[Reader-list] How the J&K papers reported the Amarnath land row, 2008

[Aditya Raj Baul]

Reporting in times of communal strife --IV


More than Kashmir Times published from Jammu, commentary in Greater
Kashmir highlighted the alienation - economic, physical, and
psychological - fostered by the blockade and the fact that it was
directly antithetical to India’s claim to the Valley,  says SUBARNO
CHATTARJI.


Posted Thursday, Sep 09 16:50:51, 2010
http://thehoot.org/web/home/story.php?storyid=4806&mod=1&pg=1&sectionId=2&valid=true



MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE AMARNATH CONTROVERSY--A CASE STUDY


Research by  Aaliya Ahmed, Sabeha Mufti and Zara Malik,
Media Education Research Centre
Kashimir University


Project coordinator, Sevanti Ninan
A Panos study

On August 31, 2008 the  three-month long Amaranth agitation sparked by
the transfer of land to the Shri Amarnath Shrine Board ended with an
agreement inked between the  Government and the Shri Amaranth
Sangharsh Samiti.  Two years later questions remain about  the role of
the political class and the media in stoking the fires that erupted
with successive government decisions on allotting land to the Shri
Amarnath Shrine Board in June 2008.  This is a preliminary inquiry
into how the media reported the series of events and the commentary
carried by newspapers during that period.



‘Economic Terrorism': the blockade of the Kashmir Valley

Subarno Chattarji


That government and bureaucratic actions often have multiple
consequences was perhaps best proven by the afterlife of the Shri
Amarnath Shrine Board (SASB) land acquisition. Protests in the Kashmir
Valley against the acquisition and counter-protests in Jammu in favour
were the more salient features of political and civic society
responses. It was when the protestors in Jammu resorted to an economic
blockade that the Valley was forced to come to terms with their own
isolation as well as the need for greater self-reliance. Newspapers '
particularly in the Valley ' were exercised by this issue since it
impinged on daily realities and revealed new vulnerabilities.

Kashmir Times carried a news item citing PDP patron Mufti Mohammad
Sayeed: ‘“Treading the footsteps of the vicious communal elements in
Jammu, the reported enforcement of the anti-Kashmir economic blockade
by BJP functionaries now even in some parts of Punjab has started
pushing Kashmir towards absolute physical and economic isolation,
perhaps for the first time since independence.”' (‘Economic blockade
not civilized conduct: Mufti,' August 7, 2008) The Mufti's reaction
expressed a type of disbelief and shock at the actuality of the
blockade ' a point taken up by other newspapers as well. While many
Kashmiris may have felt isolated from mainland India this was ‘proof'
that ‘elements' aligned to mainland political parties were determined
to reinforce that sense of separation.

More than Kashmir Times (which is published from Jammu), commentary in
Greater Kashmir highlighted the alienation ' economic, physical, and
psychological ' fostered by the blockade and the fact that it was
directly antithetical to India's claim to the Valley. Ihsan Malik
pointed to the irony inherent in trying to economically squeeze the
Valley: ‘The blockade from which we are suffering is different from
the other instances of blockades, in that, it is being used by the
state against a region which it always claims to be its integral
part.' (‘Blockade Politics,' GK, August 18, 2008) Malik conflated the
protestors in Jammu with the ‘state', implying that the state could,
if it wished, lift the blockade. Malik hinted at collusion between the
institutions of governance in Jammu, the protestors, and their
political masters in India, pointing ultimately to the failure of the
central government to alleviate the sufferings of a people it claimed
as its own. Malik's larger point was the sense of Kashmiris living
under sufferance and being ‘subjected to all sorts of physical and
mental torture', of which the blockade was only the most recent
instance. The economic blockade was a ‘leaf taken out of Israel's
book. The blockade is a favourite strategy with the Israelis. They
have, time and again, used it to stifle the poor Palestinians.' The
comparison between Palestine and Kashmir is often made by jihadists
mapping territories where Muslims are oppressed and need to be
liberated. Here, however, it was offered in a secular setting and the
fact that this was not an isolated sentiment is proven by another
article by Z. G. Muhammad who wrote that ‘the way the agitation is
being led it substantiates the much talked about the [sic] Mossad plan
for strangulating Kashmir economically.' (‘Economic Blockade can
rebound,' GK) At one level this may seem akin to paranoia and the
airing of conspiracy theories. At another level these articulations
are indicative of the sense of siege and isolation generated by the
blockade and the reference to Palestine creates larger historical and
specifically Muslim solidarities.

>From these parallels it was another step towards perceiving the
blockade as an act of war on a sovereign people, thereby further
consolidating a sense of victimized nationhood. Subaktagin Gaznavi
stated that ‘the ulterior motive [of the blockade was] to subjugate
and starve Kashmiris and bring them to their knees.' (‘Blockade as a
weapon,' RK, 8 August, 2008) Citing the Geneva Conventions on the laws
of war and collective punishment, as well as former U.S. Attorney
General Ramsey Clark, Gaznavi argued: ‘The imposition of economic
sanction/blockade is nothing but seemingly an act of war against the
Kashmiri nation. This instrument of economic warfare is against the
conventions of war.' While it is possible to cavil at the overt
articulation of war between sovereign nations ' since the Valley is
not one ' in effect, it is unsurprising that the blockade was
perceived as such, especially since it was a form of collective
punishment and the state seemed to acquiesce in these acts by its
refusal to actively lift the blockade.

Gaznavi upped the rhetorical and political ante which was partly
reflective of collective shock and anger. Several editorials stated
the need to counter these acts of war by stressing Kashmiri
self-reliance. In ‘Fighting economic blockade' Greater Kashmir
emphasized the need for economic self-sufficiency. At the same time it
also harped on the need to resist the dismemberment of Jammu &
Kashmir. ‘The economic blockade needs to be converted into an
opportunity of working for self-sufficiency. […] In this trying
situation the role of the Kashmiri leaders will be watched for years
to come. Their political acumen as well as sincerity is at test. […]
It is high time for them to respect the people's wishes and
aspirations by ironing out differences that are basically superficial
rather than deep.' (July 31, 2008) While Gaznavi seemed to see the
blockade as an irrevocable moment in the sundering of the Valley from
Jammu and the rest of India, the Greater Kashmir editorial was more
emollient in its unwillingness to push the differences thrown into
relief by the blockade.

Rising Kashmir, while shocked by the blockade, was convinced that it
was part of a larger historical framework. It editorialized on the
need for greater self-reliance particularly since it perceived the
blockade as part of a pattern sustained ‘over the last six decades':
‘The acute hardships faced by people in valley by scarcity of
essential commodities, life saving drugs and medicines, even kids'
items, by the economic blockade does call for a new thinking based on
self-reliance.' (‘Economic terrorism,' August 12, 2008) One solution
posited as a question was the opening of the Srinagar-Muzzafarabad
road: ‘Does it raise the issue of appointing an international forum
that shall propose ways of reviving the Kashmir economy and put
opening of Srinagar Muzzafarabad road on high priority?' An earlier
piece had considered the same option, stating that this route ‘will
not only help the region to prosper but will free the people of many
land locked areas of Jammu from the chains of imposed slavery.'
(Shuhab Hashmi, ‘Time to open alternate routes,' RK, 2 August, 2008)
The ‘alternate routes' may have been more rhetorical than actual but
their articulation was expressive of widespread anger, frustration,
and desperation.

While most commentaries and editorials focused on questions of
identity, survival, and isolation there were more mundane but equally
vital issues linked to these. The economic costs of the blockade was
estimated at Rs. 100 crores and articles highlighted the extent to
which organizations such as the Kashmir Fruit Growers and Dealers
Association were keen to move their products through the Muzzafarabad
route, because for them it was not just a question of supplies
dwindling but of perishable products rotting and markets being cut
off. Swaminathan Aiyar pointed to the fact of traditional market and
trade routes whereby ‘“all our fruit went down the Jhelum valley into
West Punjab (which is now in Pakistan).”' (‘Pushing Kashmir towards
Pakistan,' Economic Times, 13 August 2008) Aiyar mentions the
‘Muzzafarabad Chalo' movement, backed by the Kashmir Fruit Growers
Association, and its significance: ‘The Muzzafarabad Chalo movement
was not just an economic plea for evacuating their produce, it was a
demand for the restoration of the historical links between the Valley
and what is now Pakistan. It was a demand by Kashmiris for the right
to determine their own future, to send their produce where and when
they wanted, and not be at the mercy of Indian (or Pakistani)
political parties. The case for separatism has been strengthened
greatly, even in the mind of moderates.' This was a case for economic
emancipation and Aiyar stresses the links between economic and
political freedoms, highlighting the frustrations brought about by
geography (being landlocked), politics, and history. The arbitrary
drawing of international boundaries (part of the sub-continental
colonial heritage) coalesces with the arbitrary blockade and its
resonances of a type of latter day colonialism.

As if histories and consciousness of occupation were not difficult
enough to handle, throughout the SASB controversy the Valley
newspapers in particular were acutely aware of the communalisation of
the protests in Jammu and expressed their sense of betrayal by
repeatedly stressing the communal amity preserved during the Amarnath
pilgrimage. It was as if all their hospitality had come to nought as
the protestors in Jammu denied the pluralism of Jammu & Kashmir. Aiyar
dwelt on the ways in which communal consciousness now seemed to be a
bedrock one: ‘Optimists may keep talking about Kashmiriyat and local
traditions that transcend religion, and may project differences
between the Valley and Jammu as regional rather than religious. But
the fact is that communalism has mixed inexorably with regionalism to
produce a toxic and combustible potion.' ‘Kashmiriyat' as perceived by
the votaries of a pluralistic region not only served to highlight the
uniqueness of Kashmir but also to give it a coherent identity based on
traditions and practices of religious tolerance. Aiyar's argument
destroyed this framework implying that the communal was as much a part
of this territory of India as others, indeed that the communalisation
of the Jammu protests was evident in the economic blockade of a Muslim
majority region.

Finally, Aiyar stressed the counter-productive nature of the blockade
in political terms ' a point stressed by earlier commentators. ‘The
Jammu blockade is a blatant attempt to squeeze Kashmiris economically
into submission. This approach is doomed to failure. You cannot starve
a community into comradeship, and the very attempt to do so is a form
of colonial brutality. The Jammu agitators may have legitimate
grievances, but their chosen instrument of protest can only stoke
secessionism. Ironically, the Hindu die-hards who most bitterly oppose
secession are doing the most to make it a reality.' This was the irony
pointed out by Ihsan Malik whereby the very people one wishes to
embrace within the nation are alienated by its policies and votaries.
Aiyar's piece is significant in that it is an ‘outsider's' perspective
yet sympathetic and analytically dispassionate in its detailing of the
consequences of the economic blockade.

In a way it bolsters many of the arguments and resentments and
insights available in the Kashmiri newspapers and focuses on the
extent of the damage done by the ill-conceived blockade of the Valley.
This brief survey of editorials and commentaries of the economic
blockade not only highlights the unforeseen (perhaps unintended)
consequences of the SASB land transfer, but also the myriad and
intricate intertwining of issues in Jammu & Kashmir. Region and
religion, the plural and communal, the pull of ‘azadi' and the push
provided by an alienated government, economics and politics all
coalesce to compose the seething maelstrom of Kashmir.