[Reader-list] Inder, your answer

[Raheema Begum]

Arnab,

I don't know if you will excuse my saying so in public, but I think that
your work is brutally brutally(brutally, brutally) insensitive and inert.

It takes a lot of indifference to make a comment like this. But I hope you
will think about it.

And the reasons why I refrain from being polite are

It does'nt take a fascist to change the world. It takes a realist. In
adopting a stern ideological position you want to be heard. I have things to
say. And I cannot wait until fortune(whatever that is) drops my way. It
means that from where you are, you want, desperately to articulate what you
feel.

It only takes an extremely masculine, privileged position to be as
insensitive and culturally sterile as your research is.

While for some the personal, public, and private may be constructs that the
likes of Habermas figured out, for some it's a loss. Of an entire history.

While for some all that is going on needs to be looked at through the eyes
of (who, why?) theorists, for some people like me (and this is personal),
it's a complete lacoona of understanding about how to participate. So when
the debates are played out on some abstract notion of Freedom of Expression
(what?), for some other people it's the freedom to breathe that is at stake.
The freedom to be.To imagine.

And terrorism.

Tell you what I think terrorism is, terrorism is not being allowed to behave
how you want to.

Not being allowed to articulate your view point. I think terrorism is when
you're expected to conform to everyone's ideas.

Terrorism is stifling difference. Terrorism is when you want to scream but
are stifled because you are'nt allowed to stand out in everyone's confused
pot pourri of consumption. That's what terrorism is.

Terrorism is expecting everyone to listen when you talk, when you dole out
judgments.

Being excluded.

Terrorism is expecting someone to subscribe to what your idea of radical or
modern or noteworthy.

I refuse to participate.

I refuse to comment.

I don't want to have anything to do with your public sphere.

Go on, ask me why I'm so despondent.


On 7/5/07, ARNAB CHATTERJEE <apnawritings at yahoo.co.in> wrote:
>
> Dear Inder,
>                Thank you for your passionate response
> and I shall also remain too grateful all the more for
> that Geras blog u've given; I never knew it.
>               And I feel obliged that my piece has
> provoked such "mixed feelings" in you and u've
> catalogued a number of heterogenous,conceptual objects
> of which I know least: for instance Mira or Kabir. I
> have attended a few seminars on Sufi here at Kolkata
> but  I was never fit for that good mystic stuff.
>             So even as  I acknowledge  my absolute
> incompetence in that force field, let me, as an
> exchange of electronic gift paste two URL here for you
> as love's prosody and campaign
> :http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A-2xttUqIuA
> (or/and)  http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n1JDKyW_eag
>             Hope you get back to me with  a new
> definition of love this time inspired not by Mira but
> Mattu--Daljit Mattu, enjoy.
> thanks again
> yours in discourse & defeat
> arnab
>
> --- inder salim <indersalim at gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > Thanks dear Chatterjee,
> > i am delighted to read this heavy text piece on
> > personal-private.
> > i must write that the quote of Marx by Geras
> > moistened my eyes.
> > and that led me to discover his blog
> > http://normblog.typepad.com/normblog/
> >
> > Assume man to be man and his relationship to
> > > the world to be a human one: then you         can
> > > exchange love only for love, trust for trust,
> > etc...
> > > if you want to exercise influence over other
> > people,
> > > you must be a person with a stimulating and
> > > encouraging effect on other people. ...If you love
> > > without evoking love in return that is, if your
> > loving
> > > does not produce reciprocal love; if    through a
> > living
> > > expression of yourself as a living person you do
> >      not
> > > make yourself a beloved one then your love is
> > impotent
> > > -- a misfortune" ( cited in Geras 1990, 14).
> >
> > Here, i take a little liberty to mix things...
> > imagine how Harat
> > Sarmad Shaheed sahib must have looked. He must have
> > looked like Marx.
> >
> > The nudity of the saint was a radical step from
> > private to personal,
> > and for sheer political reasons he was murdered by
> > the King Aurangzeb.
> > As ur text  lucidly explains that how ' the state'
> > exists on this
> > difference between private and personal, and hence
> > the violence and
> > ungliness...
> >
> > This way 'the poet' has no choice but to   confront
> > 'the state', and
> > stand for the real freedom of human being. The only
> > universal form
> > available to us is indeed  'love'. We have Kabir,
> > Nanak, Meera,Sarmad,
> > Lad Ded, Rumi, and all that who repeatedly talked
> > about 'love'  No
> > wonder that lot of Left leaning poets have written
> > love poems....
> > Faiz, Pablo, Azad and other whole lot generation of
> > poets must be into
> > that deep profound thing which we lightly call
> > 'love' The word love is
> > perhaps deeper than word love, may be it is
> > existentially placed
> > within us.  Dont we know that how J.P. Sartre was
> > charmed by women, in
> > spite of his committment to Simone and Marx. To
> > label this all as
> > romanticism, is of course wrong, since we know many
> > Indian-Left
> > (netas) who lived a hidden private life and a masked
> > personal life.
> >
> > There are no immediate answers.... but debates like
> > these have a
> > potential to push things...
> >
> > thanks once again
> > love
> > inder salim
> >
> >
> > On 6/30/07, ARNAB CHATTERJEE
> > <apnawritings at yahoo.co.in> wrote:
> > >  Dear Readers,
> > >                      Sorry for being a bit late
> > but
> > > for reasons even you would surely recognize and
> > > consider my apology with sentimental biology
> > that's
> > > needed.
> > >                 You'll remember  where we parted:
> > the
> > > promise was to begin with the history of the
> > personal.
> > >  I had made a short detour charting this history
> > in
> > > telegraphic terms-from the monarch to the dictator
> > --
> > > taking Gandhi's desire as drive. And now after so
> > much
> > > of empirical historical lesson I think the choices
> > are
> > > pretty clear : people wanting to interpret the
> > world
> > > would go for so called democracy, liberalism and
> > so
> > > forth; people  wanting to change the world   would
> > go
> > > for either Fascism or revolutionary
> > Communism—there is
> > > no other way, perhaps. And my version of pure
> > politics
> > > will inform as a  rider over this  that any person
> > or
> > > programme can cheat or made to deceive: morality
> > does
> > > not come with a warranty. And this failure being
> > > irreducible, it was illuminated by Hegel when he
> > said
> > > that there are two ways to achieve a  moral world
> > :
> > > utopia or terror. Even such a grand 'deontologist'
> > > philosopher as Kant uses a phrase like "moral
> > > terrorism" and proposes a "terroristic" conception
> > of
> > > "history"; but Hegel's copula is more
> > illuminating.
> > > Terror rejects an immediate place; utopia
> > regulates a
> > > non-place—they can never, never be estranged. And
> > with
> > > Fascism and communism it is more futile to
> > undertake
> > > such an exercise. But you might have noticed  a
> > sharp
> > > difference : while in Fascism you have
> > dictatorship in
> > > the person-al form, in Marx you have dictatorship
> > of a
> > > whole class –even if universal or not. Now, if it
> > is a
> > > collective whole embodied in the one person of the
> > > monarch -- which is the dictatorial example of the
> > > first, it is basically the group personality of
> > the
> > > class that could act as the dictatorial unity,
> > > reflective of a single will, in the second case.
> > Now,
> > > my intention this time is to refer the reader  to
> > an
> > > extension of my argument stated previously.  First
> > is
> > > the person taken as a singular-collective; the
> > second
> > > is a collective-singular. First is the spontaneous
> > > natural personality; the second is an artificial
> > > personality masquerading as a legal fiction whose
> > > origins have been traced back to the Roman Law.
> > >    I'll come to the second when I deal with the
> > > Hiralal Haldar -- Mactaggart debate. In this post
> > I'll
> > > address only the first part—that too a bit
> > > cryptically.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > (1)
> > >
> > > RECEIVED HISTORY
> > >
> > > The public/private binary -whose historical roots
> > have
> > > been traced to classical Greece acquired its
> > modern
> > > meaning through the mediations of medieval Roman
> > Law
> > > and 18th century Europe. Aristotle made a
> > distinction
> > > between household (oikos) and the space of the
> > city
> > > state (polis) where through deliberation (lexis)
> > and
> > > common action (praxis) a shared, common and in a
> > loose
> > > sense "public" life beyond bare essentials or
> > > necessities was sustained. The private realm of
> > > necessities (subsistence, reproduction) was the
> > > household. Therefore property, "and the art of
> > > acquiring property" was considered a part of
> > "managing
> > > the household" (Aristotle, 1988: 5) and
> > participation
> > > in the polis was restricted by one's status or
> > rank as
> > > a master of oikos.
> > > In the medieval age in Roman Law one encounters
> > terms
> > > like publicus and privatus but without the
> > standard
> > > usage (Habermas, 1996:5) because everything
> > > public/private ultimately resided in the  person
> > of
> > > the monarch (more on this latter.) However, in
> > Roman
> > > Law-the first systematic legal document-- the
> > privacy
> > > of the home (domus) was sanctioned ( Black, 1988:
> > 593)
> > > and Roman Law itself was "private law" in that it
> > > would have application only for individuals or
> > > relations of coordination. Public law would
> > administer
> > > affairs of the state or relations of domination.
> > But
> > > similar to the Greek city state, it was the status
> > of
> > > the individuals that determined their
> > participation in
> > > the medieval public sphere. We enter modernity
> > when
> > > men entered the realm of contract from that of
> > > status, from duties  to that of rights ( 18th
> > century
> > > enlightenment and the French revolution remain the
> > > canonical examples).  Formal equality of persons
> > was a
> > > prerequisite of such a contract. Particularly, at
> > the
> > > break of the medieval age, in the wake of civil or
> > > commercial law in 18th century Europe, a
> > democratic
> > > climate was created where apparent equality of all
> > > before the law and the market was preempted. And
> > the
> > > public sphere was thus -in a sense-- opened to
> > all.
> > > This meant the formation of public opinion through
> > the
> > > media ( enabled at that time by the advent of
> > print
> > > capitalism) and institutionalization of state
> > > sovereignty which would rest, henceforth, with the
> > > people or the public. A new category of legitimacy
> > was
> > > created. This also engendered the rise of civil
> > > society  where the subjects would fulfill two
> > roles at
> > > the same time: as a property owner or bourgeois he
> > > would  pursue his  private interests and as a
> > citizen
> > > in the public sphere he would bear equal rights
> > > granted by the state. This also-- as a part of the
> > > public sphere, ensured the separation of society
> > > (family) from the state and that the state would
> > not
> > > intervene in societal matters and expectedly,
> > privacy
> > > would be located in the societal realm hence
> > forth.
> > > (Separated from the state, classically, the church
> > was
> > > the first private to have imparted  the secular
> > colour
> > > so characteristic of modernity.) The state would
> > > ensure privacy, but would not intervene; its
> > closest
> > > analogy was the market: the state would ensure a
> > free
> > > market by  itself not intervening in it and the
> > free
> > > market was not only of commodities but a great
> > market
> > > place of ideas and exchange of opinion  in which,
> > > irrespective of birthmarks and the stink of status
> > > anybody could participate. The modern public
> > sphere
> > > had arrived. It was just a step further when Marx
> > > would denounce universal suffrage and invoke  the
> > > proletariat as the class with "universal
> > suffering"
> > > (Marx, 1983:320) and would mock this artificial
> > > equality of publics before the law and the market
> > > (alleging that they  masked real inequalities) and
> > > thought of smashing the private /public divide by
> > > abolishing private property- which he thought was
> > at
> > > the core of this suffering. The rest is history
> > and
> > > its repetition. No wonder that the public/private
> > > divide has been considered as the core of  our
> > modern
> > > existence.
> > >
> > >
> > > ONE OR TWO WORDS ON HOW THE PERSONAL LOST ITSELF
> > IN
> > > THE PRIVATE
> > >
> > >  An interesting part of recent academic
> > discussions is
> > > while there is a growing interest in the public
> > and
> > > the private, critical discourse on the personal
> > nearly
> > > draws a blank. (The state of the personal is
> > somewhat
> > > dubious and absent in all classic European
> > discussions
> > > --even in Jurgen Habermas and Hannah Arendt .)
> > >       Although Habermas does cursorily refer to
> > the
> > > process through which the "modern state apparatus
> > > became independent from the monarch's personal
> > > sphere", he rarely engages with it (Habermas 1996,
> > > 29). For instance here goes this recognition in
> > the
> > > form of a footnote to one of his famous articles:
> > "The
> > > important thing to understand is that the medieval
> > > public sphere, if it even deserves this
> > recognition,
> > > is tied to the personal. The feudal lord and
> > estates
> > > create the public sphere by means of their very
> > > presence." (Habermas 1974, 51)  But the personal
> > > sphere of the monarch-and what it means in the
> > western
> > > tradition is somewhat available in G.H Mead from
> > the
> > > standpoint of a social behaviorist. Mead
> > meticulously
> > > charts the components of this personal sphere
> > where
> > > the people within the same state " can identify
> > > themselves with each other only through being
> > subjects
> > > of a common monarch…." (Mead 1972, p.311) Mead
> > traces
> > > the phenomenon to the ancient empires of
> > Mesopotamia
> > > and observes, "It is possible through personal
> > > relationships between a sovereign and subject to
> > > constitute a community which could not otherwise
> > be so
> > > constituted…." In the Roman Empire through the
> > > mediation of Roman law, Mead notes, while the
> > > emperor-subject relationship was "defined in legal
> > > terms", through sacrificial offerings made to the
> > > emperor-the subject was "putting himself into
> > personal
> > > relationship with him, and because of that he
> > could
> > > feel his connection with all the members in the
> > > community". … "It was the setting up of a personal
> > > relationship which in a certain sense went beyond
> > the
> > > purely legal relations involved in the development
> > of
> > > Roman law." (312) In India considering the King's
> > > person as sacred, it was assumed that he had
> > influence
> > > over crops, cattle, rain and general prosperity.
> > So
> > > again, the subjects, in order to relate to cattle,
> > the
> > > mediation of the King was involved in a metonymic
> > > gesture-through whose presence, people could
> > relate
> > > and be present to themselves. (Hocart 1927, 9)
> > > Personal is that which predates both the public
> > and
> > > the private and what is historically interesting
> > is to
> > > discover when and why the collapsing of the
> > personal
> > > and the private began. For this last instance - we
> > can
> > > borrow from Max Weber the diffused origins of the
> > > Public Law-Private Law distinction, which as Weber
> > > shows was "once not made at all. Such was the case
> > > when all law, all jurisdictions, and particularly
> > all
> > > powers of exercising authority were personal
> > > privileges, such as especially, the "prerogatives"
> > of
> > > the head of the state." …[Who was]  "Not different
> > > from the head of the household." (Weber 1978,
> > 643).
> > > This world of the personal or as Weber calls it
> > > "patrimonial monarchy" forms the prehistory of the
> > > private /public distinction and again I repeat
> > that
> > > what is historically interesting is to discover
> > when
> > > and why the collapsing of the personal and the
> > private
> > > began to which today's feminists are but victims.
> > > Habermas therefore does away with a vast
> > repertoire.
> > > So far Arendt is concerned, commentators have
> > tried to
> > > make a case out of the feminist energy generated
> > by
> > > the latter's 'personal' -previously having been at
> > > pains to argue that the 'political' and the
> > 'personal'
> > > during Arendt's celebration of feminist moments
> > later
> > > had become the 'public' and the 'private'.
> > >  "With the emergence of women's liberation a
> > decade or
> > > so after The Human Condition appeared, the
> > relation
> > > between the " political" and the "personal" moved
> > to
> > > the forefront of politics, and this eventually
> > took
> > > the form of the public and the private" (Zaretsky
> > > 1997, 214) with their corresponding emphasis on
> > > 'personal life' becoming a "third challenge to the
> > > liberal dichotomy" (214) (ref. endnote 1)  :
> > really a
> > > queer mix up in history. The reason perhaps is
> > that we
> > > tend to have a mix up between the private and the
> > > personal and this is its contemporary
> > moment(Nothing
> > > could be more explicit an affirmation than from a
> > > feminist superstar: Catherine Mackinnon, "The
> > private
> > > is the public for those for whom the personal is
> > the
> > > political." (Mackinnon 1992, 359). This easy and
> > > historic conflation of personal as private is
> > perhaps
> > > not the end of the story.
> > >
> > >
> > > In the western history itself there is also a
> > > suppressed narrative (suppressed because it does
> > not
> > > suit the liberal project) where the two are not
> > the
> > > same; in fact they two cannot be the same. But
> > first
> > > I'll take the opportunity to  narrate how the
> > > personal/private coalescence occurs and then I
> > shall
> > > try to excavate if the personal could be
> > recuperated.
> > >
> > >                   Then is it possible to
> > appreciate
> > > the fact that the appearance of the personal
> > through
> > > the sieve of the private is basically an
> > historical
> > > maneuver ?
> > >                This major point then needs
> > mention:
> > > the qualitative leap when personal came to be
> > > identified with the private. Now, private property
> > is
> > > as old as Greek antiquity: Aristotle had argued in
> > > favour of  and Plato had wanted to abolish private
> > > property. That is not the point; the first signs
> > were
> > > available in the natural law (or natural rights)
> > > tradition and despite a lot of caveats, one of its
> > > representative voice still remains John Locke. In
> > this
> > > tradition property, for the first time, is placed
> > in
> > > the person :
> > > "Though the earth, and all inferior creatures be
> > > common to all men, yet every man has a "property"
> > in
> > > his own "person". This no body has any right to
> > but
> > > himself. The "labour" of his body, and the "work"
> > of
> > > his hands, we may say are properly his.
> > Whatsoever…he
> > > hath mixed his "labour" with, and joined it to
> > > something that is his own, and thereby makes it
> > his
> > > "property"…that excludes the common right of other
> > > men" (Locke, (1690) 1982 : [Sec. 27.]130).
> > > "His property" or private property when derives
> > from
> > > personal capacities of labour, the first motivated
> > mix
> > > up between the personal and the private occurs.
> > And
> > > then having had its eighteenth century initiation,
> > it
> > > became a cornerstone of liberal theory where
> > property
> > > becomes an attribute of personality. If you take
> > away
> > > property from me, I become a non-person because
> > > (private) property is in my person. Here there is
> > > natural ownership before there is a legal
> > ownership.
> > > Here is a classical example in Hegel, " Not until
> > he
> > > has property does the person exist as reason"
> > (Hegel,
> > > (1820) 1991: 73). Hegel goes at length to show how
> > > property is required to supersede  "the mere
> > > subjectivity of personality"(73). In fact this is
> > the
> > > personal in Hegel invested with some kind of
> > immediacy
> > > but lacks in content i.e. Hegel's  "abstract
> > > personality" in order to become concrete and
> > objective
> > > awaits a trick:
> > >  " Since my will, as personal and hence as the
> > will of
> > > an individual [des Einzelnen], becomes objective
> > in
> > > property, the latter takes on the character of
> > private
> > > property…" (77).
> > >
> > > This would be picked up by liberal capitalism and
> > now
> > > onwards property being in person and that which
> > makes
> > > objective, tangible  personality possible, private
> > > becomes the realm of liberty, reprieve and
> > freedom.
> > > Marx would fall heavily on all of this and in fact
> > > this discourse finds its final resolution in Marx
> > > only. His argument was just the reverse: in a
> > society
> > > without private property, the personal selves of
> > men
> > > freely blossom to enter the true realm of freedom.
> > > Therefore this hyphenation between the private and
> > the
> > > personal is more an ideological investment
> > necessary
> > > for liberal history than a structurally
> > indispensable
> > > relation.
> > >
> > >
> > > RECOVERING THE PERSONAL IN LOCKE, HEGEL, MARX AND
> > OUR
> > > TIMES
> > >
> > > Now, having presented the anatomical, bare
> > rudiments
> > > of how the personal looses itself in the private,
> > here
> > > I'll extrapolate how it could be recovered and
> > allowed
> > > to have a safe passage. Given the force of
> > history, it
> > > would be wise to start with Locke.
> > >
> > > LOCKE
> > >
> > > For Lockes' allergy towards  communal or
> > collective
> > > ownership, (see Macpherson, C.B. 1972, 197-221.)
> > But
> > > even in  Locke it is possible to find an other
> > > discourse of the personal besides property and the
> > > private dominion. While discussing property as an
> > > extension of the person,  and particularly Adam's
> > > property as "private dominion" which is supposed
> > to
> > > have arisen from God's "grant" or "donation" and
> > that
> > > of  fatherhood from the act of begetting Locke
> > > meditates on  how this divine donation was made
> > > "personally" to Adam to which his heir could have
> > no
> > > right by it. (Locke1982, 60-61) Locke argues  that
> > > even if it belongs to the   parents "personally",
> > > after their death, their property does not go to
> > the
> > > common stock of mankind but is inherited by their
> > > children as heirs because human have a natural
> > > propensity to continue their creed (62). This
> > power of
> > > begetting in  another form—and that what roots
> > > continuity- founds inheritance. The point relevant
> > to
> > > our case, is,  this "personal" belongingness  is a
> > > middle-term that appears with some autonomy and
> > > mediates person and property—seen as an extension
> > of
> > > each other in Locke. And the mutual-extension
> > argument
> > >  because, I guess, in itself cannot explain
> > > inheritance,  Locke is taking recourse to a
> > different
> > > premise; the "personal" appears to give a language
> > to
> > > this premise.
> > >
> > > HEGEL
> > > As established earlier, the reading that entails
> > Hegel
> > > as a canonical case where the personal private mix
> > up
> > > receives the force of an argument, is not wrong
> > and as
> > > rendered by Marx, it carries an  immense sway with
> > it.
> > >  But it is as well possible to discover in Hegel a
> > > curious personal impatient not to be suppressed by
> > the
> > > interested world  of the private. Take for
> > instance
> > > the distinction between real property and personal
> > > property that could be traced to the Roman Law
> > from
> > > which Kant  borrowed his interesting theory of
> > rights
> > > and  where we find personal  appearing with a
> > rider
> > > "personal rights of a real kind". Hegel made a
> > > critique of Kant's  formulation; drawing on that
> > > critique,  let me here try to illuminate the
> > > distinction which I think was unconsciously made
> > by
> > > Hegel himself.
> > > Deriving from the Justinian Roman legal division
> > of
> > > right into rights of persons, things, and actions,
> > > Kant  in 1797 had proposed, taking into account
> > the
> > > "form" of the  rights, a threefold division, "a
> > right
> > > to a thing; a right against a person; a right to a
> > > person akin to a right to a thing ." (Kant 1999,
> > 412).
> > > The first is a property right, the second is a
> > > contract right, and the third is a "personal right
> > of
> > > a real kind" (Hegel 1991, 71); in other words, it
> > is a
> > >  right about " what is mine or yours domestically,
> > and
> > > the relation of persons in the domestic
> > condition…"
> > > [including] "…possession of a person." (Kant 1999,
> > > 426) like the rights of spouses over one another,
> > the
> > > rights of  parents over their children etc. The
> > third
> > > is the most interesting because it resembles what
> > > today we call Personal Laws supposed to distribute
> > > "private" affairs within a household. And this is
> > what
> > > Hegel attacks; Hegel thinks that the division is a
> > > confusing one; secondly, while family
> > relationships
> > > form the content of "personal rights of a real
> > kind" ,
> > > in actuality family relationships are based on the
> > > "surrender of personality." (Hegel 1991, 72) Hegel
> > > further notes that
> > >
> > > "For Kant personal rights are those rights which
> > arise
> > > out of a contract whereby I give something or
> > perform
> > > a service…Admittedly, only a person is obliged  to
> > > implement  the provisions of a contract, just as
> > it is
> > >  only a person  who acquires the right to have
> > them
> > > implemented. But such a right cannot therefore be
> > > called a personal right; rights of every kind can
> > > belong only to a person…" (73)
> > >
> > > What is interesting in Hegel's engagement
> > -relevant to
> > > our project is the way he   extricates the
> > personal
> > > from being stamped with the badge of household
> > rights
> > > or  the power to accomplish a  civil contract (
> > See
> > > Endnote 2)  in brief personal right not
> > masquerading
> > > as a private right. In brief, what Hegel may have
> > > argued here could be  that  there are no "personal
> > > rights of a real kind." But let us underline this
> > > binary: Personal vs./ and  real, which is
> > significant
> > > and  requires of us to reiterate that a
> > distinction
> > > between real property and personal property was
> > > strongly a feature of English Law. Real property
> > was
> > > that which had  "some degree of geographical
> > > fixity".[Reeve, 1986, 80-81] In order to examine
> > this
> > > distinction in the form that it is found in a 1827
> > > tract I think the notions of the personal still
> > could
> > > be recovered in a very different sense. In
> > personal
> > > property "the general rule is, that possession
> > > constitutes the criterion of title;…hence the
> > vendor
> > > of personal chattels is never expected to show the
> > > origin of his right. … [but] real property like
> > land
> > > is held not by possession but by title requiring
> > "the
> > > production of documents." (Mathews 1827, 27).
> > Please
> > > note the somewhat loose coverage that personal
> > > property requires compared to real property. Now
> > if it
> > > is pointed out that personal property does have
> > > property as a signified even if in a loose sense,
> > it
> > > may be rebutted by saying that  in the same text
> > > Mathews  goes on to mention  "peculiarities
> > personal"
> > > or as to how "personal disability" may be enough
> > to
> > > "repel the presumption of a grant". (14) Does
> > this
> > > personal  call for documents or is a means to
> > > establishing a title? No, in fact these are
> > blatant
> > > uses appropriate to our cause   existing in a
> > legal
> > > tract meant to discuss  property personal or real.
> > >
> > > MARX
> > >
> > > The common knowledge now that the key to
> > understanding
> > > modernity is the public/private divide and a
> > > corresponding failure to find a way beyond the
> > binary
> > > would find—if considered carefully—an approval
> > with
> > > dignity in Marx because Marx curiously is a
> > symptom of
> > >  both: he said for the first--"the state is
> > founded
> > > upon the contradiction between public and private
> > > life" (Marx, 1961, p.222) and for the second : "if
> > the
> > > modern State wished to end the impotence of its
> > > administration it would be obliged  to abolish the
> > > present conditions of private life. And if the
> > State
> > > wished to abolish these conditions of private life
> > it
> > > would have also to put an end to its own
> > existence,
> > > for it exists only  in relation to them." (p.223)
> > Now,
> > > throwing in the fact that private property is just
> > a
> > > singular and an isolated moment in the discourse
> > of
> > > private life, Marx's agenda --I guess- looks
> > readily
> > > defamiliarised here.
> > > Marx would fall heavily on all of this and in fact
> > > this discourse finds its final resolution in Marx
> > > only. It is not a fact that in a system without
> > > private property and a sanction against
> > 'unlimited
> > > appropriation' all are non persons and there would
> > be
> > > nothing personal. Therefore this hyphenation
> > between
> > > the private and the personal is more an
> > ideological
> > > investment necessary for liberal history than a
> > > structurally indispensable relation. Let us
> > document a
> > > few discursive  fragments where this collapsing
> > has
> > > been done away with. Now, notwithstanding the will
> > to
> > > go beyond private/public divide, it may rightly be
> > > asked, could Marx be used to endorse the personal
> > that
> > > I'm proposing? Yes! And  choosing only one
> > instance --
> > > love , we may document this flower unfolding in
> > Marx.
> > >
> > >         "Assume man to be man and his relationship
> > to
> > > the world to be a human one: then you         can
> > > exchange love only for love, trust for trust,
> > etc...
> > > if you want to exercise influence over other
> > people,
> > > you must be a person with a stimulating and
> > > encouraging effect on other people. ...If you love
> > > without evoking love in return that is, if your
> > loving
> > > does not produce reciprocal love; if    through a
> > living
> > > expression of yourself as a living person you do
> >      not
> > > make yourself a beloved one then your love is
> > impotent
> > > -- a misfortune" ( cited in Geras 1990, 14).
> > >
> > > Isn't this the personal in Marx -- which --I'm
> > sure
> > > --he would willingly exclude from the domain of
> > > private life   he wanted to abolish for history? I
> > > think the reader agrees.
> > >
> > > A CONTEMPORARY EXAMPLE
> > >
> > >       Marx apart, curiously, the Human Rights
> > > discourse does have, it may be pointed out, a
> > phrase
> > > like 'personal property'. What does it qualify? In
> > > fact it endorses the distinction that we are
> > making
> > > between the personal and the private. A theorist
> > of
> > > such rights comments, " By personal property" I
> > mean
> > > individual ownership and control of possessions
> > such
> > > as clothing, furniture, food, writing materials,
> > > books, and artistic and religious objects.
> > > Considerations of personal freedom provide strong
> > > reasons for instituting and protecting personal
> > > property. These reasons are related not to
> > production
> > > but to the requirements of developing and
> > expressing
> > > one's own personality. Ownership of personal
> > property
> > > is a matter of personal liberty, not a
> > > production-related right ( see endnote 3)
> > ."(Nickel
> > > 1987, 152)
> > >   Therefore it is possible to attempt a historical
> > > reconstruction  of the personal where the personal
> > > could be said to have filtered through the
> > monarchical
> > > metonymy right down to human rights discourses via
> > > Roman Law, Kant, Hegel and English Common law.
> > While
> > > the prehistorical personal comes to be
> > contaminated by
> > > the private, the human rights discourse is
> > significant
> > > in its attempt to do away with this conflation.
> > While
> > > it tries to do away with the infiltration,
> > > genealogically it perhaps proves the point that
> > there
> > > was this contamination or over determination.
> > >
> > >           CONCLUSION
> > > I conclude with a sense of disgust. I could share
> > 1/6
> > > th of the material I've amassed. This is not
> > > surprising since there are whole books on each of
> > the
> > > strands to which I've referred. Consider Roman Law
> > :
> > > Read Duff's Personality in Roman Private Law or
> > > Richard Tuck's path breaking works on Natural
> > Rights
> > > and Natural Law debates on themes surrounding that
> > > what I'm trying to pursue. A further limitation is
> > > I've bound myself to narrating bits of western
> > history
> > > of the personal and left out our own cultural
> > > cognitive histories of the personal. Let that be
> > some
> > > time else. Nevertheless,with this our narrative of
> > > historical recovery or historical demystification
> > of
> > > the personal reaches a benchmark and awaits if the
> > > personal-private distinction can be theoretically
> > > grounded as well.  We'll pursue that in the next
> > > post—early next month. Thank you.
> > >
> > > ENDNOTES
> > > 1.      For consideration of  the failure of this
> > appraisal
> > > in its true light and that the personal-private
> > > distinction could be read unto Arendt, judge the
> > > following comments of Craig Calhoun, "Arendt would
> > > never endorse social engineering and, against such
> > > threats, certainly would protect privacy. Even
> > more,
> > > she would protect the personal and the distinctive
> > > from absorption into the impersonal. But she would
> > not
> > >  assimilate the notion of the personal to that of
> > the
> > > private as Zaretsky does." (Calhoun 1997, 237).
> > The
> > > point is if it could be correct for Arendt, it
> > could
> > > be correct for Habermas as well.
> > > 2.      Carole Pateman does not agree that Hegel
> > is
> > > successful in his attempt and according to her he
> > is
> > > rather limited to transcending just one part of
> > the
> > > Kantian argument which saw personal right, among
> > > others, in the manifest act of pointing out "this
> > is
> > > my wife" where a "thing" is, accidentally, a
> > person. (
> > > Pateman1996, 212-213). But I disagree with Pateman
> > and
> > > reiterate that there is a  moment of personal in
> > Hegel
> > > which precedes the contamination of property.
> > > 3.      The ownership of means of production is
> > called in
> > > this discourse 'private productive property'
> > (Nickel
> > > 1987, 152).
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > BIBLIOGRAPHICAL REFERENCES
> > >
> > > Aristotle, 1988: The Politics, Transl. Benjamin
> > > Jowett, Cambridge: Cambridge         University
> > Press.
> > >
> > > Black, A., 1988    : The Individual and Society.
> > In
> > > J.H Burns (Ed.), The Cambridge  History of
> > Medieval
> > > Political Thought, Cambridge: Cambridge University
> > > Pres, 588-606.
> > >
> > > Calhoun, Craig. 1997.  'Plurality, promises, and
> > > Public Spaces' In Calhoun and Mc Growan. eds.
> > 1997.
> > > 232-259.
> > >
> > > Calhoun, Craig, and John Mc Growan. eds. 1997.
> > Hannah
> > > Arendt and the Meaning of Politics, Minneapolis,
> > > London: University of Minnesota Press.
> > >
> > > Geras, Norman, 1990 : 'Seven types of Obloquy:
> > > Travesties of Marxism' in Socialist register, Eds.
> > > Ralph Miliband, Leo Panitch & John Saville,
> > pp.1-34,
> > > The Merlin Press : London.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > Habermas, J.     1974.   : The Public Sphere: An
> > > Encyclopedia article. In  New German    Critique,
> > 3(
> > > 51.), 49-55.
> > >
> > >    ------------------1996       : The Structural
> > > Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry
> > into a
> > >
> > > category  of Bourgeois Society, T. Berger
> > (Trans.),
> > > Great Britain: Blackwell
> > > Publishers & Polity Press.
> > >
> > > Hegel, G.W.F. ,1991: Elements of the Philosophy of
> > > Right,. Trans. H.B. Nisbet. U.K:   Cambridge
> > > University Press.
> > >
> > > Hobbes, T.,1997   : Leviathan,  New York : W.W.
> > Norton
> > > & Company.
> > >
> > > Hocart, A.M. ,1927 : Kingship,  London: Oxford
> > > University Press.
> > >
> > > Kant, Immanuel. 1999. Practical Philosophy. UK:
> > > Cambridge University Press.
> > >
> > > Locke, John. (1924)1982. Two Treatises Of
> > Government.
> > > J.M Dent & Son's Ltd. (Everyman's Library):
> > London.
> > >
> > > Mackinnon, Catharine A. 1992. " Privacy v.
> > Equality:
> > > Beyond Roe V. wade" In Ethics: A Feminist
> > Reader.eds.
> > > Elizabeth Frazer, Jennifer Hornsby and Sabina
> > > Lovibond. 351—363. Oxford: Blackwell.
> > >
> > > Macpherson, C.B. 1972. "The Theory of Property
> > Right",
> > > in his The Political Theory of Possessive
> > > Individualism, Hobbes to Locke. 197—221.London:
> > Oxford
> > > University Press.
> > >
> > > Marx, Karl, 1961. Selected Writings in Sociology
> > and
> > > Social Philosophy, Eds. T.B. Bottomore and
> > M.Rubel,
> > > Penguin Books: Harmondsworth.
> > >
> > > ------------------------1983  : A Contribution to
> > the
> > > Critique of Hegel's 'Philosophy of Right' (1843)
> > In
> > > L.S.Stepelevich (Ed.) The Young Hegelians: An
> > > Anthology.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
> > > 310-322.
> > >
> > > Mathews, John H. 1827. Treatise On The Doctrine of
> > > Presumption and Presumptive Evidence As Affecting
> > The
> > > Title To Real and Personal Property. London:
> > Joseph
> > > Butterworth and Son, Law Booksellers.
> > >
> > > Mead, George H. (1934) 1972. Mind, Self, and
> > Society,
> > > >From the standpoint of a social behaviorist. ed.
> > > Charles W. Morris. Chicago: The University of
> > Chicago
> > > Press.
> > >
> > > Monahan, Arthur. 1994. From Personal Duties
> > towards
> > > Personal Rights: Late Medieval and Early Modern
> > > Political thought, 1300-1600. Montreal: McGill
> > Queens
> > > University Press.
> > >
> > > Nickel, James W. 1987.  Making Sense of Human
> > Rights
> > > :Philosophical Reflections on the Universal
> > > declaration of Human Rights. Berkeley: University
> > Of
> > > California Press.
> > >
> > > Pateman, Carole.1996. 'Hegel, Marriage, and the
> > > Standpoint of Contract' in Feminist
> > Interpretations of
> > > G.W. F. Hegel. Ed. Patricia Jagentowicz Mills.
> > > 209-223. Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State
> > > University Press.
> > >
> > > Reeve, Andrew. 1986. Property, London : Macmillan.
> > >
> > >
> > > Weber, M. , 1978        : Economy And Society :An
> > Outline of
> > > Interpretive Sociology. Vol.II. Guenther Roth and
> > > Claus Wittich, (Eds.), Berkeley : University of
> > > California Press.
> > >
> > > Zaretsky, Eli. 1997. "Hannah Arendt and the
> > Meaning of
> > > the Public/Private distinction" In Calhoun and Mc
> > > Growan  1997. 207-231.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> >
> __________________________________________________________
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