[Reader-list] Capacity-building a must to eliminate Maoists

[Aditya Raj Kaul]

***Capacity-building a must to eliminate Maoists*

*India must raise a new agency to fight the last stage of
counter-insurgency, write Sushant K Singh & Nitin Pai *

No security force — not even the Army — has the capacity to carry out these
tasks on the necessary scale. Even if financial resources are expended to
create this capacity it would fundamentally distract them from their core
competence.

The solution, therefore, is to create a new form of civilian capacity with
the specific purpose of tackling counter-insurgency at the fundamental
level. Civilian capacity is both relatively cost-effective and better suited
to delivering governance and development. Placing counter-insurgency
management under civilian command will accord greater legitimacy for the
mission — it will not be seen as an ‘occupation’ by Central security forces
— and facilitate eventual handover of the area to the local administration.

If India is to break from the vicious cycles of the past — where
insurgencies are never quite extinguished — the Central Government must
create a new, dedicated statutory organisation to engage in the endgame of
counter-insurgency. We shall use the acronym CIMPCOR, or Civilian Military
Partnership for Conflict Resolution to describe it. It will enable the
Government to extend its non-military authority and lay the foundations for
the rule of law and basic governance in areas cleared of Maoists.

*Mandate: * CIMPCOR’s mandate should be to fill the gap between emergency
humanitarian assistance and longer-term development assistance. It should be
charged with the responsibility to put in place the building blocks for
sustainable development, by building basic infrastructure, delivering basic
public services and unleashing economic freedom. It should have
institutional mechanisms to partner with the security forces, the local
political and community leaders and specialist Government agencies engaged
in agriculture, education, power, telecommunications and water resources
development.

*Governance: * Administratively, CIMPCOR should be placed under a revamped
Home Ministry — but with senior-level staff drawn from various Ministries
and the Planning Commission. At the present time the Home Ministry has too
much on its plate to be able to devote its resources towards internal
security, leave alone development in conflict situations. The case of the
National Disaster Management Authority — which remains a fledgling years
after its formation — suggests that merely creating a new specialised agency
is not the full answer: The Ministry must re-orient itself towards the new
priorities. If this is not possible for any reason, the next best
alternative is to place CIMPCOR as an autonomous agency under the Prime
Minister’s Office.

*Staffing: * CIMPCOR’s staffing could be drawn from three streams: First, a
core staff charged with building and maintaining the capacity to engage in
short to medium-term interventions anywhere in India. Second, its deployable
resources could be ‘lend-leased’ from the armed forces, Central paramilitary
forces, Government departments, NGOs and some public-sector units (banks,
for instance). Third, it could draw from a reserve of individual specialists
— with expertise in various domains and experience in various regional
contexts — employed through a system of call-down contracts.

To ensure co-ordination with the security forces engaged in the Hold stage,
CIMPCOR should have adequate representation of serving and retired security
forces personnel at all levels. To use the ‘Rotterdam principle’, CIMPCOR
“should be as civilian as possible and as military as necessary.” Where
circumstances dictate that the security forces play a key role in executing
development tasks — like the road through the Red Corridor — their role
would be clearly defined, with the transition process identified. In any
case, the responsibility for carrying out the development work should rest
with CIMPCOR.

If insurgencies in general and Maoism in particular are the biggest threats
to internal security, then it must follow that CIMPCOR must be staffed and
led by exemplary individuals — from Government and private sectors.

*Readiness: * In terms of operational readiness, CIMPCOR should be capable
of deploying planning teams within 10 days and project execution teams
within two months.

It must have the capability to conduct assessments; design, implement and
evaluate development programmes; provide local administration; manage
contractors and funding agencies; and provide consultation and training to
State Government departments to facilitate early transition to local
control. Its role should be catalytic — by providing staff and trainers — in
rejuvenating State Governments’ agencies and personnel.

*Deployment terms: * CIMPCOR’s deployment could vary from six months to two
years, but should be capped — perhaps at no more than three years. This is
important: For a long-term deployment of CIMPCOR would undermine the very
purpose of creating an institution; the aim being to facilitate a quick and
smooth return to normalcy, without affecting the development goals while
preserving the military success achieved by the security forces against the
insurgents. An exit strategy should be written into CIMPCOR’s charter,
mandating the transfer of responsibilities to the State Government to start
within one year of its deployment.

There are several areas in India where CIMPCOR is needed today. In the
future, it is conceivable that as India’s global role expands in tandem with
its economic and geopolitical interests, CIMPCOR might even have to be
deployed in foreign contexts. Investing in a robust, competent and
professional final-stage counter-insurgency force is not only be timely, but
will be forward-looking as well.

In his book *The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and
What Can Be Done about It, * economist Paul Collier has shown that only
economic growth decisively reduces the risk of a return to civil war. This
does not mean that insurgencies are only about economics but that an upward
growth trajectory makes a recurrence of war less probable. Indeed, Mr
Collier found that the higher the post-war growth rate was, the harder it
was to shatter the peace. Thus, growth and development, alongside security
for the population, has to be the utmost priority of any counter-insurgency
campaign.

If the struggle against Maoists is not to be Sisyphean, India cannot be
flippant about the endgame of counter-insurgency. It can be said with
confidence that given political will and leadership, India’s security forces
are competent enough to succeed against the Maoists in the military space.
Without adequate capacity to rebuild the lives, livelihoods, communities and
societies ravaged by the Maoists and the war to eliminate them, successes
will be ephemeral. India needs CIMPCOR now.

*- Courtesy: Pragati — The Indian National Interest Review*