the highway. In fact, domination of
Ganderbal was strategically vital since most infiltration routes
passed through it and militants were free to wander any where in the
Valley provided they managed to screen off their movement through this
area. Quite naturally, Ganderbal, and the areas around it, had a large
presence of militants who would stage-manage smooth transiting of
militants by engaging security forces in frequent fire fights.
Needless to say that security forces would often party over a militant
killed or a weapon captured but would be blissfully ignorant of groups
of heavily armed militants sneaking past just under their very nose.
Hence, it was essential to neutralize the local cadres of militants if
we were to upset their larger design. Having been ordered to stay back
in Zakura and with our combat responsibilities defined, one got down
to establishing a reliable intelligence network in order to gain real
time information about the militants.

Adjacent to our location, in Zakura, was another column of troops
whose area of responsibility was to south of Zakura astride the
highway. Commander of this column, a gentle man from south India,
faced enormous difficulties in cultivating local sources for obvious
reasons. That this column had no success to show was no aspersion on
its professional ability or sincerity. One could not help but
empathize with column commander’s dilemma and to assist him in all
possible ways. Initially, he was skeptical about my offers for combat
leaders in the Valley mostly wanted to ride on others’ shoulders to
corner glory. One must admit, to his credit, that he was quickly to
discern sincerity in my offers and readily agreed to coordinate our
efforts in the larger interest. Initially, our joint efforts did not
yield results. In fact, militants would often get prior information
about our plans and pre-empt our raids or cordon operations. It did
not take us long to find out that a JCO of the neighboring column was
a bit too loud with our operational secrets. This compelled us to
withhold operational plans till the very last moment and the results
started pouring in.

Intelligence inputs: One had been getting inputs from locals about
presence of section strength of Hizb -ul- Mujahideen (HM) militants
comprising of their commander and five others. Starved of funds from
across the border during winter months, this section had been on
rampage to raise funds for Jihad. Locals were fed up because of their
persistent demands for cash. This precisely was the reason why locals
shared information with us. Ghulam Nabi, alias Sahib Dandana, the
section commander, belonged  to a village atop the mountain range over
looking Rangil, Dardind and Malshahi Bagh. Sufi saint Baba Dariyadin’s
Ziyarat is located in this village. The village itself is known as
Baba Dariyadin. Though this village had a number of hideouts, yet
these Jihadis would come down to the foot hills in search of food and
funds. They would normally enjoy the morning sun in Rangil Water Works
Complex (see sketch). Located on a high ground, this Complex provided
them domination, by observation, over the area.  A number of attempts
by us to apprehend or eliminate these militants failed because of this
tactical advantage to militants. As soon as the troops would peel off
the highway on road to Rangil or Malshant Bagh, militants, forewarned
of our intentions, would melt into nearby villages. Naturally, we had
to plan with ingenuity to offset this tactical disadvantage.

Plan: The plan envisaged a swift vehicle based movement by the sister
column through Rangil to raid the Water Works Complex. In conjunction
with this operation, my column was  to undertake routine patrolling
of the highway towards Ganderbal and then turn back  to launch a
lightening raid in village Dardind, hoping to catch fleeing militants
unawares. In order to increase chances of militants being channelized
into village Darind consequent to raid on Water Works Complex, a
deception plan was conceived. Prior to actual operations our two
columns jointly dominated Rangil and Malshahi Bagh by raiding all
known militant hideouts therein and deliberately leaving village
Darind untouched. A local militant, belonging to Malshahi bagh, helped
us in locating the hideouts and he was to be used as ‘spotter’ during
the intended operations. In order to ensure that plan was not leaked
out by overenthusiastic troops, I decided to keep the plan to myself
till the very last

Execution: February 4th, 1995 was selected as D-day. I called the
neighbouring commander a day before and requested him to launch a
swift raid on Rangil Water Work Complex the next day. In interest of
secrecy, I withheld all other operational details from him. At the
appointed time, both the columns moved out of their locations on
respective missions. I retained radio control of the joint mission. As
planned, my columns moved towards Ganderbal area. To my surprise, I
found that another battalion had launched a cordon and search
operation in Ganderbal. That we had no prior information about this
operation in itself speaks volumes about poor coordination between
various troops of same organization; leave aside total absence of
coordination between different security agencies.

On confirmation that other column had reached the target area, I
requested him to stay put in the Complex till further instructions. I
turned back and wanted to head straight for village Darind. On my way
back, I was stopped by the troops who had launched operation in
Ganderbal. They requested assistance of my ‘spotter’. Reluctantly, I
agreed to loan him for half an hour. In hindsight, this delay turned
out to be a blessing in disguise.

For the final execution of the raid, I took on the wheels. Besides the
‘spotter’ my personal security guard and driver were traveling in my
vehicle. We were followed by a heavier vehicle carrying a JCO and
seven other ranks, all ready to jump to action. As soon as I reached
Darind junction, I speedily turned my vehicle onto the track leading
to Draind. I managed to speed through the muddy village track. At the
dead end of the village we spotted two militants, barely five meters
away from us, basking in the sun. Our delay at Ganderbal had helped us
by lulling these two Jihadis into a tactical complacency. Startled,
both took position behind an electric pole, aiming at us point blank.
I accelerated my vehicle and sped menacingly towards them in a bid to
unnerve them and, hoping like hell, to disturb their aim. This bold
action worked. Instead of firing at us they took to their heels.
Before we could manage ourselves out of the vehicle, one of them threw
his weapon and vanished out of our sight. My driver chased him leaving
me stranded and unarmed in this hostile area. He had picked my AK
rifle from the vehicle in a flash. Later, it was revealed that my
driver had not collected his weapon before leaving the camp. Soon
enough, I saw other vehicle struggling up the slushy track. Subedar
Sohan Lal, always an asset in a combat situation, swiftly swung into
action. He picked up the abandoned weapon and fanned his troops to
look for the second militant. Interestingly, inside a house he
discovered an innocent looking man panting heavily and engaged in
embroidery work. This aroused his suspicious. Spot frisking and snap
interrogation revealed him to be much sought after Gulam Nabi, the
selection commander. Besides apprehending him we also recovered two
AK47 rifles, six AK magazines, 162 live rounds and eight hand
grenades. We launched a thorough search for the second militant in the
area but all in vain. He probably managed to sneak out of our sight
through numerous undulations in the ground. Having abandoned his
weapon, he in any case was a liability for his Tanzim. We gave up the
search. Sure enough, this militant was summarily executed by his own
colleagues for sowing timidity and for failure to pay up a huge amount
for losing his weapon.

With Ghulam Nabi in our custody, we had a lot more to achieve which we
did but I reserve those details for some other time.



Source: Kashmir Sentinel