[Reader-list] Afghanistan

[S. Jabbar]

The Afghanistan problem
Saturday, 30 January 2010
Ayesha Siddiqa 

Nothing could be clearer than the fact that there is an ever-widening divide
in the perception, interests and understanding of the situation amongst the
various stakeholders in Afghanistan. The regional states have their eyes on
maximising benefits as the US reviews cutting its losses and bailing out of
Kabul. 
Although American officials explained that the Obama administration is yet
to take a final decision regarding withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, it
is quite clear that the US and its Nato allies are looking for an exit. This
would mean finding some face-saving method for allied forces to withdraw.
Regionally, attention is drawn towards Gen McChrystal¹s recent remarks
regarding negotiations with the Taliban. This is not a new idea but the
conspiracy mill ‹ which is forever productive in South Asia ‹ has begun to
talk about the possibility of the US doing a deal with the Taliban alone and
leaving Afghanistan at the mercy of a Karzai-Mullah Omar coalition supported
by India.

The Obama administration is considering various methods to woo the Taliban,
that would include the use of money and carefully applying the divide and
rule policy through which the Œgood¹ Taliban could be separated from the
Œbad¹. In this case, the good probably refers to a newer generation that
might be more willing to cut deals with foreign forces than the older
generation, which partnered with the likes of Osama bin Laden.

The anxiety expressed by some circles in Pakistan regarding a negotiation
plan is strange considering that the military and the strategic community on
the whole have always supported such an idea. In fact, Pervez Musharraf
continues to market the idea. There is also the worry mentioned earlier that
the US might do the talking on its own. However, this shouldn¹t be a worry
since it is not easy to ignore the ISI ‹ with its extensive contacts with
the Taliban. Sources even claim that a meeting between the ISI, CIA and
Mullah Omar did take place in the past couple of months organised by
Pakistan¹s intelligence operatives.

The Taliban do not seem averse to talking to the US, especially now that
Washington might not be insisting on Mullah Omar and his men surrendering
Osama dead or alive. The Taliban and their handlers would be happy to
negotiate with the US since they were never really averse to the idea of
such talks. There are some who believe that an agreement could have been
reached only if the US was not in such a hurry to attack.

Consequently, Mullah Omar seems to have signalled his willingness not to
engage in a war in case he is included in Afghanistan¹s future political
set-up. Interestingly, other sources have denied the report. But why
wouldn¹t he talk as he has everything to gain?

Not only would he be a part of Kabul¹s future political dispensation, he
would also be a part of establishing a religion-oriented state that would
get as much support from the West as Saudi Arabia, if not more. So denying
reports of conciliation may be for harder bargaining but definitely not to
create anxiety in western capitals which may force them to change their
minds.

A deal with Mullah Omar is all that the allies could look forward to since
there is no possibility whatsoever of a much-needed arrangement amongst
regional stakeholders like India, Iran and Pakistan regarding Kabul¹s
future. 

While Islamabad is apprehensive of the Indian presence due to its fear of a
two-front situation in the future, India seems to be thinking in terms of
the best- and worst-case scenarios. The former pertains to a situation where
Delhi is able to put Pakistan on the defensive. It has already tried to
achieve the objective through a mix of intelligence and development
assistance tactics. The worst-case scenario for Delhi, on the other hand,
pertains to the political balkanisation of Afghanistan in which Islamabad¹s
influence is limited to the southern provinces while India has greater
influence over Kabul and the north.

There are apparent holes in this strategy since India might not be able to
hold the south after an American withdrawal. Since Delhi has not invested in
the friendlier provinces in the north and concentrated all its efforts in
the south, it may not be able to establish a foothold in either part. It may
try to do the trick through pumping money to the Afghan Taliban, but there
are no guarantees that this will work.

There could even be a worst-case scenario in which Delhi gets crushed in
Afghanistan and on its mainland through these non-state forces. The fact
that Pakistan also bleeds profusely in the process is a given. But it¹s sad
to see states not understanding the future cost of their strategic games.

It¹s most unfortunate that the regional states, which will suffer the most
after they are left to confront each other¹s interests in Afghanistan after
a US withdrawal, do not think of a joint strategy. The Pandora¹s box ‹ which
many believe was opened due to American intervention in Afghanistan ‹ will
not be shut by a US withdrawal. There are a couple of possibilities that
come to mind.

First, there could be a deliberate lull in violence after the allied forces
leave. This is a period when other regional forces with stakes in
Afghanistan will be regrouping to claim greater territory and interests.
Second, violence could probably increase initially in Afghanistan and then
in the entire region.

The regional actors would pump in resources and use contacts with the
proxies to create greater chaos and mayhem on the other side. This is
certainly a dangerous proposition since what we may be looking at is a
conflict which will not be contained within specific boundaries. Therefore,
we may end up having larger ungovernable spaces. Such a development will
threaten India as much as it will Pakistan. Or perhaps it will affect
Pakistan more since society is already bleeding from the impact of a decade
of the war on terror.

Sadly, there is no end in sight to proxy wars in the region and non-state
actors. In fact, heightened competition between India and Pakistan over
Afghanistan will result in greater justification on both sides for
maintaining non-state actors as proxies.

Such a prognosis means that there will be more youth who will be deprived of
their right to education, a better and hygienic environment, greater access
to health and personal security. They will be sacrificed at the altar of
national ego and fooled into Œmartyrdom¹ in the name of faith.