[Reader-list] The Gita as India's National Book?: Bizarre Judgment Backs Hindutva's

[Yogi Sikand]

The Gita as India's National Book?: Bizarre Judgment Backs Hindutva's
Assault on Indian Constitution.

By Gautam Kumar


Justice S.N.Srivastava of the Allahabad High Court, who retired
earlier this month, is no stranger to controversy. Some months ago, he
stirred a hornet's nest by ruling that Muslims in Uttar Pradesh were
not a minority, although they form only around a fifth of the
population of the state. And just last week, five days before he was
to be relived of his responsibilities, he passed yet another bizarre
judgment, recommending that the Government of India declare the
Bhagwad Gita as the country's national 'dharma shastra' or religious
book. He also made unwarranted comments about non-Hindus, particularly
Muslims. Not surprisingly, critics denounced the judge for what they
saw as his unabashed Hindutva leanings.

As in his controversial judgment in the earlier case about the status
of Muslims in Uttar Pradesh, in the present case Srivastava clearly
overstepped his brief, so critics argue. The case in hand did not
require Srivastava to pontificate on the Gita, let alone recommend
that it be hoisted upon all Indians as their national 'religious
book'. Yet, he did not limit himself to what was strictly required by
the case, using the opportunity to make remarks that clearly defy the
constitutional principles of secularism and equality.

The case that Srivastava was hearing related to a dispute over a
property dedicated to the Hindu deity Shri Shaligram Shila, a form of
Krishna, in the Mohalla Til Bhandeshwar locality in Varanasi. The case
involved two Bengali Brahmins, Shyamlal Ranjan Mukherjee and Nirmal
Ranjan Mukherjee, both of whom claimed control over the said property.
The former, the petitioner in the case, had shifted to Gujarat for
work, and in the meanwhile the latter sold the said property to a
fellow Hindu. In his complaint, the former questioned this sale deed,
claiming that a person entrusted with the responsibility of taking
care of a property dedicated to a Hindu deity could not sell or
mortgage it. In his defence, the latter argued that he had sold the
property because the locality in which it was located had been
allegedly affected by 'communal violence' for many years, because of
which he and his family had felt insecure, compelling them to shift to
Allahabad, along with the deity he was meant to take care of.

That, in short, were the bare facts of the case. But rather than
restrict himself to the case, Srivastava went on to raise several
questions and pass remarks that, critics would argue, the case did not
require him to. Srivastava's clumsy English, glaring throughout the
text of his judgment, may be excused, but several of his conclusions
are clearly contentious. The defendant's claim of his locality being
affected by communal tension seems to have been taken at face value by
Srivastava, who used it to create the distinct impression that Hindu
temples in particular were under attack in Uttar Pradesh and
elsewhere. This suggestion was reinforced by Srivastava's lengthy
references to colonial and Hindutva writings on alleged temple
destruction by Muslim rulers, which, of course, have no direct bearing
on the case but seem to have been marshaled in order to back a
distinct Hindutva and anti-Muslim agenda.

Curiously, there was no reference in Srivastava's judgment to the
wanton destruction of Muslim places of worship (besides the regular
anti-Muslim pogroms, in Uttar Pradesh and elsewhere) that continues to
happen on a far larger scale than the destruction of Hindu religious
places. Instead of referring to this issue as well, Srivastava
approvingly quoted Sanjay Goswami, Amicus Curiae in the case, who
argued that 'it is the duty of the state of U.P. to take appropriate
steps to look after such properties to ensure proper management,
security and safety of religious rights of Hindus from communal
violence, grabbing by anti-social or communal elements […]'. The need
for similar protection of Muslim religious institutions and properties
was left unmentioned.

Srivastava went further to support Goswami's case for state protection
to Hindu temples in Uttar Pradesh by referring to his contention that
if no such protection were provided 'a time might come when properties
of temples or religious institutions will go in the hands to (sic.)
anti-Hindu forces and communal forces will be encouraged to create
communal tension who (sic.) would engineer atmosphere of communal
violence to grab Hindu religious institutions'. No mention was made
here of Muslim religious institutions grabbed or destroyed by Hindutva
hordes, a major phenomenon in post-1947 north India. Nor did
Srivastava appear to take serious note of the fact that the disputed
religious property that the case he was hearing was sold to a Hindu,
and not to a Muslim, a fact that might have greatly weakened his
argument about 'anti-Hindu' forces allegedly seeking to capture Hindu
shrines.

Not content with advocating special police protection for all Hindu
religious institutions, Srivastava went on to refer in great detail to
the contention of I.N. Singh, counsel for the Kashi Vidwat Parishad,
Varanasi, who argued that the Hindu god Krishna, whose temple was at
the centre of the present dispute, had a particular universal
'importance', because he had 'given us Gita (sic.), which is a dharma
shastra not only for the Hindus, but for the entire human being
(sic.)'. Singh urged that the Gita be declared as the 'national dharma
shastra', or holy code of duties, of India, claiming that it had
'nothing to do with any particular religion', but, rather, that it
propounded a 'theory of duties of human beings'. He insisted that the
Gita's message was 'relevant for all religions of the world'. He
further urged that the state of Uttar Pradesh be directed to 'protect
all […] religious institutions of all beliefs and thoughts (religions)
(sic.) within the fold of Hinduism'. In his judgment, Srivastava
broadly concurred with this argument, claiming that such protection
was necessary if 'a temple or any other religious institution
belonging to (sic.) Hinduism are (sic.) affected by frequent
violence/tension', adding that this was necessary in order to protect
the religious freedoms of the Hindus as guaranteed by the Indian
Constitution.

Srivastava devoted page after page of his lengthy judgment to what he
termed as the 'historical background of continuous attack on temples
belonging to Hindus', thus conjuring the spectre of Hinduism and its
institutions being under continuous siege from Muslims. He argued that
'Temples were always subject to attacks and constructions (sic.) of
mosques and madrasas in their places for the last more than 1200
years'. 'Such attacks', he claimed, 'are still continuing'. He
conveniently ignored the long tradition of Hindu rulers destroying or
forcibly appropriating places of worship of non-Hindus, such as the
Jains and Buddhists, or even of fellow Hindus, a point that numerous
historians have highlighted. Nor did he care to mention the long
tradition of Muslim rulers having patronized and liberally supported
numerous Hindu religious establishments. Nor, too, did he bother to
mention the literally thousands of Muslim shrines (and lives)
destroyed by Hindu gangs in the decades since 1947, a phenomenon much
more widespread than contemporary temple destruction by Muslims. In
this way, Srivastava sought to reinforce the image of the Muslim as
the irredeemable iconoclast and the Hindu as hapless and innocent
victim that is so central to Hindutva discourse.

Srivastava sought to argue, against the available evidence, that
non-Hindus (Muslims, in particular) continue to be the source of
communal violence in India. Thus, he spoke of 'communal and anti-Hindu
forces' seeking to 'create an atmosphere of communal tension and
insecurity in (sic.) Hindus' so as to allegedly grab their temples. He
referred to the case under dispute in Varanasi as 'only an example of
situation (sic.) prevailing in state (sic.) of U.P.', where, he
claimed, without offering proof, that Hindus are 'insecure' in areas
where 'population of members (sic.) of Hinduism are reduced and the
population of non-Hindu communities has increased'. In such places, he
contended, 'anti-social and communal elements of other religious
community (sic.) are now a dominant force, affecting religious rites
of worship and maintenance of temples of Hindus'. He claimed that
these non-Hindus were allegedly inspired by the example of
iconoclastic Muslim rulers of the past. They, he argued, have given
the Hindus no option but to 'leave the temples and transfer the
properties attached with to the temple (sic.) to anti-social and
communal elements'.

This, of course, represents a very partial view of, or some might say,
a complete reversal of, reality, given that Muslims have been and
continue to be the worst victims of communal violence, often
state-instigated, in Uttar Pradesh and in several other parts of
India. Not surprisingly, there is no mention in Srivastava's judgment
of 'anti-social' and 'communal' elements among Hindus, these epithets
being reserved for non-Hindus alone, particularly Muslims.

Srivastava rounded up his long diatribe by arguing that Hindu temples
in Uttar Pradesh were under grave threat from non-Hindu 'anti-social'
forces. Hence, he concluded, 'as such all the temples of religions
within the fold of Hinduism (sic.) require protection'. For this
purpose, he suggested that the state create a separate security force
or a separate section in the existing police forces.

Critics will find yet other parts of Srivastava's judgment deeply
disconcerting. For instance, Srivastava declares that all religious
faiths which had their origins in India are part of that amorphous
body now known as 'Hinduism', and among these he includes Buddhism,
Jainism, Sikhism and the Kabir Panth. Adherents of these religions are
thus sought to be effectively robbed of their separate identity
through this arbitrary and hegemonic definition of Hinduism, as
Srivastava reduces them to mere branches of the Hindu faith. Equally
contentious is Srivastava's announcement that 'the Bhagwad Geeta is a
Dharma Shastra of India', and that it is 'the duty of [the] State to
recognize this text as the 'National Dharma Shastra'. The judge's
convoluted and puerile logic leads him to argue that, "As India has
recognized (sic.) National Flag, National Bird, National Anthem and
National Flower, 'Bhagvad Geeta' may also be considered as (sic.)
National (Rashtriya) Dharma Shastra'.

To back this clearly unwarranted argument, Srivastava claimed that the
Gita is 'universal' in its message and is not confined to Hinduism
alone. He added that the Gita 'inspired our national struggle and
(sic.) all walks of life'. This struggle he identified as an alleged
collective Hindu movement against 'foreign' (read 'Muslim' and other
'non-Hindu') invaders 'right from the day of invasion of (sic.) Mir
Qasim on (sic.) India in 712 to 1947'. ' He quoted from various
authors, foreign as well as 'upper' caste Hindu, to proclaim what he
described as the alleged greatness of the Gita. He even went so far as
to declare that all Indians must follow the Gita. Thus, he pronounced,
 "[I]t is the duty of every citizen of India […] irrespective of
caste, creed or religion to follow (sic.) Dharm propounded by 'Bhagwad
Geeta'".

The absurdity of these declarations is, of course, plainly obvious.
The argument that the Gita inspired India's national struggle reflects
a dominant and hegemonic form of Indian nationalism that equates it
with Brahminical Hinduism, leaving out the scores of Indian freedom
fighters, Muslims, Sikhs, Christians, Dalits, Hindu skeptics,
rationalists and atheists, for whom the Gita did not serve as a source
of inspiration at all. It also clearly reflects the Hindutva
understanding of Indian history, wherein the centuries of rule by
Turks, Afghans and Mughals are described as a long period of 'slavery'
of the Hindus, who are equated with Indians in general. Non-Hindus are
thus effectively denied any space in this definition of the Indian
nation.

In his passionate glorification of the Gita, Srivastava conveniently
remained silent on one of its basic aims—the preservation and
promotion of the horrendous caste system. The Gita defines dharma
according to the varna or caste of a person, determined by birth, and
thereby sanctifies the caste system that has consigned the vast
majority of Indians to the status of 'low' caste Shudras and
Ati-Shudras. This point has been amply dealt with by critical
historians as well as by numerous Dalit-Shudra leaders, such as
Babasaheb Ambedkar, the framer of the Indian Constitution, and Mahatma
Jotiba Phule, in their various writings. Srivastava's plea that the
Gita be made the 'National Dharma Shastra' of India can thus be
construed as a thinly veiled argument for making the caste system the
law of the land.

His ardent advocacy of Brahminical mythology led Srivastava to make
the bizarre claim that 'It has come in Geeta that the (sic.) God has
given the theory of Karmayog to Surya [the Sun] and from Surya to the
(sic.) Manu, and from Manu to other highly revered saints'. 'It is now
settled', Srivastava declared, 'that the Sun is the source of all
human being (sic.) and also that entire (sic.) world and also source
of energy to (sic.) all creations (sic.) of man kind (sic.) and source
of life on earth'. Srivastava's eulogies to Manu, the putative
architect of the barbaric caste system, can well be said to be an open
defiance of the principles of equality enshrined in the Indian
Constitution. And by defending a fanciful Brahminical myth as gospel
truth he has clearly violated the principle of secularism. Clearly,
Srivastava seems better cut out as a temple pujari than as a high
court judge.

In advocating that all Indians must 'follow (sic.) Dharm propounded by
'Bhagwad Geeta'" Srivastava makes a complete mockery of the pillar of
secularism on which the Indian Constitution, which the judiciary is
sworn to protect, is based.  Srivastava's glorification of the Gita,
the Bible of Brahminism, leads him on to terrain on which, clearly, he
is unqualified to comment—defining religious 'truth' and the way other
religions and their adherents must see themselves. This constitutes
yet another clear breach of secularism. He speaks as ardent advocate
of Brahminism, rather than as a judge, when he declares that 'Theory
(sic.) of Bhagwat Geeta speaks about internal and external truth'.

While Srivastava is entitled to hold his own views on the veracity or
otherwise of the Gita in his personal capacity, surely it is not in
his right to define ultimate religious truth for others in his
capacity as a judge. By pronouncing that the Gita 'is a guiding force
for all the religions', he makes a clearly unwarranted claim, for he
is no divinely-guided prophet to dictate how other religions should be
'guided'. His announcement that 'The true essence of all the religions
in world (sic.) are echos (sic.) of Geeta' is equally ridiculous,
reflecting the deeply-entrenched Brahminical ethos that seeks to
reduce all other religions to its alleged derivatives.

Srivastava retired five days after delivering his absurd judgment, but
that is not likely to be the end of this sordid story. Clearly, his
judgment might well serve as an incentive or precedent to other
similarly-minded judges to pass similarly outrageous decrees in the
future. In the name of defending the Constitution, clearly Srivastava
has undermined it, making a complete mockery of its commitment to
secularism, social justice and equality for all Indian citizens.
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This article is based on the uncertified copy of Srivastava's judgment
hosted on the Allahabad High Court's website. For details, see
http://www.allahabadhighcourt.in/ejurix/servlet/WebViewJudgement?casetype=WRIC&caseno=56447&year=2003&judgementdate=30/08/2007




-- 
Sukhia Sab Sansar Khaye Aur Soye
Dukhia Das Kabir Jagey Aur Roye

The world is 'happy', eating and sleeping
The forlorn Kabir Das is awake and weeping