[Reader-list] 'Encounter' at Batla House: Unanswered Questions
Shuddhabrata Sengupta
shuddha at sarai.net
Mon Feb 23 09:52:36 IST 2009
Dear all,
This list has had discussion on the so called 'encounter' at Batla
House, in the vicinity of Jamia Nagar in New Delhi in the past year.
Here is a synopsis and a few details of the recently released
'report' by the Jamia Teachers Solidarity Group about this incident.
I hope that readers on this list will find this of interest.
regards,
Shuddha
-------------
'Encounter' at Batla House: Unanswered Questions
A Report by Jamia Teachers' Solidarity group
60 pp., Rs 35, February 2009.
For Copies contact: Adil Mehdi (9990923027) indianlit at yahoo.com /
Ahmed Sohaib (9899462042) sohaibnirvan at gmail.com / Ghazi Shahnawaz
(9868221506) mgshahnawaz at gmail.com
Synopsis:
This report is based on police statements, press reports, testimonies
of families and friends of the accused and other documentary
evidence. It highlights the numerous contradictions in the police
version(s) about the 'encounter' and the accusations.
Some of the questions raised are:
1) Did the police have prior information about the presence of
dreaded 'terrorists' in L-18 when they raided the flat? So far,
conflicting versions have been provided by the police. In one
version, they claim ignorance of such confirmed information, pleading
that they went in only for a routine recee and were ambushed (then
how did the Police Commissioner within hours declare Atif and Sajid
to be the mastermind behind all blasts since 2005, when Sajid would
have been 14-years-old); and in another, they claim to have put Atif
under surveillance since 26th July 2008 (so how did these boys manage
to plant bombs all over the city right under the Delhi Police's nose?)
2) Were the Police men wearing Bullet proof vests (BPV) or not?
In some statements, the Delhi Police said that they avoided wearing
the BPVs in order not to alert the 'terrorists'; in yet other
statement they claim that their officer escaped all injury while
firing upon an armed Sajid because he was wearing a BPV.
3) What explains the injury marks on the bodies of the deceased
boys? Atif's back was sloughed off and Sajid had bullet wounds on his
head as though bullets had been pumped into his head while he was
made to kneelāall of which raises doubts about the genuineness of
the 'shootout'.
4) The Police claim that Sajid was an expert bomb maker who used
quartz clocks, detonators, ammonium nitrate, yet none of the
'recoveries' which even the police have purportedly made, comprise
any of the above material that could be used for making Sajid's
'signature' bombs. So what made Dadwal and his force conclude that
Sajid was the one behind the blasts in Delhi and elsewhere?
5) Why is there such rigid resistance to any independent probe
on the part of the government and the Delhi Police? So much so that
the Lieutenant Governor has even rejected a magisterial enquiry,
which is mandatory as per NHRC guidelines on encounter killings.
6) Why are post-mortem reports of all the three killed not being
made public? Is there something to hide?
The report also carries brief profiles of the accused in the case,
including the two students killed. The fact that most of them were
students enrolled in educational institutions, whether Jamia or
elsewhere, or working gives the impression that they were regular
young men in search of better opportunities in life. None of their
actions puts them under suspicion: they enrolled as students, bought
sim cards in their name, signed a rent lease deed, duly verified by
the police (copy in report), provided genuine address details etc.
Moreover, the day after the blasts in Delhi, there were several
arrests and detentions in the Jamia Nagar area, which was common
knowledge. It is highly unlikely that actual terrorists would make no
attempt to move away from a neighbourhood which was obviously under
the police scanner to a safer hideout.
Testimonies of eyewitnesses at the Jan Sunwai (12 Oct 2008, Batla
House) have also been included in the report. Neighbours testified
that they found nothing strange or suspicious about the boys and
resented the fact that no senior local resident was taken into
confidence or to crosscheck any information about suspected
terrorists. The manner in which the police operated raised suspicions
about their real motives. Further, they also said that while the
operation was on, the policemen could be seen throwing pots etc on to
the 4th floor flat of L-18, and that they heard gun shots of only one
kind. This naturally raises the misgiving that the police was trying
to create an impression of cross fire and struggle, where none existed.
'Encounter' at Batla House also highlights the contradictions in the
'mastermind' theories developed by various state police departments.
In addition, it carries profiles of all those illegally detained by
the Delhi Police Special Cell in connection with the Delhi blasts; a
section on virtual terror that anti-terror or special cells of the
police departments unleash in the name of fighting terror: illegal
detentions, false recoveries, forging evidence etc. Special reference
is made to the case of Irshad Ali and Md. Qamar, who were implicated
in a false terror case by a team of the Delhi Police Special Cell.
Incidentally, many members of this team were part of the Batla House
'encounter' too.
Shuddhabrata Sengupta
The Sarai Programme at CSDS
Raqs Media Collective
shuddha at sarai.net
www.sarai.net
www.raqsmediacollective.net
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