[Reader-list] Inder, your answer

[ARNAB CHATTERJEE]

Dear Inder,
                Thank you for your passionate response
and I shall also remain too grateful all the more for
that Geras blog u've given; I never knew it.
               And I feel obliged that my piece has
provoked such "mixed feelings" in you and u've
catalogued a number of heterogenous,conceptual objects
of which I know least: for instance Mira or Kabir. I
have attended a few seminars on Sufi here at Kolkata 
but  I was never fit for that good mystic stuff.
             So even as  I acknowledge  my absolute
incompetence in that force field, let me, as an
exchange of electronic gift paste two URL here for you
as love's prosody and campaign
:http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A-2xttUqIuA      
(or/and)  http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n1JDKyW_eag 
             Hope you get back to me with  a new 
definition of love this time inspired not by Mira but
Mattu--Daljit Mattu, enjoy.
thanks again
yours in discourse & defeat 
arnab 

--- inder salim <indersalim at gmail.com> wrote:

> Thanks dear Chatterjee,
> i am delighted to read this heavy text piece on
> personal-private.
> i must write that the quote of Marx by Geras
> moistened my eyes.
> and that led me to discover his blog
> http://normblog.typepad.com/normblog/
> 
> Assume man to be man and his relationship to
> > the world to be a human one: then you         can
> > exchange love only for love, trust for trust,
> etc...
> > if you want to exercise influence over other
> people,
> > you must be a person with a stimulating and
> > encouraging effect on other people. ...If you love
> > without evoking love in return that is, if your
> loving
> > does not produce reciprocal love; if    through a
> living
> > expression of yourself as a living person you do  
>      not
> > make yourself a beloved one then your love is
> impotent
> > -- a misfortune" ( cited in Geras 1990, 14).
> 
> Here, i take a little liberty to mix things...
> imagine how Harat
> Sarmad Shaheed sahib must have looked. He must have
> looked like Marx.
> 
> The nudity of the saint was a radical step from
> private to personal,
> and for sheer political reasons he was murdered by
> the King Aurangzeb.
> As ur text  lucidly explains that how ' the state'
> exists on this
> difference between private and personal, and hence
> the violence and
> ungliness...
> 
> This way 'the poet' has no choice but to   confront
> 'the state', and
> stand for the real freedom of human being. The only
> universal form
> available to us is indeed  'love'. We have Kabir,
> Nanak, Meera,Sarmad,
> Lad Ded, Rumi, and all that who repeatedly talked
> about 'love'  No
> wonder that lot of Left leaning poets have written
> love poems....
> Faiz, Pablo, Azad and other whole lot generation of
> poets must be into
> that deep profound thing which we lightly call
> 'love' The word love is
> perhaps deeper than word love, may be it is
> existentially placed
> within us.  Dont we know that how J.P. Sartre was
> charmed by women, in
> spite of his committment to Simone and Marx. To
> label this all as
> romanticism, is of course wrong, since we know many
> Indian-Left
> (netas) who lived a hidden private life and a masked
> personal life.
> 
> There are no immediate answers.... but debates like
> these have a
> potential to push things...
> 
> thanks once again
> love
> inder salim
> 
> 
> On 6/30/07, ARNAB CHATTERJEE
> <apnawritings at yahoo.co.in> wrote:
> >  Dear Readers,
> >                      Sorry for being a bit late
> but
> > for reasons even you would surely recognize and
> > consider my apology with sentimental biology
> that's
> > needed.
> >                 You'll remember  where we parted:
> the
> > promise was to begin with the history of the
> personal.
> >  I had made a short detour charting this history
> in
> > telegraphic terms-from the monarch to the dictator
> --
> > taking Gandhi's desire as drive. And now after so
> much
> > of empirical historical lesson I think the choices
> are
> > pretty clear : people wanting to interpret the
> world
> > would go for so called democracy, liberalism and
> so
> > forth; people  wanting to change the world   would
> go
> > for either Fascism or revolutionary
> Communism—there is
> > no other way, perhaps. And my version of pure
> politics
> > will inform as a  rider over this  that any person
> or
> > programme can cheat or made to deceive: morality
> does
> > not come with a warranty. And this failure being
> > irreducible, it was illuminated by Hegel when he
> said
> > that there are two ways to achieve a  moral world
> :
> > utopia or terror. Even such a grand 'deontologist'
> > philosopher as Kant uses a phrase like "moral
> > terrorism" and proposes a "terroristic" conception
> of
> > "history"; but Hegel's copula is more
> illuminating.
> > Terror rejects an immediate place; utopia
> regulates a
> > non-place—they can never, never be estranged. And
> with
> > Fascism and communism it is more futile to
> undertake
> > such an exercise. But you might have noticed  a
> sharp
> > difference : while in Fascism you have
> dictatorship in
> > the person-al form, in Marx you have dictatorship
> of a
> > whole class –even if universal or not. Now, if it
> is a
> > collective whole embodied in the one person of the
> > monarch -- which is the dictatorial example of the
> > first, it is basically the group personality of
> the
> > class that could act as the dictatorial unity,
> > reflective of a single will, in the second case.
> Now,
> > my intention this time is to refer the reader  to
> an
> > extension of my argument stated previously.  First
> is
> > the person taken as a singular-collective; the
> second
> > is a collective-singular. First is the spontaneous
> > natural personality; the second is an artificial
> > personality masquerading as a legal fiction whose
> > origins have been traced back to the Roman Law.
> >    I'll come to the second when I deal with the
> > Hiralal Haldar -- Mactaggart debate. In this post
> I'll
> > address only the first part—that too a bit
> > cryptically.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > (1)
> >
> > RECEIVED HISTORY
> >
> > The public/private binary -whose historical roots
> have
> > been traced to classical Greece acquired its
> modern
> > meaning through the mediations of medieval Roman
> Law
> > and 18th century Europe. Aristotle made a
> distinction
> > between household (oikos) and the space of the
> city
> > state (polis) where through deliberation (lexis)
> and
> > common action (praxis) a shared, common and in a
> loose
> > sense "public" life beyond bare essentials or
> > necessities was sustained. The private realm of
> > necessities (subsistence, reproduction) was the
> > household. Therefore property, "and the art of
> > acquiring property" was considered a part of
> "managing
> > the household" (Aristotle, 1988: 5) and 
> participation
> > in the polis was restricted by one's status or
> rank as
> > a master of oikos.
> > In the medieval age in Roman Law one encounters
> terms
> > like publicus and privatus but without the
> standard
> > usage (Habermas, 1996:5) because everything
> > public/private ultimately resided in the  person
> of
> > the monarch (more on this latter.) However, in
> Roman
> > Law-the first systematic legal document-- the
> privacy
> > of the home (domus) was sanctioned ( Black, 1988:
> 593)
> > and Roman Law itself was "private law" in that it
> > would have application only for individuals or
> > relations of coordination. Public law would
> administer
> > affairs of the state or relations of domination.
> But
> > similar to the Greek city state, it was the status
> of
> > the individuals that determined their
> participation in
> > the medieval public sphere. We enter modernity
> when
> > men entered the realm of contract from that of
> > status, from duties  to that of rights ( 18th
> century
> > enlightenment and the French revolution remain the
> > canonical examples).  Formal equality of persons
> was a
> > prerequisite of such a contract. Particularly, at
> the
> > break of the medieval age, in the wake of civil or
> > commercial law in 18th century Europe, a
> democratic
> > climate was created where apparent equality of all
> > before the law and the market was preempted. And
> the
> > public sphere was thus -in a sense-- opened to
> all.
> > This meant the formation of public opinion through
> the
> > media ( enabled at that time by the advent of
> print
> > capitalism) and institutionalization of state
> > sovereignty which would rest, henceforth, with the
> > people or the public. A new category of legitimacy
> was
> > created. This also engendered the rise of civil
> > society  where the subjects would fulfill two
> roles at
> > the same time: as a property owner or bourgeois he
> > would  pursue his  private interests and as a
> citizen
> > in the public sphere he would bear equal rights
> > granted by the state. This also-- as a part of the
> > public sphere, ensured the separation of society
> > (family) from the state and that the state would
> not
> > intervene in societal matters and expectedly,
> privacy
> > would be located in the societal realm hence
> forth.
> > (Separated from the state, classically, the church
> was
> > the first private to have imparted  the secular
> colour
> > so characteristic of modernity.) The state would
> > ensure privacy, but would not intervene; its
> closest
> > analogy was the market: the state would ensure a
> free
> > market by  itself not intervening in it and the
> free
> > market was not only of commodities but a great
> market
> > place of ideas and exchange of opinion  in which,
> > irrespective of birthmarks and the stink of status
> > anybody could participate. The modern public
> sphere
> > had arrived. It was just a step further when Marx
> > would denounce universal suffrage and invoke  the
> > proletariat as the class with "universal
> suffering"
> > (Marx, 1983:320) and would mock this artificial
> > equality of publics before the law and the market
> > (alleging that they  masked real inequalities) and
> > thought of smashing the private /public divide by
> > abolishing private property- which he thought was
> at
> > the core of this suffering. The rest is history
> and
> > its repetition. No wonder that the public/private
> > divide has been considered as the core of  our
> modern
> > existence.
> >
> >
> > ONE OR TWO WORDS ON HOW THE PERSONAL LOST ITSELF
> IN
> > THE PRIVATE
> >
> >  An interesting part of recent academic
> discussions is
> > while there is a growing interest in the public
> and
> > the private, critical discourse on the personal
> nearly
> > draws a blank. (The state of the personal is
> somewhat
> > dubious and absent in all classic European
> discussions
> > --even in Jurgen Habermas and Hannah Arendt .)
> >       Although Habermas does cursorily refer to
> the
> > process through which the "modern state apparatus
> > became independent from the monarch's personal
> > sphere", he rarely engages with it (Habermas 1996,
> > 29). For instance here goes this recognition in
> the
> > form of a footnote to one of his famous articles:
> "The
> > important thing to understand is that the medieval
> > public sphere, if it even deserves this
> recognition,
> > is tied to the personal. The feudal lord and
> estates
> > create the public sphere by means of their very
> > presence." (Habermas 1974, 51)  But the personal
> > sphere of the monarch-and what it means in the
> western
> > tradition is somewhat available in G.H Mead from
> the
> > standpoint of a social behaviorist. Mead
> meticulously
> > charts the components of this personal sphere
> where
> > the people within the same state " can identify
> > themselves with each other only through being
> subjects
> > of a common monarch
." (Mead 1972, p.311) Mead
> traces
> > the phenomenon to the ancient empires of
> Mesopotamia
> > and observes, "It is possible through personal
> > relationships between a sovereign and subject to
> > constitute a community which could not otherwise
> be so
> > constituted
." In the Roman Empire through the
> > mediation of Roman law, Mead notes, while the
> > emperor-subject relationship was "defined in legal
> > terms", through sacrificial offerings made to the
> > emperor-the subject was "putting himself into
> personal
> > relationship with him, and because of that he
> could
> > feel his connection with all the members in the
> > community". 
 "It was the setting up of a personal
> > relationship which in a certain sense went beyond
> the
> > purely legal relations involved in the development
> of
> > Roman law." (312) In India considering the King's
> > person as sacred, it was assumed that he had
> influence
> > over crops, cattle, rain and general prosperity.
> So
> > again, the subjects, in order to relate to cattle,
> the
> > mediation of the King was involved in a metonymic
> > gesture-through whose presence, people could
> relate
> > and be present to themselves. (Hocart 1927, 9)
> > Personal is that which predates both the public
> and
> > the private and what is historically interesting
> is to
> > discover when and why the collapsing of the
> personal
> > and the private began. For this last instance - we
> can
> > borrow from Max Weber the diffused origins of the
> > Public Law-Private Law distinction, which as Weber
> > shows was "once not made at all. Such was the case
> > when all law, all jurisdictions, and particularly
> all
> > powers of exercising authority were personal
> > privileges, such as especially, the "prerogatives"
> of
> > the head of the state." 
[Who was]  "Not different
> > from the head of the household." (Weber 1978,
> 643).
> > This world of the personal or as Weber calls it
> > "patrimonial monarchy" forms the prehistory of the
> > private /public distinction and again I repeat
> that
> > what is historically interesting is to discover
> when
> > and why the collapsing of the personal and the
> private
> > began to which today's feminists are but victims.
> > Habermas therefore does away with a vast
> repertoire.
> > So far Arendt is concerned, commentators have
> tried to
> > make a case out of the feminist energy generated
> by
> > the latter's 'personal' -previously having been at
> > pains to argue that the 'political' and the
> 'personal'
> > during Arendt's celebration of feminist moments
> later
> > had become the 'public' and the 'private'.
> >  "With the emergence of women's liberation a
> decade or
> > so after The Human Condition appeared, the
> relation
> > between the " political" and the "personal" moved
> to
> > the forefront of politics, and this eventually
> took
> > the form of the public and the private" (Zaretsky
> > 1997, 214) with their corresponding emphasis on
> > 'personal life' becoming a "third challenge to the
> > liberal dichotomy" (214) (ref. endnote 1)  :
> really a
> > queer mix up in history. The reason perhaps is
> that we
> > tend to have a mix up between the private and the
> > personal and this is its contemporary
> moment(Nothing
> > could be more explicit an affirmation than from a
> > feminist superstar: Catherine Mackinnon, "The
> private
> > is the public for those for whom the personal is
> the
> > political." (Mackinnon 1992, 359). This easy and
> > historic conflation of personal as private is
> perhaps
> > not the end of the story.
> >
> >
> > In the western history itself there is also a
> > suppressed narrative (suppressed because it does
> not
> > suit the liberal project) where the two are not
> the
> > same; in fact they two cannot be the same. But
> first
> > I'll take the opportunity to  narrate how the
> > personal/private coalescence occurs and then I
> shall
> > try to excavate if the personal could be
> recuperated.
> >
> >                   Then is it possible to
> appreciate
> > the fact that the appearance of the personal
> through
> > the sieve of the private is basically an
> historical
> > maneuver ?
> >                This major point then needs
> mention:
> > the qualitative leap when personal came to be
> > identified with the private. Now, private property
> is
> > as old as Greek antiquity: Aristotle had argued in
> > favour of  and Plato had wanted to abolish private
> > property. That is not the point; the first signs
> were
> > available in the natural law (or natural rights)
> > tradition and despite a lot of caveats, one of its
> > representative voice still remains John Locke. In
> this
> > tradition property, for the first time, is placed
> in
> > the person :
> > "Though the earth, and all inferior creatures be
> > common to all men, yet every man has a "property"
> in
> > his own "person". This no body has any right to
> but
> > himself. The "labour" of his body, and the "work"
> of
> > his hands, we may say are properly his.
> Whatsoever
he
> > hath mixed his "labour" with, and joined it to
> > something that is his own, and thereby makes it
> his
> > "property"
that excludes the common right of other
> > men" (Locke, (1690) 1982 : [Sec. 27.]130).
> > "His property" or private property when derives
> from
> > personal capacities of labour, the first motivated
> mix
> > up between the personal and the private occurs.
> And
> > then having had its eighteenth century initiation,
> it
> > became a cornerstone of liberal theory where
> property
> > becomes an attribute of personality. If you take
> away
> > property from me, I become a non-person because
> > (private) property is in my person. Here there is
> > natural ownership before there is a legal
> ownership.
> > Here is a classical example in Hegel, " Not until
> he
> > has property does the person exist as reason"
> (Hegel,
> > (1820) 1991: 73). Hegel goes at length to show how
> > property is required to supersede  "the mere
> > subjectivity of personality"(73). In fact this is
> the
> > personal in Hegel invested with some kind of
> immediacy
> > but lacks in content i.e. Hegel's  "abstract
> > personality" in order to become concrete and
> objective
> > awaits a trick:
> >  " Since my will, as personal and hence as the
> will of
> > an individual [des Einzelnen], becomes objective
> in
> > property, the latter takes on the character of
> private
> > property
" (77).
> >
> > This would be picked up by liberal capitalism and
> now
> > onwards property being in person and that which
> makes
> > objective, tangible  personality possible, private
> > becomes the realm of liberty, reprieve and
> freedom.
> > Marx would fall heavily on all of this and in fact
> > this discourse finds its final resolution in Marx
> > only. His argument was just the reverse: in a
> society
> > without private property, the personal selves of
> men
> > freely blossom to enter the true realm of freedom.
> > Therefore this hyphenation between the private and
> the
> > personal is more an ideological investment 
> necessary
> > for liberal history than a structurally
> indispensable
> > relation.
> >
> >
> > RECOVERING THE PERSONAL IN LOCKE, HEGEL, MARX AND
> OUR
> > TIMES
> >
> > Now, having presented the anatomical, bare
> rudiments
> > of how the personal looses itself in the private,
> here
> > I'll extrapolate how it could be recovered and
> allowed
> > to have a safe passage. Given the force of
> history, it
> > would be wise to start with Locke.
> >
> > LOCKE
> >
> > For Lockes' allergy towards  communal or
> collective
> > ownership, (see Macpherson, C.B. 1972, 197-221.)
> But
> > even in  Locke it is possible to find an other
> > discourse of the personal besides property and the
> > private dominion. While discussing property as an
> > extension of the person,  and particularly Adam's
> > property as "private dominion" which is supposed
> to
> > have arisen from God's "grant" or "donation" and
> that
> > of  fatherhood from the act of begetting Locke
> > meditates on  how this divine donation was made
> > "personally" to Adam to which his heir could have
> no
> > right by it. (Locke1982, 60-61) Locke argues  that
> > even if it belongs to the   parents "personally",
> > after their death, their property does not go to
> the
> > common stock of mankind but is inherited by their
> > children as heirs because human have a natural
> > propensity to continue their creed (62). This
> power of
> > begetting in  another form—and that what roots
> > continuity- founds inheritance. The point relevant
> to
> > our case, is,  this "personal" belongingness  is a
> > middle-term that appears with some autonomy and
> > mediates person and property—seen as an extension
> of
> > each other in Locke. And the mutual-extension
> argument
> >  because, I guess, in itself cannot explain
> > inheritance,  Locke is taking recourse to a
> different
> > premise; the "personal" appears to give a language
> to
> > this premise.
> >
> > HEGEL
> > As established earlier, the reading that entails
> Hegel
> > as a canonical case where the personal private mix
> up
> > receives the force of an argument, is not wrong
> and as
> > rendered by Marx, it carries an  immense sway with
> it.
> >  But it is as well possible to discover in Hegel a
> > curious personal impatient not to be suppressed by
> the
> > interested world  of the private. Take for
> instance
> > the distinction between real property and personal
> > property that could be traced to the Roman Law
> from
> > which Kant  borrowed his interesting theory of
> rights
> > and  where we find personal  appearing with a
> rider
> > "personal rights of a real kind". Hegel made a
> > critique of Kant's  formulation; drawing on that
> > critique,  let me here try to illuminate the
> > distinction which I think was unconsciously made
> by
> > Hegel himself.
> > Deriving from the Justinian Roman legal division
> of
> > right into rights of persons, things, and actions,
> > Kant  in 1797 had proposed, taking into account
> the
> > "form" of the  rights, a threefold division, "a
> right
> > to a thing; a right against a person; a right to a
> > person akin to a right to a thing ." (Kant 1999,
> 412).
> > The first is a property right, the second is a
> > contract right, and the third is a "personal right
> of
> > a real kind" (Hegel 1991, 71); in other words, it
> is a
> >  right about " what is mine or yours domestically,
> and
> > the relation of persons in the domestic
> condition
"
> > [including] "
possession of a person." (Kant 1999,
> > 426) like the rights of spouses over one another,
> the
> > rights of  parents over their children etc. The
> third
> > is the most interesting because it resembles what
> > today we call Personal Laws supposed to distribute
> > "private" affairs within a household. And this is
> what
> > Hegel attacks; Hegel thinks that the division is a
> > confusing one; secondly, while family
> relationships
> > form the content of "personal rights of a real
> kind" ,
> > in actuality family relationships are based on the
> > "surrender of personality." (Hegel 1991, 72) Hegel
> > further notes that
> >
> > "For Kant personal rights are those rights which
> arise
> > out of a contract whereby I give something or
> perform
> > a service
Admittedly, only a person is obliged  to
> > implement  the provisions of a contract, just as
> it is
> >  only a person  who acquires the right to have
> them
> > implemented. But such a right cannot therefore be
> > called a personal right; rights of every kind can
> > belong only to a person
" (73)
> >
> > What is interesting in Hegel's engagement
> -relevant to
> > our project is the way he   extricates the
> personal
> > from being stamped with the badge of household
> rights
> > or  the power to accomplish a  civil contract (
> See
> > Endnote 2)  in brief personal right not
> masquerading
> > as a private right. In brief, what Hegel may have
> > argued here could be  that  there are no "personal
> > rights of a real kind." But let us underline this
> > binary: Personal vs./ and  real, which is 
> significant
> > and  requires of us to reiterate that a
> distinction
> > between real property and personal property was
> > strongly a feature of English Law. Real property
> was
> > that which had  "some degree of geographical
> > fixity".[Reeve, 1986, 80-81] In order to examine
> this
> > distinction in the form that it is found in a 1827
> > tract I think the notions of the personal still
> could
> > be recovered in a very different sense. In
> personal
> > property "the general rule is, that possession
> > constitutes the criterion of title;
hence the
> vendor
> > of personal chattels is never expected to show the
> > origin of his right. 
 [but] real property like
> land
> > is held not by possession but by title requiring
> "the
> > production of documents." (Mathews 1827, 27).
> Please
> > note the somewhat loose coverage that personal
> > property requires compared to real property. Now
> if it
> > is pointed out that personal property does have
> > property as a signified even if in a loose sense,
> it
> > may be rebutted by saying that  in the same text
> > Mathews  goes on to mention  "peculiarities
> personal"
> > or as to how "personal disability" may be enough
> to
> > "repel the presumption of a grant". (14) Does 
> this
> > personal  call for documents or is a means to
> > establishing a title? No, in fact these are
> blatant
> > uses appropriate to our cause   existing in a
> legal
> > tract meant to discuss  property personal or real.
> >
> > MARX
> >
> > The common knowledge now that the key to
> understanding
> > modernity is the public/private divide and a
> > corresponding failure to find a way beyond the
> binary
> > would find—if considered carefully—an approval
> with
> > dignity in Marx because Marx curiously is a
> symptom of
> >  both: he said for the first--"the state is
> founded
> > upon the contradiction between public and private
> > life" (Marx, 1961, p.222) and for the second : "if
> the
> > modern State wished to end the impotence of its
> > administration it would be obliged  to abolish the
> > present conditions of private life. And if the
> State
> > wished to abolish these conditions of private life
> it
> > would have also to put an end to its own
> existence,
> > for it exists only  in relation to them." (p.223)
> Now,
> > throwing in the fact that private property is just
> a
> > singular and an isolated moment in the discourse
> of
> > private life, Marx's agenda --I guess- looks
> readily
> > defamiliarised here.
> > Marx would fall heavily on all of this and in fact
> > this discourse finds its final resolution in Marx
> > only. It is not a fact that in a system without
> > private property and a sanction against 
> 'unlimited
> > appropriation' all are non persons and there would
> be
> > nothing personal. Therefore this hyphenation
> between
> > the private and the personal is more an
> ideological
> > investment necessary for liberal history than a
> > structurally indispensable relation. Let us
> document a
> > few discursive  fragments where this collapsing
> has
> > been done away with. Now, notwithstanding the will
> to
> > go beyond private/public divide, it may rightly be
> > asked, could Marx be used to endorse the personal
> that
> > I'm proposing? Yes! And  choosing only one
> instance --
> > love , we may document this flower unfolding in
> Marx.
> >
> >         "Assume man to be man and his relationship
> to
> > the world to be a human one: then you         can
> > exchange love only for love, trust for trust,
> etc...
> > if you want to exercise influence over other
> people,
> > you must be a person with a stimulating and
> > encouraging effect on other people. ...If you love
> > without evoking love in return that is, if your
> loving
> > does not produce reciprocal love; if    through a
> living
> > expression of yourself as a living person you do  
>      not
> > make yourself a beloved one then your love is
> impotent
> > -- a misfortune" ( cited in Geras 1990, 14).
> >
> > Isn't this the personal in Marx -- which --I'm
> sure
> > --he would willingly exclude from the domain of
> > private life   he wanted to abolish for history? I
> > think the reader agrees.
> >
> > A CONTEMPORARY EXAMPLE
> >
> >       Marx apart, curiously, the Human Rights
> > discourse does have, it may be pointed out, a
> phrase
> > like 'personal property'. What does it qualify? In
> > fact it endorses the distinction that we are
> making
> > between the personal and the private. A theorist
> of
> > such rights comments, " By personal property" I
> mean
> > individual ownership and control of possessions
> such
> > as clothing, furniture, food, writing materials,
> > books, and artistic and religious objects.
> > Considerations of personal freedom provide strong
> > reasons for instituting and protecting personal
> > property. These reasons are related not to
> production
> > but to the requirements of developing and
> expressing
> > one's own personality. Ownership of personal
> property
> > is a matter of personal liberty, not a
> > production-related right ( see endnote 3)
> ."(Nickel
> > 1987, 152)
> >   Therefore it is possible to attempt a historical
> > reconstruction  of the personal where the personal
> > could be said to have filtered through the
> monarchical
> > metonymy right down to human rights discourses via
> > Roman Law, Kant, Hegel and English Common law.
> While
> > the prehistorical personal comes to be
> contaminated by
> > the private, the human rights discourse is
> significant
> > in its attempt to do away with this conflation.
> While
> > it tries to do away with the infiltration,
> > genealogically it perhaps proves the point that
> there
> > was this contamination or over determination.
> >
> >           CONCLUSION
> > I conclude with a sense of disgust. I could share
> 1/6
> > th of the material I've amassed. This is not
> > surprising since there are whole books on each of
> the
> > strands to which I've referred. Consider Roman Law
> :
> > Read Duff's Personality in Roman Private Law or
> > Richard Tuck's path breaking works on Natural
> Rights
> > and Natural Law debates on themes surrounding that
> > what I'm trying to pursue. A further limitation is
> > I've bound myself to narrating bits of western
> history
> > of the personal and left out our own cultural
> > cognitive histories of the personal. Let that be
> some
> > time else. Nevertheless,with this our narrative of
> > historical recovery or historical demystification
> of
> > the personal reaches a benchmark and awaits if the
> > personal-private distinction can be theoretically
> > grounded as well.  We'll pursue that in the next
> > post—early next month. Thank you.
> >
> > ENDNOTES
> > 1.      For consideration of  the failure of this
> appraisal
> > in its true light and that the personal-private
> > distinction could be read unto Arendt, judge the
> > following comments of Craig Calhoun, "Arendt would
> > never endorse social engineering and, against such
> > threats, certainly would protect privacy. Even
> more,
> > she would protect the personal and the distinctive
> > from absorption into the impersonal. But she would
> not
> >  assimilate the notion of the personal to that of
> the
> > private as Zaretsky does." (Calhoun 1997, 237).
> The
> > point is if it could be correct for Arendt, it
> could
> > be correct for Habermas as well.
> > 2.      Carole Pateman does not agree that Hegel
> is
> > successful in his attempt and according to her he
> is
> > rather limited to transcending just one part of
> the
> > Kantian argument which saw personal right, among
> > others, in the manifest act of pointing out "this
> is
> > my wife" where a "thing" is, accidentally, a
> person. (
> > Pateman1996, 212-213). But I disagree with Pateman
> and
> > reiterate that there is a  moment of personal in
> Hegel
> > which precedes the contamination of property.
> > 3.      The ownership of means of production is
> called in
> > this discourse 'private productive property'
> (Nickel
> > 1987, 152).
> >
> >
> >
> > BIBLIOGRAPHICAL REFERENCES
> >
> > Aristotle, 1988: The Politics, Transl. Benjamin
> > Jowett, Cambridge: Cambridge         University
> Press.
> >
> > Black, A., 1988    : The Individual and Society.
> In
> > J.H Burns (Ed.), The Cambridge  History of
> Medieval
> > Political Thought, Cambridge: Cambridge University
> > Pres, 588-606.
> >
> > Calhoun, Craig. 1997.  'Plurality, promises, and
> > Public Spaces' In Calhoun and Mc Growan. eds.
> 1997.
> > 232-259.
> >
> > Calhoun, Craig, and John Mc Growan. eds. 1997.
> Hannah
> > Arendt and the Meaning of Politics, Minneapolis,
> > London: University of Minnesota Press.
> >
> > Geras, Norman, 1990 : 'Seven types of Obloquy:
> > Travesties of Marxism' in Socialist register, Eds.
> > Ralph Miliband, Leo Panitch & John Saville,
> pp.1-34,
> > The Merlin Press : London.
> >
> >
> >
> > Habermas, J.     1974.   : The Public Sphere: An
> > Encyclopedia article. In  New German    Critique,
> 3(
> > 51.), 49-55.
> >
> >    ------------------1996       : The Structural
> > Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry
> into a
> >
> > category  of Bourgeois Society, T. Berger
> (Trans.),
> > Great Britain: Blackwell
> > Publishers & Polity Press.
> >
> > Hegel, G.W.F. ,1991: Elements of the Philosophy of
> > Right,. Trans. H.B. Nisbet. U.K:   Cambridge
> > University Press.
> >
> > Hobbes, T.,1997   : Leviathan,  New York : W.W.
> Norton
> > & Company.
> >
> > Hocart, A.M. ,1927 : Kingship,  London: Oxford
> > University Press.
> >
> > Kant, Immanuel. 1999. Practical Philosophy. UK:
> > Cambridge University Press.
> >
> > Locke, John. (1924)1982. Two Treatises Of 
> Government.
> > J.M Dent & Son's Ltd. (Everyman's Library):
> London.
> >
> > Mackinnon, Catharine A. 1992. " Privacy v.
> Equality:
> > Beyond Roe V. wade" In Ethics: A Feminist
> Reader.eds.
> > Elizabeth Frazer, Jennifer Hornsby and Sabina
> > Lovibond. 351—363. Oxford: Blackwell.
> >
> > Macpherson, C.B. 1972. "The Theory of Property
> Right",
> > in his The Political Theory of Possessive
> > Individualism, Hobbes to Locke. 197—221.London:
> Oxford
> > University Press.
> >
> > Marx, Karl, 1961. Selected Writings in Sociology
> and
> > Social Philosophy, Eds. T.B. Bottomore and
> M.Rubel,
> > Penguin Books: Harmondsworth.
> >
> > ------------------------1983  : A Contribution to
> the
> > Critique of Hegel's 'Philosophy of Right' (1843)
> In
> > L.S.Stepelevich (Ed.) The Young Hegelians: An
> > Anthology.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
> > 310-322.
> >
> > Mathews, John H. 1827. Treatise On The Doctrine of
> > Presumption and Presumptive Evidence As Affecting
> The
> > Title To Real and Personal Property. London:
> Joseph
> > Butterworth and Son, Law Booksellers.
> >
> > Mead, George H. (1934) 1972. Mind, Self, and
> Society,
> > >From the standpoint of a social behaviorist. ed.
> > Charles W. Morris. Chicago: The University of
> Chicago
> > Press.
> >
> > Monahan, Arthur. 1994. From Personal Duties
> towards
> > Personal Rights: Late Medieval and Early Modern
> > Political thought, 1300-1600. Montreal: McGill
> Queens
> > University Press.
> >
> > Nickel, James W. 1987.  Making Sense of Human
> Rights
> > :Philosophical Reflections on the Universal
> > declaration of Human Rights. Berkeley: University
> Of
> > California Press.
> >
> > Pateman, Carole.1996. 'Hegel, Marriage, and the
> > Standpoint of Contract' in Feminist
> Interpretations of
> > G.W. F. Hegel. Ed. Patricia Jagentowicz Mills.
> > 209-223. Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State
> > University Press.
> >
> > Reeve, Andrew. 1986. Property, London : Macmillan.
> >
> >
> > Weber, M. , 1978        : Economy And Society :An
> Outline of
> > Interpretive Sociology. Vol.II. Guenther Roth and
> > Claus Wittich, (Eds.), Berkeley : University of
> > California Press.
> >
> > Zaretsky, Eli. 1997. "Hannah Arendt and the
> Meaning of
> > the Public/Private distinction" In Calhoun and Mc
> > Growan  1997. 207-231.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
>
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