[Reader-list] Jinnah to Jihad - book review

[Rahul Asthana]

Another article (which is also a review of a book by an Indian journalist)by a Pakistani analyst.
http://www.chowk.com/site/articles/index.php?id=16195
Jinnah to Jihad
Agha Amin August 5, 2009
Tags: Kashmir , book , India Pakistan

A brilliant Indian journalist Arvin Bahl has 

 written an excellent book on Kashmir Dispute.

I had an opportunity with interacting him in 2005 when he was writing this book and he was most kind to acknowledge my very humble inputs. A Pakistani would not have been so intellectually honest as Bahl.

Bahls book acted as a catalyst in igniting me to re-reflect on Kashmir. Gist of my conclusions is as following :--

1-Kashmir was born out of Mr Jinnahs disagreement to accept the simple majority formula of a state with Hindu majority joining India and Muslim majority joining Pakistan. This point was discussed in some detail by H.V. Hodson in his monumental book The Great Divide.

2-At the military and political level right from the start Kashmir served as a justification to military ambitions of generals and political ambitions of ambitious politicians trying to prove themselves as Bismarks, Cavours, Mustafa Kemals, Napoleons and Mahmud Ghaznavis. A means to galvanise the masses just like Daud Khan used Durand Line to galvanise the Afghans with diasatorous consequences. At the military level Pakistan missed the opportunities it had in 19447-48 and 1965 because of political and military incompetence.

3-At the ethnic level Kashmir was a case of a Punjabi speaking tract of land occupied by India. It recieved its greatest boost in General Zias time because Zia was a Punjabi. Zia laid the framework of the Kashmir low intensity war with half baked lessons from Afghan war. The same blue print has been followed by the Pakistani military to date. Even Zia the clown that he was borrowed the idea from Major General Akbar Khan who discussed this in some detail in his book Raiders in Kashmir.

4-Kashmir is a non issue in Sindh,Balochistan and now NWFP. In the past it was a non issue in East Bengal. Initially the idea was to manipulate the tribal Pashtuns in name of Jihad and loot/rapine. This was well till 2001 but when Musharraf committed the grand strategic blunder of sending the army against Pashtuns it became null and void.

5-Kashmir is a clever ploy used by the Pakistani military to assert its nuisance value.

6-Kashmir has been used by foreign powers like Britain and China to pressurise India.

7-In the aftermath of the Kargil faux pas Kashmir war became discredited and after the NWFP war of 2002-till to date Kashmir is far more discredited.

8-Kashmir is a tool to maintain primacy of the generals in Pakistani politics.

9-Kashmir will keep Pakistan a hostage to extremists and ambitious generals and politicians till the final Indo Pak war already being fought at the covert level is decided. It appears that the issue will be decided in next 5 to 10 years. Sanity will not prevail and the irrational forces in mans nature will prevail. It is the same situation as before WW One. Irrational forces will dominate and the issue will be decided after an immense amount of bloodshed. So be it because man as Freud long ago discovered is irrational.

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Former American President Bill Clinton referred to Kashmir as the most dangerous place on earth. In 1999 nuclear-armed powers India and Pakistan fought a war over Kashmir, and again in 2002 they came close to another. The Kashmir dispute represents one of the world's oldest and most intractable conflicts, having befuddled policymakers since the Partition of the subcontinent in 1947. Author Arvin Bahl attempts to analyze this conflict in the context of international relations theory, drawing on a variety of sources, including interviews with leading figures of the Indian and Pakistani establishments.

Bahl argues that the question of the Kashmir dispute is really the question of why the liberation of the Kashmir Valley from Indian rule has been a foremost Pakistani national interest since the Partition. Realism, the dominant theory of international relations, argues that regardless of era, region, ideology or domestic politics, states will behave in the same ways when faced with similar situations in the international system, namely they will try to maximize the state s interests. Yet, Pakistan s quest for control of the Kashmir Valley represents a case in which a country s foreign policy cannot be explained by realism, and realism s main assumption of the state as a rational actor appears to be violated. The Kashmir Valley has little strategic importance to Pakistan, Pakistan has almost no chance of obtaining it against a much stronger power that dismembered it in a previous war and its economy is being destroyed by military confrontation with India,
 which also threatens its security.

This study attempts to explain the puzzle of Pakistan s seemingly irrational policy behavior on Kashmir by developing a framework combining liberal and constructivist approaches. Constructivists emphasize the importance of ideas, ideologies and identities when observing how states behave. The ideology that Pakistan was founded on, the two-nation theory, makes ending Indian rule over the Kashmir Valley of utmost national interest. For Pakistan to concede that a Muslim majority region that is contiguous with it can be a part of India would be for Pakistan to accept that there was no need for the Partition of the subcontinent along religious lines and the creation of Pakistan in the first place. Liberals focus on understanding domestic politics in order to understand a country s actions in the international system. The Pakistani military, the country s most powerful institution since its formation, has used the conflict with India to bring about and
 legitimize its dominance of the country.

South Asia gained prominence in American foreign policy after the 9/11 attacks and the standoff that ensued between India and Pakistan in early 2002. Thus, this study concludes with policy recommendations, primarily to American policymakers, for dealing with Pakistan and Kashmir based on the analysis developed in the preceding chapters. This book, we hope, is an eye-opener for all general readers. It will be found immensely useful and informative by students, researchers and teachers of History, Political Science, International Relations and South Asian Studies. 

About the Author

Arvin Bahl is an investment banker based in New York City. He studied at Princeton University and received his A.B. from the University s Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. He graduated with highest honors (Summa Cum Laude), was elected to the prestigious Phi Beta Kappa Society and was awarded the Richard Ullman Prize for best thesis on American foreign policy in the Woodrow Wilson School. Bahl has written extensively on South Asian matters.