[Reader-list] reader-list Digest, Vol 88, Issue 13

[asit das]

me too
asit

On 11/2/10, Rajkamal Goswami <rajkamalgoswami at gmail.com> wrote:
> Hey,
>
> I also want to sign the "DEMAND TO UPHOLD FREE SPEECH AND EXPRESSION
> PUBLIC STATEMENT"!
>
> How can it be done?
>
> Regards
> Rajkamal
>
>
> On 11/2/10, asit das <asit1917 at gmail.com> wrote:
>> On 11/2/10, reader-list-request at sarai.net <reader-list-request at sarai.net>
>> wrote:
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>>>
>>> Today's Topics:
>>>
>>>    1. Demand to uphold free speech and expression (Yousuf)
>>>    2. Microfinance: A Fairy Tale Turns into a Nightmare (Shashidhar)
>>>
>>>
>>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>
>>> Message: 1
>>> Date: Mon, 1 Nov 2010 23:11:03 -0700 (PDT)
>>> From: Yousuf <ysaeed7 at yahoo.com>
>>> To: sarai list <reader-list at sarai.net>
>>> Subject: [Reader-list] Demand to uphold free speech and expression
>>> Message-ID: <859916.20954.qm at web51406.mail.re2.yahoo.com>
>>> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8
>>>
>>> DEMAND TO UPHOLD FREE SPEECH AND EXPRESSION
>>> PUBLIC STATEMENT
>>>
>>> We condemn the demand of the BJP to “take the strongest possible action”
>>> against Arundhati Roy for her “seditious comments” at the seminar,
>>> “Azadi:
>>> The only way” held in New Delhi, October 21, 2010. There is recorded
>>> evidence to prove that the views expressed by her are not new and have
>>> also
>>> been made by innumerable others before and after her. If Arundhati Roy or
>>> Syed Ali Shah Geelani (or any other speaker from that seminar) is to be
>>> arrested for what they have said, then by the same logic a number of us
>>> would have to be imprisoned not to mention the entire population of
>>> Kashmir.
>>>
>>> The concept of `sedition’ is archaic and has no place in a modern
>>> democratic
>>> imagination. Perhaps for this reason the Drafting Committee of the Indian
>>> Constitution did not include “sedition” among the “reasonable
>>> restrictions”
>>> to Article 19(1) (a). In 1962, the Supreme Court (Kedar Nath Singh vs.
>>> the
>>> State of Bihar) read down Section 124A IPC to argue that only a call to
>>> violence or armed rebellion qualified to be considered as `sedition’. The
>>> same Judgement reiterated the importance of not allowing the provision to
>>> interfere with the Right to Free Speech and Expression. As the present
>>> controversy proves, the Supreme Court’s worst fears have been confirmed.
>>> The
>>> Bajrang Dal’s threat that they will hound Arundhati Roy like M.F Hussain
>>> provides further confirmation that `sedition’ will now be the new pretext
>>> for censorship. When the British charged Gandhi with sedition, he
>>> famously
>>> said, “Sedition in law is a deliberate crime but it
>>>  appears to me to be the highest duty of a citizen.” Expressing dissent
>>> about thenation-state and re-imagining its future is certainly the right
>>> of
>>> every citizen if not the “highest duty”.
>>>
>>> We would like to point out that the disruption of the meeting and the
>>> allegations of `sedition’ is part of a well orchestrated campaign. The
>>> right
>>> wing elements who disrupted the Azadi meeting were working in tandem with
>>> certain media channels who flouted all norms of professional journalism
>>> to
>>> create hysteria. In what appears to be an instance of `paid news’, a
>>> certain
>>> national news channel started a one-sided campaign against “splittists”
>>> and
>>> the “sedition industry” within hours of the meeting being held. The
>>> `report’
>>> only focused on two speakers and their supposed “seditious” utterances.
>>>
>>> It is understandable that the BJP, in an attempt to deflect attention
>>> from
>>> the Ajmer Blast case, should indulge in hyper-jingoism but it is most
>>> unfortunate that the UPA, while deciding not to press charges of sedition
>>> against the speakers, did not assert their right to free speech and
>>> expression. Their silence on this matter has only emboldened groups like
>>> the
>>> Bajrang Dal who now want to take matters into their own hands.
>>> This is perhaps expected from a government that has sought to suppress
>>> all
>>> dissent in the valley through brute force. Between June and October 2010,
>>> 111 people have been killed by security forces and this includes young
>>> boys
>>> who were not even participating in the protests. Countless have been
>>> maimed
>>> and injured by bullet injuries while many have been blinded by the
>>> catapults
>>> with marble shots used by the CRPF. For over two decades now, the armed
>>> and
>>> security forces have been committing extra-judicial killings, torture,
>>> disappearances and rape with impunity. Draconian legislations like the
>>> Armed
>>> Forces (Special Powers) Act, the Jammu and &Kashmir Public Safety Act and
>>> the Disturbed Areas Act continue to facilitate human rights abuses in the
>>> valley. The hysterical cry to enforce the rule of law in the case of the
>>> Azadi seminar contrasts with the long silence about the widespread and
>>> systematic human rights violations in Kashmir. By allowing the speakers
>>> of
>>>  the Azadi seminar to be censored, the government hopes to maintain its
>>> silence on Kashmir.
>>>
>>> We therefore demand that the government take full cognizance of the
>>> continuing violation of human rights in the valley, make the security
>>> forces
>>> fully accountable so that the guilty can be prosecuted and punished. We
>>> demand that the democratic right to free speech and expression is upheld
>>> and
>>> every citizen in this country, including the speakers of the Azadi
>>> seminar,
>>> is given full protection from any attempt to impose legal or extra-legal
>>> censorship.
>>>
>>> Signatories:
>>>
>>> Vrinda Grover Lawyer, Delhi
>>> Shohini Ghosh Professor, Jamia Millia Islamia, Delhi
>>> Nivedita Menon Professor, Jawaharlal Nehru University, Delhi
>>> Amar Kanwar Filmmaker & Artist, Delhi
>>> Ranjani Mazumdar Associate Professor, Jawaharlal Nehru University.
>>> Aditya Nigam Fellow, Centre for the Study of Developing Societies
>>> Dayanita Singh Photographer, Delhi
>>> Urvashi Butalia Writer and Publisher, Delhi
>>> Lawrence Liang Alternative Law Forum, Bangalore
>>> Sabeena Gadihoke Associate Professor, Jamia Millia Islamia, Delhi
>>> Saba Dewan Independent Filmmaker
>>> Aparna Sen Filmmaker and Actress, Kolkata
>>> Kalyan Ray Author and Professor, Morris College, USA.
>>> Joya Chatterji Historian, Trinity College, University of Cambridge, UK.
>>> Lakshmi Subramaniam Professor, Centre for Social Sciences, Kolkata
>>> Kajri Jain Asst. Professor, University of Toronto, Toronto.
>>> Kumkum Roy Historian, Professor, Jawaharlal Nehru University. Delhi
>>> Kamala Vishweshwaran Professor of Anthropology, University of Texas,
>>> Austin
>>> Shikha Jhingan Asst. Professor, Lady Shri Ram College, Delhi University,
>>> Delhi.
>>> Anjali Monteiro Professor, Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Mumbai.
>>> Kalyani Menon-Sen Researcher & Independent Activist, Gurgaon
>>> Uma Chakravarty Historian (Retired Professor, Delhi University) Delhi
>>> KP Jayshankar Professor, Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Mumbai.
>>> Pamela Philipose Journalist & Director. Womens Feature Service
>>> Harsh Mandar Writer and Activist
>>> Gauhar Raza Filmmaker & Poet, Delhi
>>> Anuradha Chenoy Professor, Jawaharlal Nehru University, Delhi
>>> Shabnam Hashmi Social Activist, Anhad
>>> Neeraj Malik Associate Professor, Indraprastha College, Delhi University
>>> Javed Malick Retired Professor, Delhi University
>>> Madhu Bhaduri Former, IFS Officer
>>> Anuradha Bhasin Executive Editor, Kashmir Times
>>> Jyotsna Kapur Assoc. Professor, Southern Illinois University, Carbondale.
>>> Dunu Roy Environmentalist, Hazard Centre, Delhi
>>> Kamal Mitra Chenoy Professor, Jawaharlal Nehru University, Delhi
>>> Ujjwal Kumar Singh Professor, Delhi University, Delhi.
>>> Mahua Sarkar Assoc. Professor, Binghampton University, SUNY
>>> Arvind Narrain Lawyer, Alternative Law Forum
>>> Rebecca M. John Lawyer, Delhi
>>> Amita Baviskar Associate Professor, Institute of Economic Growth
>>> Sarada Balagopalan Associate Fellow, CSDS
>>> Kaushik Ghosh Assistant Professor, University of Texas, Austin
>>>
>>> (Issued in November 2010)
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> ------------------------------
>>>
>>> Message: 2
>>> Date: Tue, 2 Nov 2010 14:57:17 +0530
>>> From: "Shashidhar" <shashidhar at butterfliesindia.org>
>>> To: "sarai-list" <reader-list at sarai.net>
>>> Subject: [Reader-list] Microfinance: A Fairy Tale Turns into a
>>> 	Nightmare
>>> Message-ID: <008601cb7a70$249fa840$6ddef8c0$@butterfliesindia.org>
>>> Content-Type: text/plain;	charset="iso-8859-1"
>>>
>>> Good write up on the MFI nightmare in Andhra
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> http://beta.epw.in/newsItem/comment/188904/
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Shashi
>>>
>>> Microfinance: A Fairy Tale Turns into a Nightmare
>>> M S Sriram
>>> It was inevitable that the commercial model of microfinance in India,
>>> with
>>> its minimalist and standardised model of lending, would grow into a
>>> bubble
>>> and run into trouble.
>>> Many microfinance commercial organisations have entered the market in
>>> search
>>> of profits and are competing to lend to the poor. In the process they
>>> have
>>> put the “understanding” of the needs of the poor aside and have started
>>> chasing targets and numbers. For these institutions, the poor are not
>>> seen
>>> as human beings having individual identities and needs. Instead they are
>>> seen as data points that add up in their profit statements. The anxiety
>>> for
>>> growth is dictated by the fact that the investors in the market-based
>>> models
>>> are impatient and look for high returns – and then exit!
>>> There is a new intensity in the discussion on microfinance – about
>>> multiple
>>> lending, interest rates and on whether a bubble is being built around
>>> lending to the poor. There is a heated debate about the interest rates of
>>> microfinance institutions (MFIs) and whether they could be termed
>>> usurious.
>>> There has also been a boardroom fracas at SKS Microfinance – an event
>>> unrelated to the larger one about the delicate relationship between MFIs
>>> and
>>> their clients, but it is nevertheless hogging equal headline space in the
>>> press. The commercial section of the industry has reacted with the
>>> industry
>>> association – the Microfinance Institutions Network (MFIN) – coming out
>>> with
>>> a code of conduct. The State has indicated its displeasure about the
>>> level
>>> of interest rates and it has sent an advisory to the commercial banks.
>>> The
>>> Government of Andhra Pradesh, facing a lot of flak from the local press
>>> and
>>> the opposition parties, has promulgated an ordinance in order to “rein
>>> in”
>>> MFIs.
>>> There is indeed a sense of déjà vu to the entire episode – of a crisis
>>> following heady success. The success had culminated in the
>>> oversubscription
>>> of the SKS Microfinance initial public offering, allotment of shares at
>>> the
>>> upper end of the indicative price band, listing of the scrip at a
>>> premium,
>>> and its continuous rise thereafter. As this was sinking into the minds of
>>> the players in the microfinance market – and with the next rung of
>>> institutions ready to harvest the gold rush – the same SKS Microfinance
>>> was
>>> in the news for all the wrong reasons.
>>> Three Models
>>> This article looks at the growth in microfinance, keeping the current
>>> developments in perspective. But before looking at the current episode,
>>> it
>>> is important to have a perspective on how the microfinance space is
>>> organised and who the different of players in the market are. At this
>>> point
>>> of time there are three significant interventions in the provision of
>>> universal access to financial services.
>>> (1) The people’s movement which has existed outside of the government
>>> schemes, banks and other interventions by entrepreneurs. This is led by
>>> non-governmental organisations (NGOs) that have remained true to the
>>> community-based model and have emerged by organising people to sort out
>>> their financial mismatches without the intervention of the external
>>> world,
>>> and if there is an intervention it is a conscious choice collectively
>>> exercised by the people.
>>> (2) The intervention by the government pre-existed the people’s movement
>>> and
>>> was expressed in the form of the self-help groups (SHGs). This has
>>> usually
>>> been supply-driven, addressing the institutional and physical
>>> infrastructure
>>> needs and offering standardised supply-side solutions or “schemes”. In
>>> Andhra Pradesh the State has almost usurped the community model through
>>> the
>>> Indira Kranti Patham scheme (earlier known as Velugu). Clearly the role
>>> of
>>> the government in Andhra Pradesh has moved beyond being an independent
>>> observer. In this case the State is in a peculiar position of being a
>>> player
>>> as well as an arbiter of microfinance practices.
>>> (3) The market forces, which look at the poor as a market, have found a
>>> mechanism to deliver credit through an efficient delivery model. This
>>> approach is more than a decade old and has made rapid growth. This growth
>>> has encouraged us to look at the business through a different lens.
>>> Each of these interventions has a different approach and uses a different
>>> methodology to reach out to the poor. These methodologies have an
>>> important
>>> bearing on the process and packaging of financial services. The SHG model
>>> was promoted as an alternative to the available options of financial
>>> intermediation. It was at one level rooted in the community and at
>>> another
>>> level was integrated with the larger banking system. The dealings were on
>>> the basis of mutuality, thus providing the power of a collective. The
>>> approach, by definition, was a slow one because there had to be a good
>>> understanding on how a collective based on the principles of mutuality
>>> worked. It required patience, tolerance and an appreciation of the
>>> constraints that the fellow SHG members faced. It made members think
>>> about
>>> their financial services needs of their households, and also those of
>>> their
>>> neighbours who were members of the collective. This helped the members
>>> think
>>> responsibly because they were dealing with their own money or the money
>>> of
>>> the members of the collective. This methodology ensured that people were
>>> together to narrate a growth story, a story of their confidence and how
>>> they
>>> were taking charge of their own lives.
>>> This movement is very time-consuming. The collective has to go through
>>> the
>>> many phases of forming, storming, norming and performing. Even if the
>>> process is slow, the edifice will be strong and lasting. This edifice can
>>> continue to serve the poor and the marginalised on an auto-pilot basis
>>> once
>>> it stabilises. Once this happens, it shows that the poor can not only
>>> take
>>> control of their resources, but as these resources grow they can hire
>>> professional help to manage their resources. This transformation does not
>>> happen overnight, but through a long process of community intervention.
>>> Unfortunately, there is impatience, and then there is the State. If the
>>> groups succeed, there is an urge to replicate the model quickly across
>>> the
>>> country. The success of community-centred microfinance has attracted the
>>> government. The State deals with large numbers and its anxiety to deliver
>>> development at a pace that can do justice to the incumbent combination is
>>> understandable. The State learnt quickly from the SHG movement and
>>> decided
>>> to adopt it as one of its “schemes”. The bank linkage programme has been
>>> going on for years, and each year the government increases the targets to
>>> the banks for linkage and ports several other welfare schemes on to the
>>> groups.
>>> Market for Inclusion
>>> The last type of player in the inclusion market is a product of market
>>> forces. In the last decade there have been several people who for years
>>> worked in the development sector with communities and became impatient
>>> for
>>> growth. They embraced a market-based model of inclusive finance. The idea
>>> was that if we are able to make this activity of inclusive finance
>>> inherently profitable, then more and more people (who work for profits)
>>> will
>>> see merit in operating in this market. And with a good number of players,
>>> the market will not only expand, but because of competition the poor
>>> customers would eventually get a good deal.
>>> Unfortunately there have been numerous instances where our belief in the
>>> market has been belied and microfinance adds to the scepticism about the
>>> school that believes only in markets. During the initial phases of the
>>> intervention by the market model of mFIs, most of us looked at the growth
>>> of
>>> these organisations with a sense of awe. These organisations brought
>>> efficiency to their operations. But gains in efficiency are usually a
>>> function of standardisation. Standardisation worked at two levels: (a)
>>> The
>>> organisations themselves offered standardised products, that allowed them
>>> to
>>> reduce operating costs. (b) The individual identity of each organisation
>>> and
>>> what it stood for vanished. In the field one could therefore see little
>>> difference between one MFI and the other.Rhyne (2001) writing about MFIs
>>> in
>>> Bolivia has said that the institutions tend to converge operationally to
>>> the
>>> dominant microfinance paradigm. The paradigm of commercial microfinance
>>> is
>>> that of minimalism. That credit should be provided efficiently and
>>> quickly
>>> and a sharpening of financial viability have influenced institutions
>>> operating in this space.
>>> Bolivian Experience
>>> In microfinance itself, there were significant lessons to be learnt from
>>> Bolivia. For instance, Rhyne indicates that the number of institutions
>>> that
>>> had a subsidy drastically fell in about four years, and each of these
>>> institutions lost its core identity. FIE, an MFI known for technical
>>> assistance to a single community-based enterprise, Fades, which used to
>>> focus on lending for community infrastructure projects, and ProMujer,
>>> which
>>> specialised in empowerment training; all dropped most of the operational
>>> practices that differentiated them from the dominant paradigm.
>>> This “convergence” is happening in India as well. The minimalist model
>>> disburses credit in as efficient a manner as selling soaps and shampoos.
>>> It
>>> has its merits. For instance, in a largely agrarian society where large
>>> cash
>>> inflows take place only during the harvest season and the local economy
>>> operates on peaking of financial activity in this season, forcing a
>>> weekly
>>> repayment is by definition defying the logic of agrarian cash flows.
>>> However, by forcing this weekly discipline these institutions have
>>> possibly
>>> expanded the market for credit – persuading people to think about
>>> activities
>>> that give a weekly cash flow that can service their loan. This could
>>> thereby
>>> have made more cash move through the hands of people and reduced their
>>> vulnerability.
>>> However, the downside of a standardised model is that unless the cultural
>>> and economic nuances of each location are understood, there could be
>>> cracks.
>>> A standardised model closes innovation, reduces responsiveness and
>>> prevents
>>> customisation and once it reaches stability it expects to grow at a
>>> scorching pace. When something – particularly in financial services –
>>> grows
>>> at an unnatural pace, it is going to build into a bubble sooner or later.
>>> Such a process in the market-based microfinance sector may be happening
>>> now.
>>>
>>> The hope that the demonstration of one market-based experiment will
>>> attract
>>> more players has come true. Many more organisations have entered the
>>> market
>>> and are competing to lend to the poor. In the process they have put the
>>> “understanding” of the needs of the poor aside and have started chasing
>>> targets and numbers. For these institutions, the poor are not seen as
>>> human
>>> beings having an individual identity, characteristic and need. Instead
>>> they
>>> are seen as data points that add up to their profit statements. This
>>> anxiety
>>> for growth is dictated by the fact that the investors in the marketbased
>>> models are impatient and look for returns (and then exit!). The evidence
>>> from Bolivia is available before us. Microfinance in that country went
>>> through a phase of intense competition, leading to over-indebtedness and
>>> even the collapse of a few institutions. A reading of the microfinance
>>> movement of Bolivia in the 1990s looks like a contemporary Indian
>>> commentary. All the elements – client poaching, competition, reckless
>>> lending, over-indebtedness of the client – that eventually caused cracks
>>> in
>>> the efficient credit delivery mechanisms were present in Bolivia.
>>> Effects of Rapid Growth
>>> One of the visible indicators of the standardised model is its religious
>>> belief in zero tolerance of default. The organisations following the
>>> market
>>> model have possibly seen too much of indiscipline in the delivery of
>>> credit
>>> to the poor and have realised that this is one variable that has to be
>>> controlled at all cost. The story of organisations having a near 100%
>>> recovery rate for years is a fable difficult to believe, given that no
>>> household or economy can be insular to shocks all the time. Yes, the
>>> commercial models have been able to control one cause of default –
>>> intent.
>>> But it is well known that default also happens when the ability to repay
>>> is
>>> impaired. The new generation of MFIs has possibly not learnt to deal with
>>> this aspect. For a long time, while the MFIs were growing at an unnatural
>>> pace through geographic diversification, the borrowers were probably
>>> growing
>>> at a normal pace. With competition setting in, more and more MFIs
>>> concentrated on the same geographies.
>>> With the client getting multiple choices and the anxiety of the client to
>>> get as much of finance as possible from multiple institutions and this
>>> coupled with the overzealous suppliers of credit meant that the client
>>> herself was trying to grow at an unnatural pace, or that the client had
>>> begun to resort to adverse usage of credit. Unfortunately the
>>> standardised
>>> models do not have the patience to engage with the client. It is one
>>> thing
>>> to justify the high cost of credit at lower levels, but we also have to
>>> realise that at higher levels of indebtedness, interest rates become
>>> onerous
>>> from the point of view of the poor households.
>>> Servicing five MFI loans of Rs 10,000 each at 28% is not the same as
>>> servicing one such loan. And since the MFIs have not provided themselves
>>> with a mechanism of coping with default, the pressure on the borrower
>>> turns
>>> out to be intense. And this pressure could potentially lead to suicides.
>>> We
>>> do not know whether the current spate of suicides in Andhra Pradesh is a
>>> result of the MFI loans and the intense repayment pressure on the
>>> clients.
>>> These are claims made by the state government. Vikram Akula, the chairman
>>> of
>>> SKS Microfinance acknowledged that 17 of the 30 suicide cases were
>>> related
>>> to borrowers of SKS (Indian Express, 15 October 2010).
>>> However he is not helping the cause of the MFIs by stating that “the
>>> deceased borrowers were not defaulters of SKS and they would have been
>>> driven to suicides by other factors such as pressure for repayment of
>>> dues
>>> by other MFIs that lent money to the same borrowers” (Mint, 15 October
>>> 2010). The collective response of the microfinance institutions has also
>>> been found wanting. All that they have offered is a code of conduct,
>>> which
>>> is observed in violation! A meta level credit bureau makes a mockery of
>>> what
>>> is clearly acknowledged on the field. You do not need a database of
>>> clients
>>> and loans. The clients themselves are openly talking of multiple
>>> borrowings.
>>>
>>> Governance Issues
>>> Unfortunately, the celebration of the market endorsement of this business
>>> at
>>> the “bottom of the pyramid” could not have been more ill-timed. At the
>>> ground level, the stress was showing. Clients (for whatever reasons) were
>>> committing suicides. At the institutional level, it appeared that the
>>> boardroom battles were all about stock options, cashing in, cashing out
>>> and
>>> severance packages, when each of the boards should have been discussing
>>> whether their business model was showing cracks. Instead of being
>>> introspective, the response of the MFIs has been stubborn and defensive.
>>> State Response
>>> The response of the State has also not been in the desirable direction.
>>> Obviously, all the action is centred around Andhra Pradesh which has the
>>> highest concentration of MFIs and the largest exposure through the
>>> SHG-Bank
>>> linkage model. The government has responded with a heavy hand by passing
>>> an
>>> ordinance that has shifted the discourse from the basic problem to a
>>> legal
>>> frame. This almost appears like the government taking revenge on the
>>> competition with its monopolistic regulatory power. While there are
>>> nuances
>>> in whether the Government of Andhra Pradesh has the ability and the
>>> inclination to digest the administrative implications of the ordinance,
>>> it
>>> has once again shown its inability to target the errant microfinance
>>> institutions, and has instead come down heavily on the entire market.
>>> Given
>>> that the State itself is a dominant player in this market, this
>>> heavy-handedness creates an undesirable competitive barrier to an
>>> alternative model of credit delivery. Instead of harping on caps on
>>> interest
>>> rates and threatening to remove microfinance from the priority sector
>>> list,
>>> it is necessary for the State/Reserve Bank of India to look at specific
>>> instances and pull up the delinquent organisations. The RBI has set up a
>>> committee to look into the issues pertaining to MFIs and has asked the
>>> committee to submit a report within three months.
>>> But what is not clear is why the RBI is not carrying out a routine
>>> inspection of the portfolio of some MFIs that are under its purview in
>>> order
>>> to understand the issues of ghost clients and multiple borrowings and
>>> take
>>> action to discipline the erring organisations. Some of these
>>> organisations
>>> have serious governance issues that are not being investigated. The
>>> institutional representatives on the boards of these MFIs have not
>>> exercised
>>> their independence. The promoters have gotten away with significant
>>> instances of skimming and there seems to be no dissent voiced on the
>>> greedy
>>> executive compensations and short-sighted behaviour of the management of
>>> the
>>> top MFIs.
>>> So on the one hand, while the larger directional of the movement of the
>>> State/RBI in terms of financial inclusion seems to be good – directing
>>> payments through banks, calling for financial inclusion plans, opening up
>>> branch licencing, removing the cap on end use interest rates and so on –
>>> its
>>> response to the rapid growth of microfinance has been somewhat alarmist.
>>> Hopefully the State and the RBI would do what is well within their
>>> mandate
>>> in specific cases. This would be a superior approach compared to the
>>> policy-level clampdown that they have been talking about.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> ------------------------------
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> reader-list mailing list
>>> reader-list at sarai.net
>>> https://mail.sarai.net/mailman/listinfo/reader-list
>>>
>>>
>>> End of reader-list Digest, Vol 88, Issue 13
>>> *******************************************
>>>
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>
>
> --
> Rajkamal
>