[Reader-list] Personal as pre-private,pre-public!!!

[inder salim]

Thanks dear Chatterjee,
i am delighted to read this heavy text piece on personal-private.
i must write that the quote of Marx by Geras moistened my eyes.
and that led me to discover his blog http://normblog.typepad.com/normblog/

Assume man to be man and his relationship to
> the world to be a human one: then you         can
> exchange love only for love, trust for trust, etc...
> if you want to exercise influence over other people,
> you must be a person with a stimulating and
> encouraging effect on other people. ...If you love
> without evoking love in return that is, if your loving
> does not produce reciprocal love; if    through a living
> expression of yourself as a living person you do        not
> make yourself a beloved one then your love is impotent
> -- a misfortune" ( cited in Geras 1990, 14).

Here, i take a little liberty to mix things... imagine how Harat
Sarmad Shaheed sahib must have looked. He must have looked like Marx.

The nudity of the saint was a radical step from private to personal,
and for sheer political reasons he was murdered by the King Aurangzeb.
As ur text  lucidly explains that how ' the state' exists on this
difference between private and personal, and hence the violence and
ungliness...

This way 'the poet' has no choice but to   confront 'the state', and
stand for the real freedom of human being. The only universal form
available to us is indeed  'love'. We have Kabir, Nanak, Meera,Sarmad,
Lad Ded, Rumi, and all that who repeatedly talked about 'love'  No
wonder that lot of Left leaning poets have written love poems....
Faiz, Pablo, Azad and other whole lot generation of poets must be into
that deep profound thing which we lightly call 'love' The word love is
perhaps deeper than word love, may be it is existentially placed
within us.  Dont we know that how J.P. Sartre was charmed by women, in
spite of his committment to Simone and Marx. To label this all as
romanticism, is of course wrong, since we know many Indian-Left
(netas) who lived a hidden private life and a masked personal life.

There are no immediate answers.... but debates like these have a
potential to push things...

thanks once again
love
inder salim


On 6/30/07, ARNAB CHATTERJEE <apnawritings at yahoo.co.in> wrote:
>  Dear Readers,
>                      Sorry for being a bit late but
> for reasons even you would surely recognize and
> consider my apology with sentimental biology that's
> needed.
>                 You'll remember  where we parted: the
> promise was to begin with the history of the personal.
>  I had made a short detour charting this history in
> telegraphic terms-from the monarch to the dictator --
> taking Gandhi's desire as drive. And now after so much
> of empirical historical lesson I think the choices are
> pretty clear : people wanting to interpret the world
> would go for so called democracy, liberalism and so
> forth; people  wanting to change the world   would go
> for either Fascism or revolutionary Communism—there is
> no other way, perhaps. And my version of pure politics
> will inform as a  rider over this  that any person or
> programme can cheat or made to deceive: morality does
> not come with a warranty. And this failure being
> irreducible, it was illuminated by Hegel when he said
> that there are two ways to achieve a  moral world :
> utopia or terror. Even such a grand 'deontologist'
> philosopher as Kant uses a phrase like "moral
> terrorism" and proposes a "terroristic" conception of
> "history"; but Hegel's copula is more illuminating.
> Terror rejects an immediate place; utopia regulates a
> non-place—they can never, never be estranged. And with
> Fascism and communism it is more futile to undertake
> such an exercise. But you might have noticed  a sharp
> difference : while in Fascism you have dictatorship in
> the person-al form, in Marx you have dictatorship of a
> whole class –even if universal or not. Now, if it is a
> collective whole embodied in the one person of the
> monarch -- which is the dictatorial example of the
> first, it is basically the group personality of the
> class that could act as the dictatorial unity,
> reflective of a single will, in the second case. Now,
> my intention this time is to refer the reader  to an
> extension of my argument stated previously.  First is
> the person taken as a singular-collective; the second
> is a collective-singular. First is the spontaneous
> natural personality; the second is an artificial
> personality masquerading as a legal fiction whose
> origins have been traced back to the Roman Law.
>    I'll come to the second when I deal with the
> Hiralal Haldar -- Mactaggart debate. In this post I'll
> address only the first part—that too a bit
> cryptically.
>
>
>
>
> (1)
>
> RECEIVED HISTORY
>
> The public/private binary -whose historical roots have
> been traced to classical Greece acquired its modern
> meaning through the mediations of medieval Roman Law
> and 18th century Europe. Aristotle made a distinction
> between household (oikos) and the space of the city
> state (polis) where through deliberation (lexis) and
> common action (praxis) a shared, common and in a loose
> sense "public" life beyond bare essentials or
> necessities was sustained. The private realm of
> necessities (subsistence, reproduction) was the
> household. Therefore property, "and the art of
> acquiring property" was considered a part of "managing
> the household" (Aristotle, 1988: 5) and  participation
> in the polis was restricted by one's status or rank as
> a master of oikos.
> In the medieval age in Roman Law one encounters terms
> like publicus and privatus but without the standard
> usage (Habermas, 1996:5) because everything
> public/private ultimately resided in the  person of
> the monarch (more on this latter.) However, in Roman
> Law-the first systematic legal document-- the privacy
> of the home (domus) was sanctioned ( Black, 1988: 593)
> and Roman Law itself was "private law" in that it
> would have application only for individuals or
> relations of coordination. Public law would administer
> affairs of the state or relations of domination. But
> similar to the Greek city state, it was the status of
> the individuals that determined their participation in
> the medieval public sphere. We enter modernity when
> men entered the realm of contract from that of
> status, from duties  to that of rights ( 18th century
> enlightenment and the French revolution remain the
> canonical examples).  Formal equality of persons was a
> prerequisite of such a contract. Particularly, at the
> break of the medieval age, in the wake of civil or
> commercial law in 18th century Europe, a democratic
> climate was created where apparent equality of all
> before the law and the market was preempted. And the
> public sphere was thus -in a sense-- opened to all.
> This meant the formation of public opinion through the
> media ( enabled at that time by the advent of print
> capitalism) and institutionalization of state
> sovereignty which would rest, henceforth, with the
> people or the public. A new category of legitimacy was
> created. This also engendered the rise of civil
> society  where the subjects would fulfill two roles at
> the same time: as a property owner or bourgeois he
> would  pursue his  private interests and as a citizen
> in the public sphere he would bear equal rights
> granted by the state. This also-- as a part of the
> public sphere, ensured the separation of society
> (family) from the state and that the state would not
> intervene in societal matters and expectedly, privacy
> would be located in the societal realm hence forth.
> (Separated from the state, classically, the church was
> the first private to have imparted  the secular colour
> so characteristic of modernity.) The state would
> ensure privacy, but would not intervene; its closest
> analogy was the market: the state would ensure a free
> market by  itself not intervening in it and the free
> market was not only of commodities but a great market
> place of ideas and exchange of opinion  in which,
> irrespective of birthmarks and the stink of status
> anybody could participate. The modern public sphere
> had arrived. It was just a step further when Marx
> would denounce universal suffrage and invoke  the
> proletariat as the class with "universal suffering"
> (Marx, 1983:320) and would mock this artificial
> equality of publics before the law and the market
> (alleging that they  masked real inequalities) and
> thought of smashing the private /public divide by
> abolishing private property- which he thought was at
> the core of this suffering. The rest is history and
> its repetition. No wonder that the public/private
> divide has been considered as the core of  our modern
> existence.
>
>
> ONE OR TWO WORDS ON HOW THE PERSONAL LOST ITSELF IN
> THE PRIVATE
>
>  An interesting part of recent academic discussions is
> while there is a growing interest in the public and
> the private, critical discourse on the personal nearly
> draws a blank. (The state of the personal is somewhat
> dubious and absent in all classic European discussions
> --even in Jurgen Habermas and Hannah Arendt .)
>       Although Habermas does cursorily refer to the
> process through which the "modern state apparatus
> became independent from the monarch's personal
> sphere", he rarely engages with it (Habermas 1996,
> 29). For instance here goes this recognition in the
> form of a footnote to one of his famous articles: "The
> important thing to understand is that the medieval
> public sphere, if it even deserves this recognition,
> is tied to the personal. The feudal lord and estates
> create the public sphere by means of their very
> presence." (Habermas 1974, 51)  But the personal
> sphere of the monarch-and what it means in the western
> tradition is somewhat available in G.H Mead from the
> standpoint of a social behaviorist. Mead meticulously
> charts the components of this personal sphere where
> the people within the same state " can identify
> themselves with each other only through being subjects
> of a common monarch…." (Mead 1972, p.311) Mead traces
> the phenomenon to the ancient empires of Mesopotamia
> and observes, "It is possible through personal
> relationships between a sovereign and subject to
> constitute a community which could not otherwise be so
> constituted…." In the Roman Empire through the
> mediation of Roman law, Mead notes, while the
> emperor-subject relationship was "defined in legal
> terms", through sacrificial offerings made to the
> emperor-the subject was "putting himself into personal
> relationship with him, and because of that he could
> feel his connection with all the members in the
> community". … "It was the setting up of a personal
> relationship which in a certain sense went beyond the
> purely legal relations involved in the development of
> Roman law." (312) In India considering the King's
> person as sacred, it was assumed that he had influence
> over crops, cattle, rain and general prosperity. So
> again, the subjects, in order to relate to cattle, the
> mediation of the King was involved in a metonymic
> gesture-through whose presence, people could relate
> and be present to themselves. (Hocart 1927, 9)
> Personal is that which predates both the public and
> the private and what is historically interesting is to
> discover when and why the collapsing of the personal
> and the private began. For this last instance - we can
> borrow from Max Weber the diffused origins of the
> Public Law-Private Law distinction, which as Weber
> shows was "once not made at all. Such was the case
> when all law, all jurisdictions, and particularly all
> powers of exercising authority were personal
> privileges, such as especially, the "prerogatives" of
> the head of the state." …[Who was]  "Not different
> from the head of the household." (Weber 1978, 643).
> This world of the personal or as Weber calls it
> "patrimonial monarchy" forms the prehistory of the
> private /public distinction and again I repeat that
> what is historically interesting is to discover when
> and why the collapsing of the personal and the private
> began to which today's feminists are but victims.
> Habermas therefore does away with a vast repertoire.
> So far Arendt is concerned, commentators have tried to
> make a case out of the feminist energy generated by
> the latter's 'personal' -previously having been at
> pains to argue that the 'political' and the 'personal'
> during Arendt's celebration of feminist moments later
> had become the 'public' and the 'private'.
>  "With the emergence of women's liberation a decade or
> so after The Human Condition appeared, the relation
> between the " political" and the "personal" moved to
> the forefront of politics, and this eventually took
> the form of the public and the private" (Zaretsky
> 1997, 214) with their corresponding emphasis on
> 'personal life' becoming a "third challenge to the
> liberal dichotomy" (214) (ref. endnote 1)  : really a
> queer mix up in history. The reason perhaps is that we
> tend to have a mix up between the private and the
> personal and this is its contemporary moment(Nothing
> could be more explicit an affirmation than from a
> feminist superstar: Catherine Mackinnon, "The private
> is the public for those for whom the personal is the
> political." (Mackinnon 1992, 359). This easy and
> historic conflation of personal as private is perhaps
> not the end of the story.
>
>
> In the western history itself there is also a
> suppressed narrative (suppressed because it does not
> suit the liberal project) where the two are not the
> same; in fact they two cannot be the same. But first
> I'll take the opportunity to  narrate how the
> personal/private coalescence occurs and then I shall
> try to excavate if the personal could be recuperated.
>
>                   Then is it possible to appreciate
> the fact that the appearance of the personal through
> the sieve of the private is basically an historical
> maneuver ?
>                This major point then needs mention:
> the qualitative leap when personal came to be
> identified with the private. Now, private property is
> as old as Greek antiquity: Aristotle had argued in
> favour of  and Plato had wanted to abolish private
> property. That is not the point; the first signs were
> available in the natural law (or natural rights)
> tradition and despite a lot of caveats, one of its
> representative voice still remains John Locke. In this
> tradition property, for the first time, is placed in
> the person :
> "Though the earth, and all inferior creatures be
> common to all men, yet every man has a "property" in
> his own "person". This no body has any right to but
> himself. The "labour" of his body, and the "work" of
> his hands, we may say are properly his. Whatsoever…he
> hath mixed his "labour" with, and joined it to
> something that is his own, and thereby makes it his
> "property"…that excludes the common right of other
> men" (Locke, (1690) 1982 : [Sec. 27.]130).
> "His property" or private property when derives from
> personal capacities of labour, the first motivated mix
> up between the personal and the private occurs. And
> then having had its eighteenth century initiation, it
> became a cornerstone of liberal theory where property
> becomes an attribute of personality. If you take away
> property from me, I become a non-person because
> (private) property is in my person. Here there is
> natural ownership before there is a legal ownership.
> Here is a classical example in Hegel, " Not until he
> has property does the person exist as reason" (Hegel,
> (1820) 1991: 73). Hegel goes at length to show how
> property is required to supersede  "the mere
> subjectivity of personality"(73). In fact this is the
> personal in Hegel invested with some kind of immediacy
> but lacks in content i.e. Hegel's  "abstract
> personality" in order to become concrete and objective
> awaits a trick:
>  " Since my will, as personal and hence as the will of
> an individual [des Einzelnen], becomes objective in
> property, the latter takes on the character of private
> property…" (77).
>
> This would be picked up by liberal capitalism and now
> onwards property being in person and that which makes
> objective, tangible  personality possible, private
> becomes the realm of liberty, reprieve and freedom.
> Marx would fall heavily on all of this and in fact
> this discourse finds its final resolution in Marx
> only. His argument was just the reverse: in a society
> without private property, the personal selves of men
> freely blossom to enter the true realm of freedom.
> Therefore this hyphenation between the private and the
> personal is more an ideological investment  necessary
> for liberal history than a structurally indispensable
> relation.
>
>
> RECOVERING THE PERSONAL IN LOCKE, HEGEL, MARX AND OUR
> TIMES
>
> Now, having presented the anatomical, bare rudiments
> of how the personal looses itself in the private, here
> I'll extrapolate how it could be recovered and allowed
> to have a safe passage. Given the force of history, it
> would be wise to start with Locke.
>
> LOCKE
>
> For Lockes' allergy towards  communal or collective
> ownership, (see Macpherson, C.B. 1972, 197-221.) But
> even in  Locke it is possible to find an other
> discourse of the personal besides property and the
> private dominion. While discussing property as an
> extension of the person,  and particularly Adam's
> property as "private dominion" which is supposed to
> have arisen from God's "grant" or "donation" and that
> of  fatherhood from the act of begetting Locke
> meditates on  how this divine donation was made
> "personally" to Adam to which his heir could have no
> right by it. (Locke1982, 60-61) Locke argues  that
> even if it belongs to the   parents "personally",
> after their death, their property does not go to the
> common stock of mankind but is inherited by their
> children as heirs because human have a natural
> propensity to continue their creed (62). This power of
> begetting in  another form—and that what roots
> continuity- founds inheritance. The point relevant to
> our case, is,  this "personal" belongingness  is a
> middle-term that appears with some autonomy and
> mediates person and property—seen as an extension of
> each other in Locke. And the mutual-extension argument
>  because, I guess, in itself cannot explain
> inheritance,  Locke is taking recourse to a different
> premise; the "personal" appears to give a language to
> this premise.
>
> HEGEL
> As established earlier, the reading that entails Hegel
> as a canonical case where the personal private mix up
> receives the force of an argument, is not wrong and as
> rendered by Marx, it carries an  immense sway with it.
>  But it is as well possible to discover in Hegel a
> curious personal impatient not to be suppressed by the
> interested world  of the private. Take for instance
> the distinction between real property and personal
> property that could be traced to the Roman Law from
> which Kant  borrowed his interesting theory of rights
> and  where we find personal  appearing with a rider
> "personal rights of a real kind". Hegel made a
> critique of Kant's  formulation; drawing on that
> critique,  let me here try to illuminate the
> distinction which I think was unconsciously made by
> Hegel himself.
> Deriving from the Justinian Roman legal division of
> right into rights of persons, things, and actions,
> Kant  in 1797 had proposed, taking into account the
> "form" of the  rights, a threefold division, "a right
> to a thing; a right against a person; a right to a
> person akin to a right to a thing ." (Kant 1999, 412).
> The first is a property right, the second is a
> contract right, and the third is a "personal right of
> a real kind" (Hegel 1991, 71); in other words, it is a
>  right about " what is mine or yours domestically, and
> the relation of persons in the domestic condition…"
> [including] "…possession of a person." (Kant 1999,
> 426) like the rights of spouses over one another, the
> rights of  parents over their children etc. The third
> is the most interesting because it resembles what
> today we call Personal Laws supposed to distribute
> "private" affairs within a household. And this is what
> Hegel attacks; Hegel thinks that the division is a
> confusing one; secondly, while family relationships
> form the content of "personal rights of a real kind" ,
> in actuality family relationships are based on the
> "surrender of personality." (Hegel 1991, 72) Hegel
> further notes that
>
> "For Kant personal rights are those rights which arise
> out of a contract whereby I give something or perform
> a service…Admittedly, only a person is obliged  to
> implement  the provisions of a contract, just as it is
>  only a person  who acquires the right to have them
> implemented. But such a right cannot therefore be
> called a personal right; rights of every kind can
> belong only to a person…" (73)
>
> What is interesting in Hegel's engagement -relevant to
> our project is the way he   extricates the personal
> from being stamped with the badge of household rights
> or  the power to accomplish a  civil contract ( See
> Endnote 2)  in brief personal right not masquerading
> as a private right. In brief, what Hegel may have
> argued here could be  that  there are no "personal
> rights of a real kind." But let us underline this
> binary: Personal vs./ and  real, which is  significant
> and  requires of us to reiterate that a distinction
> between real property and personal property was
> strongly a feature of English Law. Real property was
> that which had  "some degree of geographical
> fixity".[Reeve, 1986, 80-81] In order to examine this
> distinction in the form that it is found in a 1827
> tract I think the notions of the personal still could
> be recovered in a very different sense. In personal
> property "the general rule is, that possession
> constitutes the criterion of title;…hence the vendor
> of personal chattels is never expected to show the
> origin of his right. … [but] real property like land
> is held not by possession but by title requiring "the
> production of documents." (Mathews 1827, 27). Please
> note the somewhat loose coverage that personal
> property requires compared to real property. Now if it
> is pointed out that personal property does have
> property as a signified even if in a loose sense, it
> may be rebutted by saying that  in the same text
> Mathews  goes on to mention  "peculiarities personal"
> or as to how "personal disability" may be enough to
> "repel the presumption of a grant". (14) Does  this
> personal  call for documents or is a means to
> establishing a title? No, in fact these are blatant
> uses appropriate to our cause   existing in a legal
> tract meant to discuss  property personal or real.
>
> MARX
>
> The common knowledge now that the key to understanding
> modernity is the public/private divide and a
> corresponding failure to find a way beyond the binary
> would find—if considered carefully—an approval with
> dignity in Marx because Marx curiously is a symptom of
>  both: he said for the first--"the state is founded
> upon the contradiction between public and private
> life" (Marx, 1961, p.222) and for the second : "if the
> modern State wished to end the impotence of its
> administration it would be obliged  to abolish the
> present conditions of private life. And if the State
> wished to abolish these conditions of private life it
> would have also to put an end to its own existence,
> for it exists only  in relation to them." (p.223) Now,
> throwing in the fact that private property is just a
> singular and an isolated moment in the discourse of
> private life, Marx's agenda --I guess- looks readily
> defamiliarised here.
> Marx would fall heavily on all of this and in fact
> this discourse finds its final resolution in Marx
> only. It is not a fact that in a system without
> private property and a sanction against  'unlimited
> appropriation' all are non persons and there would be
> nothing personal. Therefore this hyphenation between
> the private and the personal is more an ideological
> investment necessary for liberal history than a
> structurally indispensable relation. Let us document a
> few discursive  fragments where this collapsing has
> been done away with. Now, notwithstanding the will to
> go beyond private/public divide, it may rightly be
> asked, could Marx be used to endorse the personal that
> I'm proposing? Yes! And  choosing only one instance --
> love , we may document this flower unfolding in Marx.
>
>         "Assume man to be man and his relationship to
> the world to be a human one: then you         can
> exchange love only for love, trust for trust, etc...
> if you want to exercise influence over other people,
> you must be a person with a stimulating and
> encouraging effect on other people. ...If you love
> without evoking love in return that is, if your loving
> does not produce reciprocal love; if    through a living
> expression of yourself as a living person you do        not
> make yourself a beloved one then your love is impotent
> -- a misfortune" ( cited in Geras 1990, 14).
>
> Isn't this the personal in Marx -- which --I'm sure
> --he would willingly exclude from the domain of
> private life   he wanted to abolish for history? I
> think the reader agrees.
>
> A CONTEMPORARY EXAMPLE
>
>       Marx apart, curiously, the Human Rights
> discourse does have, it may be pointed out, a phrase
> like 'personal property'. What does it qualify? In
> fact it endorses the distinction that we are making
> between the personal and the private. A theorist of
> such rights comments, " By personal property" I mean
> individual ownership and control of possessions such
> as clothing, furniture, food, writing materials,
> books, and artistic and religious objects.
> Considerations of personal freedom provide strong
> reasons for instituting and protecting personal
> property. These reasons are related not to production
> but to the requirements of developing and expressing
> one's own personality. Ownership of personal property
> is a matter of personal liberty, not a
> production-related right ( see endnote 3) ."(Nickel
> 1987, 152)
>   Therefore it is possible to attempt a historical
> reconstruction  of the personal where the personal
> could be said to have filtered through the monarchical
> metonymy right down to human rights discourses via
> Roman Law, Kant, Hegel and English Common law. While
> the prehistorical personal comes to be contaminated by
> the private, the human rights discourse is significant
> in its attempt to do away with this conflation. While
> it tries to do away with the infiltration,
> genealogically it perhaps proves the point that there
> was this contamination or over determination.
>
>           CONCLUSION
> I conclude with a sense of disgust. I could share 1/6
> th of the material I've amassed. This is not
> surprising since there are whole books on each of the
> strands to which I've referred. Consider Roman Law :
> Read Duff's Personality in Roman Private Law or
> Richard Tuck's path breaking works on Natural Rights
> and Natural Law debates on themes surrounding that
> what I'm trying to pursue. A further limitation is
> I've bound myself to narrating bits of western history
> of the personal and left out our own cultural
> cognitive histories of the personal. Let that be some
> time else. Nevertheless,with this our narrative of
> historical recovery or historical demystification of
> the personal reaches a benchmark and awaits if the
> personal-private distinction can be theoretically
> grounded as well.  We'll pursue that in the next
> post—early next month. Thank you.
>
> ENDNOTES
> 1.      For consideration of  the failure of this appraisal
> in its true light and that the personal-private
> distinction could be read unto Arendt, judge the
> following comments of Craig Calhoun, "Arendt would
> never endorse social engineering and, against such
> threats, certainly would protect privacy. Even more,
> she would protect the personal and the distinctive
> from absorption into the impersonal. But she would not
>  assimilate the notion of the personal to that of the
> private as Zaretsky does." (Calhoun 1997, 237). The
> point is if it could be correct for Arendt, it could
> be correct for Habermas as well.
> 2.      Carole Pateman does not agree that Hegel is
> successful in his attempt and according to her he is
> rather limited to transcending just one part of the
> Kantian argument which saw personal right, among
> others, in the manifest act of pointing out "this is
> my wife" where a "thing" is, accidentally, a person. (
> Pateman1996, 212-213). But I disagree with Pateman and
> reiterate that there is a  moment of personal in Hegel
> which precedes the contamination of property.
> 3.      The ownership of means of production is called in
> this discourse 'private productive property' (Nickel
> 1987, 152).
>
>
>
> BIBLIOGRAPHICAL REFERENCES
>
> Aristotle, 1988: The Politics, Transl. Benjamin
> Jowett, Cambridge: Cambridge         University Press.
>
> Black, A., 1988    : The Individual and Society. In
> J.H Burns (Ed.), The Cambridge  History of Medieval
> Political Thought, Cambridge: Cambridge University
> Pres, 588-606.
>
> Calhoun, Craig. 1997.  'Plurality, promises, and
> Public Spaces' In Calhoun and Mc Growan. eds. 1997.
> 232-259.
>
> Calhoun, Craig, and John Mc Growan. eds. 1997. Hannah
> Arendt and the Meaning of Politics, Minneapolis,
> London: University of Minnesota Press.
>
> Geras, Norman, 1990 : 'Seven types of Obloquy:
> Travesties of Marxism' in Socialist register, Eds.
> Ralph Miliband, Leo Panitch & John Saville, pp.1-34,
> The Merlin Press : London.
>
>
>
> Habermas, J.     1974.   : The Public Sphere: An
> Encyclopedia article. In  New German    Critique, 3(
> 51.), 49-55.
>
>    ------------------1996       : The Structural
> Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a
>
> category  of Bourgeois Society, T. Berger (Trans.),
> Great Britain: Blackwell
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