[Reader-list] Jean Dreze on the UID-Database State in India in the Hindu

[Anivar Aravind]

On Sat, Nov 27, 2010 at 6:05 PM, Patrice Riemens <patrice at xs4all.nl> wrote:

>
> Methink RFID_tagging the whole Indian population is a much better idea!
> Preferably with a 'destroy' remote command device attached. Then finally
> 'gharib hatao' (*) policies can be effectively implemented!
>
>
Partrice,
The agenda is much more serious than that . It is not RFID taging. it is Geo
tagging
See Uncle Sam's (sam pitroda) new project which got approval
http://www.slideshare.net/pmpiii/public-information-infrastructure-4560021

GIS tagging people seems to the most scary joke i have seen in recent
past. It is covering everything other than adding a GPS  Device with gprs
modem to
your body




> (*) don't underestimate my Hindi...
>
>
> > Main intention of UID is to keep watch on criminals and terrorist. Once
> > the data is maintained it will be very easy task to keep watch on such
> > anti national elements. I don't understand why worry about its
> > confidentiality. When election data is an open document and nobody
> objects
> > to it than why for UID. UID will be worrisome for those involved in
> > antinational activity.
> >
> > However, it should be made compulsory with fingerprints than only it will
> > serve its purpose, else it's of no use.
> >
> > Thanks
> > Bipin Trivedi
> >
> >
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: reader-list-bounces at sarai.net [mailto:
> reader-list-bounces at sarai.net]
> > On Behalf Of Shuddhabrata Sengupta
> > Sent: Friday, November 26, 2010 12:04 PM
> > To: reader-list list
> > Subject: [Reader-list] Jean Dreze on the UID-Database State in India in
> > the Hindu
> >
> > Dear all,
> >
> > Please find below a really excellent article by Jean Dreze in The
> > Hindu on the UID scheme, which clearly and lucidly argues why the
> > building of the database state in India is a very bad idea and a
> > recipe for authoritarianism. Hope that this can provoke a debate on the
> >
> > http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/article911055.ece?
> > sms_ss=facebook&at_xt=4cef25dca9aa0aed%2C0
> >
> > best.
> >
> > Shuddha
> >
> > Unique facility, or recipe for trouble?
> >
> > Jean Drèze
> >
> > Opinion/Op Ed, The Hindu, November 25, 2010
> > Many questions remain about the Unique Identity Number system that is
> > being rolled out by the Central government.
> >
> > It is quite likely that a few weeks from now someone will be knocking
> > at your doors and asking for your fingerprints. If you agree, your
> > fingerprints will enter a national database, along with personal
> > characteristics (age, sex, occupation, and so on) that have already
> > been collected from you, unless you were missed in the “Census
> > household listing† earlier this year.
> >
> > The purpose of this exercise is to build the National Population
> > Register (NPR). In due course, your UID (Unique Identity Number, or
> > “Aadhaar†) will be added to it. This will make it possible to link
> > the NPR with other Aadhaar-enabled databases, from tax returns to
> > bank records and SIM (subscriber identity module) registers. This
> > includes the Home Ministry's National Intelligence Grid (NATGRID),
> > smoothly linking 21 national databases.
> >
> > For the intelligence agencies, this will be a dream-come-true.
> > Imagine, everyone's fingerprints at the click of a mouse, that too
> > with demographic information and all the rest. Should any suspicious
> > person book a flight, or use a cybercafé, or any of the services that
> > will soon require an Aadhaar number, she will be on their radar. If,
> > say, Arundhati Roy makes another trip to Dantewada, she will be
> > picked up on arrival like a ripe plum. Fantastic!
> >
> > ‘A half-truth'
> >
> > So, when the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) tells
> > us that the UID data (the “Central Identities Data Repository†) will
> > be safe and confidential, it is a half-truth. The confidentiality of
> > the Repository itself is not a minor issue, considering that UIDAI
> > can authorise “any entity† to maintain it, and that it can be
> > accessed not only by intelligence agencies but also by any Ministry.
> > But more important, the UID will help integrate vast amounts of
> > personal data, that are available to government agencies with few
> > restrictions.
> >
> > Confidentiality is not the only half-truth propagated by UIDAI.
> > Another one is that Aadhaar is not compulsory — it is just a
> > voluntary “facility.† UIDAI's concept note stresses that “enrolment
> > will not be mandated.† But there is a catch: “... benefits and
> > services that are linked to the UID will ensure demand for the
> > number.† This is like selling bottled water in a village after
> > poisoning the well, and claiming that people are buying water
> > voluntarily. The next sentence is also ominous: “This will not,
> > however, preclude governments or Registrars from mandating enrolment.â€
> >
> > That UID is, in effect, going to be compulsory is clear from many
> > other documents. For instance, the Planning Commission's proposal for
> > the National Food Security Act argues for “mandatory use of UID
> > numbers which are expected to become operational by the end of
> > 2010† (note the optimistic time-frame). No UID, no food. Similarly,
> > UIDAI's concept note on the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act
> > (NREGA) assumes that “each citizen needs to provide his UID before
> > claiming employment.† Thus, Aadhaar will also be a condition for the
> > right to work — so much for its voluntary nature.
> >
> > Now, if the UID is compulsory, then everyone should have a right to
> > free, convenient and reliable enrolment. The enrolment process,
> > however, is all set to be a hit-or-miss affair, with no guarantee of
> > timely and hassle-free inclusion. UIDAI hopes to enrol 600 million
> > people in the next four years. That is about half of India's
> > population in the next four years. What about the other half?
> >
> > Nor is there any guarantee of reliability. Anyone familiar with the
> > way things work in rural India would expect the UID database to be
> > full of errors. There is a sobering lesson here from the Below
> > Poverty Line (BPL) Census. A recent World Bank study found rampant
> > anomalies in the BPL list: “A common problem was erroneous
> > information entered for household members. In one district of
> > Rajasthan, more than 50 per cent of the household members were listed
> > as sisters-in-law.â€
> >
> > Will the UID database be more reliable? Don't bet on it. And it is
> > not clear how the errors will be corrected as and when they emerge.
> >
> > Under the proposed National Identification Authority of India Bill
> > (“NIDAI Bill†), if someone finds that her “identity informationâ€
> > is
> > wrong, she is supposed to “request the Authority† to correct it, upon
> > which the Authority “may, if it is satisfied, make such alteration as
> > may be required.† There is a legal obligation to alert the Authority,
> > but no right to correction.
> >
> > The Aadhaar juggernaut is rolling on regardless (and without any
> > legal safeguards in place), fuelled by mesmerising claims about the
> > social applications of UID. A prime example is UID's invasion of the
> > NREGA. NREGA workers are barely recovering from the chaotic rush to
> > payments of wages through banks. Aadhaar is likely to be the next
> > ordeal. The local administration is going to be hijacked by enrolment
> > drives. NREGA works or payments will come to a standstill where
> > workers are waiting for their Aadhaar number. Others will be the
> > victims of unreliable technology, inadequate information technology
> > facilities, or data errors. And for what? Gradual, people-friendly
> > introduction of innovative technologies would serve the NREGA better
> > than the UID tamasha.
> >
> > The real game plan, for social policy, seems to be a massive
> > transition to “conditional cash transfers† (CCTs). There is more than
> > a hint of this “revolutionary† plan in Nandan Nilekani's book,
> > Imagining India. Since then, CCTs have become the rage in policy
> > circles. A recent Planning Commission document argues that successful
> > CCTs require “a biometric identification system,† now made possible
> > by “the initiation of a Unique Identification System (UID) for the
> > entire population …† The same document recommends a string of mega
> > CCTs, including cash transfers to replace the Public Distribution
> > System.
> >
> > If the backroom boys have their way, India's public services as we
> > know them will soon be history, and every citizen will just have a
> > Smart Card — food stamps, health insurance, school vouchers,
> > conditional maternity entitlements and all that rolled into one. This
> > approach may or may not work (that is incidental), but business at
> > least will prosper. As the Wall Street Journal says about the
> > Rashtriya Swasthya Bhima Yojana (which is a pioneering CCT project,
> > for health insurance), “the plan presents a way for insurance
> > companies to market themselves and develop brand awareness.â€
> >
> > The danger
> >
> > The biggest danger of UID, however, lies in a restriction of civil
> > liberties. As one observer aptly put it, Aadhaar is creating “the
> > infrastructure of authoritarianism† — an unprecedented degree of
> > state surveillance (and potential control) of citizens. This
> > infrastructure may or may not be used for sinister designs. But can
> > we take a chance, in a country where state agencies have such an
> > awful record of arbitrariness, brutality and impunity?
> >
> > In fact, I suspect that the drive towards permanent state
> > surveillance of all residents has already begun. UIDAI is no Big
> > Brother, but could others be on the job? Take for instance Captain
> > Raghu Raman (of the Mahindra Special Services Group), who is quietly
> > building NATGRID on behalf of the Home Ministry. His columns in the
> > business media make for chilling reading. Captain Raman believes that
> > growing inequality is a “powder keg waiting for a spark,† and
> > advocates corporate takeover of internal security (including a
> > “private territorial army†), to enable the “commercial czars† to
> > “protect their empires.† The Maoists sound like choir boys in
> > comparison.
> >
> > There are equally troubling questions about the “NIDAI Bill,â€
> > starting with why it was drafted by UIDAI itself. Not surprisingly,
> > the draft Bill gives enormous powers to UIDAI's successor, NIDAI —
> > and with minimal safeguards. To illustrate, the Bill empowers NIDAI
> > to decide the biometric and demographic information required for an
> > Aadhaar number (Section 23); “specify the usage and applicability of
> > the Aadhaar number for delivery of various benefits and
> > services† (Section 23); authorise whoever it wishes to “maintain the
> > Central Identities Data Repository† (Section 7) or even to exercise
> > any of its own “powers and functions† (Section 51); and dictate all
> > the relevant “regulations† (Section 54).
> >
> > Ordinary citizens, for their part, are powerless: they have no right
> > to a UID number except on NIDAI's terms, no right to correction of
> > inaccurate data, and — last but not least — no specific means to
> > redress grievances. In fact, believe it or not, the Bill states (in
> > Section 46) that “no court shall take cognisance of any offence
> > punishable under this Act† except based on a complaint authorised by
> > NIDAI.
> >
> > So, is UID a facility or a calamity? It depends for whom. For the
> > intelligence agencies, bank managers, the corporate sector, and
> > NIDAI, it will be a facility and a blessing. For ordinary citizens,
> > especially the poor and marginalised, it could well be a calamity.
> >
> > (The author is Visiting Professor at the Department of Economics,
> > University of Allahabad and Member of the National Advisory Council.)
> >
> >
> > Shuddhabrata Sengupta
> >
> >
> > _________________________________________
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> >
>
>
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