[Reader-list] Hindu divided family by Sudheendra Kulkarni

[Kshmendra Kaul]

Dear Anupam
 
Thanks for sharing this. That is one helluva honest and bold introspective piece by Kulkarni. Maybe there is yet some hope for BJP.
 
2 Reader List bounties in quick succession (in the midst of all the traded nonsense - including by me). 
 
This one posted by you and Santosh Desai's "Analyzing the constant election analysis" posted by Taha.
 
Kshmendra


--- On Mon, 6/8/09, anupam chakravartty <c.anupam at gmail.com> wrote:


From: anupam chakravartty <c.anupam at gmail.com>
Subject: [Reader-list] Hindu divided family by Sudheendra Kulkarni
To: "sarai list" <reader-list at sarai.net>
Date: Monday, June 8, 2009, 12:13 PM


*Hindu Divided Family*

*In a deeply introspective essay, LK Advani’s key aide says that if the BJP
wants to win, it needs to rethink its approach to Muslims, Hindutva, the
poor, the RSS, and itself*

*SUDHEENDRA KULKARNI* *
Political advisor, BJP*

FIRST THINGS first. Before I reflect on why the Bharatiya Janata Party lost
the Lok Sabha elections and how it can revive itself, it must be said that
the outcome of the polls is a resounding victory for India’s democracy.
True, there are many glaring deficiencies in our democracy. But the people
of India have shown once again to the world that it is they who decide the
fate of governments, parties and leaders in this country, and also that
their verdict is accepted by one and all in the polity. India is not like
China, where its communist rulers fear that free elections with multiple
choices before the people would destabilise their nation. Nor are we like
Thailand, where warring parties recently laid siege to the airport and
parliament building. We are not like many other countries in Asia and the
world where the sanctity of elections is contested, where leaders are jailed
or banished, and where the military replaces the independent judiciary and
the election commission. Undoubtedly, the renewed recognition that India,
inspite of its bewildering diversities and problems, is unshakable in its
commitment to democracy has raised its prestige globally. Even as a person
belonging to the defeated party, I feel proud of this triumph of India’s
democracy.

Next. Congratulations to the Prime Minister, Sonia Gandhi and their party.
They outsmarted the BJP in the electoral battle, which I believed along with
many others outside my party, was ours to lose. The BJP snatched defeat out
of the jaws of victory. The Congress did the opposite.

A third prefatory point. In commenting on the causes that led to the BJP’s
defeat, I cannot but say upfront that I too carry my share of
responsibility. As one who was closely associated with the party’s election
campaign, specifically the campaign of LK Advani, our prime ministerial
candidate, I too committed mistakes. To be meaningful, productive and
curative, collective introspection in the party must begin with each one
individually. Collective responsibility is a laudable principle, but it can
often become a mask for persons in key positions at the central and state
levels to evade their individual responsibility. This has often happened in
the BJP. The party must, therefore, conduct a rigorous and objective
analysis of all the factors that led to its defeat, and this should be done
with the participation of the largest possible number of party workers and
supporters at various levels.

Beneath the pervasive disappointment, the mood in the party is indeed
introspective. After all, this is the second consecutive defeat for the BJP
in its bid for power at the Centre. In 2004, it had lost after heading the
government of the National Democratic Alliance for six years. The verdict of
the people, hence, clearly meant that they wanted change. In 2009, after
five years of largely dismal performance by the government of the
Congress-led United Progressive Alliance, the BJP could not convince the
voters that they should vote in favour of change. Rather, the truth is that
the people wanted change but were not convinced that the BJP or the BJP-led
NDA assured the kind of change they wanted.

*REASONS FOR THE BJP DEFEAT IN 2009*

The BJP’s failure to convince the people on this score is rooted in a
combination of structural, political, ideological, organizational and
campaign-related reasons. The party’s longstanding structural weakness is
that although it has succeeded in bi-polarising India’s politics at the
Centre, its geographical presence in the country is much narrower than that
of the Congress. It won only one seat in four big states that together
account for 143 out of the 543 seats in the Lok Sabha — West Bengal (42),
Andhra Pradesh (42), Tamil Nadu (39) and Kerala (20). The Congress’ tally:
60 seats. Unless the BJP overcomes this structural weakness by increasing
its own political and electoral strength in these big states, it can never
emerge as an equal and durable alternative to the Congress nationally.

The second reason was the failure of the BJP’s political strategy — in
particular, its alliance strategy. A principal reason for the party’s
success in forming the government, under the leadership of Atal Behari
Vajpayee, in 1998 and 1999 was its ability to forge alliances, especially in
three of the four afore-mentioned big states (Trinamool Congress in West
Bengal; Telugu Desam Party in Andhra Pradesh; and first AIADMK and later DMK
in Tamil Nadu). Its alliance with the Biju Janata Dal in Orissa (21 Lok
Sabha seats) also proved to be extremely useful. In the aftermath of the
2004 defeat, many of our allies left the NDA. The main reason for their
leaving was not that the NDA had been defeated, but their perception that
the communal violence in Gujarat in 2002 was an important cause of the
defeat and, hence, their conclusion that continuation of the alliance with
the BJP would cost them Muslim votes. Between 2004 and 2009, the BJP did
nothing to address this factor. As a result, it failed to win back a single
ally in West Bengal, Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu, or win a single ally in
Kerala. Moreover, almost on the eve of the 2009 elections, the BJP actually
lost an important ally in Orissa due to inept alliance management.

It is true that, in the early months of 2009, the BJP forged three new
alliances — with Asom Gana Parishad in Assam, Ajit Singh’s Rashtriya Lok Dal
in UP, and Omprakash Chautala’s Indian National Lok Dal in Haryana. But
these could not make up for the damage caused by the loss of our earlier
alliances. In the absence of a cohesive and numerically strong alliance, the
BJP could not assure the voters that it was in a position to form a stable
government at the Centre. Hence, by default, the voters not only chose the
Congress over the BJP but also gave it increased parliamentary strength to
quench their own thirst for stability.

*CONFUSION ABOUT HINDUTVA*

Why did the BJP invite this weakness upon itself? The reason has to do with
the widespread ideological confusion within the party over what the BJP’s
advocacy of Hindutva actually means. The confusion has persisted for a long
time, but it intensified after the defeat of the BJP/NDA in 2004. There was
a strong view within a section of the party — and a much stronger and almost
unanimous view within the larger Sangh Parivar — that the Vajpayee’s
government was defeated because the BJP had “abandoned Hindutva”. The
argument went like this: “In its bid to form the NDA government, the BJP
kept aside its core ideological commitments on the construction of the Ram
Temple in Ayodhya, the abrogation of Article 370 and the Uniform Civil Code.
The Hindu voters, who had enabled the BJP to emerge as a strong force in
Indian politics in the late 1980s and 1990s, felt let down by this. In 2004,
the BJP again kept the Hindutva issues in cold storage and made development
its main plank. This further disillusioned the Hindu voters. Their
indifference led to the party’s defeat in 2004.” In the aftermath of the
setback in 2009, many angry voices have again blamed the party leadership,
Advani in particular, for the same reason — “You lost because you abandoned
Hindutva.”

It’s a deeply flawed view. It errs in believing that the BJP’s Hindu base is
synonymous with the totality of Hindu voters. The fact is, Hindus never vote
as a block for any particular party. There is only a small section of Hindus
who have voted as Hindus for what they perceived as a pro-Hindu party — the
Jana Sangh in the past and the BJP in later years. Their number increased
dramatically in the late 1980s and early 1990s due to the Ayodhya movement,
which, for about ten years, caught the imagination of a large section of the
Hindu society. However, the BJP’s rising strength in the late 1990s was also
on account of another important factor, which had nothing “Hindu” about it:
the people’s desire to give the BJP also an opportunity to govern the
country. This desire was further whetted by Vajpayee’s pan-Indian
popularity, as was evident from the appeal of the slogan *“Sabko dekha baari
baari, Ab ki baari Atal Behari”.*

If the BJP’s electoral success in 1998 and 1999 was due to factors beyond
what are narrowly seen as “Hindutva” issues, subsequent events have proved
beyond a shadow of doubt that the party’s Hindu base is small even within
Hindu society, not to speak of the electorate as a whole. This small Hindu
base on its own can never bring the party to power at the Centre. Between
2004 and 2009, some people were toying with the idea of constructing a
‘Hindu Agenda’, and creating a large enough ‘Hindu Vote-Bank’ around it.
Even the idea of establishing a new Hindu political organization, as a
counter to the BJP, was being talked about. In the aftermath of the BJP’s
defeat in the 2009 parliamentary elections, these ideas may get a new lease
of life. They are doomed to fail.

At a broader level, it is high time the BJP seriously debated and decided
what it means by ‘Hindutva’, and also what formulations of ‘Hindutva’ are
not acceptable to it. True, the BJP must remain an ideology-driven party.
But without clarity on what the BJP’s ideology is, the party cannot win the
support of more Hindus, let alone the support of Muslims and Christians.
Understood as ‘Cultural Nationalism’ in an inclusive, integrative and
noncommunal sense, Hindutva indeed defines the organizing and sustaining
principle of the Indian Nation. However, just as the noble principle of
secularism can be perverted and practiced for politically expedient reasons
— the selfstyled ‘secular’ parties have indeed done it to isolate the BJP —
Hindutva is also vulnerable to narrow interpretations and bigoted practice.
My own understanding of Pandit Deendayal Upadhyaya’s ‘Integral Humanism’,
which the BJP accepts as its guiding philosophy, convinces me that it
completely rejects narrow, exclusivist and communal interpretations of
India’s national identity.

*FAILURE TO OVERCOME THE PARTY’S LIMITED SOCIAL BASE*

Post-2004, many leaders in the BJP, Advani in particular, had come to the
correct conclusion that the party faced twin tasks: (a) to nurse its core
ideological/social constituency (which had felt let down for various
reasons, including the valid reason of a lack of sufficient dialogue and
coordination between the BJP leaders in the Vajpayee government and the
leaders and activists of the Sangh Parivar at various levels); and (b) to
expand the BJP’s appeal and support base beyond its core constituency, both
on its own and by forging alliances. Sadly, between 2004 and 2009, the BJP
leadership attended only to the first task and did very little to attend to
the second. For example, even within the Hindu society, large sections
(especially Dalits) have remained outside the influence of the BJP. No
effort was made to endear the party to them.

As far as taking the BJP closer to the minorities (Muslims and Christians)
is concerned, both confusion and indifference within the party are of
Himalayan magnitude. The mentality of a large section of the party is so
dogmatic that any idea of promoting the welfare and development of Indian
Muslims, or of addressing their legitimate concerns, is quickly brushed
aside as “appeasement”. In five long years after 2004, the BJP did not come
up with a single worthwhile initiative which Muslims could welcome. Take the
example of the Sachar Committee report. No doubt, the Congress party, guided
by its votebank politics, tried to appease the Muslim community with some
dangerous and thoroughly condemnable pronouncements — reservation for
Muslims on religious grounds and the Prime Minister’s shocking statement
that Muslims should have the first claim on the country’s budgetary
resources. But was everything about the Sachar Committee report or its
recommendations objectionable? After all, by highlighting widespread
socio-economic backwardness within the Muslim community, the report laid
bare the successive Congress governments’ own failures and betrayals towards
a community that has been its most loyal supporter. Sadly, the BJP rejected
the Sachar report completely and unreservedly. The party could have
responded to its findings and recommendations in a more nuanced manner by
presenting some alternative proposals for addressing poverty and
backwardness among Muslims. It didn’t do so because, as I have mentioned
earlier, the party’s collective mind is suffering from a prolonged confusion
about how to deal with issues relating to Indian Muslims. Those leaders who
want to think and act innovatively know that they are prone to be quickly
accused of following a “Muslim- appeasement” policy. The BJP’s Minority
Morcha is a non-operational body, whose voice is heard neither within the
party nor within the Muslim community.

The entrenched thinking within the BJP is that “Muslims never vote for us
and therefore there is no need to think or do anything for them.” The party
gave tickets to only three Muslim candidates in the recent Lok Sabha
elections. True, the party’s manifesto had some good points about
minorities, but these could hardly change the image of the BJP as a party
that does not care for Muslims. Purely in electoral terms, all this
contributed to the BJP’s grievous self-disablement. Consider the following.
The party has a near-zero presence in 143 Lok Sabha seats in four big
states. On top of that, it practically writes off 15% of the electorate who
are Muslims. In recent years, even Christians have turned against the BJP.
Even within the Hindu society, the BJP’s support base is less than 25%
nationally. Thus, both geographically and socially, the party’s electoral
base is not strong enough to challenge the Congress. On top of all these, we
had the Varun Gandhi episode in the middle of the election campaign, which,
along with other factors, clearly led to the consolidation of Muslim votes
in favour of the Congress in UP.

*NEGATIVISM IN THE BJP’S CAMPAIGN*

In hindsight, it is obvious that the BJP failed to utilize its five years in
the opposition to construct and present a positive agenda that could catch
the imagination of the people beyond its core support base. We harped too
much on the UPA government’s failures, without convincing the people how we
would perform better. The party rightly adopted ‘Good Governance,
Development and Security’ as its plank for Elections 2009. However, none of
these three ideals was intellectually fleshed out in terms of specific
policies and programmatic initiatives, nor made the basis of a sustained
mass campaign. The people, who were hardly enthused by the performance of
the UPA government, were keen on knowing if the BJP had superior ideas on
tackling the problems of price rise, unemployment, economic downturn, plight
of farmers, etc. The middle class wanted to know if the BJP had better plans
to address the shortage of housing, water and power, the problem of
transportation, and the rising costs of education and healthcare. India’s
young men and women were waiting to see if the BJP was capable of making
them dream big and if it could connect to their own rising aspirations.

Advani did speak of the *Ladli Laxami *Yojana for the education of the girl
child, his infrastructure vision and his vision for ‘IT as an instrument for
transforming *Bharat’.* But all this did not cohere into a sharply focused
superior agenda of governance and development. On the issue of security,
which was a BJP’s strong point, we fumbled on many occasions. Even the
Congress party’s completely baseless criticism on the Kandahar episode put
the BJP on the backfoot. On the whole, we did not dictate the agenda for
Elections 2009. As a result, the media as well as a large number of
uncommitted voters concluded that this was an ‘issue-less’ election.

*LEADERSHIP IN DISARRAY*

My last point in the analysis of the 2009 elections concerns the state of
the BJP organization. Never in the history of the Jana Sangh or the BJP was
the party enfeebled by so much disarray at the top. The disorder at the
Centre and also in several states (examples: Rajasthan, UP and Delhi)
demoralised the disunited party workers down the line, with disastrous
results. Although Advani was projected as the party’s prime ministerial
candidate, this took place after he had been dis-empowered after the
Mohammad Ali Jinnah episode. The cropping up of Narendra Modi’s name in the
middle of the campaign did not help at all. To the people of India, the
contrast was obvious: there is unified command in the Congress party, but
not in the BJP.

Look at the irony. Sonia Gandhi and her son Rahul made an essentially weak
Prime Minister like Dr Manmohan Singh look strong by backing him solidly. In
contrast, the BJP and the Sangh Parivar made a strong leader like Advani,
whose contribution to the growth of the party is enormous, look weak,
helpless and not fully in command. Saddened by this, many dedicated party
workers bemoaned, “Atalji succeeded in becoming Prime Minister because he
had Advaniji working for him faithfully and determinedly. Unfortunately this
time, there was no Advaniji working similarly for Advaniji.” Of course, it
is also true that Advani himself failed to assert his leadership at crucial
points before and during the campaign.

*ROAD AHEAD*

Where does the BJP go from here? The answer depends on how honest and
widespread the introspection about the past and the future is within the
BJP, and how thorough the corrective action in the near future will be. For
this to happen, the party should encourage free debate, based on
constructive criticism and self-criticism. But let it be understood both by
the BJP’s supporters and adversaries the outcome of Elections 2009 is by no
means a catastrophe for the party. True, our strength in the Lok Sabha came
down from 182 in 1999 to 138 in 2004, and has further come down to 116 in
2009. But in defeat we should not lose a sense of balance and perspective.
After all, in 1998, the Congress was reduced to a tally of only 110 in the
Lok Sabha. Yet, six years later it bounced back. So can the BJP. Today the
BJP is not only the main opposition party in the 15th Lok Sabha but, in some
ways, the sole opposition party because the Left parties have been
completely marginalized. What this means is that, whereas there is need for
honest introspection, there is no need for despair at all.

This is not to belittle the fact that difficult days are ahead for the BJP,
at least in the short term. The Congress seems to be on the revival path in
UP and Bihar. The support for the BJP is declining in its two strongholds —
Madhya Pradesh and Gujarat. In Rajasthan and Delhi, the BJP has again scored
self-goals. In Karnataka, in spite of the good showing in the recent Lok
Sabha elections, the BJP and its government face many problems that demand
immediate attention. As far as leadership is concerned, the party needs to
address the challenges in the post-Advani era, while recognizing that it
needs the guiding hand of *karmayogi* Advani — who embodies the best of the
BJP — for as long as he can be active in public life. His message of ‘Good
Governance, Development and Security’ has relevance for the BJP in the
future too. However, the party has to infuse positive and inspiring content
into this message, and the content has to become more visible in states
where the BJP is in power. One of the most important learnings from the NDA
government, as well as from the governments of Narendra Modi, Shivraj Singh
Chauhan, Raman Singh and Nitish Kumar, is that inclusive development should
become as important an element of the ideology for a Nation First party like
the BJP as, for example, Hindutva.

Here is a sensitive question that the BJP cannot shirk. Issues relating to
the right relationship between the BJP and the RSS also need to be candidly
debated for mutual good. The RSS is indeed a nationalist organization, and
there are many valid reasons why India needs a non-communal pro- Hindu
organization committed to the ideal of Hindu unity and renaissance. However,
just as the BJP needs introspection, the RSS needs it no less. Its leaders
must ask themselves, and answer the question honestly and earnestly, “Why is
the acceptability of the RSS and the Vishwa Hindu Parishad limited in Hindu
society itself?” No less important is the challenge of re-orienting the
party’s thinking and action on issues relating to the suffering of the poor
and the downtrodden, and the severe regional and social imbalances in
India’s development.

The BJP can indeed bounce back. But it can do so only if it first renews and
empowers itself comprehensively — in its ideology, its geographical-social
spread, its own political strength, its mass activity, its
alliance-building, its cadre-based organizational network, and its
leadership.

*Kulkarni was a key aide to former Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee and**
a member of the BJP’s Election Strategy Group, 2009*
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