[Reader-list] Kashmiri Marginalities: The Construction, Nature and Response.

[gowhar fazli]

Thank you we wi! that is a remarkable response coming from you.  With respect to Ramzan, i hear that the month is just about over! It is receding and not approaching. People back home must have started singing 'alvida' (goodbye) for Ramzaan already. It is the Eid that is approaching... which is 'eid ul fitr' at that... also known locally as 'choti eid' if that is too much of a tongue twister for you!  Thank you for the greetings anyway. I accept them irrespective of not being observant.

--- On Mon, 9/6/10, we wi <dhatr1i at yahoo.com> wrote:

From: we wi <dhatr1i at yahoo.com>
Subject: Re: [Reader-list] Kashmiri Marginalities: The Construction, Nature and Response.
To: "gowhar fazli" <gowharfazili at yahoo.com>
Date: Monday, September 6, 2010, 11:58 AM

The article suits best for a essay writing in a school.  For a living in INDIA things are not that much worse.  If that would be the case 100Crore+ Indians feel the same against each other.  Any way as 'Ramadan' is approaching nearer let me wish you as a gift for this mail.

      Wishing you a happy ramzan.


  
--- On Mon, 9/6/10, gowhar fazli <gowharfazili at yahoo.com> wrote:

From: gowhar fazli <gowharfazili at yahoo.com>
Subject: [Reader-list] Kashmiri Marginalities: The Construction, Nature and Response.
To: "reader-list at sarai.net" <reader-list at sarai.net>
Date: Monday, September 6, 2010, 10:25 AM

This work in progress, that
 tries to straddle wide swathes of political difference would benefit from your engaged responses.  

Thank you.

Gowhar Fazili


Kashmiri Marginalities: The Construction, Nature and Response[1]
by Gowhar Fazili on Monday, 06 September 2010 at 10:01

By Gowhar Fazili


To start the argument, we can club the dominant discourses around Kashmir into three broad categories, i.e., the Indian, the Pakistani and the Kashmiri discourses.  While the Indian and Pakistani discourses (as detailed below), accommodate Kashmiri people and the history of their collective struggles only if, and when, these buttress their respective positions, the Kashmiri discourse is quintessentially about these struggles. In turn the dominant Kashmiri discourse simplifies the sub-struggles and fragmented politics that exists within, and the connections these have with the outside world.

These dominant discourses of political
 history are a quagmire of claims and counter claims.  For those who have not borne the immediate brunt of the conflict these generate excitement and passion, and the discourse is consumed through various media like an IPL cricket match.  The Indian state and the nationalists of various hues, including Hindutva, Leftist, Liberal, Secularists, unanimously deploy various moments of Kashmir’s history, including the accession signed by Maharaja Hari Singh, the elections held, the wars won, the leaders bought over, the subsidies given, the development achieved, investments made, etc., as indicators of Indian legitimacy and control in Kashmir.  Kashmiri alienation, and separatist movements figure in this narrative, if at all, variously, as consequences of external interference, uneven development, appeasement, result of one-off political mistakes made by previous leaders, etc., which are to be corrected in due course
 when the Indian
 democracy matures and so on. This discourse denies Kashmiris any intelligence or capability for autonomous political behavior. It betrays amnesia around the rich history of struggles in Kashmir that preceded accession in 1947 that still continue to inspire Kashmir.

The Pakistani discourse emphasizes the ‘Muslim connection’ and dwells on the disputed nature of Jammu and Kashmir which should have been theirs by the logic of partition.  It focuses on the denial of self-determination to the people and disregard of the UN resolutions, calling for plebiscite in the region.  It recounts the valor with which Azad Kashmir was won, and in their view the continued support and affinity that the majority of Kashmiri Muslims feel towards Pakistan.   Though Pakistan lends moral and diplomatic support to the current separatist movement in Kashmir, it devalues the nuanced engagement and negotiation Kashmiris have had with the Indian
 state over the last sixty years, largely independent of Pakistan.

The dominant Kashmiri narrative which is at a marginalized position with respect to the other two discourses imagines itself to be at the centre of the current political struggle. It draws from a long history of marginalization that predates modernity, tracing back Kashmiri dislike and resistance against foreign occupation to the Mughal invasion in 1588 and the subsequent progressive emasculation and dispossession of Kashmiris by the Afghan, the Sikh, the Dogra, and in the same league, the Indian regime.  It leverages dates like 16th March 1846 (Amritsar Treaty), when Kashmir was sold by the British to Maharaja Gulab Singh for Seventy- five Lakh Nanakshahi rupees[2],  the excessive taxation to recover this money that followed, leading to the famine of 1977-79 in which a large number of  Kashmiris died; the systematic denial of basic rights and dignity and
 discrimination on the basis of religion and region under the Dogra regime; the 13th July 1931
 Uprising against the Maharaja and the massacre that followed; the year 1953 when Sheikh Abdullah, the first democratically elected Prime-Minister of Kashmir was deposed and imprisoned by India on charges of conspiracy and sedition, arresting along with him the socio-economic revolution that was underway.  It presumes the subsequent elections while Sheikh was in custody for twenty years to have been rigged and the period to have been marked with extreme suppression, corruption and cooption.  It sees changes made over the years to extend provisions of Indian constitution in an attempt to bring Kashmir closer to the Indian union, as bulldozing of the residual safeguards against assimilation.  It cites failure of India to make progress on the various agreements and accords, calling for plebiscite, restoration of autonomy, etc., as illustrations
 of India’s ‘Chanakya Neeti’ (deceitful policy.)

The significant moments in recent history, like the 1984 hanging of the JKLF leader, Maqbool Bhat, the rigging of 1987 elections, the mass uprising for Azadi, and the repression that began in 1989 when Kashmiri youth took to arms against the Indian state,  and such, form the key markers around which the narrative of victimhood and valor is woven.  Not surprisingly the Indian national days are designated as black days (including the day Indian army landed in Kashmir) and are marked with protest and blackout.  The narrative erases the moments of compromise and relative calm that Kashmiris have enjoyed in spurts in the intervening years giving rise to the educated, middle class which is spearheading the current separatist movement.

Much of the writing on Kashmir prior to the year 2000 concerns debates around these discourses emerging from respective camps. 
 Spokespersons, scholars, military think tanks and a significantly large number of literate and illiterate Kashmiris are socialized into the importance of each of these claims and possess ability to maneuver through controversies to establish their political claims.  The positions are entrenched and provide for little flexibility.  The dominant narratives have also found their way into the colloquial language and often, abuses, frustrations, humor, are expressed with reference to these moments.  To mention just one, ‘ye nai Sattejihas yeeha balaay’  ‘Had not the forty-seven been accursed’, refers to 1947, the year Indian Army landed in Kashmir and the Maharaja signed that accession. The expression is used to let out everyday frustration or to poke fun at someone’s undue claims or some unworthy person’s rise through
 corruption.

While the Kashmiri Self is torn between commitments to multiple, overlapping and
 contradictory identities and interests, like people anywhere else, the fact of being born in a territory, where the conflict around its disputed nature has raged to varying degrees for over the last sixty years, complicates and intensifies concern for some identities at the cost of others.  The political uncertainty impacts different members and groups differently as they choose different strategies to deal with the onslaught from within and without.  To grossly simplify, for example a large majority of Pandits have moved out of Kashmir and many have allied themselves with Indian right-wing parties.  Kashmiri Shia and Sunni Muslims largely identify with the broad contours of separatist politics, Pashtoons are invisible, Gujjars maintain an ambivalent position depending on where they are physically, located.  People in Gurez, Karnah, Uri, who are geographically isolated from
 the valley and live in close proximity with security
 garrisons do not manifest sympathy with separatism, or at least do not overtly do so for obvious reasons.  Within the state of Jammu and Kashmir, people of Doda, Punch and Rajori ally with Kashmir or Jammu depending on which of their interests and identities are threatened at a particular moment of time.  People of Kargil gravitate towards Kashmir if and when the Buddhist majority discriminates against them.  Hindu majority areas of Jammu, and Buddhist Leh, have consistently favored India and alleged discrimination by Kashmiri Muslims and their appeasement by the Indian state.

Kashmiri society is variegated along caste, class, community, gender, region, religion and political orientation. These identities contract within and extend beyond the geographical boundaries of Kashmir in different situations and along different questions. Yet it is the collective experience of a shared geography, history, language, culture and meanings
 that make Kashmiris conversant with each other in a special way, rendering others as outside. The identification with the dominant Kashmiri narrative presented above which at this moment has a favorable bias towards the masculine, Muslim majoritarian identity, depends on where one is located within the crosscutting mesh of identities and experiences and intellectual trajectories.

In India, Kashmiris are marked irrespective of their other identities, by race, religion and language. Physically, they do not look, sound or behave like stereotypical Indians and are often harassed and made to prove their nationality at the ticket counters or wherever nationality applies. Outside Kashmir, given the context of the twenty years of armed conflict, and the consequent stereotyping of Kashmiris as terrorists, they face  difficulty in finding accommodation, are forced to inhabit Muslim ghettos; receive snares and unwelcome comments while travelling; are
 easy prey for the security agencies seeking instant suspects for terror attacks; cannot stick their neck out too much in day-to-day struggles so as not to risk being falsely reported; cannot easily get visas to ‘civilized’ aka non-Muslim countries (for being a Muslim is bad enough, but being a Kashmiri Muslim, with the word ‘Kashmir’ on their passports, makes them doubly illegitimate.)

Since Social Sciences do not form part of military curriculum, for the majority of over six lakh armed forces dotting neighbourhoods in Kashmir, Kashmiris are potential Pakistani terrorists who deserve to be eliminated or incarcerated or insulted on the flimsiest excuse. Kashmiris are targets for ready retribution in wake of militant attacks. Homes can be searched, vehicles stopped, people disembarked and detained any moment and without explanation. The laws like AFSPA permit the security forces to shoot people as a preventive measure against possible
 future terror attacks. Public Safety Act provides for preventive custody without trial even before one engages in ‘objectionable’ activity. Men, women and children are susceptible to sexual assault and torture and other forms of humiliation. Since the above experiences do not vary significantly among different segments of the Kashmiri population, they reinforce the collective marginalized identity.

The militants against the security forces, and the consequent deaths of Kashmiris in the conflict caused by militants or in crossfire, or killing of assumed or real Indian agents, the damage to personal properties, cultural and religious places, though used as firewood for Indian propaganda against the separatists, enhances the collective sense of victimhood. In some it has also resulted in abhorrence for all forms of violence emanating from anywhere. Others hold Pakistan or foreigners or religious fundamentalists responsible and hate them for this
 reason. Still others have turned overly apologetic, servile and defensive. But curiously it has not resulted in increased love for India among many.

The violence in the society has also resulted in intolerance towards those who for various reasons do not subscribe to the dominant sense of victimhood or those who try to channelize their anger and energies differently. The identities which are in-between or fall outside the markers of dominant Kashmiri identity and victimhood are rendered invisible or sought to be assimilated or in extreme cases eliminated. This is in consonance with how radical identities often turn upon their own people who may choose divergent strategies or cannot fit within their grand project.

This dominant narrative is augmented with the indices of development like poor representation in civil services, academics, armed forces; backwardness of the region in terms of industrial development, educational infrastructure;
 employment opportunities within and outside the state. It also draws from the narrative of regional discrimination establishing how India has favored development in Jammu and Ladakh at the cost of Kashmir.

In the Pre-globalization era, the center being the only source of funding, would offer financial packages to loyalist or compromisers and punish those who tried deviate or rose in opposition to the centers hegemony. This practice continues. In the present times multinational private enterprise or funding cannot move in due to instability and disturbance. Irrespective of this the deals have been struck by the government with foreign companies for example, power projects, that are complete sell-outs helped by the fact that people are alienated from the state sponsored politics and too busy fighting the separatist cause. The stunted development willful or incidental adds to alienation.

 

Kashmiri Responses

Adam Weisberger[3]
 using the German Jewry of Wilhelmine era as a test case to understand marginality and its directions among people argues that “the marginal person, having taken on elements of the dominant culture, is unable to return unchanged to his or her original group. Thus, the marginal person is caught in a structure of double ambivalence: unable either to leave or to return to the original group; unable either to merge with the new group or to slough it off. Marginal persons typically react to this field of cross-cutting pressures in four directions, here termed assimilation, return, poise, and transcendence.”

Kashmiris through history have to varying degrees of success pursued various directions in order to overcome their personal and collective sense of marginality. If we were to coalesce the four directions in which the marginalized react as suggested by Weisberger namely assimilation, return, transcendence, poise we can find parallels for each in
 different time periods, groups, institutions, individuals or simultaneously present as contradictory tendencies in a single entity or individual. Kashmiris have also produced a wide range of political, intellectual and strategic responses that range over categories like: separatists, autonomists, Islamists, secularist, loyalist, anarchist, humanist, spiritualist, apologist, radical, pacifist, self loathing and a myriad of other responses, many, still nascent and yet to be born.    (I have to develop this)

One of the latest debates raging at the moment is around a fresh attempt to pass the Permanent Residents (Disqualification) Bill introduced in the Legislative assembly.  The bill seeks to over-rule the High Court decision against the provision that renders a woman non state subject if she marries a non-state-subject.  The same does not apply to men who marry outside.  Interestingly BJP and other right of centre
 Jammu-based parties have started protesting against the bill, while the valley maintains a silence, betraying support through the lack of outrage among various political groups.  The silence is symptomatic of the male patriarchal bias in the dominant discourse in Kashmir.  Not to say that BJP and its allies are by any means less patriarchal.  They possibly see the women’s matrimony as a means to extend their connection with the Indian Hindu mainstream or to increase their likely voters in Jammu since marriage outside Kashmir is assumed to be
 more common among Hindus in Jammu.

 
Amarnath Land Transfer issue in 2008 once again fissured J&K along communal and regional lines.  While the right wing Hindu formations fanned sentiments in Jammu against the revocation of land transfer, Kashmiri Muslim separatists and mainstream regional parties saw the move as yet another attempt to change demography in Kashmir, since the
 shrine board included individuals who were non-state-subjects. For the awaam of Kashmir, the controversy provided yet another charged issue to vent their separatism.

 

Indian Responses

The Indian civil society has looked at Kashmir with empathy, apathy or disdain.  Largely the Indian mainstream has been silent on or apathetic towards Kashmiri suffering, because they do not share blood ties or see commonality of interest with Kashmiris.  Those who empathize, have their empathies conditioned by their location within the mainstream Indian politics.  Indian intellectuals have tried to read Kashmir into their own respective projects rather than look at it from the point of view of Kashmiris and their history.  Similarly Indian Muslims and their sympathizers look at Kashmir as a minority problem and expect Kashmiris to behave in a manner that does not threaten the survival of Indian Muslims through a backlash, which
 would in turn harm the fragile secular polity.  The left sees it as a class problem or at best that of regional imbalance and because of false consciousness and undifferentiated class structure, unfit for class struggle and
 revolution. Large majorities in India, under the influence of the media with its nationalist bias, look at Kashmiris with disdain as they see them as anti-nationals who share cross border loyalties and are mostly terrorists and fanatics.

The civil society groups have tried to identify or create their respective constituencies by promoting various sub-marginalities. Since funding to NGO’s is channeled through the Indian elite, based in Delhi, they exercise substantial influence on how ‘civil society’ in its NGO avatar develops in Kashmir. The initiatives presently active in Kashmir have diverse ideological backgrounds.  If we count out the covert intelligence operations in the form of NGOs, to site just
 three the Gandhian, left leaning and feminists each sees the central problem in Kashmir to be that of fissuring of the community due to violence, feudalism and/or patriarchy respectively.  While these fault-lines exist, to see them as detached from the nationality question does violence to Kashmir.  It would be like the British describing colonialism condition in India as male chauvinism or caste oppression.

Right wing nationalists block any positive moves by the state towards a negotiated solution or reconciliation by branding the seasonal olive-branch overtures by the State as Muslim appeasement, while at the same time cultivating a constituency among Pandits, and caste and class groups among Hindus in Jammu.  They also use Kashmir as a spectacle to shore up their Hinduvadi constituency in India by calling for abrogation of article 370 or through flag hoisting missions in Lal Chowk and such.

The state, since 1989 has
 largely responded with repression through violent means.  The talks are offered and withdrawn often at the peril of those who come forward and end up being disowned by the community for the failure and embarrassment.

There is also an unceasing ideological onslaught that sees Kashmir merely as a problem of development exacerbated by the ever present ‘foreign hand’, that portrays all protest as political intrigue and at best a result of internal power struggle for control over resources.

But if one were to follow the dialectics of politics in Kashmir over a longer period, it follows predictable, Sisyphean cycles of eternal return, of protests, repression, compromise, corruption and back to protests.

 

Encouragement of marginalities within

Indian state and civil society often intervenes to rescue Kashmiri women and other marginalized groups from the Kashmiri Muslim male society which is assumed to be patriarchal
 and dominating.  In any discussion on Kashmir, the question, ‘but what about the women, the Gujjars, Pahadis, Shias, Buddhists, Dogras, Pandits?’ and so on invariably comes up.  The centre is able to subvert the mobilization around a particular marginality, by bringing up the issue of marginalities within and around the claimant group. In turn the mobilization around the dominant discourse tries to suppress or ignore the discrimination within or around itself in response to this subversion.  In case of Kashmir, the demand for the right to self determination is hostage to the question of what happens to the women, shias, Gujjars, Pandits, Hindus of Jammu and Buddhists of Ladakh.  On the other hand the dominant discourse around unresolved nature of Jammu and Kashmir has subsumed
 other effective marginalities experienced by Kashmiris of various denominations at various other levels.

 

Ambivalent nature of
 Kashmiris

The narrative of Indian nationalism is fuelled by the ‘adventures’ of the Indian Army in Kashmir.  It is followed by a legalistic discourse on the nature and tenability of Kashmir’s accession with the Indian union.  This discourse forms the backdrop against which the Kashmiris are examined and variously described: as being the symbols of Indian secularism for having willfully joined the Indian union inspite of their religious and geographical affinity with Pakistan; as being primordially secular, Sufi and non-violent or being treacherous people capable of cross border allegiance, duplicity and deceit.

This problematic status makes them unfit for democracy and provides a good reason why Kashmiris need to be mainstreamed and denied autonomous self-definition and a dignified independent identity.  The only identities permissible to Kashmiris are the one that pass the litmus test of Indian ideals, the ideals
 which the Indians may themselves not have been able to uphold.  If the identity proclaimed or exhibited by Kashmiris does not fit within the standards offered to other regional minorities in India, then these have to be shorn off in the interest of the unity of the nation.  Kashmiri’s are defined partially, in a defused form and only to the extent that it serves various political purposes and then left to deal with the schizophrenic condition on their own.

Kashmiri counter narrative sees the illegal accession signed by their tormentor, Maharaja Hari Singh on their behalf and the denial of self determination only as a milestones in their long struggle for emancipation, which began much earlier and continues till date.  Kashmiris subscribing to this narrative see themselves as de-facto and temporary citizens of India who have been subjugated against their will.

While Kashmiris at different stages in history have bought into
 the discourse about the secular, peaceful, compositeness of their culture, they resent its use to make them into the essence of Indian ideal and react by adopting the exact opposite stereotype.  Simultaneously the emphasis on their affinities and continuities with regions that spread beyond the de-facto borders of the Indian state—that is the connection with Pakistan, Afghanistan, Central Asia, Persia and beyond—provide them a lever to establish their separateness.

While the Indian’s are in no hurry to make progress in resolving the issue of Kashmir and can afford all the time and spare enormous resources, for Kashmiri’s nothing matters as much or is as urgent as dignity, certainty and security of their selves and yet they are left with no choice but to stake their all and as long as it takes to achieve it.

 

Self, Community and the Universe

In order to engage with the Kashmiri self I will begin with
 myself.  I find myself marginalized from the community in which I was born because my natural intellectual and emotional trajectory pushed me to transcend my ‘received self’ by imbibing fragments of and influences from the exposure to other cultures, communities and intellectual currents.  In the process I hope to evolve by contrasting these fragments and make something new out of them and thus constantly manage to recreate myself.  This I assume is a normal course of healthy life for me.  The process however distances me from my community in terms of my appearance, opinions as well as associations.

But since the community I come from is marginalized, if I were to become too different from it in terms of my looks or my subjectivity, I would be perceived as a betrayer.  Apart from this, seeing the community under distress, I personally sense my own betrayal.  I get forced to identify with the community and
 represent it.  The struggle I am confronted with is how to retain the individual self and maintain its natural growth while at the same time not abandon my community in distress.    The third commitment is to the universal whole, the affinity and commitment one feels towards the shared values and heritage of human community.   It is hard to negotiate commitment to self, community and universe, all at the same time yet this negotiation is important since a sense of justice is at stake.  The luxury of being able to accord justice to all becomes difficult as the communal sense of victimhood alters ones subjectivity in its favour.  For example when the
 outsiders perceive and treat Kashmiris unfavorably, it reduces my emphasis on other identities within Kashmir and the collective Kashmiri identity becomes the focus of my attention.


As long as one is able to keep oneself outside and inside at the same
 time, one might be able to maintain a fairer view of things.  But in this lies the danger of blunting ones outrage and protest.


Normally one does, and should be able to identify with multiple marginalities at the same time.  Some marginalities I embody, like Muslim, South Asian and Kashmiri. Others I may not, like gender, caste, rural, disabled, and yet am I able to identify with them.  I cannot have my concerns limited to myself and my community since my own victimhood shapes my identification with other marginalities. But how exactly does one locate oneself with respect to other marginalities in a real politics? How does one negotiate between strategy and idealism?  When do I remain silent about a particular marginality to privilege the other?  When do I maintain strategic silence about other marginalities to keep certain marginality in focus?  How does one combine these simultaneous movements to ensure that a
 particular marginality does not acquire fascistic proportions?


This negotiation has to take place in the context where differential importance is given to marginalities by the state or dominant interests in order to subvert, fragment and hijack marginalities. One marginality is played up against the other. Demands are counter posed—something more general or ephemeral like ‘azadi’ against something more concrete like ‘bijli-sadak-pani’.  It is like dangling one before the deprived in order to vane them off the other.  The choice offered is often between dignity and basic amenities of life.


Symbolic activity can hijack the real issues around marginality.  The more radical I sound the more legitimate my voice becomes in a marginalized community.  This triggers one-upmanship within the marginalized group in the race to lay claim as real representatives of the marginality. One has to arrive at a position
 between compromising oneself and being reduced to a radical rant.

In order to make the larger sense of marginality composite of marginalities within and a principled and strategic alliance with other marginalities without, the process of emancipation of different marginalities has to happen simultaneously. There is need for an ongoing dialogue to negotiate the genuineness of claims of marginality and to resolve conflict of interest and issues of justice in the context of different marginalities working together.  There is need for democracy within the alliances of marginalities.  For Kashmir ‘Azadi’ has to be redefined in terms of and achieved through the notional and substantive emancipation of all the sub-marginalities that constitute it or risk being fragmented or reduced to yet another chauvinistic movement.   It is only this rigorous self definition that will facilitate principled alliances with other movements
 and conceptions of marginality.


 

[1]  Presented  at the Marginalities Workshop, Department of Sociology,  on March 25-26th 2010

 

[2] And amusingly in addition to this six pairs of pashmina goats and three pairs of Kashmiri shawls annually!



[3]  Marginality and Its Directions Author(s): Adam Weisberger Source: Sociological Forum, Vol. 7, No. 3 (Sep., 1992), pp. 425-446 Published by: Springer


      
_________________________________________
reader-list: an open discussion list on media and the city.
Critiques & Collaborations
To subscribe: send an email to reader-list-request at sarai.net with subscribe in the subject header.
To unsubscribe: https://mail.sarai.net/mailman/listinfo/reader-list
List archive: <https://mail.sarai.net/pipermail/reader-list/>