[Reader-list] Iran-discussions on the readerlist

[Junaid]

Dear Shuddha,

I know you have been one of the few consistent supporters of the struggles
of Kashmiri people in India. And I also know that your concerns regarding
Iran are not informed by right-wing Western propaganda but by a solid
scholarship. I've no doubt in mind in stating that what you say here
benefits all of us on the list. Amidst the croaky clamour that some of my
Pandit compatriots raise on the discussion board and the garbage the keep
burning, you have stood like a rock in defense of truth.

Having said that I maintain that I don't agree 'completely' with you on
Iran. When I read your posts about Iran, they have an uncanny resemblance to
regular columns that appear in the Bismarck Tribune, a small newspaper here
in the Mid-West of the US. (One of its sensational stories the other day was
"Obama's Secret Meetings with Muslims Exposed--Why is he talking to the
Enemy?"). Either Bismarck Tribune is doing some wonderful journalism or
there is this one story we all are repeating. And I get suspicious of
singular narratives.

You could choose to highlight the numerous advances Iranian society has made
after 1979. From the decay of the later Shah years to a feeling of progress
and a possibility of achievement that pervaded Iran in the 90s and later.
You could choose to say that the ratio of women to men in education and
employment in Iran has been increasing faster than most developing
countries. You could say that workers in Iran still make better wages than
in other developing countries.
This<http://www.finfacts.ie/biz10/globalworldincomepercapita.htm>webite
suggests that GNP per capita in Iran is higher than many other
developing countries, and it increased by around 15 percent from 2005 to
2006. GNP per capita in Iran is about four times that in India or Pakistan.
Poverty and inequality (suggested by an improving GINI coefficient) has
substantially improved in the post-Iran-Iraq war period. In fact, poverty in
Iran today is 1/8th of what it was before the revolution.

In contradiction to what most of the Western propaganda would have us
believe, the economic issues (and not "democracy!") have remained the
centre-piece of political debates in Iran since the revolution. Khomenie had
all along repeatedly mentioned that the revolution belonged to the
disinherited "Mostazafan" and the barefooted "Paberehnagan". In fact what
brought Ahmedinejad to power in 2005 was the deep-seated dissatisfaction
with the unkept promises of the revolution. People wanted an increased pace
at which their lives could improve in Iran. Ahmedinejad to them represented
a "change" from the stagnation that was beginning to sweep across Iran under
the belied promises of Khatami, who invested too much time in rhetorical
exchanges with his other clerics, than focus his energy on actually doing
something on the ground. Under Rafsanjani and Khatami one of the most
important politico-economic agenda--redistribution-- shifted to growth.
Under Ahmedinejad more welfare programs were initiated than earlier. Poor
had better access to electricity and clean drinking water than before. That
is atleast what UN's Human Development Index suggests, which incidentally
places Iran much higher than India, and India with its "roaring" growth
rates etc, has made much less progress than Iran in removing poverty.

(Rakesh sahab, this is where comparison sometimes helps. I compare Iran to
India only to put things in perspective. Otherwise, we begin to mimic West
in their polemic, without pausing once to look over our own shoulder and see
what we are standing on.)

Ahmedinejad has consistently argued with the clergy that minimum wages
should be raised by 40 percent, but faced criticism from many of the
so-called reformists and the hardliners alike. The reformist-clerical
economic agenda is closer to Montek-ManMohan one, and which is why they hate
Ahmedinejad who gives subsidized fuel and food to the Iran's poor. They hate
him because he has consistently confronted elite economists who would prefer
"trickle-down" to redistribution. For Tehran's elite where all major
industries are based, the rural poor (which is most of the people) are no
concern. During boom times of late 60s or  the crash of late 70's and early
80s rural poor had remained insulated in their relative poverty. They began
to see change only by mid-90s. And after Ahmedinejad came to power
significant shifts took place which favoured rural poor over the moneyed
Tehranians who did not know where to pump their money in. Yes, inflation
increased, because interest rates were cut, and it was a bitter pill that
government was willing to take, in the interest of the poor farmers to get
cheaper loans. Liquidity was down because Tehran's rich hoarded money.
Anything they could to crush Ahmedinejad. But I am not saying that
Ahmedinejad was some messiah for the poor. In fact, many of his early
promises were reversed. And one of the reasons for that was his too much
focus on foreign policy.

I am all for demilitarization of states, including disbanding of the Basij
or National Gaurds and Special Forces in the US, or the Salwa Judums and
Ikhwanis and SoGs or STF's and Rashtriya Rifles. All states have overt and
covert forces who in the name of national territorial integrity or in
defense of "our way of life" or Islam or Jewish State persecute and stifle
opposition. Such system should vaporise. But I don't think Iran deserves a
special treatment in this regard. Compared to the devastation visisted by US
in Iraq or Afghanistan or the Indian oppression in Kashmir, the Iranian
Basij look like cute innocent babies! When you speak of Khudro motor strike
and its aftermath, I think of Honda motors in Haryana and the farmers in
Rajasthan. I think of the Assam Rifles in Manipur. No one on this forum
discussed the possibility of disbanding Haryana Police or the CRPF or the
Assam Rifles! Or call them "much-hated"! What brings this hate...(a little
later).

On nuclear question most Iranians are happy with Ahmedinejad, as suggested
by a poll done by the Mehr News Agency. He took a principled stand on the
issue. Stoking anti-Iranian hatred West, with a lot of Israeli poking,
raised the demon of an Iranian N-bomb. Ahmedinejad always stated that use of
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes was a right Iran had under
international treaties, and he was right. I don't understand why the US and
Israel are playing the defenders of world when they have stockpiles of
weapons with which they threaten and bully the West Asia and other regions.
The Iranian nuclear debate has become laughable with the comic entry of
Indian "strategic analysts" who argue that Iran should be prevented from
acquiring nuclear tech at any cost. If anything, it is India, Pakistan, and
most importantly Israel which should be the topic of such discussions. But
also US, Russia, UK, France and China.

The "anti-semitism" charge that you levelled against Ahmedinejad is
obnoxious. First of all let me say that "anti-semitism" in the context of
Europe and US before (and to some extent immediately after the WWII) has
validity. In the present day and age, especially when it comes to charges
against Muslims, I find it to be a purely political-rhetorical instrument to
stiffle dissent and disagreement with the Western narrative of WWII,
establishment of the Israeli entity and its actions subsequently. Holocaust
wasn't a Middle-Eastern experience, Nakbah is. What befell Palestinians and
what continues to make them live sub-human lives is what should count. Most
of the time, Ahmedinejad was mistranslated or only partially quoted. And he
said Israel should be shifted to Europe. And yes, I think that is what
should have happened. If Central European and Eastern European Jews were
facing persecution, their Israel should have been established there, and not
on an innocent people's land. I think if Ahmedinejad truly said "Israel
should be wiped of the map" it is of not much consequence than Netanyahu
giving a go-ahead to further constructions in Occupied Territories. It is of
less consequence than a Golda Meir saying "Palestinians don't exist" or
Moshe Dayan saying "Palestinians are insects". It is not of that great a
significance than Madeliene Albright saying if 'Santions against Iraq costs
half a million Iraqi lives, "it is worth it"'.  Or a Bush saying, "War on
Terror is a War without End". Or Tzipi Livni saying "We'ill teach 'em a
lesson". Because their words lead to a mass slaughter by Israelis of
Palestinians like in Gaza last year. Or in Sabra and Shatilla. Or Fallujah.
Or Baghdad.

What gets reported and said and narrated is what is given importance.
Ahmedinejad has continuously said that he respects Jews, which form a
significant minority in Iran. It is not Jews he has problems with, it is
Israel and the idea behind it. (Interestingly, one of the allegations that
royalist diasporic Iranians levelled at Ahmedinejad was that he was a Jew.
Reformists too were trying to spread it. The royalists had at one time
suspected Ruhollah Khomeinie as being a Jew!). Nobody on this forum speaks
about Netanyahu, the hawkish Israeli PM, and his rabid denial of Palestinian
statehood. I don't like him, and I know you don't either. I know you despise
him and perhaps hate him too, but did you question his win in the recent
election in Israel?

I have my doubts too about electoral democracy, but then it is a choice
between accepting people's choice or hurling out democracy itself. I know
CPIM played a lot of tricks in West Bengal, but I feel they won elections
too, and on their own. I guess Bengalis would have risen up in revolt much
before "electronic voting machine" came to their rescue if they thought they
were being cheated. I don't think Mamta was ever a better choice for
Bengalis. It is easy to cheat even with Electronic Voting Machines. In
Anantnag during the last election, my neighbour said her whole family had
voted (7 members, including 5 kids who are all below 15).

I'm not dismissing the possibility that many irregularities (600 as you say)
might have happened during Iran elections. Iranian authorities from the
beginning said that complaints may be lodged if there are any. Moussavi
instead chose to play the populist for a change and with support from
traditional clerical elite in Tehran, who despise Ahmedinejad (a poor
blacksmith's son), launched a campiagn to delegitimise the elections. If he
was right then he should have brought the charges to the front, and played
his game on a more solid ground. While he waved "Allah O Akbar" to hundreds
of young people on Tehran streets, he couldn't validate his claims. The
Guardian Council, which in many ways acts like the Election Commission of
India, and which had vetted both Ahmedinejad as well as Moussavi (and
allowed both to participate) meanwhile said elections were fair but
irregularities, if any, must be looked into.

I don't agree that there has to be something like a Guardian Council, if
anything its role should simply be to ensure fair and free polls. But it is
not so much of a monster it is made out to be. Khatami, the more reformist
than Moussavi, was vetted and allowed to contest by the same Council. He won
too and ruled. Why did no one contest Ahmedinejad's first election?
Ahmedinejad's popularity has remained consistent from the beginning of his
first presidential bid, and not just on the counting day of this last
election. He always enjoyed the support of the 2/3rd of the Iranian masses,
an overwhelming majority of whom are rural and urban poor. And I believe 4
and 44 confusion can help both candidates equally. The fact that protests
were concentrated to Tehran testifies that rural people were not so shocked
with the results. And contrary to what you say, other Iranian cities and
towns have been remarkably silent.

Imperialism, and its opposition, is not a grand-narrative, it is a reality,
perhaps the most felt and experienced reality in todays world. I don't
believe that what is happening about Iran in the discursive sphere can be
understood separately, without bringing imperialism into perspective. As you
rightly pointed out US and British intervention in Iran in 1953 was the
original sin. And the way Reza Shah Pehlavi was babied by the West in return
of massive oil contracts was only bound to snowball into a structural change
in Iran.

Religion played a big role in the revolution. The idea of left-wing in Iran
during 1979 needs to be revisited. Islamic revolution was religion-inspired
but socialist in orientation. But religion also played a big role in the
protests in Eastern Europe especially Poland in the 1980s. One revolution
was welcome, and another was despised. Khomenie, who upon his arrival from
exile in 1979 was received by millions of people in Tehran (yes, 2 million
according to a BBC documentary I can't remember the name of but was recently
broadcast), had become the rallying cry and the major organiser of the
revolution. The "betrayal" of the promises that you spoke about did happen.
Yes, who can deny people were not persecuted. Yes, it was not what Iranians
had bargained for. But at the time the referendum was held (April 1979)
there was very little of the Bisij or the Revolutionary Gaurd, so no
question of coercion. And people overwhelmingly supported the establishment
of the Islamic Republic. There were unfortunate incidents like hostage
crisis in the American Embassy but many such incidents were precipated by
the actions and interference of the US and British govts. Many persecutions
that took place were also a direct result of the war that Saddam's Iraq
launched on Iran, and the covert (Cheney's gas bomb) support US gave to the
Iraqi leader. Left alone, Iran faced the darkest side of Western coercion.
Not only was Iran and Iranians suddenly despised and hated and depicted as
Evil, but they were attacked too. The shooting down of an Iranian airplane
which was carrying 290 people by the US Navy was the worst one could
imagine. Americans later said it was a case of mis-recognition!! This story
has been already forgotten, with no one talking of reparations to Iranians
who lost their lives.

Since the day Ahmedinejad became President, American and Israeli war
hysteria has kept Ahmedinejad's office busy in deflecting the threats.Iran
is constantly under threat of being attacked by powerful foreign forces
(remember Seymour Hersh's reports two years back), and when such threats are
mixed with evil stereotyping (using films like 300 for eg.), and when it is
openly declared by startegic experts that the war is going to be even
bloodier than in Iraq, I guess the country would be greatly worried and feel
comfortable with a president who can stand up to such forces, than with one
who makes quirky jumps from being a painter to suddenly be a Presidential
hopeful, who has nothing to show to impress, who says he is a "reformist"
but never clearly defines his agenda, who eats the Western bait.

That Daniel Pipes and some Moshev says Israel would actually prefer
Ahmedinejad should be a reason for Iranians to prefer Moussavi is
preposterous and an insult to the judgement of Iranians. I wouldn't make my
judgement in reaction to what Pipes or Lewis or others of their clique say.
That would be giving them too much power and influence over me. I don't
trust them on Muslim-bashing, and I don't trust them on their mischievously
concocted fake liking for Ahmedinejad.

One thing about the role of Islamists in 1953. Across the Muslim world
Islamists have persecuted and have been persecuted. There is no objective
basis for us to like or dislike all of them. In Egypt, Muslim Brotherhood
was ready to support former Imperialists against Nasser, but they were
targetted and slaughtered in Egypt once Nasser's grip got stronger. Under
the corrupt rule of Hosni Mubarak, Muslim Brotherhood remain a strong,
albiet suppressed, voice for democratic reform. In Algeria too FIS was
seeking democratic reforms after they won elections in early 90s but were
barred by the military from taking their rightful place in the government.
There is no actual proof that Israel encouraged Muslim Brotherhood. I also
support the theory that Israel sat on the fence watching while Muslim
Brotherhood grew. Yes, Israel could have eliminated Muslim Brotherhood or
substantially destroyed it if it chose to do so. But it is a blatant lie
that Israel supported or helped Hamas. Hamas was formed in the midst of the
First Intifada in 1988. It was formed because a huge faction within Muslim
Brotherhood felt there is no alternative to active resistance. In any case
again, I wouldn't form my judgement on a logic that what Israel likes I
should dislike. Because now that Israel seems comfortable with a defanged
PLO, should we not like Hamas by default? I don't buy the logic.

So yes there was a section of Islamists in Iran who did not like Mossadegh's
more secular outlook. But it was not the case with all the Islamists. It is
very unclear what role Hojatulislam Khomenie played at that time. There are
many conspiracy theories, and you have also narrated one of them. But it is
true that the royalists persecuted the Islamists like never before. One
cannot forget that main victims of the dreaded SAVAK were mostly Islamists,
but also many Communists. In fact, during the Shah years Islamists were the
primary victims of the great game that Soviets and Americans played in Iran,
being victimised by the proxies of both sides.

So, my question is what brings about this "hate", when people speak of Iran.
What causes some to hate and despise the Iranian government when most other
governments around the world are not much different. Although, Kashmiris
face oppression and persecution everyday at the hands of Indian troops, I
don't HATE Indian government. I just want them to roll back their occupation
from Kashmir. I dislike Indian government policies on Kashmir. And yet I
accept Indian government's validity in India because it's got Indian
people's mandate. I don't hate Manmohan or Sonia Gandhi or even any soldier
in particular. What brings your hatred toward Iran? Do you hate Manmohan the
same way as Ahmedinejad? And I am sure you have more actual grievances with
Manmohan's policies than Ahmedinejad's, who doesn't affect you directly?
Yet, still.. you have such strong feelings!

Shuddha, I just feel we sometimes play into a script and we need a critical
distance and an ethical objectivity to develop opinions. I know you are very
busy with many other things. So if you don't find time to respond, it is ok.

Always a friend,

Junaid





On 6/30/09, Shuddhabrata Sengupta <shuddha at sarai.net> wrote:
>
> Dear Junaid,
> Thank you for your well argued response to my post on Iran.
>
> I have no hesitation at all in saying that with respect to the regime that
> rules Iran, I think my usage of the word 'hatred' is a measured and
> considered. I have nothing but hatred and rage for the Ahmedinejad-Khamenei
> clique, and the reason I have this is because I have a deep and abiding
> engagement with Iran and its history.
>
> You and I may agree on many things, and we usually do, especially on
> Kashmir, but I have to say that on Iran we have to be clear that we have
> differences. And that does not worry me at all, nor does it diminish my
> categorical support to your positions on Kashmir. Differences are healthy
> and positive things. I write to you, not in opposition, but in the spirit of
> critical solidarity, and I hope it will be understood as such.
>
> Let me, first of all say a few things in order to clarify where I am coming
> from on Iran.
>
> I actually despise the Hugo Chavez regime. And I say this as a person who
> places himself squarely on the left.  think Chavez represents the worst form
> of authoritarian populism, buttressed (not unlike Ahmadinejad) by oil
> wealth, and the backing of the military establishment, and I think his brand
> of politics is actually harmful for the building up of a credible global
> left wing alternative. I also think Hamas are reactionary.
>
> But, notwithstanding my personal distaste for Chavez and what he
> represents, and Hamas, I do not doubt that both Chavez and Hamas command the
> support of the majority of the populations in Venezuela and the Gaza strip
> (though not, for Hamas, in the West Bank in Palestine). And so, I have no
> hesitation in saying that they enjoy the electoral mandate given to them by
> the populations that they represent. The intenrational observers in place
> during the Venezuelan and Palestinian elections, have also not indicated
> that the elections in Venezuela and Palestine/Gaza were anything but
> regular.
>
> Iran is a different matter. Elections were also regularly held in the
> Soviet Union, in Poland, in Czechoslovakia (during the years of Soviet
> hegemony) and they continue to be held in China. In each of these cases, the
> ruling regime always maintained that it had won, and by ludicrously handsome
> figures. It won due to massive manipulation of the electoral process. Not
> very far from home, until recently (and until electronic voting machines
> introduced a new, as yet, untried technology of selection) the ruling Left
> Front government in West Bengal had near perfected techniques of 'electoral
> management' that always gave them the edge. George Bush did exactly the same
> with his 'stolen election'. You yourself know very well how elections have
> been and are 'managed', especially by the intelligence agencies of the
> Indian state  in Jammu and Kashmir. I think that the elections we have
> witnessed in Iran are not very different from these instances. Finally, let
> us at least concede that an electoral process in which candidates are vetted
> by an unelected, unrepresentative body, like happens in Iran, where the
> Guardians Council decides who is suitable and who is not, can never be
> characterized as a free and fair election. So we can never really say who,
> or what kind of politics enjoys the confidence of the majority of the
> population of Iran. Even if that is the case, there was a feeling
>
> There are numerous instances of electoral irregularities, which include the
> fact that the polling percentage for Ahmadinejad
> stayed constant, from the very beginning to the very end of the counting
> process, leading to the reasonable suspicion that the outcome was somehow
> 'fixed' in advance. The opposition has in fact indicated more than 600
> specific and concrete instances of irregularity. Here is only one instance -
> that deliberate confusions within the ballot marking system (between the
> number for the candidate and a code of endorsement) such as 4 for Moussavi
> and 44 for Ahmadinejad, lay them open to manipulation. Numerous instances of
> voter intimidation by the Basij, especially in poorer Industrial and rural
> districts. And finally, the crackdown on phones, internet and email
> communication that made communication difficult for opposition activists.I
> have been in touch with friends in Iran throughout this process, and they
> are utterly dismayed at what happened, exactly as people were dismayed when
> elections were blatantly rigged in Kashmir in 1987. They have told me that
> reliable sources from within the ministry of the interior have communicated
> to them that the election was utterly, utterly rigged. And that the rigging
> was well planned from before.
>
> I am not a champion of Moussavi. I know very well that he is a part of the
> ruling establishment of the Islamic Republic, and that he was close to the
> section of left-leaning intellectuals in Iran who colluded with the Khomeini
> faction in the initial years after 1979, and that they were complicit (as
> was for instance the well known Iranian filmmaker, now Mousavi's
> representative, Mohsen Makhmalbaf, in the brutal repression of the 'left
> opposition' - their own former comrades). He is like a Khruschev after
> Stalin. No doubt a part of the system, but also its own internal adversary.
> This does not make him any less a luminary of the Islamic Republic, just as
> Khruschev was no less a Soviet luminary. And notwithstanding my critique of
> the Islamic Republic and the post 1920s Soviet Union, I can still maintain
> that there is a difference between a Khruschev and a Stalin, and that there
> are differences between Khomeini, Khameini, Ahmedinejad and Moussavi.
>
> But I also know that, over the years, Moussavi has grown closer to
> Ayatollah Montazeri, (once seen as Khomeini's successor) who made his
> opposition to the excesses of the regime quite clear and open, and who has
> been kept under virtual house arrest, since his removal from all positions
> of influence.
>
> But, at the present juncture, things are way beyond the question of what
> exactly Mousavi represents. To the large majority of Iranians, he represents
> the realistic possibility of change. The Ahmadinejad regime is, contrary to
> what you say, deeply unpopular amongst the working poor. Inflation has
> skyrocketed in Iran, wages have been cut, people have been laid off, there
> is deep economic discontent. He may have once enjoyed the support of a
> section of the working poor, because of his apparently 'incorruptible'
> image, but the growing corruption and nepotism, especially within the
> industrial and economic agencies managed by the elite of the Revolutionary
> Guard have strongly alienated him. So has his brutal handling of legitimate
> working class protest. Only last year, the Vahed Transport workers strike
> was brutally crushed, union leaders were arrested, tortured and one even had
> his tongue cut off. There has also been constant attrition in the Khodro
> automobile works (the regions biggest automobile producer) and in large
> sectors of industry.
>
> As for Ahmadinejad's anti-American and anti-Zionist posturing, I have very
> little to say. I do not think that the rhetoric of 'Anti-Imperialism' ,
> 'Anti-Zionism' and 'Anti-US' postures alone, which sustained tyrants ranging
> from Idi Amin to Indira Gandhi, necessarily has to endear us to anyone who
> spouts the same rhetoric, especially if they do so in the company of Klu
> Klux Klan functionaries like David Duke (as Ahmadinejad did in one of his
> 'Holocaust Investigation Conferences' in Tehran). In fact, I reiterate,
> Ahmadinejad is the best bet for reactionaries within the US and Israel. They
> can trust him, they know him, and they know that they can use his
> anti-Semitic lunacy to paint themselves as victims or potential victims and
> thus build the case for war against Iran. That is why people like Daniel
> Pipes and Efraim Halevy (former Mossad director) would rather have
> Ahmadinejad around.
>
> Finally, let me put a few other things in perspective. You invoked Mossadeq
> and the CIA-MI6 engineered coup against him in 1953, which to my mind, is
> the 'original sin' that began the whole process that led up to the mess in
> the entire region. The coup and its details are little known. And there is a
> kind of caginess surrounding it, even in Iran. Ahmadinejad himself has
> spoken about it once, in his famous 'love letter' to George Bush (where he
> invited George Bush, the good Christian, to join him, the good Muslim, in
> ridding the world of Evil). But even in that letter, Ahaminejad's reference
> to the event is opaque.
>
> What is little known, is the fact that the Islamists in Iran (though not
> all religious figures were Islamists) were strongly behind the coup. They
> were in fact injected with serious amounts of cash by the local CIA station
> then, and it is with this event that they first got their taste of political
> influence. Mossadeq's one time ally, Ayatollah Kashani (Khomeini's mentor)
> fell out with Mossadeq, when he (Mossadeq) introduced legislation hinting at
> land reforms and rights for women. It was at this time that bridges began
> being built between the beleagured Shah, the CIA station and the Ayatollah
> Kashani camp. Incidentally, one of the couriers between the Shah and the
> Ayatollah Kashani (and his ally in the town of Qom, Ayatollah Uzma
> Broujerdi) was the then young and rising, charismatic 'Hojatolislam'
> Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini (none other than the later 'Ayatollah' Khomeini).
>
> "Before and after the coup he (Khomeini) opposed Dr. Mossadegh and
> cooperated with the Shah. According to the Iranian historian, Nasser
> Pakdaman, in January 1953, after Mossadeq's cabinet had submitted a bill to
> Majles granting women the vote, Ayatollah Kashani opposed it. Ruhollah
> Khomeini — who was a hojatolislam at the time -- gave a sermon in Qom and
> called upon the folks in the mosque to go out and protest against the
> Mossadeq government and the bill."
>
> (See - http://www.ghandchi.com/iranscope/Anthology/Kazemzadeh/28mordad.htm
> )
>
> The Shah was grateful for the help he received, via the CIA from Khomeini
> and his mentors. And it was only later, in 1961-63, that the Islamists fell
> out with the Shah, and Khomeini began to take on an active 'oppositional'
> role. The Iranian Islamist regime has made many attempts to whitewash the
> realities of the 1953-1961 period and the honeymoon that the Shah had with
> the Islamists at that time, during and after which, he used the Islamist
> Fadayeen-e-Islam (with which Kashani and Khomeini were closely associated)
> to eliminate many traces of the 'left opposition'.
>
> This is reasonably well documented, and if you are interested, I can point
> you to more sources for this.
>
> This is why, Khomeini never had much regard for Mossadeq, and is even
> reported to have said 'Mossadeq slapped Islam, and we would have had to slap
> him back'.  Incidentally, in one of the numerous flip-flops that
> characterized Khomeini's ascendancy the Avenue named after Mossadeq in the
> initial heady days after the 1979 revolution was renamed, and almost all
> traces of his memory were eliminated. It is only recently that the legacy of
> Mossadeq is being put to some (limited) use, as an attempt to build a
> 'nationalist' consensus by a beleagured regime.
>
> If you examine the history of Iran carefully, I think one cannot but come
> to the conclusion that had the CIA not meddled in 1953, had the Shah not
> been restored, figures like Ayatollah Khomeini, and the eventual rise of the
> Islamic Republic might not have happened. In that case, we can only conclude
> that the Ayatollah Khomeini, and the regime that he inaugurated, is a
> beneficiary of CIA policies. Just as Hamas would never have had the
> influence it now commands if it did not tolerate the tacit acceptance, and
> indeed benevolence of the State of Israel, during the 1970s and 80s.
>
> Chickens do come to roost in the end. And the best laid plans go awry.
>
> warm regards,
>
> Shuddha
>
>
> Shuddhabrata Sengupta
> The Sarai Programme at CSDS
> Raqs Media Collective
> shuddha at sarai.net
> www.sarai.net
> www.raqsmediacollective.net
>
>
>