[Reader-list] Kashmir in the AfPak equation

[Sanjay Kak]

However horrid the "AfPak" coinage is, this may be useful as an
indicator of US thinking in the region.
Best
Sanjay KaK

http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/08/18/kashmir_in_the_afpak_equation

Kashmir in the AfPak equation

Tue, 08/18/2009 - 10:59am

By Paul Staniland

When Kashmir is discussed in the strategic discourse these days, it is
usually in the context of the broader stabilization effort in the
region. Reducing tensions between India and Pakistan would improve
Pakistani cooperation in Afghanistan and thus advance US interests.
But Kashmir itself is curiously absent from many of these discussions
-- the assumption seems to be that between them Delhi and Islamabad
control the Kashmir Valley, and once the governments agree on the high
politics, Kashmiris will fall into line.

Lydia Polgreen's Sunday New York Times article and Kashmir's recent
history instead clearly show that, for better and worse, Kashmiris
have the capacity to surprise everyone, even Indian and Pakistani
intelligence agencies. Though violence has substantially dropped since
2003, the last two years have been in many respects the most dramatic
since the insurgency began in 1988.

The summer of 2008 saw a prolonged series of massive street protests
over land use issues that catalyzed a broader movement against Indian
policy, followed in 2009 by another round of demonstrations against
human rights abuses (including a double rape-murder) allegedly
committed by the security forces. Both series of protests were able to
shut down parts, and at times all, of the Valley for weeks at time.

Yet in between these protests, there was a state assembly election
during the winter of 2008 marked by surprisingly high voter turnout,
followed by a national election with decent turnout during in the
spring of 2009. This political rollercoaster was most recently capped
by a sordid series of allegations and counter-allegations between the
Valley's main political parties, including the faux-resignation of the
state's Chief Minister amidst microphone throwing, shouting matches,
and walk-outs in the state assembly.

There are two realities in Kashmir that are under-appreciated
elsewhere, and which have implications for any future attempts to
settle the dispute (or even just reduce tensions between India and
Pakistan).

First, the era of mass protest has returned after a grim period in
which brutal, extremely violent insurgency and counterinsurgency
dominated political life in Kashmir. This political mobilization is
often inspired or directed by political leaders of various ideologies,
but it shows that mass unrest and disaffection have not disappeared.
They are now being expressed openly, and in significant numbers. While
in Kashmir it is impossible to miss the depth of sentiment against
Indian policy (what Polgreen calls "seemingly bottomless Kashmiri
rage").

Second, the politics of the Valley have become far more closely
contested than either the period before militancy, or that of much of
the 1990s. Since the rise of the People's Democratic Party (PDP) in
the late 1990s, Valley politics have moved beyond the hegemonic
control of the National Conference (NC) and into a hard-fought,
extremely partisan battle for electoral power. The separatist movement
is also factionalized and often internally competitive. Any possible
settlements or confidence-building measures would need to survive this
polarized political climate.

In some strange sense, this means that Kashmir has actually become
more like "mainland" India, in which strikes, street protest, and
cutthroat partisan political competition are par for the course. There
are more avenues for people to politically express themselves, both in
and outside of mainstream politics, than in 1997 or 1987.

One of the huge differences between Kashmir and India south of the Pir
Panjal mountain range, however, is that these protests have been met
with lethal force by security forces who have legal impunity and are
not accountable to local elected representatives. Moreover, political
instability in the state has the potential to disastrously unsettle
India-Pakistan relations - what would be a parochial tussle for power
among obscure parties in Karnataka or a routinely raucous street
protest in Uttar Pradesh has serious geopolitical implications in
Kashmir.

If the United States tries to facilitate deals over Kashmir in the
future, as some suggest and others fear, it must pay very close
attention to the politics on the ground in the Valley. Kashmir looks
remarkably different from the streets of Srinagar than it does from
the seminar circuits of Delhi, and Kashmiris are serious political
players who can thwart the agendas of the Indian and Pakistani
governments.

Neither Delhi nor Islamabad have strong track records in predicting or
controlling politics in Kashmir, which has an unpredictable, whirlwind
political dynamic all its own. Any effort to reduce tensions over
Kashmir, with an eye to stabilizing the broader region, must build a
coalition that includes at least some major indigenous Kashmiri
stakeholders; without this, no deal will realistically bring peace or
stability. Taking Kashmiris seriously is essential for slowly removing
Kashmir from the "AfPak" equation.

Paul Staniland is a Ph.D candidate in MIT's Department of Political
Science and Security Studies Program.