[Reader-list] The Naxalites overreached

[Pawan Durani]

http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/MaoistChallengeThePartyshallbeover_pvramana_130410

Maoist Challenge: The Party shall be over!

P. V. Ramana

April 13, 2010
The massacre of 76 police personnel, on April 6, 2010, in Dantewada
district, in the Bastar region of Chhattisgarh, by Naxalites of the
Communist Party of India (Maoist), or CPI (Maoist), sent shock waves
across the country and, understandably, generated the impression that
the Indian state is losing the battle against the Maoists. The
chilling massacre, naturally, provoked angry reactions and decrying of
the security forces.

Let us face the stark reality! Bastar is central to the Maoists’
principal objective of capturing state power. Therefore, they shall
not ‘tolerate’ any disturbance, but shall fight it out. It is a war
and there are bound to be casualties on both sides –– the state and
the rebels. It is also becoming evident that personnel of the Central
Reserve Police Force did not ‘strictly’ adhere to the laid-down
Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). It would be wiser to leave to a
Court of Inquiry that would be constituted by the CRPF to inquire into
the reasons for the avoidable, unfortunate and heart wrenching deaths.
But the CRPF shall have to learn its lessons, thereafter.

Chhattisgarh is a unique theatre. The Naxalites staged their entry
into what is now Chhattisgarh, or the current war zone –– Bastar
region (which now constitutes five revenue and police districts, and
is a little larger in geographical area than Kerala and a little
smaller than Haryana) –– to be more precise, almost immediately after
the Communist Party of India-Marxist-Leninist (People’s War) was
founded in 1980. From then on, the powers that be allowed the
Naxalites to entrench themselves, until, say, six or seven years ago.

The highest leadership of the Maoists today were, during those years,
the field-commanders (local leaders), who built the outfit. Polit
Bureau (PB) Member Malla Raji Reddy, who was arrested in Kerala and
later escaped bail in November/December 2009, was one such person.
Kishanji –– Mallojula Koteswara Rao –– who is in the news presently
for leading the movement in Lalgarh, West Bengal, was another key
person. His brother is Mallojula Venugopal alias Bhupathi alias Sonu,
the present PB in-charge of Dandakaranya Special Zone Committee
(DKSZC), who was earlier Secretary of the DKSZC. The list is vast.

On the other hand, while the Naxalites were building themselves up,
the State adopted an ostrich-like approach. It did not, until now,
hurt Bhopal, the then capital of Madhya Pradesh, nor Gwalior, its
northern-most important town, which is barely 321 km from Delhi.
Therefore, Madhya Pradesh/Chhattisgarh was not only little prepared
but rather disinclined to take on the Naxalites militarily. Precious
little seems to have changed in the past few years.

Everything seemed hunky-dory in Bastar until the ‘engagement’ began.
Thus, Chhattisgarh, now, reports a large numbers of casualties, and
the Maoists are seemingly determined to fight back, rather than make a
tactical retreat, as they have done elsewhere say in Andhra Pradesh.
Perhaps, they are ‘sure’ of themselves in Bastar and might have
assessed that it is yet not time to flee.

For a number of reasons that have been identified by knowledgeable
persons already, a posting in Bastar is considered as ‘punishment’.
Local intelligence is lacking, troop morale is low, motivation is
hardly present, the leadership is not as strong as it needs to be, and
infrastructure, training, etc. are yet to be geared-up to the required
level.

In this backdrop, it is difficult to expect results to be delivered on
the ground by the Chhattisgarh Police. The onus, then, is laid on the
central paramilitary forces (CPMFs). Here, coordination between the
CPMFs and the Chhattisgarh Police is yet to reach the desired levels.
This, nevertheless, does not absolve the Chhattisgarh Police of making
every effort to move in the direction of gearing itself up. At the
same time, CPMFs need to adhere strictly to every single SOP laid down
in the manual.

The hype generated in the media of an all-India offensive on the
Naxalites raised the expectations of the people, and people are fickle
minded with short memories. Even as the Union government was claiming
that the Maoists would be put-down in two to three years, as if to
cock a snook at such claims the Maoists executed one strike after
another –– mowing down 24 personnel of the Eastern Frontier Rifles at
the Silda camp on March 15 in West Medinipore district, West Bengal;
killing 11 personnel of the Special Operations Group (SOG) near
Govindapalli in a land mine blast on April 4, 2010 in Koraput
district, Orissa.

The watch words are ‘patience’ and ‘silent work’. The sate and the
people should be prepared for a few more Dantewada-like ‘shocks’
before the tables are eventually turned on the Maoists. There have
been a number of wake-up calls, but, somehow, state response has left
a lot to be desired. If at all a final wake-up call was needed, it
came through the medium of the Chintalnar attack. The Union Government
has clearly laid-out its approach –– ‘security and development’. The
affected States would also need to join-in. This has, perhaps, just
begun.

It is a matter of time before the party is over for the Maoists. In
its totality, the Indian state is no match for the Maoists and it is
eminently possible to make them wind-up their business of macabre
killings, wanton destruction and irresponsible actions.