[Reader-list] Zizek on Egypt

[Britta Ohm]

But his actual idea seems to be to strengthen the left so it can be  
the new front group against radical Islam, and I don't see how this  
should work if you antagonise the liberals in the first place. It's  
not only illogical, I also don't see any merit in suddenly creating a  
new old enemy, Islam, and just repeat the mistake already made. I find  
it amazing how he only seems to be able to think in head-on  
antagonisms, which is precisely what US policy has been doing. He  
probably thinks that's dialectics.

Am 02.02.2011 um 03:44 schrieb SJabbar:

> No but America considers itself a liberal country. It claims to wage  
> war for
> 'freedom' and 'democracy' around the world. These categories, are of  
> course,
> shifting goalposts. The US killed the Left and encouraged the rise of
> radical Islamists in Afghanistan when it considered Communism the  
> greatest
> enemy of 'freedom' and 'democracy' and now...
> The only reason dictators like Mubarak could lord it over for 30  
> years is
> because of US and Israel support. Now if only the tide could lap  
> against the
> shores of the kingdom of Saud.
>
> On 02/02/11 4:12 AM, "TaraPrakash" <taraprakash at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> I wonder why the author is selectively attacking the liberals.  
>> George Bush
>> attacked Iraq and defended with the D word. As far as I know Bush  
>> is not was
>> not will not ever be considered a liberal.
>>
>> ----- Original Message -----
>> From: "SJabbar" <sonia.jabbar at gmail.com>
>> To: "Sarai" <reader-list at sarai.net>
>> Sent: Tuesday, February 01, 2011 9:31 AM
>> Subject: [Reader-list] Zizek on Egypt
>>
>>
>>>
>>>     Slavoj Žižek in The Guardian
>>>
>>>
>>> Why fear the Arab revolutionary spirit?
>>> The western liberal reaction to the uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia
>>> frequently shows hypocrisy and cynicism
>>>
>>>
>>> What cannot but strike the eye in the revolts in Tunisia
>>> <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jan/23/tunisia-government-protests 
>>> >
>>> and Egypt
>>> <http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/blog/2011/jan/31/egypt-protests-live-updates
>>>> is the conspicuous absence of Muslim fundamentalism. In the best  
>>>> secular
>>> democratic tradition, people simply revolted against an oppressive  
>>> regime,
>>> its corruption and poverty, and demanded freedom and economic  
>>> hope. The
>>> cynical wisdom of western liberals, according to which, in Arab  
>>> countries,
>>> genuine democratic sense is limited to narrow liberal elites while  
>>> the
>>> vast
>>> majority can only be mobilised through religious fundamentalism or
>>> nationalism, has been proven wrong. The big question is what will  
>>> happen
>>> next? Who will emerge as the political winner?
>>>
>>> When a new provisional government was nominated in Tunis, it  
>>> excluded
>>> Islamists and the more radical left. The reaction of smug liberals  
>>> was:
>>> good, they are the basically same; two totalitarian extremes - but  
>>> are
>>> things as simple as that? Is the true long-term antagonism not  
>>> precisely
>>> between Islamists and the left? Even if they are momentarily united
>>> against
>>> the regime, once they approach victory, their unity splits, they  
>>> engage in
>>> a
>>> deadly fight, often more cruel than against the shared enemy.
>>>
>>> Did we not witness precisely such a fight after the last elections  
>>> in
>>> Iran?
>>> What the hundreds of thousands of Mousavi supporters
>>> <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/feb/02/iran-mousavi-dictatorship-khame
>>> ini-protests>  stood for was the popular dream that sustained the  
>>> Khomeini
>>> revolution
>>> <http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/blog/2009/feb/03/iranian-revolution-archive 
>>> >
>>> : freedom and justice. Even if this dream utopian, it did lead to a
>>> breathtaking explosion of political and social creativity,  
>>> organisational
>>> experiments and debates among students and ordinary people. This  
>>> genuine
>>> opening that unleashed unheard-of forces for social  
>>> transformation, a
>>> moment
>>> in which everything seemed possible, was then gradually stifled  
>>> through
>>> the
>>> takeover of political control by the Islamist establishment.
>>>
>>> Even in the case of clearly fundamentalist movements, one should be
>>> careful
>>> not to miss the social component. The Taliban is regularly  
>>> presented as a
>>> fundamentalist Islamist group enforcing its rule with terror.  
>>> However,
>>> when,
>>> in the spring of 2009, they took over the Swat valley in Pakistan,  
>>> The New
>>> York Times <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/17/world/asia/17pstan.html 
>>> >
>>> reported that they engineered "a class revolt that exploits profound
>>> fissures between a small group of wealthy landlords and their  
>>> landless
>>> tenants". If, by "taking advantage" of the farmers' plight, the  
>>> Taliban
>>> are
>>> creating, in the words of the New York Times "alarm about the  
>>> risks to
>>> Pakistan, which remains largely feudal," what prevented liberal  
>>> democrats
>>> in
>>> Pakistan and the US similarly "taking advantage" of this plight  
>>> and trying
>>> to help the landless farmers? Is it that the feudal forces in  
>>> Pakistan are
>>> the natural ally of liberal democracy?
>>>
>>> The inevitable conclusion to be drawn is that the rise of radical  
>>> Islamism
>>> was always the other side of the disappearance of the secular left  
>>> in
>>> Muslim
>>> countries. When Afghanistan is portrayed as the utmost Islamic
>>> fundamentalist country, who still remembers that, 40 years ago, it  
>>> was a
>>> country with a strong secular tradition, including a powerful  
>>> communist
>>> party that took power there independently of the Soviet Union?  
>>> Where did
>>> this secular tradition go?
>>>
>>> And it is crucial to read the ongoing events in Tunisia and Egypt  
>>> (and
>>> Yemen
>>> and ... maybe, hopefully, even Saudi Arabia) against this  
>>> background. If
>>> the
>>> situation is eventually stabilised so that the old regime survives  
>>> but
>>> with
>>> some liberal cosmetic surgery, this will generate an insurmountable
>>> fundamentalist backlash. In order for the key liberal legacy to  
>>> survive,
>>> liberals need the fraternal help of the radical left. Back to  
>>> Egypt, the
>>> most shameful and dangerously opportunistic reaction was that of  
>>> Tony
>>> Blair
>>> as reported on CNN: change is necessary, but it should be a stable  
>>> change.
>>> Stable change in Egypt today can mean only a compromise with the  
>>> Mubarak
>>> forces by way of slightly enlarging the ruling circle. This is why  
>>> to talk
>>> about peaceful transition now is an obscenity: by squashing the
>>> opposition,
>>> Mubarak himself made this impossible. After Mubarak sent the army  
>>> against
>>> the protesters, the choice became clear: either a cosmetic change  
>>> in which
>>> something changes so that everything stays the same, or a true  
>>> break.
>>>
>>> Here, then, is the moment of truth: one cannot claim, as in the  
>>> case of
>>> Algeria a decade ago, that allowing truly free elections equals  
>>> delivering
>>> power to Muslim fundamentalists. Another liberal worry is that  
>>> there is no
>>> organised political power to take over if Mubarak goes. Of course  
>>> there is
>>> not; Mubarak took care of that by reducing all opposition to  
>>> marginal
>>> ornaments, so that the result is like the title of the famous Agatha
>>> Christie novel, And Then There Were None. The argument for Mubarak  
>>> - it's
>>> either him or chaos - is an argument against him.
>>>
>>> The hypocrisy of western liberals is breathtaking: they publicly  
>>> supported
>>> democracy, and now, when the people revolt against the tyrants on  
>>> behalf
>>> of
>>> secular freedom and justice, not on behalf of religion, they are all
>>> deeply
>>> concerned. Why concern, why not joy that freedom is given a  
>>> chance? Today,
>>> more than ever, Mao Zedong's old motto is pertinent: "There is  
>>> great chaos
>>> under heaven - the situation is excellent."
>>>
>>> Where, then, should Mubarak go? Here, the answer is also clear: to  
>>> the
>>> Hague. If there is a leader who deserves to sit there, it is him.
>>>
>>> _________________________________________
>>> reader-list: an open discussion list on media and the city.
>>> Critiques & Collaborations
>>> To subscribe: send an email to reader-list-request at sarai.net with
>>> subscribe in the subject header.
>>> To unsubscribe: https://mail.sarai.net/mailman/listinfo/reader-list
>>> List archive: <https://mail.sarai.net/pipermail/reader-list/>
>>
>
>
> _________________________________________
> reader-list: an open discussion list on media and the city.
> Critiques & Collaborations
> To subscribe: send an email to reader-list-request at sarai.net with  
> subscribe in the subject header.
> To unsubscribe: https://mail.sarai.net/mailman/listinfo/reader-list
> List archive: <https://mail.sarai.net/pipermail/reader-list/>

---------------------------------------
Dr. Britta Ohm

Institute of Social Anthropology
University of Bern
Laenggassstr. 49a
3012 Bern
Switzerland
+41-(0)31-631 8995 (main office)
+41-(0)31-631 5373 (direct line)
britta.ohm at anthro.unibe.ch


Solmsstr. 36
10961 Berlin
Germany
+49-(0)30-69507155
ohm at zedat.fu-berlin.de