[Reader-list] Fwd: Open letter to Noam Chomsky

Nagraj Adve nagraj.adve at gmail.com
Tue Oct 20 15:22:58 IST 2009


---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Nirmalangshu Mukherji <somanshu at bol.net.in>

 Dear Prof. Chomsky,





I saw your support to the statemement issued by Sanhati in the form of a
letter to the prime minister—endorsed by some intellectuals from India and
abroad. Three points are transparent: (a) the Indian government IS planning
a massive armed operation in the tribal-hilly areas in the eastern part of
the country, (c) the poorest of the poor and the historically marginalised
will suffer the most in terms of loss of lives, livelihood and habitat, and
(c) for whatever it's worth, an all out campaign by democratic forces is
needed to resist the armed invasion of people's habitat by any party. To
that extent, the statement does bring out the urgency of the matter.


What is not so transparent from the statement is the condition that has
brought about this state of affairs. It is said that large-scale neo-liberal
policies—including formation of SEZs and encroachment of tribal habitats for
mining and other forms of exploitation—has led to mass impoverishment. So,
in desperation, the poor have allegedly taken up arms to defend themselves.
This picture is wrong in (i) ascribing the so-called armed struggle to the
people, and (ii) being silent about the *specific* source of the current
aggression by the state, namely, the armed operations of CPI (Maoist). The
statement is otherwise right about the *general* situation: sinister
neo-liberal policies, growing impoverishment and marginalisation of the
poor, and the resulting anger thereof.



Hundreds of organisations working at the grass roots level across the
country are engaged in a variety of struggles against state repression and
the insidious economic policies of the government. This includes many
Gandhian, liberal and leftist organisations and individuals. Importantly,
some of these—such as the organisations led by veteran activists Kanu Sanyal
and Asim Chatterjee, among many others in Bengal, Andhra, Bihar, Orissa and
elsewhere—also subscribe to maoism and are known initiators of the original
naxalbari movement. Thus, the labels ‘maoist’ and ‘naxalite’ apply to a much
wider category of organisations and individuals than the CPI (Maoist).
Needless to say, even the wider category of maoists, not to mention just the
CPI (Maoist), forms a tiny fraction of the broad democratic resistance to
the policies of the state. The current armed operations of the state are
directed ostensibly against the CPI (Maoist) in the areas under its control.




The state of course makes no such distinction in public; by identifying the
wider category with the narrower one, it is constructing the opportunity to
target the entire left-democratic fraternity in due course. To put the point
differently, although the undeclared target of the state covers the entirety
of left-democratic forces—as evidenced, for example, in the growing attacks
on industrial workers especially in the private sector—the declared target
currently consists of CPI (Maoist) and its area of control. The significance
of this specificity is wholly missing from the statement you endorsed.



The identification of CPI (Maoist) with the entire resistance movement suits
CPI (Maoist) as well. Its Supreme Commander recently declared from his
hideout from a guerrilla-controlled area: ‘People, who are the makers of
history, will rise up like a tornado under *our party’s leadership* to wipe
out the reactionary blood-sucking vampires ruling our country ... our
party’s influence has grown stronger and *it* has now come to be recognised
as the only genuine alternative before the people.’

(
http://www.openthemagazine.com/article/nation/we-shall-certainly-defeat-the-government,
emphasis added). We will evaluate the factual content of this declaration
below.



For now, it is interesting to note the character of the propaganda: somehow
the propagandistic interests of CPI (Maoist), the state, and the corporate
media suitably converge. The Supreme Commander’s claim is grimly endorsed by
the prime and the home ministers of India; according to them, the ‘naxalite
menace’ is the greatest threat to internal security. It is also endorsed by
the corporate media: the ‘menace’ is said to have spread in 15 of about 25
states, and in 180 of about 500 districts of the country—the numbers
accelerating each month to encourage the prospect of a ‘civil war’ soon
across the country. The Central government frequently convenes high-profile
meetings of chief ministers, secretaries, and police chiefs of the country
to meet the challenges posed by the menace. Cutting-edge special forces,
carved out of the paramilitary forces, are being constructed and deployed in
‘naxal-infested’ areas. In recent months, even the army and the air force
are beginning to enter into the picture. Naxalite actions—widespread arson,
mass killings, and the ability to take on the security forces—are
prominently reported in the corporate media with ill-concealed awe. This
strand of the naxalite movement never had it so big in its close to 40 years
of existence in hideouts in remote jungles.



As for the factual content of this dramatic story, I will briefly record
some facts that do not find a place in the three-pronged propaganda.

   - CPI (Maoist) is a comparatively new organisation formed in 2004 when
   two naxalite factions Maoist Coordination Committee (MCC) and People’s War
   Group (PWG)—located primarily in some tribal-inhabited jungle areas in Bihar
   and Andhra Pradesh respectively—decided to join hands after fighting a
   bloody war for area-control among themselves for close to two decades. By
   2006, CPI (Maoist) was almost completely wiped out from Andhra after their
   presence there for close to forty years. They also lost major areas in
   Bihar. The organisation has basically shifted to two of the most backward,
   tiny, and newly-formed states of Jharkhand and Chatthisgarh. As noted, even
   there, their presence is basically centered in the areas of dense forest and
   adjacent tribal-dominated villages, especially in the Bastar district.
   Ostensibly, as the jungles extend from their headquarters, they have also
   developed some hideouts and some armed squads to create enough violence to
   mark their ‘presence’ in West Bengal, Orissa, and elsewhere. To sum, they
   have essentially failed to emerge out of portions of jungles of eastern
   India after over four decades of campaign for this particular strand of
   ‘Marxism-Leninism-Maoism’.
   - The organisation has no presence whatsoever in the vast agrarian and
   industrial terrains of the rest of the country. It has no trade union, no
   peasant organisation worth its name, no penetration in the dalit, youth, and
   women’s movements. But it seems to have captured the imagination of sections
   of elite, urban, and ‘radical’ intelligentsia in Calcutta and Delhi who have
   impressive connections with some Indian intellectuals settled in
   universities abroad, as the statement you endorsed highlights (earlier, this
   intellectual support used to come from Bombay and Hyderabad). The phenomenon
   is historically familiar.
   - ‘The only genuine alternative before the people’ is viewed as a
   terrorist organisation by none other than Kanu Sanyal and many other active
   maoists, not to speak of broad spectrums of left parties and organisations
   most of whom do not find a representation in the statement. The basic reason
   why Sanyal calls CPI (Maoist) ‘terrorists’ is as follows.

Ever since its inception in 1969, this brand of maoism rejected all
classical forms of mass struggle and adopted the sinister doctrine of
individual annihilation of ‘class enemies’. ‘Class enemies’ typically
consisted of hapless, poorly armed police constables, petty landlords and
traders, and an assorted category of ‘informers and traitors’. Most notably,
the category of ‘class enemies’ also included grass-root cadres—not their
leaders—of the parliamentary left. In the states of West Bengal and Andhra,
where this campaign originated, the parliamentary left was typically the
only organisation present at the grass root. The annihilation of these
‘class enemies’—typically, middle peasants, school teachers, party
wholetimers, etc—effectively meant capturing of areas, by means of guns and
knives, already under the left. To that end, the squads first targetted
their own maoist fraternity who refused to subscribe to their murderous
politics. After the ‘renegades’ were silenced, the next target was cadres of
CPI(M), CPI, etc.

This ‘red terror’ basically led to the dismantling of democratic movements
in the erstwhile red bastions. In West Bengal, a neo-fascist regime of the
Congress Party won the elections handsomely and watched the mutual killings
of the left with glee. Once the task was accomplished, the government turned
on the maoists and the remaining left and white terror ruled West Bengal for
five years. During the nightmare, all forms of democratic movements
virtually disappeared from the state as lumpen youth accompanied by
paramilitary forces roamed the streets.

In time, almost all of the initiators of this campaign realised their grave
mistakes and those who survived encounters, long imprisonment, and
psychological collapse, returned to classical mass lines in a variety of
forms, including participation in the elections. However, a fragment
continued the murderous politics in the jungles of Andhra and Bihar in the
form of two organisations MCC and PWG, later unifying into CPI (Maoist), as
noted.



Two recent—and contrasting—events in the neighbourhood throw significant
light on the consequences of this brand of politics. In Sri Lanka, a vast
freedom movement of Tamil nationalism arose about three decades ago. As the
movement became progressively militant, it gave rise to a formidable
militarist organisation: Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE). LTTE
declared armed struggle, systematically eliminated all other groups
advocating Tamil liberation, took to the jungles, and launched a civil war.
There were several rounds of ‘negotiations’ between the government and the
LTTE, often with international effort. LTTE refused to give up arms and join
the democratic process; thus, it used each pause in the hostilities to
consolidate its forces. After over twenty years of bloody war with Sri
Lankar security forces, resulting in incalculable suffering of Tamil people,
the LTTE was recently wiped out from Sri Lanka. The calamity facilitated the
emergence of a neo-fascist regime in Colombo; it also left behind nearly a
million hapless Tamil refugees at the mercy of this government. With all
moderate forces from both the sides eliminated from the scene, the Tamil
freedom movement is now faced with a historical setback after over hundred
thousand deaths.



The Supreme Commander (Op. Cit), whose organisation was trained in guerrilla
warfare by former commandos of LTTE, agrees with the consequences: ‘There is
no doubt that the movement for a separate sovereign Tamil Eelam has suffered
a severe setback with the defeat and considerable decimation of the LTTE.
The Tamil people and the national liberation forces are now leaderless.’ But
he puts the blame elsewhere: ‘The jingoistic rallies and celebrations
organised by the government and Sinhala chauvinist parties all over Sri
Lanka in the wake of Prabhakaran’s death and the defeat of the LTTE show the
national hatred for Tamils nurtured by Sinhala organisations and the extent
to which the minds of ordinary Sinhalese are poisoned with such chauvinist
frenzy.’ Nonetheless, he hopes that ‘the ground remains fertile for the
resurgence of the Tamil liberation struggle. Even if it takes time, the war
for a separate Tamil Eelam is certain to revive, taking lessons from the
defeat of the LTTE.’ Although he is prepared to learn—perhaps,
tactical—‘lessons’, he does not seem to have any problems with the
militarist, sectarian, and exclusivist politics of the LTTE.



In sharp contrast, the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (CPN(M)) also
launched a civil war against a ruthless feudal monarchy protected by the
Royal Nepalese Army after all democratic methods failed. The war lasted
nearly a decade with the CPN(M)-directed People’s Liberation Army dominating
vast terrains of the country with massive popular support. The basic point
to note is that what CPN(M) strove for during the armed struggle—republic,
constituent assembly, supremacy of the parliament created by universal
franchise, etc.—India already has. Once that was achieved in Nepal, a
genuine armed struggle—far far superior than anything Indian 'maoists' have
ever envisaged—was immediately brought to a halt. CPN (M) proved its point
by winning over 40% of the seats in the interim parliament after the
republic was established. With this mandate in hand, innovative, peaceful
but militant processes were then adopted to broaden the democratic base even
in a context in which the possibility of a counter-revolution orchestrated
by the ousted monarch, the army and the ruling elites of India loomed large.
The current impasse in Nepal is about the supremacy of the parliament over
the army. As the leader of CPN(M) Prachanda points out, the democratic
movement is at a crossroads due to this seminal conflict. Indian
republicanism addressed and solved that problem 60 years ago.



During the war, PWG—followed by CPI (Maoist)—maintained close contact  with
CPN(M). But after the CPN(M) joined—in fact, established—the democratic
process in Nepal, the CPI (Maoist) does not find any lessons to be learned.
This time the blame is on CPN(M). As the Supreme Commander (Op. Cit.) puts
it: ‘It is indeed a great tragedy that the CPN(M) has chosen to abandon the
path of protracted people’s war and pursue a parliamentary path in spite of
having de facto power in most of the countryside.’ In a letter to CPN(M),
CPI (Maoist) ‘advised’ the former not to give up armed struggle until the
‘old order’ is smashed and the CPN (M) is able to seize power all by itself
to usher in ‘new democratic revolution’. However, the Supreme Commander
remains optimistic since ‘given the great revolutionary traditions of the
CPN(M), we hope that the inner-party struggle will repudiate the right
opportunist line pursued by its leadership, give up revisionist stands and
practices, and apply minds creatively to the concrete conditions of Nepal.’
So, the statesman-like leadership of Prachanda is ‘revisionist’.



Beyond the bluster, it is not difficult to discern that, no matter what, the
CPI (Maoist) is not prepared to give up its fatal policies. They are not
open to any debates, no one can enter their ‘liberated zones’ without
unconditional support to their line. Like Prabhakaran and his LTTE, having
meticulously secured hideouts for themselves in ‘impregnable’ dense forests
protected by squads armed with sophisticated weapons, they are prepared to
carry on ‘protracted war’ for many years before their inevitable decimation.
In the process, not only will the tribals under their control suffer
immensely, it will give the growingly authoritarian state a golden
opportunity to smash whatever avenues of hard-won democratic resistance
still remain in place.



As noted, the CPI (Maoist) has exactly two channels of ‘popular’ support:
the tribals they control and a section of ‘radical’, urban intelligentsia.
It is the support of the latter that gives the CPI (Maoist) significant
propaganda mileage and a false impression of invincibility and popular
support. By posing the current military preparations of the state only as a
state vs. people conflict, the statement you endorsed effectively exonerates
the CPI (Maoist) and plays into their hands.



Sincerely



Nirmalangshu Mukherji

Department of Philosopy

University of Delhi





Nirmalangshu Mukherji
Professor of Philosophy
University of Delhi, Delhi-110007
Web: people.du.ac.in/~nmukherji/
 Ph: 27666253 (Res)
       27666629 (Off)


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