[Reader-list] Is Personal the terrorized unity of private & Public?IF--Post 3

Wed May 23 19:20:10 IST 2007

Dear Readers,
              After giving you a breather, here is the
third post. Hope you'll like it.
Love,
arnab

BIFURCATION OF THE SIMPLE : IS PERSON/AL THE
TERRORIZED  UNITY OF PRIVATE AND  PUBLIC?

I think the political life must be an echo of private
life and that there cannot be any divorce between the
two. (1) Mahatma Gandhi .

This is the statement that has led hordes of critics
astray. But I'll allow this to appear in the middle; a
story first to begin at the beginning.

                                In the years of
1920-21 Motilal  Nehru is reported to have played a
leading role in  anti liquor picketing (2).   Three
years after this it was 1924.  Read the tract of the
dilemma  via the voice of Gandhi  who having received
a dubious paper cutting from a journalist, writes to
Motilal Nehru,   The writer has sent me the enclosed
cutting ( from  The Leader ). I had not read it
before. He says that at another dinner you are
reported to have said: Water has been called pure. But
wine is made after being thrice distilled. It is,
therefore, purer than water.
if the report is to be
relied upon, I cannot but be grieved that you, who
lead the antiliquor campaign, should publicly drink it
and, what is worse, chaff at teetotalism. 
[ PS.] I
know that if a man drinks privately, he may drink
publicly too. A public man, however, may not drink
publicly, if he is likely to offend. I distinguish
between private drinking and secret drinking (3).  
Motilal Nehru in a lengthy reply avoided  answering
the main question: whether it is apt to lead an
anti-liquor campaign as well as drink at the same
time; instead wrote,  the charge divides itself into
two counts: (1) that I have drunk wine publicly, and
(2) that I said in the course of an after dinner
speech that  Water has been called pure but wine is
made after being thrice distilled. It is therefore,
purer than water. My answer to the first count is an
unequivocal yes. As to the second, I am sure I did
not institute any comparison between the respective
merits of wine and water. The statement, as reported,
is too silly
(4)  In fact, during the forty years
preceding 1921, I had seldom missed my evening drink
for 11 months in the year. I abstained for one month
in every year simply to avoid getting enslaved to the
habit
 I must also respectfully differ from the
distinction you draw between  Private drinking and
secret drinking. In my humble opinion, it is a
distinction without a difference. ..  pray do not
misunderstand me. I do not mean that I am going to
take to regular boozing at this time of my life
because of the stupid attacks made on me. I may or may
not drink at all. This is my own concern. But if I do,
nothing in the world will make me seek privacy for
doing so. I would have the world judge as I am and not
as  others would wish me to appear
The tongue of
slander will not deter me from what is right and
proper.  [ all italics mine] 
 It is for you to
judge which is the graver offencethe levity in which
I indulged in  the course of a private talk with a
friend or the publication of the talk by that friend
(5).    
Two synoptic inferences should be made here:  Gandhi
is proposing an integration between the public agenda
that a public man puts forward and whether s/he
believes and practices the same   in his/her private
lifeas far as that is practicable; two, at the same
time  he is also proposing a model of the public
man: a private person may drink publicly, he does not
offend any one; a public person cannot do so, he
offends because he has preached to the contrary---
(And let us remind ourselves here that to the picketer
Motilal boozing was  an evilnot a temporary one but
an evil incarnate, evil in itself (6) .) This has
been referred to in ethical debates as the problem of
integration (7) , which I assume, should be pegged at
the level of the person-al and Gandhi exactly does
that by making a distinction between persons. This is
very different from making the private and public one
as eschewed in dominant Gandhian discourse. 

An elaborate comment on the above inferences: It is
not true that in our anti-modernist discourse the
public/private distinction is not deployed; the
significant point here is, even being devoid of a
cultural signification, Gandhi uses it to enforce an
integration-- responding to which ultimately Motilal
turns the table on Gandhi. But irrespective of the
rhetorical game between Gandhi and Motilal, it would
be instructive to remember that this unity or fracture
then will be different for different persons.
Similarly, as the Gandhian discourse goes, a public
person needs to prove himself differently for
particular kinds of acts and messages than the
ordinary average person on the road who is inscribed
within the rigours of a  non-public or janta. ( and
because I elsewhere detail  the history of our
non-public/non-private, janta, sadhahron, byaktikhetra
 etc in conversation with a number of useful standing
notions drawn from the Indian discussion of the public
sphere --like  imperfect public, public as an
unresolved concept public imaginary as public
ought to be, public as the domain of future
conversation  etc. while distinguishing them from
each other, here  I shall limit myself to making
liminal but understandable references to them only).
Briefly, my idea of non-public ( not in the Rawlsian
sense but as sadaharon or aam janta) or non-private is
derived largely from the idea of no-bodies. Persons in
India who are generally held to be  publicly 
consequential, and a majority of the others - who are
condemned to move as private individuals only without
security cover, publicity or mass importance are not
public persons. The beggars who copulate on the
footpathare not, in terms of essence,  even private
individuals. The somebodies are  those whose
individuality - by virtue of property, office   or
manipulative coping are never lost in the average
vagueness  or the forced inferiority of the aam
janta. But a no-body is s/he who as a member of the 
anonymous ordinary collective (janta) and even as an
individual is the one who in fact lives the life of
the individual, [and] who in the end is no one. (8)
  Therefore, having understood that Gandhi is far from
any such  cultural deployment of the private and
public, it may also be asserted that the problem of
integration at the level of the individual (9)   is
also not original. A surprise awaits us in the next
section.

(II)

But at first even at the cost of exposing myself to
boring repetition, I shall summarize what weve
discussed so far because this summary is crucial not
to have to loose the thread. 
           Gandhi then ends with his will to integrate
the public and the private  for public persons. For
private persons he would not make this compulsory,
since it seems-- they could not be held to have a
message at the public level, thereby, any question of
violating them does not arise.
        Therefore what we have here is the axiom that
public/private can be brought together at the level of
the person-al third by this maneuver of Gandhi;
maneuver because the binary isotherwise-- locked in
its own insurmountable and instrumental opposition.
But this overcoming, as it is evident, Gandhi would
hold active only for public persons and not for
private persons. But this will not work.
	We enter into discussing this by asking a preliminary
question, what kind of consequential understanding it
entails for the concepts public and private? We enter
this domain of discussion surely (but) by
acknowledging first that Gandhi is well within the
liberal distinction; the only transcendence that he
can achieve is when he wants to forge a unity and
discover a third. Secondly, unity of course but
allegedly or evidently  for public persons only; but
who are public persons anyway? From which inventory
and  by what taxonomy can they  be defined?  

By a Public person we mean either the State, or the
sovereign part of it, or a body or individual holding
delegated authority under it. By a Private person we
mean an individual or collection of individuals
however large, who, or each one of whom is of course a
unit of the State, but in no sense represents it, even
for a special purpose(10).  I am suspending for the
time being the way Holland uses this distinction to
explicate a radical division of rights on the basis of
this distinction between the public or private
character of the persons with whom the right is
connected (11). But  with our non-public, janta or
sadharon jonogon  as argued above  this integrity can
rarely be proposed. Why? Now we can answer: They are
well within society and not state; further drinking is
a social life practice related to the ideal of good
life that I have not to be regulated by a liberal
state.  Unless Gandhi takes recourse to an algorithm 
( we shall name the genre later) where society and
state are undivided in one person, he cannot  pose the
question of such integrity. Private persons are
liberated from this constraint from the beginning. The
non-private persons ( beggars who copulate on the
footpath or hospitalised or in prison or those bearing
the burden of involuntary poverty, children, babies,
senile or those lacking functional normalcy) would be
automatically excluded. 
   Firstly therefore,  they ( the non-publics,
non-private persons) are within society and public
persons belong to the state. The formal equality of
persons is disturbed and distributed along
differences.  To integrate them requires a magic, what
is that? This is the question weve been deferring so
long but not any more.
 (III)
To answer this well have to start at the beginning.
Lets take hold of the apparent content of the dispute
: drinking. As a life practice it ought to be located
within the emancipatory motivation of the nationalist
signifier that Gandhi propelled. But this can rarely
be discussed if not related to various other syntagms
in context, i.e., drinking as a singular instance, if
critiqued or considered, will render us insensitive,
if not we give it a horizon of totality by linking it
to its associational neighbours.  
    Let us start then by asking a simple question :
How is Gandhi to be situated in relation to the
problem of drinking? In other words, how does he
discover and translate it as a problem? It should be
obvious to anybody having preliminary acquaintance
with Gandhi and Gandhiana, there is a broader
narrative always with him  to absorb every fragment of
experimentation or protest he proposes.   Drinking
therefore predictably as evil (All citations from
M.K Gandhi, Prohibition at any cost, unless otherwise
stated).
is  national evil(12)  to Gandhiand that he can
allow secret drinking for a public person or private
drinking for a private person, is a testimony to the
fact that as he confessed once, he didnt want to make
a fetish of consistency. Thus being inconsistent
allowed differences and encouraged a positive, nearly
unpredictable  plurality. However, this difference is
abolished the moment we hear his call for absolute
prohibition on the sale of drinking. Why drinking
after all and why subsequently --a call for
prohibition? 
 Firstly,  prohibition is to mean a great moral
awakening in India and the campaign for prohibition
led by women  would be an immense civic education of
the masses ( Gandhi uses a peculiar ascriptor here :
adult educationwell soon come to that). But this
evil as it is evident, Gandhi knows, is shared both by
the ruler and the ruled,  the colonizer and the
colonized, by the rich and the poor without
distinction. So here it is necessary to wrench oneself
away not  supposedly from an evil infused by a
colonizer, but from the evil or the habit itself. But
what is so evil or morally degenerative about
drinking?
  Here we come to the most interesting part and that
which will anticipate more surprises when it finally
takes the interpretive turn.
      Gandhi clearly and repetitively dubs drinking as
a  robber of reason (p.5) so much so that he asserts
alleging that the alcoholic tends to forget  the
distinction between wife and mother, lawful and
unlawful (5). Gandhi shivers imagining this dark
night of incest and this time, he wants to protect
reason--  eluding his anti-enlightenment admirers, but
at the same time it must be acknowledged, to the
latters relief,  this is communicative reason and not
substantive reason of the enlightenmentthat Gandhi
wants to protect. And when it comes to incest he is
into a more serious, severe sexual economy.
 The drunkard forgets the distinction between wife,
mother and sister and indulges in crimes of which in
his sober moments he will be ashamed (3); but this
evil levels all :  I have seen respectable Englishmen
rolling in the gutter under the effect of alcohol
(6).
To invoke this moral reasoning where sexual reasoning
and prohibitions are not done away with, what needs to
be done?
                Primarily  adult education (in above
matters  stamped with  the symbol A, perhaps!!)
Women
.will visit those who are addicted to drink and
try to win them from the habit. Employers of labour
will be expected by law to provide cheap, healthy
refreshment, reading and entertainment rooms where the
working men can go and find shelter, knowledge, health
giving food and drink and innocent fun (18).
Fine, but will this ultimately-- in terms of
effectiveness and finality, work?
 ..it would be a wrong thing for you to say that
education has to precede legislation. Education will
never be able to cope with the evil (8). Gandhi is
aware of the obstacles in his path to eradicate the
above ( or any) evil of unreasonableness exemplified
in  involuntary incest and for which he justifiably
thinks his adult education insufficient. He is well
aware that either private right would be invoked or
public rights would be transposed onto the state to
hurt this agenda: this is the first hazard; thirdly, 
Gandhi does not make private/ public one because he
seems well aware of the menace. To Gandhi a woman
becomes a public woman by selling sex which is an
intimately private virtue not to be sold (p.11-12);
further, evident in the statement -- Those who speak
in the name of individual freedom do not know their
India (p.11) is the anxiety that  if the language of
liberal freedom as a private right is projected or
allowed to interpellate, then, thus spake Gandhi : 
There is as much right of a person to demand drinking
facilities from the state as there is to demand
facilities for the supply of public women for the
satisfaction of  his animal passion (p.11). And
therefore neither would Gandhi  invoke  the mixing of
public & private, keeping the example of public
woman and demand for liquor, nor would he surrender
to the liberal  language of rights which would act as
hindrances to the abolition of the evil. Here weve
had certain answers to questions weve been posing
throughout. 
                However, the impasse seems to be
overbearing; Gandhi requires a transcendental magic,
what is that?

(IV)

To protect the prohibition on incest then what does
Gandhi suggest? Prohibition of liquor ofcourse, but an
iota more than that and here is the long awaited
answer ; and a long quote here with apologies :

 If I was appointed dictator for one hour for all
India, the first thing I would do would be to close
without compensation all the liquor shops, destroy all
the toddy palms such as I know them in Gujarat, compel
factory owners to produce humane conditions for their
workmen and open refreshment and recreation rooms
where these workmen would get innocent drinks and
equally innocent amusements. I would close down the
factories if the owners pleaded want of funds. Being a
teetotaler I would I would retain my sobriety in spite
of the possession of one hours dictatorship and
therefore and therefore arrange for the examination of
my European friends and diseased persons who may be in
medical need of brandy and the like at State expense
by medical experts and where necessary, they would
receive certificates which would entitle them to
obtain the prescribed quantity  of fiery waters from
certified chemists. The rule will apply mutates
mutandis  to intoxicating drugs. 
              For the loss of revenue from drinks, I
would straightway cut down the military expenditure
and expect the Commander in Chief to accommodate
himself to the new conditions in the best way he can.
The workmen left idle by the closing of factories, I
would remove to model farms to be immediately opened
as far as possible in the neighbourhood of the
factories unless I was advised during that brief hour
that the State could profitably run the factories
under the required conditions and could therefore take
over from the owners (9).

Apologies again for the long quote but its
indispensability should be understood: this is not to
inscribe within the Gandhian discourse an elemental
hour of contradiction  and prove discursive
incoherence; our engagement is not with the psycho
biography or truth of Gandhian discourse in general so
that it can be countered by a contrasting utterance
made by Gandhi elsewhere. Truly, in dealing with the
irreconcilable differentiation of life spheres in
modernity and subsequently public and private, we have
been examining the origin and future of a discourse
trying to make them compatible.  What I shall try to
argue here is that this dictatorial apparatus is not a
matter of intellectual or infinite, manifest  desire
belonging to an agency  but an immanent necessity
which rises in response to transcend public/private
and unite them in one. But this is not the originary
moment. It is elsewhere.

				(V)

The incestuous excess induced by drinking has to be
countered by a power that is excessive : why? In other
words, it could not be confronted by the politics of
pure means, again-why?  Because such a practice --not
only is inextricably, and elementally tied to
non-violent peace or the discourse of pure means;  it
is its habitus.
 Unproductive expenses : luxury, mourning,
ceremonies, wars, cults, the erection of splendid
buildings, games, theater, the arts, perverse
sexuality (that is, detached from genitality)
represent activities that atleast originally have
their end in themselves.(13) 
 Without a single strike of doubt we may incorporate
drinking and sytagmatically relate it to the perverse
sexuality of incest  in the list of unproductive
expenses. Thereby Gandhis proposal to institute
cheap, healthy refreshment, reading and entertainment
rooms where the working men can go and find shelter,
knowledge, health giving food and drink and innocent
fun, or drinking as allowed to fulfill a medical
necessity ( --all within a rubric we might name as
productive expense and consumption) is not be had in
the  temporality of pure means where activities are
ends in themselves.

And here it will be remembered that in my previous
post invoking such a context of peace, I had tried
to relate it to leisure; here interestingly it finds a
support in Habermas  arguing this for Bataille, The
self sufficient activity performed for its own sake (
Aristotle), as displayed in the luxury of the leisure
classes, still reveals something of primordial
sovereignty (223). 
    This excess that gives content to the discourse of
pure means: non-violent peace or primordial
sovereignty, could not be overcome from within that
discourse but only violently from without : forcible
prohibition without compensation. In other words,
the excess of drinking  leading to a loss of reason
and sexual economy, could be overcome  yet by another
power that is excessive :  the dictatorial negation.
Gandhi is true to this structure, therefore,  by
immanent necessity; there is no other way. 
               Let us put this schematically in the
form of an elaboration. If you look at the list of
unproductive expenses above youll find a curious
heterogeneity of items: from war to orgies and
perverse sexuality. In other words, that what we
shall classify today under private and public are
rooted in a disastrous unity there. But this is not an
artificial, synthetically superimposed unity of
differences; it instances the  medieval, monarchical
sovereignty which is the origin of these unity. There
is no state/society distinction by which these objects
could be divided. The person or the body of the
monarch holds them all without distinction; since any
discrimination would divide his person/body and his
powers. Hobbes stated this classically when he said
that the representer is the sovereign, not the
represented. This argument, what to say of the middle
ages,  would flow correctly and absorb even history
during the ancien regime. 

The society of the ancien regime represented its
unity and its identity to itself as that of a body---a
body which found its figuration in the body of the
king, or rather which identified itself with the
kings body, while at the same time it attached itself
to it as its head (14). 
With the onset of the democratic revolution this unity
  burst out when the body of the king was destroyed,
when the body politic was decapitated and when, at the
same time, the corporeality of the social was
dissolved(303). The historical opposition to
universal suffrage, where the represented is the
sovereign,  was thus well placed  because Number
breaks down unity, destroys identity(303). With the
state/society and public/private division now
inaugurated there was no looking back. Divisions in
the ungraspable society now looked clear and could
not be demythized by a formal equality before law.
With Marx came the first blow and with the fascists
the second. Both retained dictatorship in some
theoretical form to transcend the disintegrating
fractures proposed by the liberal divide and charted
according to the registers of the state/society and
public/private division. Mercuse in his memorable
explanation of the fascists documented this attempt in
tenuous theoretical detail. But this unity could not
be forged artificially for the second time; divorced
from the person of the king it could never be
de-differentiated again. The private and the public
could never come again in the person-al figure of the
king. The language used to deplore dictatorship is
charted in these terms and history perhaps proves the
anachronism of such experiments. 
Let us be synoptic and demonically transparent on this
point. 
The public private once upon a time  were united and
that in the body of the sovereign monarch. Post
anti-absolutist movements and the rise of liberal
capitalism bifurcated this simple and once divided
they were never to meet again. Any attempt in this
direction and that too in the times after its
sovereign  times are over, if reappears it has to meet
with the reprobation that assumes the form of  a 
strong rejection, even without a dialogue,  of the
dictatorial imago.
But this narrative has its ruptures:  Somewhere in the
middle of this nowhere, some one like Gandhi would
invoke an hour of  dictatorship to transcend evils
that are genealogically  aligned with peaceful
leisure, by prohibiting them forcibly without
compensation.  But alas only an hour ! Not wrongly
because this springs from Gandhis own idea of  not
more than what is strictly needed (15) an idea which
is behind the strong notion of voluntary poverty 
resurrected  with a lovely force by Ashish Nandy. Even
the great utterance inscribed on the head of De
Sadewhich Giorgio Agamben is so fond of quoting
everywhere, There is no man
 who does not want to be
a despot when he has an erection(16) may be
demystified similarly by pointing out that going by
this--one wants to become a dictator only when has an
erection; in other times s/he is purportedly  a
democrat. But bypassing this precarious ( and clearly
masculine)mood swings, we may now brace ourselves to
sense why  pornography in 18th century Europe  wanted
to de-sacralize the kings body and why later the
liberal critiques would condemn pornography as aiming
only at sexually stimulating its readers while this
curious category called the erotic using arty,
figural language aimed at combining the sexual with
other departments of human existence and maintain  an
equilibrium as if by a weighing scale, was situated.
In this (not so very etymological) sense pornography (
with De Sade and Gandhi of one hour being its
screaming representatives)  is pre-modern and erotica 
is modern. To  me Machiavelli or Gandhi or De Sade are
anti-modern only in this sense of political 
pornography.
		But that is another story.

CONCLUSION
What is the major outcome or as they say  impact of
the study? The first is, as I have said already, the
well established view that  Gandhi wanted the public
and the private to be the echoes of each other is, if 
Im correct, stands demolished. But this is to endorse
the point of their irreconcilability only and Gandhi
was well within this paradigm--always.  Infact Gandhi
is rather suspicious of the radical translation the
two categories (Public /private) might entail: public
woman or private rights. He finds them as obstacles
not to be diluted by means of the politics of pure
means his brand of what he calls adult education. 
                Very rightly, he would transcend them
by means of  dictatorship. Dictatorship  because
..the Fuhrer is no longer an office in the sense of
traditional public law, but rather something [ a
whole body that is neither private nor public] that
springs forth without mediation from his person
(Agamben, Ibid., p.184) If we want to connect it to
its past, dictatorship is the modernist transformation
of the monarch: Transforming a Hegelian discursive
fragment, he is   a person, but the solitary person
who stands over against all the rest [ constituting] 
the real authoritative universality of that person;
which  is but a natural result of the personal hunt
for content and determinateness
 ...their impotent
self consciousness is the defenceless enclosed arena
of their tumult
 whose activities and self enjoyment
are equally monstrous excesses.(17)   But a rider:
Gandhi requires this  monstrous excess to counter the
excess induced by drinking not as an instance of his
own emotional pathology but as  the reenactment of an
indispensable, unconscious structural genealogy.  The
modern dictator tries to absorb or override, or
forcibly transcend the public /private divisions but
fails; fails because once the division has had been
made and they having emerged with their own
irreconcilable validity claims, they survive on their
differences. They cannot be mutated as one in the post
bifurcation times. They were one in the person of the
monarch who didnt have to unite them synthetically
like the modern dictator. He was the original habitus
of the division where they peacefully and
[practically] slept as one; origin of all values-- his
voice  was conscience, his speech--law. Today this
monstrous excess of the person would be condemned like
hell and denounced by the help of divisions that
originated in him ( protection of  society or
privacy). Gandhi understands this and calls for an
hour of dictatorship. This hour must be a very
lonely hour.
                     But we are not concerned with the
niceties of the Gandhian discourse or the truth claims
made on its behalf. With reference to our own project
here, we have arrived in this wake, at the history of
the person-al as the prehistory of the public and
private and in the next post I shall pursue that and
wonder what could be a possible theory of the
personal. 
                                Thank You.

REFERENCES

1.	Mahatma Gandhi, The Essential Writings of Mahatma
Gandhi, Ed. Raghavan Iyer, Oxford University Press:
Delhi,1991, p.109. 

2.	For his own version of the success of those events,
See Selected Works of Motilal  Nehru, Vol.3, Edited by
Ravinder Kumar & D. N Panigrahi, Vikas Publishing
House Pvt. Limited:  New Delhi, 1984, p45.

3.	In Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, Vol.XXIV, The
Publications Division, Ministry of Information and
Broadcasting, Government of India: India, 1967, p
350-351 ( All Italics mine.) And in this sense onlyI
assume Gandhi could be called religious : 
religion
exists once the secret of the sacred, orgiastic, or
demonic mystery has been, if not destroyed, at least
integrated, and finally subjected to the sphere of
responsibility. 
Jacques Derrida, The Gift of Death, Transl. David
Wills, ( Chicago: The University of Chicago Press )
1995, p.2. 

4.	M.R Jayakar, The Story of My Life, Asia Publishing
House: Bombay, Vol.II, 1958, pp.333-34.

5.	All quotations  from Ibid. pp. 334-335.

6.	Selected Works of Motilal  Nehru, Vol.3, Edited by
Ravinder Kumar & D. N Panigrahi, Vikas Publishing
House Pvt. Limited: New Delhi, 1984, p.45.

7.	For an initial philosophical account of the
discourse of integrity see Alan Montefiore, Identity
and Integrity in Rajev Bhargava, Amiya Bagchi& R.
Sudarshan (eds.) Multiculturalism, Liberalism and
Democracy, Oxford University Press: New Delhi, 1999,
pp 58-79;  where he argues integrity as being 
inscribed within a larger discourse of essential
identity and how such integration is always deferred
and incomplete. The result I conjecture would be this:
there will always be  some people who will feel
cheated or let down even by an integrated person - who
going by the indices of an essential identity is not
supposed to cheat others. Alan thinks, taking full
responsibility of an acknowledged change of position
would do the job here, but rememorating the Hegelian
objection to Kantian U norm, the same strategy could
be easily deployed by an immoral person too. Some
think this paradox could be avoided when an I is
integrated into we accounts.

8.	To mark this  existential drift of the non-public,
I draw upon Theodore Kisiel, The Genesis Of
Heideggers Being and Time, University of California
Press : Berkeley, 1993, pp.257-260.

9.	In a perceptive history of the western public man,
Richard Sennett informs how the molecule
public/private broke the moment individual character
was used to form a social principle.   From this idea
of individual personality as a social principle came
ultimately the modern impulse to find political
measures worthwhile only to the extent that their
champions are  credible, believable, decent
persons. Richard Sennett, The Fall of Public Man,
Cambridge University Press : Cambridge, 1976, p105.

10.	Sir Thomas Erskine Holland, Elements of
Jurisprudence, Progressive Publishers, Calcutta, 
reprint of 1924 edition, p.127.

11.	Ibid. p.127.

12.	All citations from M.K Gandhi, Prohibition at any
cost, compiled by R.K Prabhu, Navajivan Publishing
House: Ahmedabad,1960, page numbers specified in
brackets.

13.	Jurgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of
Modernity: Twelve Lectures, Transl: F. Lawrence, The
MIT press : Cambridge, 1993, p.223. 

14.	Claude Lefort,  The Image of the Body and
Totalitarianism in The Political forms of Modern
Society, 292-306, Ed. John B. Thompson, Disha
Publications: Delhi,1989.

15.	M.K Gandhi, Voluntary Poverty,  Navajivan
Publishing House: Ahmedabad,1960, p.7.

16.	Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and
Bare Life, Transl: D.H. Roazen, Stanford University
Press : Standford, California, 1998, pp.134135.

17.	G.W.F Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, Trans. A.V
Miller, Motilal Banarasi dass Publishers, Delhi, 1998,
pp.292-293. 

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