[Reader-list] Fwd: war or peace on the indus // briscoe

[yasir ~يا سر]

Dear Kshemendra

I am clueless as to how to answer you.
except to say that one should -these people should- have more respect for
rivers.

best

yasir



On Mon, Apr 19, 2010 at 4:19 PM, Kshmendra Kaul <kshmendra2005 at yahoo.com>wrote:

> Dear Yasir
>
> The wicked temptation is to dismiss Briscoe as "Pakistan ka tattoo" or "ISI
> Agent" but that would be trivialising what is a serious issue between India
> and Pakistan.
>
> The following is my thinking-aloud on Briscoe's article.
>
> (((((( It has led to the concluding remark by me:
>
> To "move beyond the past", especially a bitter past is the right thing to
> do, but it would be foolish of India to ease Pakistan's worries when the
> 'past' inimical actions and propagations of Pakistan against India continue
> in the "present'  and show no signs of abating in the near 'future'. )))))))
>
> John Briscoe is very precise in his understanding and as a neutral voice,
> is concerned about Pakistan ("the great vulnerability and legitimate concern
> of Pakistan) as the 'lower riparian' land which might be at the mercy of the
> India described by him as the "regional hegemon".
>
> Briscoe's very fair comment is "there is no objective conflict of interests
> between the countries over the waters of the Indus Basin,". He is referring
> to the water-sharing regimes under the 1960 Indus Water Treaty between
> Pakistan and India.
>
> Briscoe rightly pinpoints the problem being in "quantity of water reaching
> Pakistan" and interference in "the natural timing of those flows." that can
> and has arisen from the nature of execution of India's rights under the
> Treaty to "tap the considerable hydropower potential of the Chenab and
> Jhelum before the rivers enter Pakistan"
>
> Briscoe lists out the technical aspects of what have-been/can-be the source
> of the problem.
>
> India's major problem under the Treaty, as Briscvoe states, comes
> from  "physical restrictions meant that gates for flushing silt out of the
> dams could not be built, thus ensuring that any dam in India would rapidly
> fill with the silt pouring off the young Himalayas."
>
> Pakistan's problem is well summarised (in connection with India's right to
> build dams) in this comment from Briscoe " If, God forbid, India so chose,
> it could use this cumulative live storage to impose major reductions on
> water availability in Pakistan during the critical planting season."
>
> While India's problem was redressed by adjucation in the Bagliar Dam case
> it left Pakistan more "vulnerable".
>
> So Briscoe calls out for:
>
> - "some courageous and open-minded Indians – in government or out – who
> will stand up and explain to the public why this is not just an issue for
> Pakistan, but why it is an existential issue for Pakistan."
>
> - " leadership from the Government of India."
>
> - "invitation to Pakistan to explore ways in which the principles of the
> Indus Waters Treaty could be respected, while providing a win for Pakistan
> (assurance on their flows) and a win for India (reducing the chronic legal
> uncertainty which vexes every Indian project on the Chenab or Jhelum). With
> good will there are multiple ways in which the treaty could be maintained
> but reinterpreted so that both countries could win"
>
> Very laudable of Briscoe.
>
> Where Briscoe falters in his understanding of the nature of complexities in
> the relations between India and Pakistan is in his advice " Indus waters
> should be de-linked from both historic grievances and from the other
> Kashmir-related issues."
>
> Briscoe says " it is a sign of statesmanship, not weakness, to acknowledge
> the past and then move beyond it."
>
> "Leadership" and "Statesmanship" are all very well but should not be
> employed in the absence of reciprocity.
>
> "Let me sit with you to solve your problems while you continue top create
> problems for me" is neither statesmanlike nor sensible leadership.
>
> To "move beyond the past", especially a bitter past is the right thing to
> do, but it would be foolish of India to ease Pakistan's worries when the
> 'past' inmical actions and propagations of Pakistan against India continue
> in the "present'  and show no signs of abating in the near 'future'.
>
> Kshmendra
>
> War or Peace on the Indus?
> By SouthAsian
>  *By John Briscoe*
> Anyone foolish enough to write on war or peace in the Indus needs to first
> banish a set of immediate suspicions. I am neither Indian nor Pakistani. I
> am a South African who has worked on water issues in the subcontinent for 35
> years and who has lived in Bangladesh (in the 1970s) and Delhi (in the
> 2000s). In 2006 I published, with fine Indian colleagues, an Oxford
> University Press book titled India’s Water Economy: Facing a Turbulent
> Future and, with fine Pakistani colleagues, one titled Pakistan’s Water
> Economy: Running Dry.
>
> I was the Senior Water Advisor for the World Bank who dealt with the
> appointment of the Neutral Expert on the Baglihar case. My last assignment
> at the World Bank (relevant, as described later) was as Country Director for
> Brazil. I am now a mere university professor, and speak in the name of no
> one but myself.
>
> I have deep affection for the people of both India and Pakistan, and am
> dismayed by what I see as a looming train wreck on the Indus, with
> disastrous consequences for both countries. I will outline why there is no
> objective conflict of interests between the countries over the waters of the
> Indus Basin, make some observations of the need for a change in public
> discourse, and suggest how the drivers of the train can put on the brakes
> before it is too late.
>
> *Is there an inherent conflict between India and Pakistan?*
> The simple answer is no. The Indus Waters Treaty allocates the water of the
> three western rivers to Pakistan, but allows India to tap the considerable
> hydropower potential of the Chenab and Jhelum before the rivers enter
> Pakistan.
>
> The qualification is that this use of hydropower is not to affect either
> the quantity of water reaching Pakistan or to interfere with the natural
> timing of those flows. Since hydropower does not consume water, the only
> issue is timing. And timing is a very big issue, because agriculture in the
> Pakistani plains depends not only on how much water comes, but that it comes
> in critical periods during the planting season. The reality is that India
> could tap virtually all of the available power without negatively affecting
> the timing of flows to which Pakistan is entitled.
>
> *Is the Indus Treaty a stable basis for cooperation?*
> If Pakistan and India had normal, trustful relations, there would be a
> mutually-verified monitoring process which would assure that there is no
> change in the flows going into Pakistan. (In an even more ideal world, India
> could increase low-flows during the critical planting season, with
> significant benefit to Pakistani farmers and with very small impacts on
> power generation in India.) Because the relationship was not normal when the
> treaty was negotiated, Pakistan would agree only if limitations on India’s
> capacity to manipulate the timing of flows was hardwired into the treaty.
> This was done by limiting the amount of “live storage” (the storage that
> matters for changing the timing of flows) in each and every hydropower dam
> that India would construct on the two rivers.
>
> While this made sense given knowledge in 1960, over time it became clear
> that this restriction gave rise to a major problem. The physical
> restrictions meant that gates for flushing silt out of the dams could not be
> built, thus ensuring that any dam in India would rapidly fill with the silt
> pouring off the young Himalayas.
>
> This was a critical issue at stake in the Baglihar case. Pakistan
> (reasonably) said that the gates being installed were in violation of the
> specifications of the treaty. India (equally reasonably) argued that it
> would be wrong to build a dam knowing it would soon fill with silt. The
> finding of the Neutral Expert was essentially a reinterpretation of the
> Treaty, saying that the physical limitations no longer made sense. While the
> finding was reasonable in the case of Baglihar, it left Pakistan without the
> mechanism – limited live storage – which was its only (albeit weak)
> protection against upstream manipulation of flows in India. This
> vulnerability was driven home when India chose to fill Baglihar exactly at
> the time when it would impose maximum harm on farmers in downstream
> Pakistan.
>
> If Baglihar was the only dam being built by India on the Chenab and Jhelum,
> this would be a limited problem. But following Baglihar is a veritable
> caravan of Indian projects – Kishanganga, Sawalkot, Pakuldul, Bursar, Dal
> Huste, Gyspa… The cumulative live storage will be large, giving India an
> unquestioned capacity to have major impact on the timing of flows into
> Pakistan. (Using Baglihar as a reference, simple back-of-the-envelope
> calculations suggest that once it has constructed all of the planned
> hydropower plants on the Chenab, India will have an ability to effect major
> damage on Pakistan. First, there is the one-time effect of filling the new
> dams. If done during the wet season this would have little effect on
> Pakistan. But if done during the critical low-flow period, there would be a
> large one-time effect (as was the case when India filled Baglihar). Second,
> there is the permanent threat which would be a consequence of substantial
> cumulative live storage which could store about one month’s worth of
> low-season flow on the Chenab. If, God forbid, India so chose, it could use
> this cumulative live storage to impose major reductions on water
> availability in Pakistan during the critical planting season.
>
> *Views on “the water problem” from both sides of the border and the role
> of the press*
> Living in Delhi and working in both India and Pakistan, I was struck by a
> paradox. One country was a vigorous democracy, the other a military regime.
> But whereas an important part of the Pakistani press regularly reported
> India’s views on the water issue in an objective way, the Indian press never
> did the same. I never saw a report which gave Indian readers a factual
> description of the enormous vulnerability of Pakistan, of the way in which
> India had socked it to Pakistan when filling Baglihar. How could this be, I
> asked? Because, a journalist colleague in Delhi told me, “when it comes to
> Kashmir – and the Indus Treaty is considered an integral part of Kashmir —
> the ministry of external affairs instructs newspapers on what they can and
> cannot say, and often tells them explicitly what it is they are to say.”
>
> This apparently remains the case. In the context of the recent talks
> between India and Pakistan I read, in Boston, the electronic reports on the
> disagreement about “the water issue” in The Times of India<http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Water-Pakistans-diversionary-tactic-/articleshow/5609099.cms>,
> The Hindustan Times<http://www.hindustantimes.com/News-Feed/india/River-waters-The-next-testing-ground/Article1-512190.aspx>,
> The Hindu <http://beta.thehindu.com/news/national/article112388.ece>, The
> Indian Express<http://www.indianexpress.com/news/Pak-heats-up-water-sharing/583733>and The
> Economic Times<http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics/nation/Pak-takes-water-route-to-attack-India/articleshow/5665516.cms>.
> Taken together, these reports make astounding reading. Not only was the
> message the same in each case (“no real issue, just Pakistani shenanigans”),
> but the arguments were the same, the numbers were the same and the phrases
> were the same. And in all cases the source was “analysts” and “experts” — in
> not one case was the reader informed that this was reporting an official
> position of the Government of India.
>
> Equally depressing is my repeated experience – most recently at a major
> international meeting of strategic security institutions in Delhi – that
> even the most liberal and enlightened of Indian analysts (many of whom are
> friends who I greatly respect) seem constitutionally incapable of seeing the
> great vulnerability and legitimate concern of Pakistan (which is obvious and
> objective to an outsider).
>
> *A way forward*
> This is a very uneven playing field. The regional hegemon is the upper
> riparian and has all the cards in its hands. This asymmetry means that it is
> India that is driving the train, and that change must start in India. In my
> view, four things need to be done.
>
> First, there must be some courageous and open-minded Indians – in
> government or out – who will stand up and explain to the public why this is
> not just an issue for Pakistan, but why it is an existential issue for
> Pakistan.
>
> Second, there must be leadership from the Government of India. Here I am
> struck by the stark difference between the behaviour of India and that of
> its fellow BRIC – Brazil, the regional hegemon in Latin America.
>
> Brazil and Paraguay have a binding agreement on their rights and
> responsibilities on the massive Itaipu Binacional Hydropower Project. The
> proceeds, which are of enormous importance to small Paraguay, played a
> politicised, polemical anti-Brazilian part in the recent presidential
> election in Paraguay. Similarly, Brazil’s and Bolivia’s binding agreement on
> gas also became part of an anti-Brazil presidential campaign theme.
>
> The public and press in Brazil bayed for blood and insisted that Bolivia
> and Paraguay be made to pay. So what did President Luis Inacio Lula da Silva
> do? “Look,” he said to his irate countrymen, “these are poor countries, and
> these are huge issues for them. They are our brothers. Yes, we are in our
> legal rights to be harsh with them, but we are going to show understanding
> and generosity, and so I am unilaterally doubling (in the case of Paraguay)
> and tripling (in the case of Bolivia) the payments we make to them. Brazil
> is a big country and a relatively rich one, so this will do a lot for them
> and won’t harm us much.” India could, and should, in my view, similarly make
> the effort to see it from its neighbour’s point of view, and should show the
> generosity of spirit which is an integral part of being a truly great power
> and good neighbour.
>
> Third, this should translate into an invitation to Pakistan to explore ways
> in which the principles of the Indus Waters Treaty could be respected, while
> providing a win for Pakistan (assurance on their flows) and a win for India
> (reducing the chronic legal uncertainty which vexes every Indian project on
> the Chenab or Jhelum). With good will there are multiple ways in which the
> treaty could be maintained but reinterpreted so that both countries could
> win.
>
> Fourth, discussions on the Indus waters should be de-linked from both
> historic grievances and from the other Kashmir-related issues. Again, it is
> a sign of statesmanship, not weakness, to acknowledge the past and then move
> beyond it. This is personal for me, as someone of Irish origin. Conor Cruise
> O’Brien once remarked, “Santayana said that those who did not learn their
> history would be condemned to repeat it; in the case of Ireland we have
> learned our history so well that we are condemned to repeat it, again and
> again.”
>
> And finally, as a South African I am acutely aware that Nelson Mandela,
> after 27 years in prison, chose not to settle scores but to look forward and
> construct a better future, for all the people of his country and mine. Who
> will be the Indian Mandela who will do this – for the benefit of Pakistanis
> and Indians – on the Indus?
>
> *John Briscoe is the Gordon McKay Professor of Environmental Engineering,
> Harvard University. This op-ed is reproduced with permission of the author
> who wrote it for Aman ki Asha, the joint peace initiative of the Jang
> Group of Pakistan and the Times of India. It was originally published in
> Jang (March 31) and The News (April 3) as part of Aman ki Asha’s ongoing
> campaign on information about water issues.*
> *
>
> Link for The News:
> http://thenews.com.pk/print1.asp?id=232342*
>
> --- On *Thu, 4/15/10, yasir ~يا سر <yasir.media at gmail.com>* wrote:
>
>
> From: yasir ~يا سر <yasir.media at gmail.com>
> Subject: [Reader-list] Fwd: war or peace on the indus // briscoe
> To: "Sarai Reader-list" <reader-list at sarai.net>
> Date: Thursday, April 15, 2010, 8:00 PM
>
> *war or peace on the indus*
>
>
> http://thesouthasianidea.wordpress.com/2010/04/03/war-or-peace-on-the-indus/
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