[Reader-list] It's time to open the debate on covert operations

[Bipin]

Yes Pawan, it's time for some hard action now. But, I think so with congress rule it is not possible.



-----Original Message-----
From: reader-list-bounces at sarai.net [mailto:reader-list-bounces at sarai.net] On Behalf Of Pawan Durani
Sent: Sunday, February 21, 2010 12:04 AM
To: reader-list
Subject: [Reader-list] It's time to open the debate on covert operations

http://www.virsanghvi.com/CounterPoint-ArticleDetail.aspx?ID=443

It's time to open the debate on covert operations (NEW)- Vir Sanghvi

Last month an 11-member hit team dispatched by Israel’s Mossad
travelled to Dubai and assassinated Mahmoud Al-Mabhouh, a Hamas
military commander and number one on Israel’s list of most wanted
terrorists.

   Al-Mabhouh was clearly an unsavoury character, one of the founders
of Hamas’s military wing, an abductor and murderer of Israeli soldiers
and an organizer of terrorist attacks on civilians.

   Few tears were shed in Israel over his death but there has been a
minor uproar in England over the use of cloned British passports by
the Israeli hit team. Normally, the Israelis just fake passports. But
on this occasion, they cloned the real passports of Britons who have
settled in Israel. The Brits say this is unacceptable. Why couldn’t
Mossad have just faked the passports as usual?

   What’s interesting is that very little of the outrage focuses on
the assassination itself. By now, the West has accepted that Israelis
will track down and assassinate terrorists no matter where in the
world they hide. And, in the post 9/11 era, few people seem to mind.
It is widely accepted that terrorists can rarely be brought to justice
and convicted by courts of law. So, an assassination often seems like
the most effective option.

   All this has lessons for India. There are broadly, four ways of
fighting terrorism. The first is that you guard every likely target.
This is nearly impossible to do and no matter how many men you deploy,
terrorists will slip through the cracks. The second is that you use
intelligence to discover terrorist plots and then foil them. This too,
is hardly a fool-proof strategy.

   The third is that after terrorist attacks are committed you spare
no effort in going after the perpetrators so that you deter would-be
terrorists. The Israelis travelled the world in the aftermath of the
Munich attacks in 1972 and killed every one of the terrorist
masterminds.

   And the fourth is covert action: you take the battle into the
enemy’s camp. You infiltrate terrorist organizations, you kill
terrorists before they can strike, and you dabble in the internal
affairs of your opponents, financing and arming those groups that are
likely to create trouble for your enemies.

   Pakistan has always shown a willingness to use covert operations
against India. Even if you take the line that the 26/11 terrorists did
not have official sanction, nobody can deny that the Pakistanis have
used assassination as an element of state policy. In Kashmir, for
instance, important leaders have been bumped off by the Pakistanis
when they refused to follow Islamabad’s line.

   Equally, Islamabad has traditionally funded groups that are
inimical to Delhi. Till the creation of Bangladesh, East Pakistan was
used to provide arms and support to the Mizos and the Nagas. Since
then, Pakistan has funded Sikh separatists, local jihadis and of
course Kashmiri militants.

   India’s record on covert operations has been lacklustre. We have
preferred to fight terrorism either by relying on intelligence or by
heightening security. When it comes to retribution, we prefer to go
through legal channels rather than take direct action. We will wait
for the Pakistanis to prosecute Hafiz Sayeed rather than eliminate him
ourselves. And while we have funded Pakistani separatists in the past,
this assistance has been feeble and more or less dried up after Inder
Gujral made R&AW roll up its operations in Pakistan when he was PM.

   It is now increasingly clear that Pakistan either cannot (the view
of the doves) act against powerful terrorist groups or will not (the
view of the hawks) prevent terrorists from attacking Indian targets. A
similar lack of strength or willingness is reflected in its failure to
effectively prosecute the likes of Hafiz Sayeed.

   So what is India to do? Are we to rely on increased security and
better intelligence? Or are we to step up our covert operations?

 "Western nations do not finance terrorism. But equally, they do not
consider themselves restricted by the niceties of the law."
   Till recently, many Indians would have been appalled by the idea of
covert operations. We reject the idea of moral equivalence with
Pakistan and cannot see ourselves financing militants who engage in
violence.

   I once asked Manmohan Singh why we rejected the covert option and
his answer summed up the mood in government: because of the manner in
which it would brutalize the Indian state and damage our moral psyche.
Indians simply do not do such things.

   But I am now coming around to the view that it is time to
reconsider. There are two kinds of covert operations. The first is the
Pakistani style, whereby jihadis travel to India and kill women and
children. The other is the approach increasingly favoured by the West
(and pioneered by Israel) in the aftermath of 9/11.

   Western nations do not finance terrorism. But equally, they do not
consider themselves restricted by the niceties of the law. America has
infiltrated terror groups, encourages them to fight with each other,
kidnaps and whisks away important terrorists (‘rendition’) and
sub-contracts the job of executing terrorists to friendly secret
services.

   There is a strong case for us in India to follow that example.
Let’s take the instance of the three terrorists who were freed in
Kandahar in exchange for the passengers on IC 814. They travelled to
Pakistan where they were welcomed as heroes. Should we not have
pursued them and taken them out? Would this not have served as a
warning to other terrorists?

   Similarly, we know who many of the 26/11 masterminds are and where
they live. Should we wait for the Pakistanis to move against them –
assuming that Pakistan is so inclined? Or should we just send a hit
team? We know where Dawood Ibrahim, the man behind the Bombay blasts,
lives. Should we mount a large-scale operation to eliminate him?

   Similarly, should we not consider doing to Pakistan what it does to
us? There are many Sindhis, Mohajirs, and yes, Baluchis, who have no
affection for the Punjabi elite which runs Pakistan. Should we not
finance them so that they can more forcefully express their
discontentment? The more trouble there is for Pakistan from within,
the more distracted the government in Islamabad will be.

   Our answer to all these questions, so far, has been an unequivocal
no. When Manmohan Singh agreed to include a reference to Baluchistan
in the Sharm-el-Sheikh statement, we were appalled because the thought
of any Indian involvement in Baluchistan was repugnant to us. We did
not object on pragmatic grounds: why surrender the Baluchistan option
when we can use it to create trouble for Pakistan?

   As the Poona attack demonstrates, the terrorism is not going to
stop. Pakistan is going to step up its efforts to radicalize and arm
Indian Muslim groups so that it can then argue that the terrorism is
indigenous. Should we just sit back and wait for this to happen while
placing our faith in the power of dialogue? Or should we re-think our
approach to the battle against terror?

   I’m not sure what the answers to these questions are. But the time
has come to open the debate on covert operations.
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