[Reader-list] "Mass Incidents"

Jeebesh jeebesh at sarai.net
Wed Jun 17 11:58:36 IST 2009


Dear All, This is an fascinating account of the crisis in China. In  
2007 around 90,000 riots and public disturbances was recorded. This  
was from police record. It shows a society in great turmoil and deep  
transformation. Since the identity based mobilizations is not strong  
in China, the material basis of many of the conflicts are much freely  
discussed than in India. Maybe we can learn something from here.  
warmly, jeebesh.

(The following article is from Xinhuanet.com. Translated by E. Shih)
http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2009/06/xinhua-improving-our-ability-to-react-to-mass-incidents-12/

2009 will possibly be a year with an unusual concentration of mass  
incidents.

  In response to the new situation that social harmony and stability  
face in 2009, Outlook News Weekly has expressly invited three of our  
journalists who are on the frontlines, specialists on this issue, for  
their predictions and analysis. They believe that 2009 could be a year  
with many mass incidents. At the same time, heightened sensitivity and  
early planning, combined with innovative thinking and comprehensive  
mechanisms, could bring about a deepening of reform, creating new  
opportunities for social harmony.

(Huang Huo, Xinhua News Chief at the Chongqing bureau; Guo Bensheng,  
Xinhua News Editorial Board Member at the Jiangsu bureau; Zhong  
Yuming, Xinhua News Assistant Editor-in-Chief at the Guangdong bureau)

  Are mass incidents entering a period of high concentration?

     Huang Huo: Without question, we’ve already entered a period of  
highly concentrated mass incidents. Furthermore, 2009 may also be the  
year that Chinese society will face many contradictions and conflicts  
in a way that will test the governance at every level of Party  
government.

   At the moment, the most sensitive problem is that of working to  
stop the financial tsunami’s metamorphosis from economic pressure to a  
social crisis. The focus has been on maintaining economic growth,  
guaranteeing employment, protecting the people’s livelihood and  
maintaining stability.

  The effects of the financial crisis on our country are becoming  
increasingly severe. Many small to medium size businesses on the coast  
are stopping production or closing down altogether. Large numbers of  
peasants are returning to rural areas, increasing employment pressures  
there. At the same time, the number of next year’s college graduates  
added to the number of this year’s unemployed graduates will be over 7  
million. Even assuming the country can maintain 8 percent growth in  
2009, there would only be 8 million jobs created. What’s more, 2008  
was the last year that China’s state-owned enterprises went into  
strategic bankruptcy, unavoidably leading to the resignation or  
unemployment of more workers than the year before. As employment  
difficulties and a high unemployment rate cause crises for individual  
livelihood, social contradictions will likely to come into the  
foreground.

Because of this, the most sensitive problem at the moment is that of  
“employment.” That problem can be further divided into two groups: the  
“peasant” problem and the “college graduate” problem. To the peasant  
migrant workers, the city has become home—especially for the  
“post-80s” second-generation migrants. Their salary expectations are  
higher than those of their parents, but their tolerance level is lower  
and their will to stay in the city is much stronger.

     According to a survey in Chongqing, among those counties which  
have a large population of exported contract workers, nearly 80  
percent of peasants who return to their rural homes express  
unwillingness to stay in the villages and say they are willing to stay  
in the city even if they cannot find employment. If large numbers of  
peasant workers cannot find work and have no income for over half a  
year in 2009, this will result in a floating urban population, and the  
problem will become much worse.

  The employment of college graduates is thus not only central to the  
employment issue, but also to the question of social fairness.  
Education is the main channel of “upward” social mobility for those in  
the lower levels of society. For those in the lower levels, despair  
can be staved off as long as they have hope for their children. If  
large numbers of average families discover that their costly  
investment in their children’s education is only repaid with  
“unemployment upon graduation, it could easily affect social harmony.  
The sensitive periods of 2009 are the month immediately following  
Chinese New Year, during peasants leave home in large numbers to find  
work; and in July, directly before and after college students graduate.

  What are the new and unique characteristics of current mass incidents?

     Huang Huo: Currently, systemic change, structural adjustment and  
social reform have touched, in a broad sense, the fields of economics,  
politics and culture among others; they have also touched, on a deeper  
level, the concrete economic interests of the people. Considering mass  
incidents against this greater context, we find that a good majority  
of the incidents occur because the masses are protecting personal  
economic interest. Interest groups have spontaneously organized,  
grabbing government attention through collective action and thereby  
obtaining the government’s validation and protection for personal  
interests.

As a result, mass incidents reflect a continuity with the past in  
their usage of “contradictions among the people” as a rationale, and  
must avoid a willful descent into “politicization.” Party officials  
must pay close attention to mass incidents without making mountains  
out of molehills and seeing them as colossal “political incidents.”  
Treating these incidents as anti-government actions and subsequently  
suppressing them with strong force would be the precise method of  
exacerbating problems, and would have the direct result of aggravating  
the opposition between officials and civilians.

The common characteristics of current mass incidents can be summarized  
as follows: social contradictions have already formed certain  
foundations of society and the masses, creating a powder keg ready to  
explode at the first hint of a flame. Conflicts escalate extremely  
rapidly; confrontation is intense; the destruction to society is  
sizable; appropriate management is difficult. At the same time, behind  
the seemingly random “sparks,” there is always a pile of “tinder.”  
This causes small incidents to escalate quickly, evolving into a large- 
scale, intense conflict. This shows that in a period of constant  
change in greater social interest and personal interests, a social  
crisis can be instigated by a contagion of dissatisfaction among the  
people. Even a street brawl could turn into an irrational mass venting  
that engulfs the whole city.

Recently, mass incidents have had one other new characteristic. The  
“PX” incident in Xiamen and the Chongqing rental car strike, among  
others, are “non-traditional mass incidents.” In contrast to past  
instances of mass incidents, in which hotheaded masses rioted and  
looted, and intense violent conflict occurred between the police and  
the civilians, these protesters express their demands and fight for  
personal interests through a “non-violent non-cooperative” method.  
This has to do with social improvement, but it is also dependent on  
the tolerance and political wisdom of local government. Both sides are  
conscious of the fact that negotiation, compromise and peaceful  
methods are much less costly solutions than violence.

How can we find the boundaries of propriety in managing mass incidents?

Huang Huo: In the past few years, a contagion of “maladjustment” to  
mass incidents has been plaguing local governments. Examples of bad  
judgment and inappropriate handling are ubiquitous. Yet recently,  
local government’s standards for handling problems have improved with  
regards to mass incidents. Whether it’s the rationale behind the  
handling of the problem or the methods themselves, there has been a  
certain amount of change, demonstrating an “aptitude for learning.”

  For example, on the level of open access to information and guidance  
of public opinion, the government had always remained silent in the  
past. This led to the propagation of rumors and false news. Now, the  
local governments distribute information much more quickly,  
transmitting their own voice, as in the “Weng’an Incident” and the  
“Yunnan Menglian Incident.” Moreover, these local governments have  
gained valuable references on civilian livelihood and conflict from  
the handling of such cases as the “Chongqing Taxi Driver Strike”  
through the information age.

  Although they have improved to a certain extent, some localities are  
still learning many lessons in how not to handle mass incidents. The  
lesson that stands out is that of local governments have not fully  
understood their duties, and have not held strictly to a principle of  
“unbiased government” in the midst of market capitalist struggle. On  
the contrary, they bound themselves to powerful interest groups. They  
transformed the motto of “ruling for the people” into “serving the  
boss” and “serving capital.” They then went as far as to use heavy- 
handed measures against civilians during the mass incidents. The  
“Yunnan Menglian Incident” is a classic case.

  Another lesson involves cadres being willing to speak the truth and  
to face contradictions. This requires a systematic acculturation and  
evaluation of cadres.

The central government has admitted that this is a “period of  
outstanding contradictions;” but on the way from implementation to  
concrete acts of execution, many local governments also ask the lower  
levels to “remain incident free” and to avoid mass incidents. Having  
no appeals to high-level authorities, no one travelling to Beijing to  
make demands: this is called “stability.” It has also become an  
important measure of the cadre’s performance and promotion record.  
Because of this, the lower level officials do not dare reveal problems  
to their superiors or speak the truth. Instead, they do all in their  
power to suppress negative information and move mountains to obstruct  
those who would make appeals to the central government. Only when the  
problem becomes too big do they report to their superiors.

If “stability” becomes a kind of “social control,” then in terms of  
practical execution it becomes a matter of: “keeping things under  
control is stability, pacification is ability, having no incidents is  
real skill, and compromise is harmony.” This naturally causes mass  
incidents to follow the expansive pattern of “small to big, big to  
explosive.”

  Zhong Yuming: Local governments need to be particularly careful to  
avoid “drinking poison to quench thirst”: In other words, in the name  
of quickly achieving peace, they will pay off whoever needs to be paid  
off and release whomever it is demanded they release. The letter and  
procedure of the law are thrown to the four winds. This results in the  
amelioration process of mass incidents turning into “anti-legalization  
precedents.”

Currently, there is a tacit “gold standard” for some local governments  
dealing with mass incidents: to disperse the crowds as quickly as  
possible. They do not query too deeply into the issue of whether or  
not the methods are legal, or what effects they might have on social  
management thereafter.

In order to “quench their thirst” quickly, some local governments do  
not follow legal procedures in dealing with mass incidents in the name  
of efficiency.

     With this kind of temptation, the crowds are more likely to  
“follow justification” instead of “following the law”: if my interests  
have suffered, then I have “justification” and I am allowed to create  
havoc as I please. The government must immediately satisfy my demands.

     The more quickly the government satisfies mass demands, the more  
irritable the public psychology becomes. It becomes a mentality of  
expecting near “instant gratification.” The people worry that as soon  
as the gathered crowd disperses and the media attention moves to its  
next target, the government will simply become indifferent. Even  
matters such as the reform of rules concerning taxis and a crackdown  
on illegal cars, matters that require a colossal investment of human  
and material resources, there is an expectation for immediate  
effectiveness. When certain medical accidents set off a mass incident,  
there are objective limitations to the method of solving of the case.  
Sometimes exams take half a month to run; but the media will often  
express dissatisfaction with words such as: “It’s been four days since  
the incident occurred, and the case has still had no developments.”

In order to quickly “quench the thirst,” the “rich governments” spend  
money to buy the peace, forcing “poor governments” and enterprises to  
face difficulties. For example, when the Hejun toy factory in  
Zhangmutou township, Dongguan closed down, the boss ran away. The  
local government immediately promised to step up and pay the entirety  
of the workers’ salary. The workers were extremely satisfied, and  
immediately demanded compensation beyond the owed salary. Zhangmutou  
happily paid, and the media reported on it shamelessly. Before this,  
the Hejun toy factory had built a second factory in the Guangdongshan  
zone, and it also closed down. While the “example” of Dongguan sat  
before the workers’ eyes, the Shan zone government was not as well- 
endowed as Dongguan and was filled with worry. In order to “quench the  
thirst” quickly, they use violence against mass incidents, and some  
locales turn a blind eye to violations of relevant national laws. The  
state departments’s “Letters and Visits Decree” has lost legitimacy.  
The stipulation of “recommending five representatives” has been  
ignored. Some local police departments would detain a number of the  
violent participants, and the crowd would immediately add “release the  
prisoners!” to its “demands,” declaring that “we won’t leave until you  
release the prisoners!” As a result, in order to avoid “not having a  
good exit,” the police departments are hesitant even in the matter of  
detaining violent actors. In disputes over state-expropriated land,  
some people obstruct construction and destroy equipment, or attack  
government and construction workers. We don’t hear often of these  
people being subjected to the law.


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