[Reader-list] Fwd: Kashmiri Marginalities: The Construction, Nature and Response.

[Pawan Durani]

Hoisting of pakitsan flag and burning of public properties has exposed
all eleents of sunni jehadis in kashmir

On Sat, Sep 11, 2010 at 12:19 AM, Shuddhabrata Sengupta
<shuddha at sarai.net> wrote:
> Dear Gowhar,
>
> Let me add to Sanjay's comment. I will write a more detailed response later.
> Right now a bit snowed under. But I especially appreciate the honesty with
> which you come across with your own doubts and questions about the
> construction of identity. Especially the tension  between the self-awareness
> of being the member of a minority in one sense, and the majority in another.
> I have always thought of the question of identity as having a fluidity, an
> almost tactile and subtle slipperiness that congeals into something grim and
> viscous the moment one tries to define oneself.
>
> The multitudes that each of us contain, and the currents that flow through
> us, cannot ever be adequately represented by a single name, regardless of
> whether that name points to an ethnic, or a national, or a religious or any
> other kind of affiliation.
>
> That is why, ultimately, all forms of identity based politics, regardless of
> origins, regardless of destinations, visit the very people they claim as
> their subjects, in the form of persistent nightmares of loyalty and treason.
> That said, it cannot be denied that one inhabits an identitiy if one is made
> to wear it like a prison uniform or an armour. To ignore the presence of
> identity in such a context would be to ignore the reality of incarceration.
> The question is, how does one know that the prison uniform is something one
> can choose to cease to wear, when one is released.
>
> looking forward to more discussion on this,
>
> best,
>
> Shuddha
>
> On 10-Sep-10, at 7:38 PM, Sanjay Kak wrote:
>
>> Dear Gowhar
>>
>> Thank you for sketching out a very deft, thoughtful and nuanced
>> account of Kashmiri marginality. I hope that as the colours and
>> details are filled in this will turn into a substantial contribution
>> to the discourse on Kashmir.
>>
>> Do please keep us all posted
>>
>> Warmest Eid greetings too!
>>
>> Sanjay Kak
>>
>> On Mon, Sep 6, 2010 at 10:25 AM, gowhar fazli <gowharfazili at yahoo.com>
>> wrote:
>>>
>>> This work in progress, that tries to straddle wide swathes of political
>>> difference would benefit from your engaged responses.
>>>
>>> Thank you.
>>>
>>> Gowhar Fazili
>>>
>>>
>>> Kashmiri Marginalities: The Construction, Nature and Response[1]
>>> by Gowhar Fazili on Monday, 06 September 2010 at 10:01
>>>
>>> By Gowhar Fazili
>>>
>>>
>>> To start the argument, we can club the dominant discourses around Kashmir
>>> into three broad categories, i.e., the Indian, the Pakistani and the
>>> Kashmiri discourses.  While the Indian and Pakistani discourses (as detailed
>>> below), accommodate Kashmiri people and the history of their collective
>>> struggles only if, and when, these buttress their respective positions, the
>>> Kashmiri discourse is quintessentially about these struggles. In turn the
>>> dominant Kashmiri discourse simplifies the sub-struggles and fragmented
>>> politics that exists within, and the connections these have with the outside
>>> world.
>>>
>>> These dominant discourses of political history are a quagmire of claims
>>> and counter claims.  For those who have not borne the immediate brunt of the
>>> conflict these generate excitement and passion, and the discourse is
>>> consumed through various media like an IPL cricket match.  The Indian state
>>> and the nationalists of various hues, including Hindutva, Leftist, Liberal,
>>> Secularists, unanimously deploy various moments of Kashmir’s history,
>>> including the accession signed by Maharaja Hari Singh, the elections held,
>>> the wars won, the leaders bought over, the subsidies given, the development
>>> achieved, investments made, etc., as indicators of Indian legitimacy and
>>> control in Kashmir.  Kashmiri alienation, and separatist movements figure in
>>> this narrative, if at all, variously, as consequences of external
>>> interference, uneven development, appeasement, result of one-off political
>>> mistakes made by previous leaders, etc., which are to be corrected in due
>>> course
>>>  when the Indian democracy matures and so on. This discourse denies
>>> Kashmiris any intelligence or capability for autonomous political behavior.
>>> It betrays amnesia around the rich history of struggles in Kashmir that
>>> preceded accession in 1947 that still continue to inspire Kashmir.
>>>
>>> The Pakistani discourse emphasizes the ‘Muslim connection’ and dwells on
>>> the disputed nature of Jammu and Kashmir which should have been theirs by
>>> the logic of partition.  It focuses on the denial of self-determination to
>>> the people and disregard of the UN resolutions, calling for plebiscite in
>>> the region.  It recounts the valor with which Azad Kashmir was won, and in
>>> their view the continued support and affinity that the majority of Kashmiri
>>> Muslims feel towards Pakistan.   Though Pakistan lends moral and diplomatic
>>> support to the current separatist movement in Kashmir, it devalues the
>>> nuanced engagement and negotiation Kashmiris have had with the Indian state
>>> over the last sixty years, largely independent of Pakistan.
>>>
>>> The dominant Kashmiri narrative which is at a marginalized position with
>>> respect to the other two discourses imagines itself to be at the centre of
>>> the current political struggle. It draws from a long history of
>>> marginalization that predates modernity, tracing back Kashmiri dislike and
>>> resistance against foreign occupation to the Mughal invasion in 1588 and the
>>> subsequent progressive emasculation and dispossession of Kashmiris by the
>>> Afghan, the Sikh, the Dogra, and in the same league, the Indian regime.  It
>>> leverages dates like 16th March 1846 (Amritsar Treaty), when Kashmir was
>>> sold by the British to Maharaja Gulab Singh for Seventy- five Lakh
>>> Nanakshahi rupees[2],  the excessive taxation to recover this money that
>>> followed, leading to the famine of 1977-79 in which a large number of
>>>  Kashmiris died; the systematic denial of basic rights and dignity and
>>> discrimination on the basis of religion and region under the Dogra regime;
>>> the 13th July 1931
>>>  Uprising against the Maharaja and the massacre that followed; the year
>>> 1953 when Sheikh Abdullah, the first democratically elected Prime-Minister
>>> of Kashmir was deposed and imprisoned by India on charges of conspiracy and
>>> sedition, arresting along with him the socio-economic revolution that was
>>> underway.  It presumes the subsequent elections while Sheikh was in custody
>>> for twenty years to have been rigged and the period to have been marked with
>>> extreme suppression, corruption and cooption.  It sees changes made over the
>>> years to extend provisions of Indian constitution in an attempt to bring
>>> Kashmir closer to the Indian union, as bulldozing of the residual safeguards
>>> against assimilation.  It cites failure of India to make progress on the
>>> various agreements and accords, calling for plebiscite, restoration of
>>> autonomy, etc., as illustrations of India’s ‘Chanakya Neeti’ (deceitful
>>> policy.)
>>>
>>> The significant moments in recent history, like the 1984 hanging of the
>>> JKLF leader, Maqbool Bhat, the rigging of 1987 elections, the mass uprising
>>> for Azadi, and the repression that began in 1989 when Kashmiri youth took to
>>> arms against the Indian state,  and such, form the key markers around which
>>> the narrative of victimhood and valor is woven.  Not surprisingly the Indian
>>> national days are designated as black days (including the day Indian army
>>> landed in Kashmir) and are marked with protest and blackout.  The narrative
>>> erases the moments of compromise and relative calm that Kashmiris have
>>> enjoyed in spurts in the intervening years giving rise to the educated,
>>> middle class which is spearheading the current separatist movement.
>>>
>>> Much of the writing on Kashmir prior to the year 2000 concerns debates
>>> around these discourses emerging from respective camps.  Spokespersons,
>>> scholars, military think tanks and a significantly large number of literate
>>> and illiterate Kashmiris are socialized into the importance of each of these
>>> claims and possess ability to maneuver through controversies to establish
>>> their political claims.  The positions are entrenched and provide for little
>>> flexibility.  The dominant narratives have also found their way into the
>>> colloquial language and often, abuses, frustrations, humor, are expressed
>>> with reference to these moments.  To mention just one, ‘ye nai Sattejihas
>>> yeeha balaay’  ‘Had not the forty-seven been accursed’, refers to 1947, the
>>> year Indian Army landed in Kashmir and the Maharaja signed that accession.
>>> The expression is used to let out everyday frustration or to poke fun at
>>> someone’s undue claims or some unworthy person’s rise through
>>>  corruption.
>>>
>>> While the Kashmiri Self is torn between commitments to multiple,
>>> overlapping and contradictory identities and interests, like people anywhere
>>> else, the fact of being born in a territory, where the conflict around its
>>> disputed nature has raged to varying degrees for over the last sixty years,
>>> complicates and intensifies concern for some identities at the cost of
>>> others.  The political uncertainty impacts different members and groups
>>> differently as they choose different strategies to deal with the onslaught
>>> from within and without.  To grossly simplify, for example a large majority
>>> of Pandits have moved out of Kashmir and many have allied themselves with
>>> Indian right-wing parties.  Kashmiri Shia and Sunni Muslims largely identify
>>> with the broad contours of separatist politics, Pashtoons are invisible,
>>> Gujjars maintain an ambivalent position depending on where they are
>>> physically, located.  People in Gurez, Karnah, Uri, who are geographically
>>> isolated from
>>>  the valley and live in close proximity with security garrisons do not
>>> manifest sympathy with separatism, or at least do not overtly do so for
>>> obvious reasons.  Within the state of Jammu and Kashmir, people of Doda,
>>> Punch and Rajori ally with Kashmir or Jammu depending on which of their
>>> interests and identities are threatened at a particular moment of time.
>>>  People of Kargil gravitate towards Kashmir if and when the Buddhist
>>> majority discriminates against them.  Hindu majority areas of Jammu, and
>>> Buddhist Leh, have consistently favored India and alleged discrimination by
>>> Kashmiri Muslims and their appeasement by the Indian state.
>>>
>>> Kashmiri society is variegated along caste, class, community, gender,
>>> region, religion and political orientation. These identities contract within
>>> and extend beyond the geographical boundaries of Kashmir in different
>>> situations and along different questions. Yet it is the collective
>>> experience of a shared geography, history, language, culture and meanings
>>> that make Kashmiris conversant with each other in a special way, rendering
>>> others as outside. The identification with the dominant Kashmiri narrative
>>> presented above which at this moment has a favorable bias towards the
>>> masculine, Muslim majoritarian identity, depends on where one is located
>>> within the crosscutting mesh of identities and experiences and intellectual
>>> trajectories.
>>>
>>> In India, Kashmiris are marked irrespective of their other identities, by
>>> race, religion and language. Physically, they do not look, sound or behave
>>> like stereotypical Indians and are often harassed and made to prove their
>>> nationality at the ticket counters or wherever nationality applies. Outside
>>> Kashmir, given the context of the twenty years of armed conflict, and the
>>> consequent stereotyping of Kashmiris as terrorists, they face  difficulty in
>>> finding accommodation, are forced to inhabit Muslim ghettos; receive snares
>>> and unwelcome comments while travelling; are easy prey for the security
>>> agencies seeking instant suspects for terror attacks; cannot stick their
>>> neck out too much in day-to-day struggles so as not to risk being falsely
>>> reported; cannot easily get visas to ‘civilized’ aka non-Muslim countries
>>> (for being a Muslim is bad enough, but being a Kashmiri Muslim, with the
>>> word ‘Kashmir’ on their passports, makes them doubly illegitimate.)
>>>
>>> Since Social Sciences do not form part of military curriculum, for the
>>> majority of over six lakh armed forces dotting neighbourhoods in Kashmir,
>>> Kashmiris are potential Pakistani terrorists who deserve to be eliminated or
>>> incarcerated or insulted on the flimsiest excuse. Kashmiris are targets for
>>> ready retribution in wake of militant attacks. Homes can be searched,
>>> vehicles stopped, people disembarked and detained any moment and without
>>> explanation. The laws like AFSPA permit the security forces to shoot people
>>> as a preventive measure against possible future terror attacks. Public
>>> Safety Act provides for preventive custody without trial even before one
>>> engages in ‘objectionable’ activity. Men, women and children are susceptible
>>> to sexual assault and torture and other forms of humiliation. Since the
>>> above experiences do not vary significantly among different segments of the
>>> Kashmiri population, they reinforce the collective marginalized identity.
>>>
>>> The militants against the security forces, and the consequent deaths of
>>> Kashmiris in the conflict caused by militants or in crossfire, or killing of
>>> assumed or real Indian agents, the damage to personal properties, cultural
>>> and religious places, though used as firewood for Indian propaganda against
>>> the separatists, enhances the collective sense of victimhood. In some it has
>>> also resulted in abhorrence for all forms of violence emanating from
>>> anywhere. Others hold Pakistan or foreigners or religious fundamentalists
>>> responsible and hate them for this reason. Still others have turned overly
>>> apologetic, servile and defensive. But curiously it has not resulted in
>>> increased love for India among many.
>>>
>>> The violence in the society has also resulted in intolerance towards
>>> those who for various reasons do not subscribe to the dominant sense of
>>> victimhood or those who try to channelize their anger and energies
>>> differently. The identities which are in-between or fall outside the markers
>>> of dominant Kashmiri identity and victimhood are rendered invisible or
>>> sought to be assimilated or in extreme cases eliminated. This is in
>>> consonance with how radical identities often turn upon their own people who
>>> may choose divergent strategies or cannot fit within their grand project.
>>>
>>> This dominant narrative is augmented with the indices of development like
>>> poor representation in civil services, academics, armed forces; backwardness
>>> of the region in terms of industrial development, educational
>>> infrastructure; employment opportunities within and outside the state. It
>>> also draws from the narrative of regional discrimination establishing how
>>> India has favored development in Jammu and Ladakh at the cost of Kashmir.
>>>
>>> In the Pre-globalization era, the center being the only source of
>>> funding, would offer financial packages to loyalist or compromisers and
>>> punish those who tried deviate or rose in opposition to the centers
>>> hegemony. This practice continues. In the present times multinational
>>> private enterprise or funding cannot move in due to instability and
>>> disturbance. Irrespective of this the deals have been struck by the
>>> government with foreign companies for example, power projects, that are
>>> complete sell-outs helped by the fact that people are alienated from the
>>> state sponsored politics and too busy fighting the separatist cause. The
>>> stunted development willful or incidental adds to alienation.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Kashmiri Responses
>>>
>>> Adam Weisberger[3] using the German Jewry of Wilhelmine era as a test
>>> case to understand marginality and its directions among people argues that
>>> “the marginal person, having taken on elements of the dominant culture, is
>>> unable to return unchanged to his or her original group. Thus, the marginal
>>> person is caught in a structure of double ambivalence: unable either to
>>> leave or to return to the original group; unable either to merge with the
>>> new group or to slough it off. Marginal persons typically react to this
>>> field of cross-cutting pressures in four directions, here termed
>>> assimilation, return, poise, and transcendence.”
>>>
>>> Kashmiris through history have to varying degrees of success pursued
>>> various directions in order to overcome their personal and collective sense
>>> of marginality. If we were to coalesce the four directions in which the
>>> marginalized react as suggested by Weisberger namely assimilation, return,
>>> transcendence, poise we can find parallels for each in different time
>>> periods, groups, institutions, individuals or simultaneously present as
>>> contradictory tendencies in a single entity or individual. Kashmiris have
>>> also produced a wide range of political, intellectual and strategic
>>> responses that range over categories like: separatists, autonomists,
>>> Islamists, secularist, loyalist, anarchist, humanist, spiritualist,
>>> apologist, radical, pacifist, self loathing and a myriad of other responses,
>>> many, still nascent and yet to be born.    (I have to develop this)
>>>
>>> One of the latest debates raging at the moment is around a fresh attempt
>>> to pass the Permanent Residents (Disqualification) Bill introduced in the
>>> Legislative assembly.  The bill seeks to over-rule the High Court decision
>>> against the provision that renders a woman non state subject if she marries
>>> a non-state-subject.  The same does not apply to men who marry outside.
>>>  Interestingly BJP and other right of centre Jammu-based parties have
>>> started protesting against the bill, while the valley maintains a silence,
>>> betraying support through the lack of outrage among various political
>>> groups.  The silence is symptomatic of the male patriarchal bias in the
>>> dominant discourse in Kashmir.  Not to say that BJP and its allies are by
>>> any means less patriarchal.  They possibly see the women’s matrimony as a
>>> means to extend their connection with the Indian Hindu mainstream or to
>>> increase their likely voters in Jammu since marriage outside Kashmir is
>>> assumed to be
>>>  more common among Hindus in Jammu.
>>>
>>>
>>> Amarnath Land Transfer issue in 2008 once again fissured J&K along
>>> communal and regional lines.  While the right wing Hindu formations fanned
>>> sentiments in Jammu against the revocation of land transfer, Kashmiri Muslim
>>> separatists and mainstream regional parties saw the move as yet another
>>> attempt to change demography in Kashmir, since the shrine board included
>>> individuals who were non-state-subjects. For the awaam of Kashmir, the
>>> controversy provided yet another charged issue to vent their separatism.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Indian Responses
>>>
>>> The Indian civil society has looked at Kashmir with empathy, apathy or
>>> disdain.  Largely the Indian mainstream has been silent on or apathetic
>>> towards Kashmiri suffering, because they do not share blood ties or see
>>> commonality of interest with Kashmiris.  Those who empathize, have their
>>> empathies conditioned by their location within the mainstream Indian
>>> politics.  Indian intellectuals have tried to read Kashmir into their own
>>> respective projects rather than look at it from the point of view of
>>> Kashmiris and their history.  Similarly Indian Muslims and their
>>> sympathizers look at Kashmir as a minority problem and expect Kashmiris to
>>> behave in a manner that does not threaten the survival of Indian Muslims
>>> through a backlash, which would in turn harm the fragile secular polity.
>>>  The left sees it as a class problem or at best that of regional imbalance
>>> and because of false consciousness and undifferentiated class structure,
>>> unfit for class struggle and
>>>  revolution. Large majorities in India, under the influence of the media
>>> with its nationalist bias, look at Kashmiris with disdain as they see them
>>> as anti-nationals who share cross border loyalties and are mostly terrorists
>>> and fanatics.
>>>
>>> The civil society groups have tried to identify or create their
>>> respective constituencies by promoting various sub-marginalities. Since
>>> funding to NGO’s is channeled through the Indian elite, based in Delhi, they
>>> exercise substantial influence on how ‘civil society’ in its NGO avatar
>>> develops in Kashmir. The initiatives presently active in Kashmir have
>>> diverse ideological backgrounds.  If we count out the covert intelligence
>>> operations in the form of NGOs, to site just three the Gandhian, left
>>> leaning and feminists each sees the central problem in Kashmir to be that of
>>> fissuring of the community due to violence, feudalism and/or patriarchy
>>> respectively.  While these fault-lines exist, to see them as detached from
>>> the nationality question does violence to Kashmir.  It would be like the
>>> British describing colonialism condition in India as male chauvinism or
>>> caste oppression.
>>>
>>> Right wing nationalists block any positive moves by the state towards a
>>> negotiated solution or reconciliation by branding the seasonal olive-branch
>>> overtures by the State as Muslim appeasement, while at the same time
>>> cultivating a constituency among Pandits, and caste and class groups among
>>> Hindus in Jammu.  They also use Kashmir as a spectacle to shore up their
>>> Hinduvadi constituency in India by calling for abrogation of article 370 or
>>> through flag hoisting missions in Lal Chowk and such.
>>>
>>> The state, since 1989 has largely responded with repression through
>>> violent means.  The talks are offered and withdrawn often at the peril of
>>> those who come forward and end up being disowned by the community for the
>>> failure and embarrassment.
>>>
>>> There is also an unceasing ideological onslaught that sees Kashmir merely
>>> as a problem of development exacerbated by the ever present ‘foreign hand’,
>>> that portrays all protest as political intrigue and at best a result of
>>> internal power struggle for control over resources.
>>>
>>> But if one were to follow the dialectics of politics in Kashmir over a
>>> longer period, it follows predictable, Sisyphean cycles of eternal return,
>>> of protests, repression, compromise, corruption and back to protests.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Encouragement of marginalities within
>>>
>>> Indian state and civil society often intervenes to rescue Kashmiri women
>>> and other marginalized groups from the Kashmiri Muslim male society which is
>>> assumed to be patriarchal and dominating.  In any discussion on Kashmir, the
>>> question, ‘but what about the women, the Gujjars, Pahadis, Shias, Buddhists,
>>> Dogras, Pandits?’ and so on invariably comes up.  The centre is able to
>>> subvert the mobilization around a particular marginality, by bringing up the
>>> issue of marginalities within and around the claimant group. In turn the
>>> mobilization around the dominant discourse tries to suppress or ignore the
>>> discrimination within or around itself in response to this subversion.  In
>>> case of Kashmir, the demand for the right to self determination is hostage
>>> to the question of what happens to the women, shias, Gujjars, Pandits,
>>> Hindus of Jammu and Buddhists of Ladakh.  On the other hand the dominant
>>> discourse around unresolved nature of Jammu and Kashmir has subsumed
>>>  other effective marginalities experienced by Kashmiris of various
>>> denominations at various other levels.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Ambivalent nature of Kashmiris
>>>
>>> The narrative of Indian nationalism is fuelled by the ‘adventures’ of the
>>> Indian Army in Kashmir.  It is followed by a legalistic discourse on the
>>> nature and tenability of Kashmir’s accession with the Indian union.  This
>>> discourse forms the backdrop against which the Kashmiris are examined and
>>> variously described: as being the symbols of Indian secularism for having
>>> willfully joined the Indian union inspite of their religious and
>>> geographical affinity with Pakistan; as being primordially secular, Sufi and
>>> non-violent or being treacherous people capable of cross border allegiance,
>>> duplicity and deceit.
>>>
>>> This problematic status makes them unfit for democracy and provides a
>>> good reason why Kashmiris need to be mainstreamed and denied autonomous
>>> self-definition and a dignified independent identity.  The only identities
>>> permissible to Kashmiris are the one that pass the litmus test of Indian
>>> ideals, the ideals which the Indians may themselves not have been able to
>>> uphold.  If the identity proclaimed or exhibited by Kashmiris does not fit
>>> within the standards offered to other regional minorities in India, then
>>> these have to be shorn off in the interest of the unity of the nation.
>>>  Kashmiri’s are defined partially, in a defused form and only to the extent
>>> that it serves various political purposes and then left to deal with the
>>> schizophrenic condition on their own.
>>>
>>> Kashmiri counter narrative sees the illegal accession signed by their
>>> tormentor, Maharaja Hari Singh on their behalf and the denial of self
>>> determination only as a milestones in their long struggle for emancipation,
>>> which began much earlier and continues till date.  Kashmiris subscribing to
>>> this narrative see themselves as de-facto and temporary citizens of India
>>> who have been subjugated against their will.
>>>
>>> While Kashmiris at different stages in history have bought into the
>>> discourse about the secular, peaceful, compositeness of their culture, they
>>> resent its use to make them into the essence of Indian ideal and react by
>>> adopting the exact opposite stereotype.  Simultaneously the emphasis on
>>> their affinities and continuities with regions that spread beyond the
>>> de-facto borders of the Indian state—that is the connection with Pakistan,
>>> Afghanistan, Central Asia, Persia and beyond—provide them a lever to
>>> establish their separateness.
>>>
>>> While the Indian’s are in no hurry to make progress in resolving the
>>> issue of Kashmir and can afford all the time and spare enormous resources,
>>> for Kashmiri’s nothing matters as much or is as urgent as dignity, certainty
>>> and security of their selves and yet they are left with no choice but to
>>> stake their all and as long as it takes to achieve it.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Self, Community and the Universe
>>>
>>> In order to engage with the Kashmiri self I will begin with myself.  I
>>> find myself marginalized from the community in which I was born because my
>>> natural intellectual and emotional trajectory pushed me to transcend my
>>> ‘received self’ by imbibing fragments of and influences from the exposure to
>>> other cultures, communities and intellectual currents.  In the process I
>>> hope to evolve by contrasting these fragments and make something new out of
>>> them and thus constantly manage to recreate myself.  This I assume is a
>>> normal course of healthy life for me.  The process however distances me from
>>> my community in terms of my appearance, opinions as well as associations.
>>>
>>> But since the community I come from is marginalized, if I were to become
>>> too different from it in terms of my looks or my subjectivity, I would be
>>> perceived as a betrayer.  Apart from this, seeing the community under
>>> distress, I personally sense my own betrayal.  I get forced to identify with
>>> the community and represent it.  The struggle I am confronted with is how to
>>> retain the individual self and maintain its natural growth while at the same
>>> time not abandon my community in distress.    The third commitment is to the
>>> universal whole, the affinity and commitment one feels towards the shared
>>> values and heritage of human community.   It is hard to negotiate commitment
>>> to self, community and universe, all at the same time yet this negotiation
>>> is important since a sense of justice is at stake.  The luxury of being able
>>> to accord justice to all becomes difficult as the communal sense of
>>> victimhood alters ones subjectivity in its favour.  For example when the
>>>  outsiders perceive and treat Kashmiris unfavorably, it reduces my
>>> emphasis on other identities within Kashmir and the collective Kashmiri
>>> identity becomes the focus of my attention.
>>>
>>>
>>> As long as one is able to keep oneself outside and inside at the same
>>> time, one might be able to maintain a fairer view of things.  But in this
>>> lies the danger of blunting ones outrage and protest.
>>>
>>>
>>> Normally one does, and should be able to identify with multiple
>>> marginalities at the same time.  Some marginalities I embody, like Muslim,
>>> South Asian and Kashmiri. Others I may not, like gender, caste, rural,
>>> disabled, and yet am I able to identify with them.  I cannot have my
>>> concerns limited to myself and my community since my own victimhood shapes
>>> my identification with other marginalities. But how exactly does one locate
>>> oneself with respect to other marginalities in a real politics? How does one
>>> negotiate between strategy and idealism?  When do I remain silent about a
>>> particular marginality to privilege the other?  When do I maintain strategic
>>> silence about other marginalities to keep certain marginality in focus?  How
>>> does one combine these simultaneous movements to ensure that a particular
>>> marginality does not acquire fascistic proportions?
>>>
>>>
>>> This negotiation has to take place in the context where differential
>>> importance is given to marginalities by the state or dominant interests in
>>> order to subvert, fragment and hijack marginalities. One marginality is
>>> played up against the other. Demands are counter posed—something more
>>> general or ephemeral like ‘azadi’ against something more concrete like
>>> ‘bijli-sadak-pani’.  It is like dangling one before the deprived in order to
>>> vane them off the other.  The choice offered is often between dignity and
>>> basic amenities of life.
>>>
>>>
>>> Symbolic activity can hijack the real issues around marginality.  The
>>> more radical I sound the more legitimate my voice becomes in a marginalized
>>> community.  This triggers one-upmanship within the marginalized group in the
>>> race to lay claim as real representatives of the marginality. One has to
>>> arrive at a position between compromising oneself and being reduced to a
>>> radical rant.
>>>
>>> In order to make the larger sense of marginality composite of
>>> marginalities within and a principled and strategic alliance with other
>>> marginalities without, the process of emancipation of different
>>> marginalities has to happen simultaneously. There is need for an ongoing
>>> dialogue to negotiate the genuineness of claims of marginality and to
>>> resolve conflict of interest and issues of justice in the context of
>>> different marginalities working together.  There is need for democracy
>>> within the alliances of marginalities.  For Kashmir ‘Azadi’ has to be
>>> redefined in terms of and achieved through the notional and substantive
>>> emancipation of all the sub-marginalities that constitute it or risk being
>>> fragmented or reduced to yet another chauvinistic movement.   It is only
>>> this rigorous self definition that will facilitate principled alliances with
>>> other movements and conceptions of marginality.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> [1]  Presented  at the Marginalities Workshop, Department of Sociology,
>>>  on March 25-26th 2010
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> [2] And amusingly in addition to this six pairs of pashmina goats and
>>> three pairs of Kashmiri shawls annually!
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> [3]  Marginality and Its Directions Author(s): Adam Weisberger Source:
>>> Sociological Forum, Vol. 7, No. 3 (Sep., 1992), pp. 425-446 Published by:
>>> Springer
>>>
>>>
>>>
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>
> Shuddhabrata Sengupta
> The Sarai Programme at CSDS
> Raqs Media Collective
> shuddha at sarai.net
> www.sarai.net
> www.raqsmediacollective.net
>
>
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