[Reader-list] Research Update

[Vikhar Ahmed]

In this section I want to look at the ideas of objectivity in journalism and
the rationale behind the production of news.

"The mass media serve as a system for communicating messages and symbols to
the general populace[1] <#_ftn1>," write Herman and Chomsky in their
book *Manufacturing
Consent: The Political Economy and the Mass Media. *It is a valid point that
the authors make and it is important to see the media as a dominant element
of popular culture. The view point of structuralism can be bought in here as
they have a significant amount to contribute to the idea of communicating by
language and the medium of journalism is dominated by language. The
structuralists, led primarily by Saussure's ideas, contend that language
consists of 'signs', which in turn can be divided into two component parts,
'signifier' and 'signified'. 'Signifier' for Saussure means the 'inscription
or the acoustic sound' while 'signified' means the 'concept or mental image'
[2] <#_ftn2>.

The meaning of this initial idea of Saussure was restricted to linguistics
but was taken forward by Roland Barthes who in his book
*Mythologies*represents the most significant attempts to bring the
method of semiology to
bear on popular culture[3] <#_ftn3>. The guiding principle of this book is
to always interrogate what is not obvious. He takes Saussure's principle of
'signifier' and 'signified' and adds one more level to it. The first level
of 'signification', he calls 'primary signification' or 'denotation' and the
second level he calls 'secondary signification' or 'connotation'. He then
argues that it is at the second level of signification that what he calls
'myth' is produced and consumed. By myth Barthes means ideology understood
as ideas and practices which defend the status quo – the 'bourgeois norm' –
and actively promotes the interests and values of the dominant classes in
society. Myth is the turning of the cultural and historical into the
natural, the taken-for-granted.  As we can see Barthes is taking a slightly
'political framework of analysis' to borrow a phrase that Stuart Allen uses
in his book *News Culture*. The 'political framework of analysis' draws
heavily from the writings of Karl Marx and Fredrick Engels in *The German
Ideology *as will become obvious from this excerpt:

The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e., the
class which is the ruling *material* force of society, is at the same time
its ruling *intellectual *force. The class which has the means of material
production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of
mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those
who lack the means of mental production are subject to it…In so far,
therefore, as they rule as a class and determine the extent and compass of
an epoch, it is self-evident that they…among other things…regulate the
production and distribution of the ideas of their age: thus their ideas are
the ruling ideas of the epoch[4] <#_ftn4>.



            As is obvious Barthes' understanding of popular culture is
partly based on Karl Marx' ideas of the dominant ideas being nothing but a
means to maintain the status quo. While Marx was a journalist for ten years
himself, he has not written directly about journalism thus his comments that
he made about popular culture like the one above taken from *The German
Ideology* need to be understood for journalistic institutions.

            Before moving one I must make clear that many theorists of
culture do not generally take the media into consideration in their
understanding of popular culture. Most of the academicians involved in
cultural studies tend to neglect this crucial aspect of popular culture. If
we look at the studies of culture we will see that the early culturalists
like Arnold and Leavis tended to see culture as restricted to art,
literature and classical music. For them there was a difference between
'high culture' and 'low-brow culture'[5] <#_ftn5>. The anthropologists offer
a more complete definition of culture as 'forms of life and social
expression'. This is relevant in studies of the media as media is an
important part of culture[6] <#_ftn6>.

            Thedor Adorno and Max Horkenheimer write that mass culture is a
way of offering temporary ephemeral gratification to people condemnded to
lives of work. In their idea of mass culture they bring in the idea of
television[7] <#_ftn7>. Though they do not specifically comment on the media
here we have to see that how media forms an important part of 'popular
culture' and if we interpret Adorno and Horkenheimer's thesis that they
offered for 'popular culture' in journalism we will realise that the media
serves as a temporary ephemeral gratification for the consumers of media who
tend to absorb everything that is offered unquestioningly and as the
'truth'.

            This brings us to another interesting point in journalism.
Journalists operate on the premise that they provide the truth to their
consumers but what is 'truth'. Is there an objective basis for truth? The
answer to that question goes to the heart of ongoing debates over whether or
not the news media 'reflect' social reality truthfully, or the extent to
which journalists can produce a truthful news account. How do you separate
facts from values? The assumption that the truth resides entirely in the
former raises the question whether it is actually possible to separate the
two.

            For Noam Chomsky and Herman there is nothing like 'objective
truth'. They have come with the propaganda model where they argue that there
exists within that country's (their analysis is for the media as it operates
in the United States of America) commercial news media an institutional news
bias which guarantees mobilisation of certain 'propaganda campaigns' on
behalf of an elite consensus (propaganda is deemed to be broadly equivalent
with dominant ideology in this analysis. There is a collaboration of the
state and the mass media. They use the idea of 'filters' where they
demonstrate the extent to which journalists reiterate uncritically official
positions of the state while simultaneously, adhering to its political
agenda. The five filters are:

1.      *Size, Ownership, and Profit Orientation of the Mass Media[8]<#_ftn8>
*: This is the first filter and concerns the commercial basis of the
dominant news organisations. Close ties between the media elite and their
political and corporate counterparts ensure that an 'establishment
orientation' is ordinarily maintained at the level of news coverage. It is
this top tier of major news companies which, together with the government
and wire services, 'defines the news agenda and supplies much of the
national and international news to the lower tiers of the media'.

2.      *The Advertising License to do Business[9] <#_ftn9>:* "With
advertising the free market does not yield a neutral system in which final
buyer choice decides. The advertisers' choices influence media prosperity
and survival". They also point out that advertisers are primarily interested
in affluent audiences due to their 'purchasing power', and thus are less
inclined to support forms of news and public affairs content which attract
people of more modest means. Moreover, there is a strong preference for
content which does not call into question their own politically conservative
principles or interferes with the 'buying mood' of the audience. **

3.      *Sourcing Mass-Media News[10] <#_ftn10>:* "The mass media are drawn
into a symbiotic relationship with powerful sources of information by
economic necessity and reciprocity of interest. The media need a steady,
reliable flow of the raw material of news. They have daily news demands and
imperative news schedules that they must meet," write Chomsky and Herman.
The relative authority and prestige of these sources also helps to enhance
the credibility of the journalist's account leading to the news media's over
reliance on government and corporate 'expert sources'.**

4.      *Flak and the Enforcers[11] <#_ftn11>*: Flak refers to negative
responses to a media statement or program. This disciplines the news
organisations. Chomsky and Herman are referring to a variety of flak
including complaints from individuals or organised groups like state
officials. The authors suggest that these makers of 'flak' receive
respectful attention by the media, only rarely having their impact on news
management activities explicitly acknowledged.

5.      *Anti-communism as a Control Mechanism[12] <#_ftn12>*: This final
filter is the role of the 'ideology of anti-communism' as a 'political
control mechanism'. This ideology in Herman's and Chomsky's words helps
mobilse the populace against an enemy. The concept is so fuzzy it can be
used against anybody advocating policies that threaten property interests or
support accommodation with Communist states and radicalism. **

Overall only the residue that passes through these five filters is
pronounced fit to call news. This basically sums up the arguments of the
propaganda model used by Herman and Chomsky. Chomsky and Herman write, "In
sum, a propaganda approach to media coverage suggests a systematic and
highly political dichotmisation in news coverage based on serviceability to
important domestic power interests[13] <#_ftn13>." A main criticism of this
approach according to Allen is that their approach "…risks reducing the news
media to tired ideological machines confined to performing endlessly, and
unfailingly, the overarching function of reproducing the prerogatives of an
economic and political elite through processes of mystification. Journalists
in this process become well-intentioned puppets whose strings are being
pulled by forces they cannot fully understand. Meanwhile the news audience
would appear to be composed of passive dupes consistently fooling fooled
into believing such propaganda is true[14] <#_ftn14>." But it cannot be
denied that they make important points and this framework of analysis has
provided the basis for many other observers of the media to carry ahead
their research.

Edward Said's book *Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine
how we see the World* looks at also follows a similar method of looking at
the media. Said critically questions the role of the media and accuses it of
creating certain shibboleths about Muslims without recognising the diversity
in the faith of over one billion. He writes that the generalisations that
can be made about Muslims in the media cannot be made about any other
community and continues, ""My concern, though, is that the mere label
'Islam', either to explain or indiscriminately condemn 'Islam', actually
ends up becoming a form of attack, which in turn provokes more hostility
between self-appointed Muslim and Western spokespersons[15] <#_ftn15>."

      Islam is variegated and the homogenous way in which it is looked at is
wrong. "Instead of scholarship, we often find only journalists making
extravagant statements, which are instantly picked up and further dramatised
by the media[16] <#_ftn16>." He argues that there is a slippery concept of
fundamentalism that they attribute only to Islam without ever defining any
thing properly. "Much in current representations of Islam is designed to
show the religion's inferiority with reference to the West, which Islam is
supposed to be hell-bent on opposing, competing with, resenting, and being
enraged at[17] <#_ftn17>". Apart from hostility and reductionism offered by
all these misrepresentations they also exaggerate and inflate Muslim
extremism within the Muslim world[18] <#_ftn18>". Said's point is that
cooperation must be admitted. There has been a gross simplification of
Islam.

"The academic experts whose specialty is Islam have generally treated the
religion and its various cultures within an invented or culturally
determined ideological framework filled with passion, defensive prejudice,
sometimes even revulsion; because of this framework, understanding of Islam
has been a very difficult thing to achieve[19] <#_ftn19>," Said writes and
criticises Naipual for furthering this viewpoint and writes that he has an
intense antipathy to Islam. "For Naipaul and his readers, 'Islam' somehow is
made to cover everything that one disapproves of from the standpoint of
civlised, and Western, rationality.

Labels are vague and unavoidable. Labels function in atleast two different
ways and produce two different meanings[20] <#_ftn20>. First, they perform a
simple identifying function. The second function is much more complex and
when Islam and the West are pitted against one another the assumption is
that the West is greater and has surpasses the age of Christianity. On the
other hand Islam is still mired in religion, primitivity and backwardness.

"The experts whose field was modern Islam worked within an agreed-upon
framework for research formed according to notions decidedly not set in the
Islamic world. Modern Islamic studies in the academy belong to 'area
programs' generally and are affiliated to the mechanism by which national
policy is set[21] <#_ftn21>". He questions the source of funding for
scholarly studies and links it up with questions of why scholars get it
wrong. Apart from this the Western scholars do not command relevant
linguistic expertise and have had to rely on press and other Western writers
for information[22] <#_ftn22>.

Media coverage is superficial, friendly regimes produced official
information that they wanted and US had made no efforts to get to know the
country well or to make contact with the opposition. These sum up US and
European attitude towards Islamic World. Said writes that he has not been
able to discover any period in European or American history since the Middle
Ages in which Islam was generally discussed or thought about outside a
framework created by passion, prejudice and political interests[23]<#_ftn23>
.

Said questions the aims of the press like objectivity, factuality, realistic
coverage and calls them highly relative terms. "News, in other words, is
less an inert given than the result of a complex process of usually
deliberate selection and expression[24] <#_ftn24>." The American media
differ from the French and the British media because the societies differ so
much. Said writes that every reporter is subliminally aware of his setting
and is subjective in that way[25] <#_ftn25>. The medium itself exercises
great pressure. Said writes that all media is somewhere a corporation that
has a corporate identity – they all have the same central consensus in mind.
It is the result of the culture.

            About this creation of consensus Said makes two
points[26]<#_ftn26>.
First, because the US is a complex society, the need to impart a more or
less standardised common culture through the media is felt with particular
strength. The second point shows that this consensus sets limits and
maintains pressures. Said next comments on the quantitative aspects of news.
The consequence of this is that Islam is viewed reductively, coercively and
oppositionally. He gives an example by saying that Islam for the west is
nothing but 'news' of a particularly unpleasant sort. Said criticises the
whole institution of Islamic studies as geared towards providing what the
media and the governments need.

Apart from the adherents of the 'political economy' position that includes
those media theorists influenced by the ideas of Marx the other group
believes in a 'liberal pluralist position' where they are convinced that the
market-bases mass media system protects the citizen's right to freedom of
speech. It is the news media, to the extent that they facilitate the
formation of public opinion, which are said to make democratic control over
governing relations possible. For the adherents of this position the news
media represents the fourth estate (as distinguished, in historical terms,
from the church, the judiciary and the commons). Journalism, as a result, is
charged with the crucial mission of ensuring that members of the public are
able to draw upon a diverse 'market place of ideas' to both sustain and
challenge their sense of the world around them. Thus, for this group of
ideologues media is seen as empowering rather than propaganda. 'News' helps
people in making decisions and forming opinions. The inherent notion on
which the liberal pluralists operate is that 'News' provided through the
media offers the 'truth'[27] <#_ftn27>.




*In this section I want to look at the world of fatwas. I try to understand
what a fatwa is and look at it historically in India and the manner in which
it operated. Some of this research is based on a research paper I wrote
earlier but I have incorporated some work I read in a recent book (Masud,
Muhammad Khalid, Brinkley Messick and David. S. Powers. Islamic Legal
Interpretation: Muftis and their Fatwas. Karachi: Oxford University Press,
2005) This book is very useful for anybody interested in the world of
fatwas. *

A fatwa is a legal opinion of a Mufti[28] <#_ftn28> (a jurisconsult). It
derives from a verb meaning 'to inform'[29] <#_ftn29>. The mufti is a person
educated in Islamic jurisprudence and the mechanism of the working of the
fatwa is like this; a person who is doubtful or ignorant of what the shariat
says in particular circumstances turns towards the mufti to answer his
question. The person writes an istifa (question) addressed to a particular
mufti or to an institution and the mufti pronounces a fatwa based on his
understanding of sources. These sources include the Quran, the Sunna (the
traditions of the prophet), hadith reports (the activities of the prophet as
seen by his companions), the fiqh literature (this means the Islamic schools
of jurisprudence) and ijma (meaning consensus among a majority of the ulema)
[30] <#_ftn30>.

A fatwa need not be necessarily written and can be orally pronounced. The
fatwas that are printed do not include the real names of the individuals
involved in a dispute but allot them fictitious names, the most common ones
being Umar and Zayd[31] <#_ftn31>. In India, the fatwa is not legally
binding, neither was it in colonial times. In colonial India the ulema
functioning as the mufti registered some important changes, fatwas were
given on the authority of a particular madrasa (most madrsas had a
dar-ul-ifta, were issued in larger numbers and the technology of print
enabled the madrasas to disseminate their fatwas more widely and to begin
publishing influential compilations of them[32] <#_ftn32>. The collections
of these fatwas by the ulema of this period are of immense importance for
understanding the preoccupations of Indian Muslims outside the charmed
circle of those whom the British met socially[33] <#_ftn33>.

Masud, Messick and Powers distinguish between the domain of legal procedure
(the job of the qazi) and nonbinding advisory opinions (fatawa) and write
that the muftis have received lesser attention than that qazi because the
job of the mufti is unfamiliar and it was not institutionalised as much as
qazis. Also many muftis operate privately and unobtrusively unlike the
qazis. Fatwas, throughout history have been more concerned with practical
aspects of the state of Islamic law[34] <#_ftn34>.

In the Indian subcontinent and Central Asia, the Hanafi school of Sunni
Islam predominated. Although several contemporary scholars treat muftis as
an integral part of the pre-modern judicial system, suggesting that they
were attached to the qadi courts at all levels, this conclusion is not borne
out by the primary sources. In this region the term fatwa often denoted an
authoritative and accepted opinion of the Hanafi school, not necessarily an
opinion issued in response to a question. Pre-modern Indian fatwa
collections bear the names of rulers, indicating the status of these texts
as authoritative opinions potentially enforceable in state courts[35]<#_ftn35>
.

Whereas a judgement of a qazi entails direct action, a fatwa provides access
to sharia knowledge in the form of a considered opinion. Whereas a judgement
carries the presumption of finality, a fatwa enters the world of competing
opinions. Despite their non-binding and informational qualities fatwas often
had a significant impact on law[36] <#_ftn36>.

Behind the encounter of mustafti and mufti, the posing of a query and the
giving of a fatwa lies a complex social and interpretive relation[37]<#_ftn37>.
The mufti is not an investigator of facts so the manner in which a question
is phrased becomes important. The issues involved ought to be ones that have
actually arisen and should not be purely hypothetical or imaginary. The
fatwas also have a disclaimer, such as allahu a'lam "God knows best". As
muftis commonly are affiliated with particular schools of law, in some
historical settings, they cite authors of authoritative works in their
fatwas 25[38] <#_ftn38>.

Fatwas had been in common use in colonial India. Fatwas were used quite
liberally during the 1857 Mutiny and Jalal writes that "The fatwas issued
during 1857 are a colourful medley of quite different points of
view.[39]<#_ftn39>"
Fatwas were also issued against cow slaughter, only to be rejected by
another Muslim divine or propagandist[40] <#_ftn40>. In Kashmir, Shiekh
Abdullah used the instrument of the fatwa as he sought to establish an
alternative religious authority through his own appointed muftis[41]<#_ftn41>
.

All the various groups contesting for domination of the narrow sphere used
the fatwa during this period as a potent instrument[42] <#_ftn42>. Several
fatwa wars took place between the various groups with one fatwa being
answered by another fatwa[43] <#_ftn43>. One of these fatwa wars related to
the whether the *azaan *(call for the prayer) should be given from inside or
outside the mosque. The special significance of this issue is that it was
one of the few times when a non-Muslim was bought in as the arbitrator. The
issue went up to the Hindu magistrate who held Ahmed Riza Khan (founder of
the Barelvi school of Islam in South Asia to which most of the subcontinents
Muslims claim allegiance to) guilty of libel against the recently deceased
Maulana Abdul Muqtadir[44] <#_ftn44>. Ahmad Riza Khan, in the very few
fatwas that he deals with the British, is rather emphatic in severing all
ties with them[45] <#_ftn45>. So it is rather unfortunate that of all the
alims, it was he who was forced to appear before the magistrate. This is
also significant because it points to the power of the state. The ulema
might choose to ignore the British and continue their religious debates with
their fellow Muslims but the state would not let them go if its direct
interference was solicitied.

The Deobandis also urged their followers to completely avoid the courts of
British India[46] <#_ftn46>. They set up a separate court to circumvent
Anglo-Muhammedan Law[47] <#_ftn47>. The ulema of this period, writes Hardy,
shared the political attitudes towards British rule of the mass of educated
Muslims outside the circle – antipathy, sometimes hatred, but not active
underground resistance[48] <#_ftn48>.

Then these fatwas were also circulated among the general populace by either
reproducing them in the newspapers run by these organisations or by printing
tracts and distributing them all over South Asia and beyond. Bookshops were
also publishing houses and began to be identified with particular groups of
ulema[49] <#_ftn49>. The Barelwis had two printing presses in Bareilly that
exclusively published Riza Khan's work. His books had generally something on
the cover that poked fun at other sects and the newspaper that furthered the
cause of the Barelwis was the Dabdaba-e Sikandari and had a section that
reproduced the fatwas of Riza Khan[50] <#_ftn50>.

Most madrasahs had a dar-al-ifta (an office that was responsible for
answering fatwas) and Sanyal writes, "Even the addition of a Dar al-ifta to
a madrasas of the time was competitive, for it was through the fatwa
produced by the ulema of different movements that they made known their
stand on controversial issues and rebutted those of their rivals. Ahmad Riza
expressed his views for the most part in a daily stream of fatwa going out
to people through British India and beyond"[51] <#_ftn51>.

The main groups involved in these contestations and these contestations
continue even in the present day were the Ahl-e-Hadis (the adherents of this
group recognise only the Quran and the hadith and legitimate sources of
Islamic law), the Deobandis (The Deobandis are Hanafis, meaning the
followers of the Islamic jurisprudential system as established by the
8thcentury cleric Imam Abu Hanifa), the Barelwis (The Barelwis
legitmise the
uniquely sub-continental version of Islam which includes sacerdotalism) and
the Nadwaites (followers of the Nadwat Ul Uloom in Lucknow). Most of the
Sunni Muslims barely tolerated the Shiahs and considered them apostates from
the true faith. The issues dealt with by the Barelwis, the Ahl-e-Hadis and
the Deobandis seem to have been similar, as can be understood from the
analysis of their fatwas, and the concerns were also the same[52] <#_ftn52>.

Fatwa writing for Riza Khan was a hierarchical institution and it was
divided among his disciples based on their areas of specialisation but
complex fatwas were answered by himself. Sanyal writes, "Matters relating to
ritual and the so-called 'pillars' – purification *(taharat)*, prayer (*
salat*), alms-giving (*zakat*), fasting (*sawm*) and the pilgrimage (*hajj*)
– appear first and in that order, in the first 4 volumes. The remaining
volumes deal with marriage (*nikah*), regulations concerning infidels,
apostates, and rebels (*sair*), economic issues such as partnership (*
shirkat*) and sale (*bai'*) and bequests (*rahn*) among other things."

"Then there are fatwas on janaza, fatwas relating to the Khilafat movement
of the 1920's, on learning the English language. These fatwas on political
issues are enmeshed in the section on funerals and apostates.[53] <#_ftn53>"
I agree with Metcalf when she writes that the concern of these fatawa has
mainly been with "…correct individual ritual practice and behaviour in
everyday life, not, in these years of high colonial rule, issues of larger
political or societal concerns."[54] <#_ftn54> Metcalf has translated and
paraphrased a few Deobandi fatwas of which I will reproduce one here for the
reader to understand the general way in which a Deobandi fatwa was composed

*Query*: What of a person who goes to Noble Mecca on hajj and does not go to
Medina the Radiant, thinking, 'To go to Noble Medina is not a required duty
(*farz-i-wajib*) but rather a worthy act (*kar-i-khayr)*. Moreover, why
should I needlessly take such a dangerous route where there are marauding
tribes from place to place and risk to property and life. A great deal of
money would be spent as well- so what is the point?' Is such a person sinful
or not?



*Answer*: Not to go to Medina because of such apprehension is a mark of lack
of love for the Pride of the World, on whom be peace. No one abandons the
worldly task out of such apprehension, so why abandon this pilgrimage? The
road is not plundered every day; (safety) is a matter of chance- so that is
no argument. Certainly, to go is not obligatory. Some people, at any rate,
think this is pilgrimage is a greater source of reward and blessing
than *lifting
the hands in prayer and saying amin out loud*. Do not give up going out of
fear of controversy or concern for your reputation. Should you abandon this
pilgrimage from such apprehension and supposition, or put it off, consider,
then, which portion is  that of full faith. It is a joy to spend money on
good acts. To go from Mecca to Medina, travelling first class, costs only
fifty rupees. Whoever takes account of fifty rupees and does not take
account of the blessed speulchre of the lord is a person of undoubtedly
defective faith and love. Even if not a sinner, this person lacks faith in
is basic nature. The end. Almightly Allah knows better[55] <#_ftn55>. Rashid
Ahmad, may he be forgiven[56] <#_ftn56>.

* *

            This is the general reply to a fatwa. Instead of answering the
question in a simple manner the answer is long and drawn out and as the
portion in italics shows is specifically targeted at other groups. In this
particular fatwa of Rashi Ahmed Gangohi the target is the Ahl-e-Hadis. The
Ahl-e-Hadis do not encourage pilgrims on the Hajj to visit the grave of
Mohammed and thus we see how Gangohi is directly making them the targets of
his fury when he writes that making this pilgrimage is a greater source of
reward than lifting the hands in prayer and saying amin out loud. This
practice called rafayidin is peculiar to the Ahl-e-Hadis' salat and there
are many fatwas legitimising this practice in Amritsari's collection. This
is one example to show how the fatwa was used as a chance to very visibly
demonstrate the contempt that one group held for the other.

            Metcalf has examined the Deobandi fatwas and writes that they
were largely concerned with dealings with other Muslim groups rather than
having to anything to do with the Hindu and the British. The Deoband fatwas
were quite prolific and the number of fatwas produced by the dar-al-ifta at
Deoband were 147, 851 between 1911 and 1951[57] <#_ftn57>. The influence of
the ulema was primarily limited to matters of belief, ritual and relations
to other religious groups. She writes, "Many of the fatawa dealt with the
basic required rituals of the faith. A full one-fifth of the whole were
devoted to the correct performance of the canonical prayer, the most
important and frequent of the Islamic religious duties. These fatawa dealt
with such problems such as the correct time of prayer, the manner of
ablution and the procedure of both requisite *namaz* and special prayers.
They, too, reflected reformist concerns. For example, they forbade the
funeral prayer to be read in either mosque or graveyard and prohibited
ceremonies on fixed days after a death. Many of the fatawa on
*namaz*treated differences in details of performance with the Ahl-i
Hadis. A
handful of fatawa deal covered other ritual obligations such as fasting and
hajj. About an equal number were concerned with the proper care and
techniques of reading the Quran. The bulk of the remaining fatawa dealt with
relations to other groups, including the Ahl-i Hadis, the so called bid'ati
Muslims, the Shiah, the Hindus, and the British rulers. The existence of
such fatawa suggest the active religious debate characterisation of this
period.[58] <#_ftn58>" This long quote from Metcalf shows a remarkable
similarity on the issues dealt with by Amritsari and thus, the Ahl-e-hadis
with even the ratio of fatwas on certain issues being the same. The only
lack in Amritsari's fatwas is on those related to the British.

Even the fatwas of Ahmed Riza Khan ignores British presence[59] <#_ftn59>.
But unlike the fatwas of Sanaullah Amritsari (a prominent early twentieth
century cleric of the Ahl-e-hadis) and Ahmed Riza Khan Barelwi the Deobandi
fatwas did not have extensive citations from the Quran and the
hadis[60]<#_ftn60>.
The fatwas are in simple Urdu and are actual exchanges of letters. At the
risk of digressing, a point must be made here about how the ulema tended to
popularise Urdu and Metcalf writes that Deoband was instrumental in
establishing Urdu as a language of communication among the Muslims of India
[61] <#_ftn61>. Robinson also mentions this point as he traces the history
of the Firangi Mahal family. He writes that the Perso-Islamic culture
declined in India from the 1820's and 1830's and the reformist ulema were
partly responsible for this decline because they started using local
languages to transmit their messages[62] <#_ftn62>. The fatwas of Abdul Hay,
a prominent Firangi Mahali were also important during this period but these
were rather more academic compendium of legal rulings than the collections
of the Deobandi ulema[63] <#_ftn63>.

Many a time there was a bombardment of fatwas on either side. One instance
was when Ahmed Riza Khan went on his second Hajj in 1905 and secured fatwas
against the Deobandis who responded with their own fatwas[64] <#_ftn64>.
Riza Khan institutionalised the traditional version of Islam that had come
down through the centuries and was widely prevalent all over the
subcontinent. He wanted to maintain Islam as it existed and he did not see
any mistake in the way Islam was followed. Riza Khan gave a legitimacy to
the rituals and ceremonies that were being practised among South Asian
Muslims but which did not have scriptural sanction. Riza Khan's argument was
that any practice that hundred's  of ulema have considered to be good over
hundred's of years cannot be bad[65] <#_ftn65>. These practices increasingly
came under attack of reformist groups like the Ahl-e-Hadis and the
Deobandis.

To the extent that the sharia remains relevant or authoritative, it is
usually in the domain of family law. Many nation states have muftis
nowadays. Formal instructional programmes and apprenticeships for the
training of muftis have been established in institutions such as Azhar
University in Egypt and Dar-al-Ulum in Karachi, which has a specialised two
year program of courses in ifta[66] <#_ftn66>. Dar-al-ifta's have become
common in many countries. Other notable fatwa committees include that
established by the World Muslim League in Mecca etc.



*In my further research I will be looking at the way the media reports about
fatwas.*



------------------------------

[1] <#_ftnref1> Herman…p. 1

[2] <#_ftnref2> Storey…p. 93

[3] <#_ftnref3> Ibid. p. 94

[4] <#_ftnref4> Allen…p. 50

[5] <#_ftnref5> Storey…p. 3

[6] <#_ftnref6> Rivkin…p.

[7] <#_ftnref7> Ibid.,

[8] <#_ftnref8> Herman…p. 3

[9] <#_ftnref9> Ibid., p. 14

[10] <#_ftnref10> Ibid., p. 18

[11] <#_ftnref11> Ibid., p. 26

[12] <#_ftnref12> Ibid., p. 29

[13] <#_ftnref13> Ibid., p. 35

[14] <#_ftnref14> Allen…p. 60

[15] <#_ftnref15> Said…p. xv-xvi

[16] <#_ftnref16> Ibid., p. xviii

[17] <#_ftnref17> Ibid., p. xxv

[18] <#_ftnref18> Ibid., p. xxvi

[19] <#_ftnref19> Ibid., ps. 6 & 7

[20] <#_ftnref20> Ibid., ps. 9 & 10

[21] <#_ftnref21> Ibid., p. 19

[22] <#_ftnref22> Ibid., ps. 22 & 23

[23] <#_ftnref23> Ibid., p. 50

[24] <#_ftnref24> Ibid.

[25] <#_ftnref25> Ibid., p. 51

[26] <#_ftnref26> Ibid., pgs. 54 &55

[27] <#_ftnref27> Allen…p. 49

[28] <#_ftnref28> The education of a Mufti involves several years of
education. The education to become an alim requires 14 years at the
Nadwat-ul-Uloom. I am not sure about the number of years it requires at
other institutions. Kozlowski writes that only 7 students become Maulawi
Kamil every year which gives them the right to issue a fatwa. A person who
wants to be a Maulawi Kamil has to first be a Maulawi and then graduate to
be a Maulawi alim and only then finally he can be a Maulawi kamil that is
equivalent to an M.A. p. 909.

[29] <#_ftnref29> Kozlowski…p. 896.

[30] <#_ftnref30> Masud…p. 16

[31] <#_ftnref31> We see this phenomenon occurring in several of Sanaullah
Amritsari's fatwas also.

[32] <#_ftnref32> Zaman…p. 25

[33] <#_ftnref33> Hardy…p. 171

[34] <#_ftnref34> Masud…p. 4

[35] <#_ftnref35> Masud…ps. 14 & 15

[36] <#_ftnref36> Ibid., p. 19

[37] <#_ftnref37> Ibid., p. 20

[38] <#_ftnref38> Ibid., ps. 22-25

[39] <#_ftnref39> Jalal…p. 33

[40] <#_ftnref40> Jalal…p. 85

[41] <#_ftnref41> Rai…p. 269

[42] <#_ftnref42> See Sanyal…pp. 203-207 for a brief idea about the manner
in which Riza Khan used the fatwa to target other groups.

[43] <#_ftnref43> Sanyal…p. 196

[44] <#_ftnref44> Sanyal…p. 197 and p. 200.

[45] <#_ftnref45> Sanyal…p. 283.

Ahmad Riza Khan's response as far as relations with the British went showed
a reluctance to deal with them at all: -

-          Muslims must refrain from taking disputes to the court

-          Muslims should keep commercial transactions within the community

-          Wealthy Muslims should open interest-free banks for fellow
Muslims

-          Muslims should go back to follwing the *din* (religion) correctly

[46] <#_ftnref46> Kozlowski…p. 922

[47] <#_ftnref47> Metcalf…pp. 146-147.

[48] <#_ftnref48> Hardy…p. 173

[49] <#_ftnref49> Metcalf…pp. 214-215.

[50] <#_ftnref50> Sanyal…p. 84-87

[51] <#_ftnref51> Sanyal…p. 81

[52] <#_ftnref52> The issues dealt by the ulema even today remain the same
as the article by Gregory Kozlowki shows. Kozlowski studies the fatwas of
the Mufti of the Jami'ah Nizamiyyah in 1989 and writes that, "In published
collection of fatawa, an outside portion of the queries and replies deal
with ritual matters such as the etiquette of prayer or the pilgrimage and
ritual pollution. Many of the problems addressed seem to be purely
hypothetical, designed as much to display a scholars forensic skill and
learning as to resolve some genuine dilemma. The most common queries to this
mufti (of the Jami'ah Nizamiyya) were those that related to marital
relations and inheritance.

[53] <#_ftnref53> Sanyal…p. 183-184.

[54] <#_ftnref54> Metcalf…Intro…p. 17

[55] <#_ftnref55> Kozlowski writes that the fatwas of Jamiyah Nizamiyah also
carry the caveat, 'God alone knows the truth!' p. 917. Thus, we see how the
ulema try to solve the issue to the best of their knowledge but try to
signify their modesty by including this statement at the end of every fatwa.


[56] <#_ftnref56> Metcalf…Two Fatwas…p. 56

[57] <#_ftnref57> Hardy…p. 171

[58] <#_ftnref58> Metcalf…Islamic Revival…p. 149

[59] <#_ftnref59> Sanyal…p. 50

[60] <#_ftnref60> Metcalf…Two Fatwas…p. 62

[61] <#_ftnref61> Metcalf…Islamic Revival…pp. 102-103. Also see pp. 206-210.
Metcalf writes that from modest beginnings early in the century, Urdu had
become the language of almost all religious works with a shift in the social
and political implications of using Urdu slowly shifting. Urdu was
identified as a Muslim language and threatened. The ulema were reacting to a
threat to their culture and political position by fostering the use of Urdu.
The ulema played a fundamental role in establishing Urdu as a pre-eminent
symbol of Muslim identity in India.

[62] <#_ftnref62> Robinson…Ulama…p. 33

[63] <#_ftnref63> Hardy…p. 173

[64] <#_ftnref64> Sanyal…p. 65

[65] <#_ftnref65> Sanyal…p. 162-163.

[66] <#_ftnref66> Masud…p. 27
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: http://mail.sarai.net/pipermail/reader-list/attachments/20060424/b1d9b6de/attachment.html