[Reader-list] Notes from a contested history of Multipurpose National Identity Card (MNIC) in India:1999-2007

[Taha Mehmood]

Dear all,


The essay below presents the history of the emergence of National identity
card in India from the perspective of bureaucratic and political players. I
have documented the role played by key players that led to sustained
thinking towards the idea of a national identity card.


Regards


Taha


Notes from a contested history of National Identity Card in India:1999-2007

/People first have to develop confidence in written document before it could
supplant familiar oral and written records. /

* Multi-Purpose National Identity Card*

*_ _*

* *

*1. Origins: The Kargil War*

* *

In the sweltering heat of May 1999, as the plane carrying The Chief of Army
Staff General Ved Prakash Malik crossed the Indian territorial skies to far
away Poland, Malik could have hardly imagined that the lines of actual
control on the ground beneath his feet were changing.

>From the 26th day of May till the 26th day of month of July 1999, India and
Pakistan were engaged in a Low Intensity Conflict over the possession of
barren, but strategically important mountain peaks of Kargil.

According to some calculations the cost of Kargil 'war' was around 10,000
crore rupees[i] 1 [around Two Billion US Dollars] in addition to the
incalculable loss of Five hundred and Twenty Seven lives[ii] 2.

The conflict generated a huge debate in the media about the ideas of border,
fencing, intrusion, defense preparedness, illegal immigration and
intelligence apparatus.

Towards the end of July after the war was officially over, the Government
came under a lot of flak about its conduct and the foggy nature of events
leading up to the war.

*2. Kargil Review Committee [KRC]*

* *

On 24th July 1999, 'At a tea party hosted for journalists who covered the
Kargil Conflict'[iii] 3, the Government 'quickly announced the setting up of
a review committee'[iv] 4, the then Minister of Information Pramod Mahajan,
said, "When we say events leading to, it may be intelligence,
administrative, political failures. We are not binding the Committee with
one or two aspects"[v] 5. Five days later on 29th July 1999, through an
order No. 361/6/4/99-TS[vi] 6 the Government of India formally instituted
the Kargil Review committee.

The Committee was given a mandate to investigate two prominent aspects of
the war. Firstly, to inspect the timeline of events leading up to the
Pakistani aggression in the Kargil District of Ladakh in Jammu & Kashmir and
secondly, to recommend necessary measures to, 'safeguard national security
against such armed intrusions'[vii] 7 .

>From 29th July 1999, the date of its constitution, the Kargil Review
Committee started working at 3rd Floor of Sardar Patel Bhavan at Parliament
Street, in New Delhi[viii] 8. The Committee was to submit its report by the
31st October 1999[ix] 9 . The committee also invited members of public who
had 'reliable and authentic'[x] 10  information regarding the war. The
National Security Service Council Secretariat was required to assist the
committee, by a Government order[xi] 11.

*3. Pre History of National Security Service Council*

In the previous year, on 19th March 1998, Atal Bihari Vajpayee led center
right coalition Government called the National Democratic Alliance [NDA]
came to power. On 18th March 1998, a day before Vajpayee was sworn in as the
Prime Minister of India, his party, the Bhartiya Janta Party, the dominant
member of the NDA, released a document called the National Agenda for
Governance[xii] 12.

Section 26 of the document titled National Security promised to establish a
'National Security Council to analyze the military, economic and political
threats to the nation'[xiii] 13. The Council was to undertake a 'Strategic
Defense Review'[xiv] 14>. This was purported to 'ensure the security,
territorial integrity and unity of India'[xv] 15>.

Next month, on 10th of April 1998, Prime Minister Vajpayee sanctioned an
order to constitute a 'Task Force'[xvi] 16> to review security related
issues. The 'Task Force' was chaired by K.C Pant[xvii] 17>, Deputy Chair
person Planning Commission, other members were Foreign Minister, Jaswant
Singh[xviii] 18> and Air Commodore (retd) Jasjit Singh[xix] 19>, the then
head of a highly influential, Defense Ministry funded[xx] 20>, strategic
affairs think tank called the Institute of Defense Studies and Analyses
(IDSA).

Working on the recommendations of the 'Task Force', Government constituted a
National Security Council on 18th November, 1998[xxi] 21>.

*4. The National Security Service Council * [NSSC]

The National Security Service Council was a three tier set up.

Prime Minister was to the Chair, followed by Home Minister, Defense
Minister, External Affairs Minister, Finance Minister and Deputy Chairman,
Planning Commission[xxii] 22>.

Going by the logic of 'Task Force's' recommendations it seemed as if members
were laying out institutional framework to invite themselves to higher
groups of decision making. As, by virtue of being the External Affairs
minister and Deputy Chairperson Planning Commission, two of the three
members of the 'Task Force', Jaswant Singh and K C Pant became members of
National Security Council.

Principal Secretary to Prime Minister was to act as the National Security
Advisor.

The second tier would comprise of three more elements, they were, the
National Security Council Secretariat [NSCS] by the Joint Intelligence
Committee, Strategic Policy Group and other invitees.

The Strategic Planning Group was to consist of Cabinet Secretary, the three
Service Chiefs, Foreign Secretary, Home Secretary, Defense Secretary,
Secretary (Defense Production), Finance Secretary, Secretary (Revenue), RBI
Governor, Director (IB), Secretary (R) Cabinet Secretariat, Secretary (DAE),
SA to RM, Secretary (Space) and Chairman (JIC). One of the key tasks of the
Strategic Policy Group was take a strategic defense review.

National Security Advisory Board [NSCAB] was to form the third tier. The
Board was to consist of 'persons of eminence'[xxiii] 23> from outside the
Government covering expertise in external security, strategic analysis,
foreign affairs, defense, the Armed Forces, internal security, Science &
Technology, and economics.

When the Kargil Review Committee formed its members were partially sourced
from the National Security Service council.

*5. Members of Kargil Review Committee*

* *

Constituted on 29th July 1999 the four member committee, was also called the
Subrahmanyam Committee, as it was chaired by K Subrahmanyam. Other three
members were, B.G Verghese, Satish Chandra and K.K. Hazari

K Subrahmanyam, a former director of IDSA[xxiv] 24>, [which was then headed
by Air Commodore (retd) Jasjit Singh] and B.G Verghese, a senior journalist
both were members of National Security Council Advisory Board [NSCAB]. K
Subrahmanyam, was also the convener of NSCAB. Earlier, on 3rd May 1999,
Satish Chandra, a 1965 batch IFS officer, was made Chairman of Joint
Intelligence Committee, Cabinet Secretariat as Secretary of the National
Security Council Secretariat [NSCS][xxv] 25>. While Lieutenant General
(Retd.) K.K. Hazari, was a former Vice Chief of Army Staff who retired from
service in 1986, was the only person in the Committee who wasn't a member of
any other official setup[xxvi] 26>.

The committee submitted a 228 page report[xxvii] 27> to the Prime Minister
on 7th January, 2000[xxviii] 28>. The prologue of the report was eight pages
long, followed by, " 'history' 18 pages, security implications of trends in
India's defence expenditure" (Chapter 9) covers 14, "Nuclear backdrop"
(Chapter 10) has 29 and "The public dimension" (Chapter 11) six"[xxix] 29>.

That was perhaps the only thing known about the report. News reports on or
about the content of Kargil Review Committee reports became hazy after 7th
January 2000. A press note issued by the National Security Council
Secretariat, just before the submission of report, said, 'Conscious of the
fact that the disclosure of some of this information would not be in public
interest for reasons of national security… the committee has itself excised
the same from the report'[xxx] 30>.

Subrahmanyam told a Times of India correspondent that day, 'We believe we
have been able to establish /what/ went wrong. We did not undertake the
exercise to find out /who/ went wrong'[xxxi] 31>.

Others however respectfully disagree. A senior print journalist, who
appeared before the Committee had this to say- 'The most significant finding
that the Kargil Review Committee (KRC) appears to have made is that the
office of the Prime Minister poses a threat to national security… not even
the Prime Minister or his Cabinet colleagues are entitled to know the truth
about Kargil'[xxxii] 32>, he adds that, 'Inconvenient reports by committees
have frequently not been made public, but censorship-at-source is a wholly
new phenomenon'[xxxiii] 33>. Till date baring perhaps the members of the
KRC, no one really knows 'what went wrong'.

The Government however accepted the 'excised' report. On February 24th
2000[xxxiv]
34> the then Defense Minister George Fernandes presented the report in the
Lower House of Parliament, 'amidst din'[xxxv] 35>… just before it was
adjourned for the day[xxxvi] 36>. A month and a half later, on 18th of April
2000, George Fernandes's deputy, Hiren Pathak [the then Minister of State
for Defense], presented a Supplementary action taken report in the Upper
House of Parliament[xxxvii] 37>.

*6. Recommendations *

An executive summary of the Kargil Review Committee report [which was
drafted by K Subrahmanyam and BG Verghese[xxxviii] 38>] was made available
to the members of Upper House of Parliament on 25th February, 2000.

One of the key observations of the Committee was that 'Kargil type situation
could perhaps have been avoided'[xxxix] 39>. And in order to repeat a Kargil
type situation again the Committee urged setting up of a 'a comprehensive
space and aerial based surveillance system'[xl] 40>

Under a sub section titled Intelligence, the Committee observed that the
Kargil episode highlighted, 'gross inadequacies in the nation's surveillance
capability... Some countries have created a national surveillance command.
Since the Indian system is still in the initial stages, decisions taken at
this juncture will have long term implications...'[xli] 41>. It deliberated
whether 'a two-stream approach - civil and military -… may not be a better
alternative than depending on a single agency'[xlii] 42>.

On Civil- Military Liaison the Committee felt that 'at various levels, from
the ranking Command HQ to the operational formations on the ground.
Division) Brigade or Battalion, is most necessary to smoothen relationships
during times of emergency and stress, like war and proxy war… Relocating
villages behind the Army's forward defense line in J&K can best be done
through an initially limited experimental move'[xliii] 43>. For this it
recommends 'steps [to] be taken to issue ID Cards to border villagers in
certain vulnerable areas on a priority basis, pending its extension to other
or all parts of the State'. The committee further urged that a policy like
this 'would also be relevant in the North-East, Sikkim and part of West
Bengal'.

Right from the point of time when the Committee was set up till it presented
its report, sections of the media and opposition parties were very critical
about its very constitution and findings.

At the time of inception the charge was, that since, 'committee is not
governed by the Commission of Inquiry Act'[xliv] 44> it has 'no statutory
powers'[xlv] 45>, 'it cannot summon senior government and intelligence
officials, nor can it be given top secret documents'[xlvi] 46>. Most
importantly, 'Subrahmanyam is a member of the National Security Council, he
can hardly probe the premier agency in charge of national security'[xlvii]
47>.

Later when the report was submitted the whole affair was read by various
sections as 'a triumph for fiction over fact'[xlviii] 48>, 'an eye
wash'[xlix] 49> and 'a clear white wash'[l] 50>. So much so that, Dr.
Manmohan Singh, a Member of Parliament from Assam and the then leader of
opposition at the Upper House, speaking on the issue of national security
said, that, 'I do not believe that the Subrahmanyam Committee report is the
last word on the subject'[li] 51>

* *

*7. Group of Ministers [GoM]*

Going by what happened next, it seemed as if the Government also didn't
think that Dr. Manmohan Singh's utterances were the final word on the Kargil
Review Committee Report.

By 17th April 2000, the then Prime Minster Vajpayee through a Government of
India, Cabinet Secretariat, Rashtrapati Bhavan order No.141/2/1/2000-TS[lii]
52>, approved with 'immediate effect'[liii] 53> the formation of Group of
Ministers [GoM] under the Chairmanship of Home Minister, LK Advani, other
members Defense Minister, George Fernandes, the External Affairs Minister
Jaswant Singh, the Finance Minister Yashwant Sinha and Brijesh Mishra, who
was besides being Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister was the National
Security Advisor. The GoM was to submit its report in six months from the
date of its constitution.[liv] 54>

There was a persistent mutation and replication with respect to the
membership in the formation of various groupings. As, for instance, the
External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh, besides being in the GoM, had
earlier been a member of the 'Task Force' which proposed the formation of a
National Security Service Council, of which he was also a member.

The National Security Service Council membership on the other hand was
shared by the Home Minister, LK Advani, the Defense Minister, George
Fernandes, the Finance Minister Yashwant Sinha and Brijesh Mishra who were
part of GoM.

Twenty three days after its formation, on May 10th 2000, the GoM created
four 'Task Forces' to 'to examine the recommendations of the KRC in
detail'[lv] 55>. The 'Task Forces' were to probe issues concerning, 'the
intelligence apparatus, internal security, border management and management
of defense'[lvi] 56>. By 22 May 2000, the GoM asked the 'Task Forces' 'to
evaluate aspects of national security above and beyond the recommendations
of the KRC'[lvii] 57>.

Later, on 27th July 2000, the then Defense Minister George Fernandes while
replying to a question, in the Lower House of the parliament about the
follow up action on report of Subrahmanyam Committee, said that, 'in view of
the sensitive nature of issues involved, it would not be in the national
interest to divulge further details of actions being taken by the Government
on these recommendations'[lviii] 58>. Of the recommendations that he said
that Government had accepted, there was no mention of a National Identity
card[lix] 59>. However he did mention that the 'Task forces' were given
three months to submit the reports to the GoM[lx] 60>.

*8. The Task Forces*

The 'Task Force' on intelligence apparatus was chaired by Girish Chander
Saxena, a 1950 batch IPS officer, was the then Governor of Jammu and Kashmir
and former RAW chief[lxi] 61> followed by, M.K. Narayanan, the present
National Security Advisor, former Intelligence Bureau Chief and a 1953 batch
IPS officer. K. Raghunath, former Foreign Secretary,. P.P. Srivastav IAS,
the then Home Affairs Special Secretary, B. Raman, the then RAW additional
secretary, R. Narasimha was with the National Institute of Advanced Studies
(NIAS)and Maj. Gen. (retired) Chandan .S. Nugyal[lxii] 62>.

The Task for on Defense management was chaired by Arun Singh and assisted by
a host of people with defense and civil administration background. Among
them was, Narendra Singh Sisodia, who was then an Additional Secretary in
the National Security Council Secretariat now heads the IDSA as
Director[lxiii] 63>.

For Internal Security, former bureaucrat N.N.Vohra was the Chair, before
that he has served as the principal secretary to the Prime Minister
[1997-1998], previously between 1985-94 he served as an Additional Defense
Secretary Defense Production, and later as Secretary Home and Defense[lxiv]
64>Secretary. In 2003 Vohra was sent as the Government's special
Interlocutor to Kashmir[lxv] 65>. Julio Riberio, an ex IPS oficer was the
other member. Vohra and Riberio go a long way back together. Vohra was the
Home Secretary of Punjab during Operation Bluestar while Riberio was the
Director General of Police[1986-88]. Riberio later wrote a book called
'Bullet for Bullet' about his experiences in Punjab[lxvi] 66>. Riberio lives
a retired life in Bombay[lxvii] 67> while Vohra has become a member of the
executive council of IDSA[lxviii] 68>. Rajendra Shekhar, former chief of the
Central Bureau of Investigation during the VP Singh regime was an IPS
officer Rajasthan cadre. 1998 he also wrote a book called 'Not a License to
Kill', where emphasis was more on 'prevention and detection'[lxix] 69>. In
an interview to a magazine he rued about the fact that, 'those who control
us, want us to control dissent more than the enforcement of the rule of
law'. Lt-Gen (Retd) V. K. Nayyar, served as Governor of Manipur between
1993-1994[lxx] 70> and was Additional Director General Military Operations
at Army Head Quarters in charge of Operation Bluestar 1984[lxxi] 71>. The
other members were RC Jha, M. K. Narayanan, who also served on the 'Task
force on Intelligence Apparatus' and M. L. Wadhawan.* *

* *

Former bureaucrat, Dr. Madhav Godbole and the Chair of Task Force on Border
Management was Home Secretary, Union Government of India when Babri Masjid
was demolished on 6th of December 1992[lxxii] 72>. Godbole was assisted by
Lt.Gen (Retd) V K Sood, former Vice Chief of Army Staff [1993][lxxiii] 73>.
Sood had once served under K K Hazari[lxxiv] 74> of the Subrahmanyam/Kargil
Review Committee fame. M L Mehta, former Chief Secretary was a bureaucrat
from Rajasthan Cadre[lxxv] 75> and junior in service to Rajendra Shekhar. T
Ananthachari, former Director General Border security Force[lxxvi] 76>. Vice
Admiral (Retd) AR Tandon was formerly Flag Officer commanding in Chief
Western Command[lxxvii] 77> and Deputy Chief of Naval Staff. DVLN
Ramakrishna Rao former Andhra Pradesh Inspector General of Police[lxxviii]
78>, and former DG Home Ministry. Last member of the group was Chinmoy
Chakravarty.

Exactly five months after the GoM had asked the 'Task force' to begin work,
on late Friday night 22nd December 2000, television news channels started
running flashes about a terrorist attack on the historic Red Fort[lxxix]
79>. A red alert was declared in the Capital. Within weeks the Delhi police
launched a massive drive for 'Tenant Verification'[lxxx] 80>. This was for
the first time that police was amassing personal data on all 'outsiders' to
the Capital city. But this drive became yet another excuse for the police to
extract money, so much so that on 17th April 2002, a question was raised in
the Upper House of Parliament with respect to the harassment of land owners
by the police[lxxxi] 81>.

As of 24th October 2005 the Delhi High court had acquitted four people and
sentenced seven others, of the total eleven arrested in the wake of the
attack[lxxxii] 82>.

It was in this background that by 5th January 2001, all the 'Task Forces'
had submitted their reports[lxxxiii] 83> to the GoM.

Eleven months later, on 22nd November 2001, in the Parliament House, when
the 8th Session of the XIII Lok Sabha was in progress, it took an Unstarred
Question No. 915, asked by Lok Sabha MP, Jayaben B. Thakkar, for the then
Defense Minister George Fernandes to declare that, 'The GoM…presented their
comprehensive Report titled `Reforming the National Security System` to the
Prime Minister on February 26, 2001'[lxxxiv] 84> and that 'The
recommendations made by the GoM were approved by the Government on 11th May,
2001'[lxxxv] 85>. Of the fifteen recommendations spelt out by the Defense
Minister in the parliament that day, there was not a single mention of smart
identity cards.

On the other hand, a cursory glance at the questions asked in the parliament
between 18th April and 12th December 2001 presents a different picture. For
instance, there were questions about introducing a smart card system to
ensure punctuality of Government employees[lxxxvi] 86>, smart card for
Employee Provident fund[lxxxvii] 87>, and selling electricity through smart
card[lxxxviii] 88>

Pramod Mahajan, the then Minister of Information Technology, while replying
to an Unstarred Question No. 3657, submitted jointly by Gowdar
Mallikarjunappa, Gangasandra Siddappa Basavaraj, Iqbal Ahmed Saradgiy and S.
Vivekananda Reddy, which was answered on 12th of December 2001, said that 'A
Committee has been set-up to formulate common Standards for Multi
Application Smart Cards'[lxxxix] 89>. Since it was not asked, it would be
very difficult for us to know the reasons as to why this committee was set
up, or who were there in this committee.

*9. Attack on Parliament*

* *

Next day, on 13th of December 2001 the Parliament of India was attacked[xc]
90>. In a televised address shortly after the attacks, Prime Minister
Vajpayee said, "This was not just an attack on the building, it was a
warning to the entire nation," he said. "We accept the challenge."[xci] 91>
Three days later on December 16th 2001 the Army launched Operation
Parakaram. Around half a million troops were mobilized along the
international border with Pakistan. The standoff lasted for eight months.
Although nothing came out of it but by 2003 around Three Hundred and Seventy
Five military and civilian personnel were killed in various stages of mine
laying and De-mining operations.[xcii] 92> Of the four people arrested and
charged with 'waging a war against the state'[xciii] 93>. The Supreme Court
had acquitted two and confirmed death penalty for the other two[xciv] 94>.

The sudden change in environment reflected in the parliament as well. As
questions after 13th December specifically related to providing for identity
documents were mostly about giving smart cards to Air India passengers[xcv]
95>, providing smart cards instead of paper identity cards to employees
working with various agencies at the Air ports[xcvi] 96>, introducing a
smart card based security system at the airports[xcvii] 97>, and introducing
smart cards instead of ration cards for the Public Distribution
System[xcviii] 98>. **

**

*10. **Change of Guard.*

* ** *

On 22nd May 2004, precisely four years to the day, after the GoM had asked
the 'Task Force' to start working, there was a change of guard at the
Center. Sonia Gandhi led United Progressive Alliance came to power and
Manmohan Singh was sworn in as Prime Minister of India. Shivraj Vishwanath
Patil became the Home Affairs Minister[xcix] 99>.

* *

*11. MNIC*

According to a Department of Information and Technology document, on
National e-Governance Plan, presented in a workshop with States and Union
Territories, held on 11-12th March, 2005, at Hotel Samrat, in New Delhi- on
22nd July, 2004, Shivraj Vishwanath Patil, the present Home Minister, had
given gave a go ahead to the Registrar General of India to start work on the
pilot project concerning the Multipurpose National identity card[c] 100>.

This particular insertion of the go ahead order by the Home Minister after
the presentation by the RGI is quite interesting, as former Minister Of
State In The Ministry Of Home Affairs, Swami Chinmayanand on 22nd July 2003,
while answering a Lok Sabha Starred Question, titled Multipurpose Identity
Cards asked by Dalpat Singh Paraste and Mohan Rawale had already stated that
'A Pilot Project on the Multipurpose National Identity Card (MNIC) scheme*
/has been initiated by the Government in April, 2003/* covering a few
sub-districts in the selected districts of 13 States and Union Territories.
The Project is expected to be completed within one year'[ci] 101> .

Nevertheless, it seems, according to the Department of Information and
Technology document mentioned above- the premise on which Home minister
Shivraj Patil gave his approval was the Report submitted by the Group of
Ministers [GoM] Titled `Reforming the National Security System`, of which
L.K Advani, the Former Home Minister was a member. One of the key
recommendations of the report was to introduce a national identity card.

The case of Illegal immigration forms the basis of a renewed enforcement of
the rule of enumerating 'citizens' and through a deductive logic it
concludes with a new fact that National identity cards be issued.

The rhetoric of this argument is perhaps most precise in Chapter 5, of the
above mentioned GoM report, titled Border Management. This Chapter was in
fact written as per the submissions on Border Management, by the Task Force
headed by Madhave Godbole. The first paragraph sets up the premise-'India
has 14,880 kms of land border running through 92 districts in 17 States and
a coastline of 5,422 kms touching 12 States and Union Territories
(UTs)'[cii] 102>. And 'barring Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand,
Delhi and Haryana, all other States in the country have one or more
international borders or a coastline'[ciii] 103>. Further, in Section 110,
page 85, of the report, it is mentioned that- 'Illegal migration has assumed
serious proportions. There should be compulsory registration of citizens and
non-citizens living in India. This will facilitate preparation of a national
register of citizens' All citizens should be given a *Multi-Purpose National
Identity Card *(*MPNIC*) and non-citizens should be issued identity cards of
a different color and design'[civ] 104>.

The report does not explain what does category such as, 'citizen' or 'non
citizen' exactly entail. Nor does it shed any light on, as to Why a national
identity card for all 'citizens' would solve all the problem of 'illegal
immigration'.

When, primary documents, like ration card, that would form the very basis on
which the 'identity' of present citizens would be eventually verified, are
in fact 'not considered' as valid identity documents, by the Government at
all. And moreover, other identification document like the Election
Commission issued voter identity card, introduced in 1993 have yet not being
available to all citizens.

The above assertion stems from a careful perusal of a number of questions in
the XIII and XIV Lok Sabha on the idea of identity. For instance, on as
early as 11th May 2000, that was, a day after, GoM had created four 'Task
Forces', the then Minister Of State In The Ministry Of Consumer Affairs And
Public Distribution, V. Sreenivasa Prasad had stated in Parliament that 'The
State Governments/UT Administrations have been directed to issue
instructions to concerned authorities not to insist on production of ration
card for …for identification purposes'[cv] 105>.

By 9th March 2007, the present Minister of Law And Justice, H.R. Bhardwaj,
while replying to a query posed by Jyotiraditya Madhavrao Scindia had
responded, by stating that, 'The Election Commission has intimated that
approximately 30% electors are yet to be issued voter identity cards'[cvi]
106>. According to him, one of the major factors that contribute to non
issuance of voter identity card for the rural population is 'intercity and
intra-city migration in major metropolitan towns'[cvii] 107>. While it is
difficult to track urban population as 'the urbanites do not show any
enthusiasm for obtaining EPICs as it involves spending their time to go to a
Photo location for a document which anyway has relevance for them once in 5
years only'[cviii] 108>.

*12. One Nation, One-Citizenship, One Card*

* *

The GoM report, 'Reforming the National Security System' is perhaps the most
prescient indicator of a gradual shift in ways in which, ideas about
personal identity are thought about by those who govern India. This shift is
marked by a historical anxiety of the rulers to not only know about but also
to have a documentary record of the ruled. Moreover, this shift is becoming
increasingly characterized by a technologically driven desire to stabilize
the idea of land and its people. Thus the Chapter on Internal Security, for
instance[cix] 109>, talks about the notion of 'one border-one force'. The
Multi-purpose National Identity card of course, underlines the idea of
national membership through one identity, stabilized by one National
Identification Number, something which has been historically contested by
the dwellers of land, in a variety of ways. As the idea of Multipurpose
National Identity Card is tested for its 'feasibility', it appears that the
real test has only begun.

*13. Dilemma of enumerating citizenship.*

* *

According to a Times of India, report, by, Dipak Mishra, datelined, 13th
February, 2003[cx] 110>, the then chief minister of Bihar, Rabari Devi,
refused to implement 'the first phase of MNIC project in the state'[cxi]
111>. The Bihar Government didn't consider illegal immigration as a 'major
problem' as, 'only nine Bangladeshis have been detected… so far'[cxii] 112>.

Almost a year and a half year later, Surojit Mahalonbis, writing for Times
of India on 23 July 2004 ruminated that 'It may not be humanly possible that
the Registrar General of India (RGI) will end up completing the MNIC cards
countrywide mistake-free'[cxiii] 113>.

In an another news article by, Deepak K Upreti, published in, Deccan Herald
on March 26, 2007, unknown senior officials sited various 'hurdles', such
as, 'non-availability of data entry operators in regional languages,
difficulty in capturing photographs and finger biometrics'[cxiv] 114> in
addition to, ' "Weak document base" for determining citizenship status of
individuals in rural areas , especially for agricultural laborers, landless
laborers, married females, and individuals not present at their place of
residence'[cxv] 115> at the time of enumeration.

Undeterred by these troubles the Government has introduced an umbrella of
unique identification numbers and smartcards to stabilize the predicament of
individual membership in a variety of contexts.

*14. Avalanche of Smart Cards*

* *

On 25th November 2003, the National Securities Depositories Ltd, [NSDL]
launched MAPIN[cxvi] 116>, a unique number identification enabled smart card
for market participants and investors. NSDL's sister concern NDML or NSDL
Data Management Ltd maintains the National Skills Registry [NSR] for
Information Technology Professionals. Through a unique identification number
generated from finger print patterning the NSR provides verification of
details and details of verification to both the ITP and the prospective
employers[cxvii] 117>.

But perhaps the most imaginative idea is proposed by the Report of the
Eleventh Plan Working Group on Integrated Smart Card System, submitted by
the Planning Commission, Government of India, in January 2007, titled-
Entitlement Reform for Empowering the Poor: The Integrated Smart
Card[cxviii] 118>. On page 8, Chapter 2, titled, Multi Application smart
card, section 5, titled Application to unique ID to Government schemes the
report puts forth what it considers as 'a major conceptual and practical
issue'[cxix] 119> 'converting all unique IDs in a household into a single
unit' because 'Welfare schemes such as TPDS [Targeted Public Distribution
System] and the NREGS [National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme] are based
on the household rather than the individual'[cxx] 120>. On the next page it
dwells on the question of 'how to take children into account'[cxxi] 121>.
Since MNIC cards will only be given to adults, child centered schemes like
MDMS [Mid Day Meal Scheme] and ICDS [Integrated Child Development Scheme]
needs to be fully addressed 'in the unique ID based smart card
framework'[cxxii] 122>. One of the solutions on offer is, that 'the
biometric information of all family members needs to be in-built into the
smart card'[cxxiii] 123>. The report is under consideration by the
Government.


------------------------------

------------------------------------------

[i] ref1> The Hindu, January 05, 2002, The Cost of War, C Rammanohar Reddy -
http://www.hinduonnet.com/2002/01/05/stories/2002010501261000.htm

[ii] ref2>Sainik Samachar,Vol.47, No17,1-15 September 2000, Kargil War: A
Glorious victory for India,*/ /*K Subrahmanyam

http://mod.nic.in/samachar/17/html/ch8.htm

[iii] ref3> India Today, August 9, 1999, Kargil Intrusion, The War of Words,
Harinder Baweja and Raj Chengappa

http://www.india-today.com/itoday/19990809/defence.html

[iv] ref4> ibid

[v] ref5> Frontline,* *Volume 17 - Issue 06, Mar. 18 - 31, 2000. The Kargil
Committee Expedition, A G Noorani-
http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl1706/17060860.htm

[vi] ref6> PIB Press Release K. SUBRAHMANYAM COMMITTEE INVITES INPUTS -
http://pib.nic.in/archieve/lreleng/l0899/r040899.html

[vii] ref7> Rajya Sabha, Executive Summary of the Kargil Committee Report-
http://rajyasabha.nic.in/25indi1.htm#9

[viii] ref8> PIB Press Release, K. SUBRAHMANYAM COMMITTEE INVITES INPUTS -
http://pib.nic.in/archieve/lreleng/l0899/r040899.html

[ix] ref9> ibid

[x] ref10> ibid

[xi] ref11> ibid

[xii] ref12> National Agenda For Governance-
http://www.bjp.org/nagenta.htm#national

[xiii] ref13> ibid

[xiv] ref14> ibid

[xv] ref15> ibid

[xvi] ref16> Rajya Sabha, Synopsis of Debates, Proceedings other than
questions and answers,* *DISCUSSION ON THE WORKING OF THE MINISTRY OF
DEFENCE, SHRI NILOTPAL BASU, Monday May 15, 2000

http://164.100.24.167/rsdebate/synopsis/189/15052000.htm

[xvii] ref17> From a talk titled -NATIONAL SECURITY MECHANISM- delivered by,
B. Raman, at a seminar on "National Security--Internal and External
Dimensions" jointly organised by the Association of Retired Senior Indian
Police Service Officers (ARSIPSO) and the India International Centre (IIC)
at New Delhi on January 15, 2005).
http://www.saag.org/papers13/paper1228.html

B. Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of
India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies,
Chennai, and Distinguished Fellow and Convenor, Observer Research
Foundation, Chennai//

[xviii] ref18> ibid

[xix] ref19> ibid

[xx] ref20> IDSA- About, General Information-
http://www.idsa.in/about-idsa.htm

[xxi] ref21> Rajya Sabha, Synopsis of Debates, Proceedings other than
questions and answers, DISCUSSION ON THE WORKING OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE,
SHRI NILOTPAL BASU, Monday May 15, 2000

http://164.100.24.167/rsdebate/synopsis/189/15052000.htm

[xxii] ref22> PIB Press Release, National Security Council set up-

http://pib.nic.in/archieve/lreleng/lyr98/l1198/r191198.html

[xxiii] ref23> ibid

[xxiv] ref24> K Subrahmanyam wikipedia profile
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/K._Subrahmanyam

[xxv] ref25> PIB SENIOR LEVEL APPOINTMENTS-
http://pib.nic.in/archieve/lreleng/l0599/r030599.html

[xxvi] ref26> Frontline, Volume 17 - Issue 02, Jan. 22 - Feb. 04, 2000, The
Armed Forces, A Committee and some Questions, Praveen Swami-

http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl1702/17020310.htm

[xxvii] ref27> Frontline,* *Volume 17 - Issue 06, Mar. 18 - 31, 2000. The
Kargil Committee Expedition, A G Noorani-
http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl1706/17060860.htm.

[xxviii] ref28> Frontline, Volume 17 - Issue 02, Jan. 22 - Feb. 04, 2000.
The Armed Forces, A Committee and some Questions, Praveen Swami-

http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl1702/17020310.htm

[xxix] ref29> Frontline,* *Volume 17 - Issue 06, Mar. 18 - 31, 2000. The
Kargil Committee Expedition, A G Noorani-
http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl1706/17060860.htm

[xxx] ref30> Frontline, Volume 17-Issue 02, Jan.22-Feb. 04, 2000, The Armed
Forces, a committee and some questions, A first person account with regard
to Kargil Review Committee Report and its implications, Praveen Swami.
http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl1702/17020310.htm

[xxxi] ref31> Frontline,* *Volume 17 - Issue 06, Mar. 18 - 31, 2000. The
Kargil Committee Expedition, A G Noorani-
http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl1706/17060860.htm

[xxxii] ref32> Frontline, Volume 17-Issue 02, Jan.22-Feb. 04, 2000, The
Armed Forces, a committee and some questions, A first person account with
regard to Kargil Review Committee Report and its implications, Praveen
Swami. http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl1702/17020310.htm

[xxxiii] ref33> ibid

[xxxiv] ref34> Lok Sabha, Bulletin -Part II [General information Relating to
Parliamentary and the matters], Friday August 18, 2000. No.1176- The
following motion given notice of by Shri George Fernandes has been
admitted:- "That this House do consider the Report of (Subrahmanyam
Committee) laid on the Table of Lok Sabha on the 24th February, 2000."

http://www.parliamentofindia.nic.in/ls/bulletin2/2k/18082k.html

[xxxv] ref35> The Tribune, Friday, February 25, 2000, Kargil took army, Govt
unawares, Panel blames defense chiefs, security set up, Tribune news
service- http://www.tribuneindia.com/2000/20000225/main1.htm

[xxxvi] ref36> ibid

[xxxvii] ref37> Rajya Sabha, Journal of 189th Session, Tuesday, the 18th of
April, 2000, 12 Noon,* *4. Papers Laid on the Table,* *Shri Harin Pathak
(Minister of State in the Ministry of Defense) laid on the Table a copy (in
English and Hindi) of the Supplementary Action Taken Report on the
recommendations of the Kargil Review Committee.

http://164.100.24.167/journals/189/18042000.htm

[xxxviii] ref38> B G Verghese About the Author-
http://www.bgverghese.com/about.htm

[xxxix] ref39> Executive Summary of the Kargil Review Committee Report as
presented in Rajya Sabha, 25 Feburary, 2000. VII. Was Kargil Avoidable?-
http://rajyasabha.nic.in/25indi1.htm#8

[xl] ref40> ibid

[xli] ref41> Executive Summary of the Kargil Review Committee Report as
presented in Rajya Sabha, 25 Feburary, 2000. Recommendations. Intelligence-
http://rajyasabha.nic.in/25indi1.htm#8

[xlii] ref42> ibid

[xliii] ref43> Executive Summary of the Kargil Review Committee Report as
presented in Rajya Sabha, 25 Feburary, 2000. Recommendations. Civil Military
Liaison- http://rajyasabha.nic.in/25indi1.htm#8

[xliv] ref44> India Today, August 9, 1999, Kargil Intrusion, The War of
Words, Harinder Baweja and Raj Chengappa

http://www.india-today.com/itoday/19990809/defence.html

[xlv] ref45> ibid

[xlvi] ref46> ibid

[xlvii] ref47> ibid

[xlviii] ref48> Frontline, Volume 16-Issue 17, Aug 14-27 1999, The Kargil
Conflict, A Probe and its Prospects, Praveen Swami-
http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl1617/16170330.htm

[xlix] ref49> The Hindustan Times, July 26, 1999, Kargil Inquiry an eyewash,
says opposition and experts, Vinod Sharma-
http://www.media-watch.org/articles/0799/223.html

[l] ref50> Frontline, Volume 17-Issue 7, Apr 01-14, 2000, Letters, The
Kargil Report, N Kunju, Delhi.
http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl1707/17071130.htm

[li] ref51> Uncorrected Debates, Rajya Sabha, 189th Session, 2PM to 3 PM,
The Data is taken from the uncorrected verbatim debates. Shri LSR Murthy,
Director[Reporting]
http://164.100.24.167/rsdebate/deb_ndx/189thdeb/189deb.htm

[lii] ref52> Reforming the National Security System- Recommendations of the
Group of Ministers, Annexture A

http://mod.nic.in/newadditions/welcome.html

[liii] ref53> ibid

[liv] ref54> ibid

[lv] ref55> Bharat Rakshak Monitor- Volume 3 (4) January- February, 2000,
Featured Articles, Intelligence Reforms, Sunil Sainis-
http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/ISSUE3-4/sainis.html

[lvi] ref56> Frontline, volume 18 Issue 1, Jan 06-19, 2001, Defence, Battle
over Intelligence, Praveen Swami-
http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl1801/18010240.htm

[lvii] ref57> Bharat Rakshak Monitor- Volume 3 (4) January- February, 2000,
Featured Articles, Intelligence Reforms, Sunil Sainis-
http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/ISSUE3-4/sainis.html

[lviii] ref58> Government Of India Ministry Of Defence Lok Sabha Unstarred
Question No 681 To Be Answered On 27.07.2000 Follow Up Action On Report Of
Subrahmanyam Committee 681.Shri Raghunandan Lal Bhatia Dilip Kumar
Mansukhlal Gandhi Bhavana Pundlikrao Gawali Kanti Singh Raghuvansh Prasad
Singh http://164.100.24.208/lsq/quest.asp?qref=7762

[lix] ref59> ibid

[lx] ref60> ibid

[lxi] ref61> G C Saxena. J&K Rajbhavan Profile
http://jkrajbhawan.nic.in/His%20Excellency/present10.htm

[lxii] ref62> Bharat Rakshak Monitor- Volume 3 (4) January- February, 2000,
Featured Articles, Intelligence Reforms, Sunil Sainis-
http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/ISSUE3-4/sainis.html

[lxiii] ref63> IDSA Faculty, Director, NS Sisodia
http://www.idsa.in/faculty/n-s-sisodia.htm

[lxiv] ref64> The Tribune, Main News, SS Sodhi, NN Vohra are new Tribune
Trustees, Tribune News Service, Saturday, February, 9, 2002, Chandigarh,
India-http://www.tribuneindia.com/2002/20020209/main3.htm

[lxv] ref65> The Hindu, Thursday, February 20, 2003, Front Page, Vohra new
interlocutor to Jand K
http://www.hinduonnet.com/2003/02/20/stories/2003022006040100.htm

[lxvi] ref66> The Tirbune, Book Review, G.V.Gupta, Sunday, March 7, 1999,
Bullet for Bullet:My Life as Police Officer by Julio Roberio, Viking,, New
Delhi. http://www.tribuneindia.com/1999/99mar07/book.htm#1

[lxvii] ref67> Meeta Bhatti, Profile, Julio Riberio, Still on the Job,
Harmony for silver's foundation.
http://www.harmonyindia.org/hportal/VirtualPageView.jsp?page_id=1200

[lxviii] ref68> Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis, Executive
council, 2005-07, NN Vohra Member. http://www.idsa.in/executivecouncil.htm

[lxix] ref69> Outlook Magazine, December 21 1998, Book Review by Ranjit
Bhushan, Policing the Force, Rajendra Shekhar.
http://www.outlookindia.com/full.asp?fodname=19981221&fname=booksa&sid=1

[lxx] ref70> Manipur Legislative Assembly Former Governors, Lt. Gen. [Retd]
VK Nayar 31.08.1993-12.02.1994 http://manipurassembly.nic.in/governor.htm

[lxxi] ref71> Rear Admiral [Retd]Satyindra Singh, Remembering Operation
Bluestar. Book Review. All about Sikhs-
http://www.allaboutsikhs.com/Sikh-History/Remembering-Operation-Bluestar.html

[lxxii] ref72> Sheela Bhatt, Are our policies to fight terror, right or
wrong?, interview with Dr. Madhav Godbole, rediff, September 15, 2006.-
http://in.rediff.com/news/2006/sep/15inter1.htm

[lxxiii] ref73> Force, Monthly Magazine on National Security, About the
Editors, Consulting Editor, V K Sood

http://www.forceindia.net/editor.asp

[lxxiv] ref74> The Hindustan Times, July 26, 1999, Kargil Inquiry an
eyewash, says opposition and experts, Vinod Sharma-
http://www.media-watch.org/articles/0799/223.html

[lxxv] ref75> Chief Secretaries of Rajasthan, ML Mehta 02..02.1994-
31.12.1997. http://www.rajasthan.gov.in/CS.SHTM

[lxxvi] ref76> The Tribune, Saturday, November 14, 1998,, Nehru Fellowship,
T Ananthachari- http://www.tribuneindia.com/1998/98nov14/nation.htm#12

[lxxvii] ref77> Joy Joseph, Experts urge Govt to see importance of seas,
International Fleet Review 2001, rediff.com-
http://www.rediff.com/news/2001/feb/16josy2.htm

[lxxviii] ref78> Andhra Pradesh CID, Chiefs then and now,Sri D.V.L.N. Rama
Krishna Rao, IPS I.G.P.19/05/1986 27/06/1988 -
http://www.cidap.gov.in/chiefs.aspx

[lxxix] ref79> Hindustan Times, Cities, October 29, 2005, Chronology of Red
Fort Case, Press Trust of India, New Delhi Oct 24, 2005.
http://www.hindustantimes.in/news/181_1528110,0006.htm

[lxxx] ref80> Delhi police, Bhagidari, 15. Changes Observed. 6. Tenant
Verification in the Colonies.

http://delhigovt.nic.in/bhagi.asp#25

[lxxxi] ref81> Rajya Sabha, list of Question for oral answers, to be asked
at a sitting of Rajya Sabha to be held on, Wednesday, the April 17, 2002. 342.
Tenant Verification Drive in Delhi. Shri Amar Singh.

http://164.100.24.167/dailyques/195/sq17042002.pdf

[lxxxii] ref82> Hindustan Times, Cities, October 29, 2005, Chronology of Red
Fort Case, Press Trust of India, New Delhi Oct 24, 2005.
http://www.hindustantimes.in/news/181_1528110,0006.htm

[lxxxiii] ref83> Bharat Rakshak Monitor- Volume 3 (4) January- February,
2000, Featured Articles, Intelligence Reforms, Sunil Sainis-
http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/ISSUE3-4/sainis.html

[lxxxiv] ref84> Government if India, Ministry of Defense, Lok Sabha,
Unstarred Question, No. 915, To Be Answered on 22.11.2001, Kargil Review
Committee, Smt, Jayaben B Thakkar
http://164.100.24.208/lsq/quest.asp?qref=34243

[lxxxv] ref85> ibid

[lxxxvi] ref86> Government if India, Ministry of Personnel, Public Greviance
and Pension, Lok Sabha, Unstarred Question, No. 4726, To Be Answered on
18.04.2001, Smart Card System. Dr.Daggubati Ramanaidu.
http://164.100.24.208/lsq/quest.asp?qref=22690 <
http://164.100.24.208/lsq/quest.asp?qref=34553>

[lxxxvii] ref87> Government if India, Ministry of Labour, Lok Sabha,
Unstarred Question, No. 4200, To Be Answered on 28.08.2001, Smart Card
Pushpdan Shanbhudan Gadhavi and Sukender Reddy Gutha
http://164.100.24.208/lsq/quest.asp?qref=29705

[lxxxviii] ref88> Government if India, Ministry of Power, Lok Sabha,
Unstarred Question, No. 2662, To Be Answered on 16.12.2001, Selling
Electrification Through Smart Card Dr. Ramesh Chander Tomar, Shyama singh
http://164.100.24.208/lsq/quest.asp?qref=33608

[lxxxix] ref89> Government if India, Ministry of Information and Technology,
Lok Sabha, Unstarred Question, No. 3657, To Be Answered on 12.12.2001,
Development of Smart Card, Gowdar Mallikarjunappa, Gangasandra Siddappa
Basavaraj, Iqbal Ahmed Saradgiy and S. Vivekananda Reddy.
http://164.100.24.208/lsq/quest.asp?qref=34553

[xc] ref90> 2001:Suicide Attack in Indian Parliament, bbc.co.uk
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/december/13/newsid_3695000/3695057.stm

[xci] ref91> ibid

[xcii] ref92> PIB Press Release, 20th February, 2003, Ministry of Defense,
De-Mining of forward Areas.
http://pib.nic.in/archieve/lreleng/lyr2003/rfeb2003/20022003/r2002200311.html

[xciii] ref93> Anjali Mody, Three sentenced to death in Parliament Attack
Case, The Hindu, Thrusday, December 19 2002, Front page.
http://www.hinduonnet.com/2002/12/19/stories/2002121905170100.htm

[xciv] ref94> Times of India, Parliament Attack chronology, 29 October, 2003.
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/256595.cms

[xcv] ref95> Government if India, Ministry of Civil Avaition, Lok Sabha,
Unstarred Question, No. 177, To Be Answered on 18.11.2002, Smart Card to Air
India Passengers, Paty Ripple Kyndiah.
http://164.100.24.208/lsq/quest.asp?qref=48948

[xcvi] ref96> Government if India, Ministry of Civil Avaition, Lok Sabha,
Unstarred Question, No. 2218, To Be Answered on 18.03.2002, Smart Card to
Employees working at the Air ports, Smt Shyama Singh, Kambalapadu E.
Krishnamurthy. http://164.100.24.208/lsq/quest.asp?qref=38118

[xcvii] ref97> Government if India, Ministry of Civil Avaition, Lok Sabha,
Unstarred Question, No. 3175, To Be Answered on 05.08.2002, Smart Card
Security System in Air ports, Kambalapadu E. Krishnamurthy.
http://164.100.24.208/lsq/quest.asp?qref=46999

[xcviii] ref98> Government if India, Ministry of Consumer Affairs Food and
Public Distribution, Lok Sabha, Unstarred Question, No. 4192, To Be Answered
on 19.04.2002, Smart Card for PDS, Chadda Suresh Reddy, Gaddam Ganga Reddy.
http://164.100.24.208/lsq/quest.asp?qref=40088

[xcix] ref99> rediff.com, Elections 2004, Manmohan Singh, 67 Ministers Sworn
in, May 22, 2004. http://in.rediff.com/election/2004/may/22man.htm

[c] ref100> National e-Governance Plan,National e Governance Plan - Workshop
with States and UTs, 11-12 March 2005, Hotel Samrat, New Delhi.
http://www.mit.gov.in/plan/cmmp.asp 05 National Citizen Database Ministry of
Home Affairs/Registrar General of India (RGI ) ppt Slide 5
http://www.mit.gov.in/plan/ppt/national%20ID.ppt

[ci] ref101> Government Of India Ministry Of Home Affairs Lok Sabha Starred
Question No 37 To Be Answered On 22.07.2003 Multipurpose Identity Cards 37.
Shri Dalpat Singh Paraste Mohan Rawale.
http://164.100.24.208/lsq/quest.asp?qref=62367

[cii] ref102> Reforming the National Security System - Recommendations of
the Group of Ministers (The report is in pdf ) CONTENTS Chapter V Border
Management Page 58. http://mod.nic.in/newadditions/welcome.html

[ciii] ref103> ibid

[civ] ref104> ibid, Chapter V Border Management. 5.110. Pg. 85

[cv] ref105> Government Of India Ministry Of Consumer Affairs And Public
Distribution Lok Sabha Unstarred Question No 6996 To Be Answered On
11.05.2000 Cancellation Of Ration Cards 6996. Smt. Jayaben B. Thakkar.
http://164.100.24.208/lsq/quest.asp?qref=4269

[cvi] ref106> Government Of India Ministry Of Law And Justice Lok Sabha
Unstarred Question No 1697 To Be Answered On 09.03.2007 Voters Identity
Cards 1697. Shri Jyotiraditya Madhavrao Scindia.
http://164.100.24.208/lsq14/quest.asp?qref=41635

[cvii] ref107> ibid

[cviii] ref108> ibid

[cix] ref109> Reforming the National Security System - Recommendations of
the Group of Ministers (The report is in pdf ) CONTENTS Chapter IV Internal
Security Page 50. http://mod.nic.in/newadditions/welcome.html

[cx] ref110> Dipak Mishra, Bihar govt refuses to implement ID-card plan,13
February, The Times Of India,Cities: Patna.
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/37306745.cms

[cxi] ref111> ibid

[cxii] ref112> ibid

[cxiii] ref113> Surojit Mahalonbis, People count gaining smooth momentum,
The Times Of India,23 Jul, 2004, Cities: Delhi.
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/788272.cms

[cxiv] ref114> Deepak K Upreti DH News Service New Delhi,National ID cards
to be ready soon, Deccan Herald,Monday, March 26, 2007.
http://www.deccanherald.com/deccanherald/Mar262007/national019192007326.asp

[cxv] ref115> ibid

[cxvi] ref116> National Securities Depositories Ltd. Launch of Central
Database of Market Participants https://nsdl.co.in/mapin.php

[cxvii] ref117> National Skills Registry Description.
https://nationalskillsregistry.com/NSR_DESCRIPTION.html

[cxviii] ref118> Working Groups / Task Force for the Eleventh Five Year Plan
(2007-2012).Planning Commission, Government of India 4.Development Policy
Division Entitlement reform for empowering the poor: The Integrated Smart
Card Report (ISC). January 2007 Report: MS Word.
http://planningcommission.nic.in/aboutus/committee/11wrkgindx.htm

[cxix] ref119> ibid Chapter 2, Multi Application smart Card. 2.5 Application
of Unique ID to Government schemes page 8
http://planningcommission.nic.in/aboutus/committee/11wrkgindx.htm

[cxx] ref120> ibid

[cxxi] ref121> ibid Chapter 2, Multi Application smart Card. 2.5 Application
of Unique ID to Government schemes page 9
http://planningcommission.nic.in/aboutus/committee/11wrkgindx.htm

[cxxii] ref122> ibid

[cxxiii] ref123> ibid