[Reader-list] Fwd: Kashmiri Marginalities: The Construction, Nature and Response.

[Inder Salim]

Well,  to say  the least, the article is dense, and is a very serious
attempt to understand the complex nature of conflict.good to read it
again.

Such reflections are likely to come up in future, not only from Valley
directly, but from outside as well.  More and more serious reflections
from Indian intellectuals on Kashmir would pile up in coming days,
because it is debated in many circles now, by those who look at it
beyond that beaten track :Nationalistic Perspective.

Talking on Kashmir a little away from that conventional perspective
looks anti national to most in India which is normal to some and
abnormal to some, depends what is your  the mental makeup?

Normally, kashmir  debators in Indian are those who are directly or
indirectly the beneficiary of the faulty systems here. and naturally
they are those who dont want the satus quo to change, fearing some
catastrophe, and on the other hand those who are earning a little more
than two square meals are content with one liner that Kashmir is the
head/crown of India ,which needs protection, and therefore, any
killing justified. Forget about the millions who dont know where
Kashmir is and what it is all about. They dont know anything beyond
Roti Kapda aur Juggi/makkan.

Serious thinking would come from disillusioned lot. From the people
who know how dangerous the Indfian establishment has become.  Commen
Wealth Games is one little example,where 30 billion dolloars have
magically disappeared in the names of games. Food grains are rotting.
Almost all the edible things are contaminated including medicine. Land
and water is sold to companies clandestinley, and more than 10000
billion US$ are siphoned to banks outisde India.  Extra judicial
killings are in the interest of Nations... the list is long...Shame

so, serious minded people will talk about Babri mosque Demolition and
Gujarat riots for decades and decades now,  and will question article
370 and its dilution in the coming years also. Questioning article 370
from BJP perspective would be a joke

 So, the more and more the question of accountability comes up, the
more and the more Kashmir question will come up. Because the
establishment would do it possible best to hide its corrupt
inefficient vices, and therefore, more suffering and therefore, more
debates on the very fabric of  Nature State.  People would talk about
the legal status of Kashmir ? What  happened in 1947 and beyond is a
constant now.....

That is how it can be; as i see

further, about what Gowhar said :
"The process however distances me from my community in terms of my
appearance, opinions as well as associations."

I just happened to convey my Eid Mubarak to friends in Valley, and
almost all of them expressed utter frustration

One of my friends said that he would like to die in a stampede
anywhere but it will be his own choice. He further said , that he
wants to laugh and laugh and laugh outside Kashmir.

Another, poet, said to me that everything is quite clear in kashmir
but nobody knows what it is ?

Another said, that if they listen to X or Y, why they dont listen to
me also. He said that about the Kashmir problem, he was never taken
into confidence. and therefore, he feels alienated even amongst those
who think that they know what is the nature of kashmir politics. They
are all aged 60 and above.

They younger lot, say 20 - 30 years old know their identity, if they
are living in Kashmir, and are not exposed to other cultures which
might change them a bit, as Gowhar feels. But i doubt if there are is
single thread of thought prevalent in Kashmir, except that " Go India
Go". Elites in Kashmir are generally similar to opportunists who are
not in dearth here.

Gowhar further adds  " I cannot have my concerns limited to myself and
my community "
which is a radical departure from people like poet Iqbal, who openly
expressed that he would certainly nurse his own ailing mother first if
there is other one next to her. ( Gowhar, plz confirm )

This shift too can motivate non-kashmiri intellectuals to speak about
kashmir conflict at the core.

This approach is good for those who doubt, things that look solid, and
things that dont yield to meaning without a referent,. which is about
self at the same time, i believe....

love
is






On Sat, Sep 11, 2010 at 10:06 PM, Pawan Durani <pawan.durani at gmail.com> wrote:
>
> Hoisting of pakitsan flag and burning of public properties has exposed
> all eleents of sunni jehadis in kashmir
>
> On Sat, Sep 11, 2010 at 12:19 AM, Shuddhabrata Sengupta
> <shuddha at sarai.net> wrote:
> > Dear Gowhar,
> >
> > Let me add to Sanjay's comment. I will write a more detailed response later.
> > Right now a bit snowed under. But I especially appreciate the honesty with
> > which you come across with your own doubts and questions about the
> > construction of identity. Especially the tension  between the self-awareness
> > of being the member of a minority in one sense, and the majority in another.
> > I have always thought of the question of identity as having a fluidity, an
> > almost tactile and subtle slipperiness that congeals into something grim and
> > viscous the moment one tries to define oneself.
> >
> > The multitudes that each of us contain, and the currents that flow through
> > us, cannot ever be adequately represented by a single name, regardless of
> > whether that name points to an ethnic, or a national, or a religious or any
> > other kind of affiliation.
> >
> > That is why, ultimately, all forms of identity based politics, regardless of
> > origins, regardless of destinations, visit the very people they claim as
> > their subjects, in the form of persistent nightmares of loyalty and treason.
> > That said, it cannot be denied that one inhabits an identitiy if one is made
> > to wear it like a prison uniform or an armour. To ignore the presence of
> > identity in such a context would be to ignore the reality of incarceration.
> > The question is, how does one know that the prison uniform is something one
> > can choose to cease to wear, when one is released.
> >
> > looking forward to more discussion on this,
> >
> > best,
> >
> > Shuddha
> >
> > On 10-Sep-10, at 7:38 PM, Sanjay Kak wrote:
> >
> >> Dear Gowhar
> >>
> >> Thank you for sketching out a very deft, thoughtful and nuanced
> >> account of Kashmiri marginality. I hope that as the colours and
> >> details are filled in this will turn into a substantial contribution
> >> to the discourse on Kashmir.
> >>
> >> Do please keep us all posted
> >>
> >> Warmest Eid greetings too!
> >>
> >> Sanjay Kak
> >>
> >> On Mon, Sep 6, 2010 at 10:25 AM, gowhar fazli <gowharfazili at yahoo.com>
> >> wrote:
> >>>
> >>> This work in progress, that tries to straddle wide swathes of political
> >>> difference would benefit from your engaged responses.
> >>>
> >>> Thank you.
> >>>
> >>> Gowhar Fazili
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> Kashmiri Marginalities: The Construction, Nature and Response[1]
> >>> by Gowhar Fazili on Monday, 06 September 2010 at 10:01
> >>>
> >>> By Gowhar Fazili
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> To start the argument, we can club the dominant discourses around Kashmir
> >>> into three broad categories, i.e., the Indian, the Pakistani and the
> >>> Kashmiri discourses.  While the Indian and Pakistani discourses (as detailed
> >>> below), accommodate Kashmiri people and the history of their collective
> >>> struggles only if, and when, these buttress their respective positions, the
> >>> Kashmiri discourse is quintessentially about these struggles. In turn the
> >>> dominant Kashmiri discourse simplifies the sub-struggles and fragmented
> >>> politics that exists within, and the connections these have with the outside
> >>> world.
> >>>
> >>> These dominant discourses of political history are a quagmire of claims
> >>> and counter claims.  For those who have not borne the immediate brunt of the
> >>> conflict these generate excitement and passion, and the discourse is
> >>> consumed through various media like an IPL cricket match.  The Indian state
> >>> and the nationalists of various hues, including Hindutva, Leftist, Liberal,
> >>> Secularists, unanimously deploy various moments of Kashmir’s history,
> >>> including the accession signed by Maharaja Hari Singh, the elections held,
> >>> the wars won, the leaders bought over, the subsidies given, the development
> >>> achieved, investments made, etc., as indicators of Indian legitimacy and
> >>> control in Kashmir.  Kashmiri alienation, and separatist movements figure in
> >>> this narrative, if at all, variously, as consequences of external
> >>> interference, uneven development, appeasement, result of one-off political
> >>> mistakes made by previous leaders, etc., which are to be corrected in due
> >>> course
> >>>  when the Indian democracy matures and so on. This discourse denies
> >>> Kashmiris any intelligence or capability for autonomous political behavior.
> >>> It betrays amnesia around the rich history of struggles in Kashmir that
> >>> preceded accession in 1947 that still continue to inspire Kashmir.
> >>>
> >>> The Pakistani discourse emphasizes the ‘Muslim connection’ and dwells on
> >>> the disputed nature of Jammu and Kashmir which should have been theirs by
> >>> the logic of partition.  It focuses on the denial of self-determination to
> >>> the people and disregard of the UN resolutions, calling for plebiscite in
> >>> the region.  It recounts the valor with which Azad Kashmir was won, and in
> >>> their view the continued support and affinity that the majority of Kashmiri
> >>> Muslims feel towards Pakistan.   Though Pakistan lends moral and diplomatic
> >>> support to the current separatist movement in Kashmir, it devalues the
> >>> nuanced engagement and negotiation Kashmiris have had with the Indian state
> >>> over the last sixty years, largely independent of Pakistan.
> >>>
> >>> The dominant Kashmiri narrative which is at a marginalized position with
> >>> respect to the other two discourses imagines itself to be at the centre of
> >>> the current political struggle. It draws from a long history of
> >>> marginalization that predates modernity, tracing back Kashmiri dislike and
> >>> resistance against foreign occupation to the Mughal invasion in 1588 and the
> >>> subsequent progressive emasculation and dispossession of Kashmiris by the
> >>> Afghan, the Sikh, the Dogra, and in the same league, the Indian regime.  It
> >>> leverages dates like 16th March 1846 (Amritsar Treaty), when Kashmir was
> >>> sold by the British to Maharaja Gulab Singh for Seventy- five Lakh
> >>> Nanakshahi rupees[2],  the excessive taxation to recover this money that
> >>> followed, leading to the famine of 1977-79 in which a large number of
> >>>  Kashmiris died; the systematic denial of basic rights and dignity and
> >>> discrimination on the basis of religion and region under the Dogra regime;
> >>> the 13th July 1931
> >>>  Uprising against the Maharaja and the massacre that followed; the year
> >>> 1953 when Sheikh Abdullah, the first democratically elected Prime-Minister
> >>> of Kashmir was deposed and imprisoned by India on charges of conspiracy and
> >>> sedition, arresting along with him the socio-economic revolution that was
> >>> underway.  It presumes the subsequent elections while Sheikh was in custody
> >>> for twenty years to have been rigged and the period to have been marked with
> >>> extreme suppression, corruption and cooption.  It sees changes made over the
> >>> years to extend provisions of Indian constitution in an attempt to bring
> >>> Kashmir closer to the Indian union, as bulldozing of the residual safeguards
> >>> against assimilation.  It cites failure of India to make progress on the
> >>> various agreements and accords, calling for plebiscite, restoration of
> >>> autonomy, etc., as illustrations of India’s ‘Chanakya Neeti’ (deceitful
> >>> policy.)
> >>>
> >>> The significant moments in recent history, like the 1984 hanging of the
> >>> JKLF leader, Maqbool Bhat, the rigging of 1987 elections, the mass uprising
> >>> for Azadi, and the repression that began in 1989 when Kashmiri youth took to
> >>> arms against the Indian state,  and such, form the key markers around which
> >>> the narrative of victimhood and valor is woven.  Not surprisingly the Indian
> >>> national days are designated as black days (including the day Indian army
> >>> landed in Kashmir) and are marked with protest and blackout.  The narrative
> >>> erases the moments of compromise and relative calm that Kashmiris have
> >>> enjoyed in spurts in the intervening years giving rise to the educated,
> >>> middle class which is spearheading the current separatist movement.
> >>>
> >>> Much of the writing on Kashmir prior to the year 2000 concerns debates
> >>> around these discourses emerging from respective camps.  Spokespersons,
> >>> scholars, military think tanks and a significantly large number of literate
> >>> and illiterate Kashmiris are socialized into the importance of each of these
> >>> claims and possess ability to maneuver through controversies to establish
> >>> their political claims.  The positions are entrenched and provide for little
> >>> flexibility.  The dominant narratives have also found their way into the
> >>> colloquial language and often, abuses, frustrations, humor, are expressed
> >>> with reference to these moments.  To mention just one, ‘ye nai Sattejihas
> >>> yeeha balaay’  ‘Had not the forty-seven been accursed’, refers to 1947, the
> >>> year Indian Army landed in Kashmir and the Maharaja signed that accession.
> >>> The expression is used to let out everyday frustration or to poke fun at
> >>> someone’s undue claims or some unworthy person’s rise through
> >>>  corruption.
> >>>
> >>> While the Kashmiri Self is torn between commitments to multiple,
> >>> overlapping and contradictory identities and interests, like people anywhere
> >>> else, the fact of being born in a territory, where the conflict around its
> >>> disputed nature has raged to varying degrees for over the last sixty years,
> >>> complicates and intensifies concern for some identities at the cost of
> >>> others.  The political uncertainty impacts different members and groups
> >>> differently as they choose different strategies to deal with the onslaught
> >>> from within and without.  To grossly simplify, for example a large majority
> >>> of Pandits have moved out of Kashmir and many have allied themselves with
> >>> Indian right-wing parties.  Kashmiri Shia and Sunni Muslims largely identify
> >>> with the broad contours of separatist politics, Pashtoons are invisible,
> >>> Gujjars maintain an ambivalent position depending on where they are
> >>> physically, located.  People in Gurez, Karnah, Uri, who are geographically
> >>> isolated from
> >>>  the valley and live in close proximity with security garrisons do not
> >>> manifest sympathy with separatism, or at least do not overtly do so for
> >>> obvious reasons.  Within the state of Jammu and Kashmir, people of Doda,
> >>> Punch and Rajori ally with Kashmir or Jammu depending on which of their
> >>> interests and identities are threatened at a particular moment of time.
> >>>  People of Kargil gravitate towards Kashmir if and when the Buddhist
> >>> majority discriminates against them.  Hindu majority areas of Jammu, and
> >>> Buddhist Leh, have consistently favored India and alleged discrimination by
> >>> Kashmiri Muslims and their appeasement by the Indian state.
> >>>
> >>> Kashmiri society is variegated along caste, class, community, gender,
> >>> region, religion and political orientation. These identities contract within
> >>> and extend beyond the geographical boundaries of Kashmir in different
> >>> situations and along different questions. Yet it is the collective
> >>> experience of a shared geography, history, language, culture and meanings
> >>> that make Kashmiris conversant with each other in a special way, rendering
> >>> others as outside. The identification with the dominant Kashmiri narrative
> >>> presented above which at this moment has a favorable bias towards the
> >>> masculine, Muslim majoritarian identity, depends on where one is located
> >>> within the crosscutting mesh of identities and experiences and intellectual
> >>> trajectories.
> >>>
> >>> In India, Kashmiris are marked irrespective of their other identities, by
> >>> race, religion and language. Physically, they do not look, sound or behave
> >>> like stereotypical Indians and are often harassed and made to prove their
> >>> nationality at the ticket counters or wherever nationality applies. Outside
> >>> Kashmir, given the context of the twenty years of armed conflict, and the
> >>> consequent stereotyping of Kashmiris as terrorists, they face  difficulty in
> >>> finding accommodation, are forced to inhabit Muslim ghettos; receive snares
> >>> and unwelcome comments while travelling; are easy prey for the security
> >>> agencies seeking instant suspects for terror attacks; cannot stick their
> >>> neck out too much in day-to-day struggles so as not to risk being falsely
> >>> reported; cannot easily get visas to ‘civilized’ aka non-Muslim countries
> >>> (for being a Muslim is bad enough, but being a Kashmiri Muslim, with the
> >>> word ‘Kashmir’ on their passports, makes them doubly illegitimate.)
> >>>
> >>> Since Social Sciences do not form part of military curriculum, for the
> >>> majority of over six lakh armed forces dotting neighbourhoods in Kashmir,
> >>> Kashmiris are potential Pakistani terrorists who deserve to be eliminated or
> >>> incarcerated or insulted on the flimsiest excuse. Kashmiris are targets for
> >>> ready retribution in wake of militant attacks. Homes can be searched,
> >>> vehicles stopped, people disembarked and detained any moment and without
> >>> explanation. The laws like AFSPA permit the security forces to shoot people
> >>> as a preventive measure against possible future terror attacks. Public
> >>> Safety Act provides for preventive custody without trial even before one
> >>> engages in ‘objectionable’ activity. Men, women and children are susceptible
> >>> to sexual assault and torture and other forms of humiliation. Since the
> >>> above experiences do not vary significantly among different segments of the
> >>> Kashmiri population, they reinforce the collective marginalized identity.
> >>>
> >>> The militants against the security forces, and the consequent deaths of
> >>> Kashmiris in the conflict caused by militants or in crossfire, or killing of
> >>> assumed or real Indian agents, the damage to personal properties, cultural
> >>> and religious places, though used as firewood for Indian propaganda against
> >>> the separatists, enhances the collective sense of victimhood. In some it has
> >>> also resulted in abhorrence for all forms of violence emanating from
> >>> anywhere. Others hold Pakistan or foreigners or religious fundamentalists
> >>> responsible and hate them for this reason. Still others have turned overly
> >>> apologetic, servile and defensive. But curiously it has not resulted in
> >>> increased love for India among many.
> >>>
> >>> The violence in the society has also resulted in intolerance towards
> >>> those who for various reasons do not subscribe to the dominant sense of
> >>> victimhood or those who try to channelize their anger and energies
> >>> differently. The identities which are in-between or fall outside the markers
> >>> of dominant Kashmiri identity and victimhood are rendered invisible or
> >>> sought to be assimilated or in extreme cases eliminated. This is in
> >>> consonance with how radical identities often turn upon their own people who
> >>> may choose divergent strategies or cannot fit within their grand project.
> >>>
> >>> This dominant narrative is augmented with the indices of development like
> >>> poor representation in civil services, academics, armed forces; backwardness
> >>> of the region in terms of industrial development, educational
> >>> infrastructure; employment opportunities within and outside the state. It
> >>> also draws from the narrative of regional discrimination establishing how
> >>> India has favored development in Jammu and Ladakh at the cost of Kashmir.
> >>>
> >>> In the Pre-globalization era, the center being the only source of
> >>> funding, would offer financial packages to loyalist or compromisers and
> >>> punish those who tried deviate or rose in opposition to the centers
> >>> hegemony. This practice continues. In the present times multinational
> >>> private enterprise or funding cannot move in due to instability and
> >>> disturbance. Irrespective of this the deals have been struck by the
> >>> government with foreign companies for example, power projects, that are
> >>> complete sell-outs helped by the fact that people are alienated from the
> >>> state sponsored politics and too busy fighting the separatist cause. The
> >>> stunted development willful or incidental adds to alienation.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> Kashmiri Responses
> >>>
> >>> Adam Weisberger[3] using the German Jewry of Wilhelmine era as a test
> >>> case to understand marginality and its directions among people argues that
> >>> “the marginal person, having taken on elements of the dominant culture, is
> >>> unable to return unchanged to his or her original group. Thus, the marginal
> >>> person is caught in a structure of double ambivalence: unable either to
> >>> leave or to return to the original group; unable either to merge with the
> >>> new group or to slough it off. Marginal persons typically react to this
> >>> field of cross-cutting pressures in four directions, here termed
> >>> assimilation, return, poise, and transcendence.”
> >>>
> >>> Kashmiris through history have to varying degrees of success pursued
> >>> various directions in order to overcome their personal and collective sense
> >>> of marginality. If we were to coalesce the four directions in which the
> >>> marginalized react as suggested by Weisberger namely assimilation, return,
> >>> transcendence, poise we can find parallels for each in different time
> >>> periods, groups, institutions, individuals or simultaneously present as
> >>> contradictory tendencies in a single entity or individual. Kashmiris have
> >>> also produced a wide range of political, intellectual and strategic
> >>> responses that range over categories like: separatists, autonomists,
> >>> Islamists, secularist, loyalist, anarchist, humanist, spiritualist,
> >>> apologist, radical, pacifist, self loathing and a myriad of other responses,
> >>> many, still nascent and yet to be born.    (I have to develop this)
> >>>
> >>> One of the latest debates raging at the moment is around a fresh attempt
> >>> to pass the Permanent Residents (Disqualification) Bill introduced in the
> >>> Legislative assembly.  The bill seeks to over-rule the High Court decision
> >>> against the provision that renders a woman non state subject if she marries
> >>> a non-state-subject.  The same does not apply to men who marry outside.
> >>>  Interestingly BJP and other right of centre Jammu-based parties have
> >>> started protesting against the bill, while the valley maintains a silence,
> >>> betraying support through the lack of outrage among various political
> >>> groups.  The silence is symptomatic of the male patriarchal bias in the
> >>> dominant discourse in Kashmir.  Not to say that BJP and its allies are by
> >>> any means less patriarchal.  They possibly see the women’s matrimony as a
> >>> means to extend their connection with the Indian Hindu mainstream or to
> >>> increase their likely voters in Jammu since marriage outside Kashmir is
> >>> assumed to be
> >>>  more common among Hindus in Jammu.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> Amarnath Land Transfer issue in 2008 once again fissured J&K along
> >>> communal and regional lines.  While the right wing Hindu formations fanned
> >>> sentiments in Jammu against the revocation of land transfer, Kashmiri Muslim
> >>> separatists and mainstream regional parties saw the move as yet another
> >>> attempt to change demography in Kashmir, since the shrine board included
> >>> individuals who were non-state-subjects. For the awaam of Kashmir, the
> >>> controversy provided yet another charged issue to vent their separatism.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> Indian Responses
> >>>
> >>> The Indian civil society has looked at Kashmir with empathy, apathy or
> >>> disdain.  Largely the Indian mainstream has been silent on or apathetic
> >>> towards Kashmiri suffering, because they do not share blood ties or see
> >>> commonality of interest with Kashmiris.  Those who empathize, have their
> >>> empathies conditioned by their location within the mainstream Indian
> >>> politics.  Indian intellectuals have tried to read Kashmir into their own
> >>> respective projects rather than look at it from the point of view of
> >>> Kashmiris and their history.  Similarly Indian Muslims and their
> >>> sympathizers look at Kashmir as a minority problem and expect Kashmiris to
> >>> behave in a manner that does not threaten the survival of Indian Muslims
> >>> through a backlash, which would in turn harm the fragile secular polity.
> >>>  The left sees it as a class problem or at best that of regional imbalance
> >>> and because of false consciousness and undifferentiated class structure,
> >>> unfit for class struggle and
> >>>  revolution. Large majorities in India, under the influence of the media
> >>> with its nationalist bias, look at Kashmiris with disdain as they see them
> >>> as anti-nationals who share cross border loyalties and are mostly terrorists
> >>> and fanatics.
> >>>
> >>> The civil society groups have tried to identify or create their
> >>> respective constituencies by promoting various sub-marginalities. Since
> >>> funding to NGO’s is channeled through the Indian elite, based in Delhi, they
> >>> exercise substantial influence on how ‘civil society’ in its NGO avatar
> >>> develops in Kashmir. The initiatives presently active in Kashmir have
> >>> diverse ideological backgrounds.  If we count out the covert intelligence
> >>> operations in the form of NGOs, to site just three the Gandhian, left
> >>> leaning and feminists each sees the central problem in Kashmir to be that of
> >>> fissuring of the community due to violence, feudalism and/or patriarchy
> >>> respectively.  While these fault-lines exist, to see them as detached from
> >>> the nationality question does violence to Kashmir.  It would be like the
> >>> British describing colonialism condition in India as male chauvinism or
> >>> caste oppression.
> >>>
> >>> Right wing nationalists block any positive moves by the state towards a
> >>> negotiated solution or reconciliation by branding the seasonal olive-branch
> >>> overtures by the State as Muslim appeasement, while at the same time
> >>> cultivating a constituency among Pandits, and caste and class groups among
> >>> Hindus in Jammu.  They also use Kashmir as a spectacle to shore up their
> >>> Hinduvadi constituency in India by calling for abrogation of article 370 or
> >>> through flag hoisting missions in Lal Chowk and such.
> >>>
> >>> The state, since 1989 has largely responded with repression through
> >>> violent means.  The talks are offered and withdrawn often at the peril of
> >>> those who come forward and end up being disowned by the community for the
> >>> failure and embarrassment.
> >>>
> >>> There is also an unceasing ideological onslaught that sees Kashmir merely
> >>> as a problem of development exacerbated by the ever present ‘foreign hand’,
> >>> that portrays all protest as political intrigue and at best a result of
> >>> internal power struggle for control over resources.
> >>>
> >>> But if one were to follow the dialectics of politics in Kashmir over a
> >>> longer period, it follows predictable, Sisyphean cycles of eternal return,
> >>> of protests, repression, compromise, corruption and back to protests.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> Encouragement of marginalities within
> >>>
> >>> Indian state and civil society often intervenes to rescue Kashmiri women
> >>> and other marginalized groups from the Kashmiri Muslim male society which is
> >>> assumed to be patriarchal and dominating.  In any discussion on Kashmir, the
> >>> question, ‘but what about the women, the Gujjars, Pahadis, Shias, Buddhists,
> >>> Dogras, Pandits?’ and so on invariably comes up.  The centre is able to
> >>> subvert the mobilization around a particular marginality, by bringing up the
> >>> issue of marginalities within and around the claimant group. In turn the
> >>> mobilization around the dominant discourse tries to suppress or ignore the
> >>> discrimination within or around itself in response to this subversion.  In
> >>> case of Kashmir, the demand for the right to self determination is hostage
> >>> to the question of what happens to the women, shias, Gujjars, Pandits,
> >>> Hindus of Jammu and Buddhists of Ladakh.  On the other hand the dominant
> >>> discourse around unresolved nature of Jammu and Kashmir has subsumed
> >>>  other effective marginalities experienced by Kashmiris of various
> >>> denominations at various other levels.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> Ambivalent nature of Kashmiris
> >>>
> >>> The narrative of Indian nationalism is fuelled by the ‘adventures’ of the
> >>> Indian Army in Kashmir.  It is followed by a legalistic discourse on the
> >>> nature and tenability of Kashmir’s accession with the Indian union.  This
> >>> discourse forms the backdrop against which the Kashmiris are examined and
> >>> variously described: as being the symbols of Indian secularism for having
> >>> willfully joined the Indian union inspite of their religious and
> >>> geographical affinity with Pakistan; as being primordially secular, Sufi and
> >>> non-violent or being treacherous people capable of cross border allegiance,
> >>> duplicity and deceit.
> >>>
> >>> This problematic status makes them unfit for democracy and provides a
> >>> good reason why Kashmiris need to be mainstreamed and denied autonomous
> >>> self-definition and a dignified independent identity.  The only identities
> >>> permissible to Kashmiris are the one that pass the litmus test of Indian
> >>> ideals, the ideals which the Indians may themselves not have been able to
> >>> uphold.  If the identity proclaimed or exhibited by Kashmiris does not fit
> >>> within the standards offered to other regional minorities in India, then
> >>> these have to be shorn off in the interest of the unity of the nation.
> >>>  Kashmiri’s are defined partially, in a defused form and only to the extent
> >>> that it serves various political purposes and then left to deal with the
> >>> schizophrenic condition on their own.
> >>>
> >>> Kashmiri counter narrative sees the illegal accession signed by their
> >>> tormentor, Maharaja Hari Singh on their behalf and the denial of self
> >>> determination only as a milestones in their long struggle for emancipation,
> >>> which began much earlier and continues till date.  Kashmiris subscribing to
> >>> this narrative see themselves as de-facto and temporary citizens of India
> >>> who have been subjugated against their will.
> >>>
> >>> While Kashmiris at different stages in history have bought into the
> >>> discourse about the secular, peaceful, compositeness of their culture, they
> >>> resent its use to make them into the essence of Indian ideal and react by
> >>> adopting the exact opposite stereotype.  Simultaneously the emphasis on
> >>> their affinities and continuities with regions that spread beyond the
> >>> de-facto borders of the Indian state—that is the connection with Pakistan,
> >>> Afghanistan, Central Asia, Persia and beyond—provide them a lever to
> >>> establish their separateness.
> >>>
> >>> While the Indian’s are in no hurry to make progress in resolving the
> >>> issue of Kashmir and can afford all the time and spare enormous resources,
> >>> for Kashmiri’s nothing matters as much or is as urgent as dignity, certainty
> >>> and security of their selves and yet they are left with no choice but to
> >>> stake their all and as long as it takes to achieve it.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> Self, Community and the Universe
> >>>
> >>> In order to engage with the Kashmiri self I will begin with myself.  I
> >>> find myself marginalized from the community in which I was born because my
> >>> natural intellectual and emotional trajectory pushed me to transcend my
> >>> ‘received self’ by imbibing fragments of and influences from the exposure to
> >>> other cultures, communities and intellectual currents.  In the process I
> >>> hope to evolve by contrasting these fragments and make something new out of
> >>> them and thus constantly manage to recreate myself.  This I assume is a
> >>> normal course of healthy life for me.  The process however distances me from
> >>> my community in terms of my appearance, opinions as well as associations.
> >>>
> >>> But since the community I come from is marginalized, if I were to become
> >>> too different from it in terms of my looks or my subjectivity, I would be
> >>> perceived as a betrayer.  Apart from this, seeing the community under
> >>> distress, I personally sense my own betrayal.  I get forced to identify with
> >>> the community and represent it.  The struggle I am confronted with is how to
> >>> retain the individual self and maintain its natural growth while at the same
> >>> time not abandon my community in distress.    The third commitment is to the
> >>> universal whole, the affinity and commitment one feels towards the shared
> >>> values and heritage of human community.   It is hard to negotiate commitment
> >>> to self, community and universe, all at the same time yet this negotiation
> >>> is important since a sense of justice is at stake.  The luxury of being able
> >>> to accord justice to all becomes difficult as the communal sense of
> >>> victimhood alters ones subjectivity in its favour.  For example when the
> >>>  outsiders perceive and treat Kashmiris unfavorably, it reduces my
> >>> emphasis on other identities within Kashmir and the collective Kashmiri
> >>> identity becomes the focus of my attention.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> As long as one is able to keep oneself outside and inside at the same
> >>> time, one might be able to maintain a fairer view of things.  But in this
> >>> lies the danger of blunting ones outrage and protest.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> Normally one does, and should be able to identify with multiple
> >>> marginalities at the same time.  Some marginalities I embody, like Muslim,
> >>> South Asian and Kashmiri. Others I may not, like gender, caste, rural,
> >>> disabled, and yet am I able to identify with them.  I cannot have my
> >>> concerns limited to myself and my community since my own victimhood shapes
> >>> my identification with other marginalities. But how exactly does one locate
> >>> oneself with respect to other marginalities in a real politics? How does one
> >>> negotiate between strategy and idealism?  When do I remain silent about a
> >>> particular marginality to privilege the other?  When do I maintain strategic
> >>> silence about other marginalities to keep certain marginality in focus?  How
> >>> does one combine these simultaneous movements to ensure that a particular
> >>> marginality does not acquire fascistic proportions?
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> This negotiation has to take place in the context where differential
> >>> importance is given to marginalities by the state or dominant interests in
> >>> order to subvert, fragment and hijack marginalities. One marginality is
> >>> played up against the other. Demands are counter posed—something more
> >>> general or ephemeral like ‘azadi’ against something more concrete like
> >>> ‘bijli-sadak-pani’.  It is like dangling one before the deprived in order to
> >>> vane them off the other.  The choice offered is often between dignity and
> >>> basic amenities of life.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> Symbolic activity can hijack the real issues around marginality.  The
> >>> more radical I sound the more legitimate my voice becomes in a marginalized
> >>> community.  This triggers one-upmanship within the marginalized group in the
> >>> race to lay claim as real representatives of the marginality. One has to
> >>> arrive at a position between compromising oneself and being reduced to a
> >>> radical rant.
> >>>
> >>> In order to make the larger sense of marginality composite of
> >>> marginalities within and a principled and strategic alliance with other
> >>> marginalities without, the process of emancipation of different
> >>> marginalities has to happen simultaneously. There is need for an ongoing
> >>> dialogue to negotiate the genuineness of claims of marginality and to
> >>> resolve conflict of interest and issues of justice in the context of
> >>> different marginalities working together.  There is need for democracy
> >>> within the alliances of marginalities.  For Kashmir ‘Azadi’ has to be
> >>> redefined in terms of and achieved through the notional and substantive
> >>> emancipation of all the sub-marginalities that constitute it or risk being
> >>> fragmented or reduced to yet another chauvinistic movement.   It is only
> >>> this rigorous self definition that will facilitate principled alliances with
> >>> other movements and conceptions of marginality.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> [1]  Presented  at the Marginalities Workshop, Department of Sociology,
> >>>  on March 25-26th 2010
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> [2] And amusingly in addition to this six pairs of pashmina goats and
> >>> three pairs of Kashmiri shawls annually!
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> [3]  Marginality and Its Directions Author(s): Adam Weisberger Source:
> >>> Sociological Forum, Vol. 7, No. 3 (Sep., 1992), pp. 425-446 Published by:
> >>> Springer
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> _________________________________________
> >>> reader-list: an open discussion list on media and the city.
> >>> Critiques & Collaborations
> >>> To subscribe: send an email to reader-list-request at sarai.net with
> >>> subscribe in the subject header.
> >>> To unsubscribe: https://mail.sarai.net/mailman/listinfo/reader-list
> >>> List archive: <https://mail.sarai.net/pipermail/reader-list/>
> >>
> >> _________________________________________
> >> reader-list: an open discussion list on media and the city.
> >> Critiques & Collaborations
> >> To subscribe: send an email to reader-list-request at sarai.net with
> >> subscribe in the subject header.
> >> To unsubscribe: https://mail.sarai.net/mailman/listinfo/reader-list
> >> List archive: <https://mail.sarai.net/pipermail/reader-list/>
> >
> > Shuddhabrata Sengupta
> > The Sarai Programme at CSDS
> > Raqs Media Collective
> > shuddha at sarai.net
> > www.sarai.net
> > www.raqsmediacollective.net
> >
> >
> > _________________________________________
> > reader-list: an open discussion list on media and the city.
> > Critiques & Collaborations
> > To subscribe: send an email to reader-list-request at sarai.net with subscribe
> > in the subject header.
> > To unsubscribe: https://mail.sarai.net/mailman/listinfo/reader-list
> > List archive: <https://mail.sarai.net/pipermail/reader-list/>
> _________________________________________
> reader-list: an open discussion list on media and the city.
> Critiques & Collaborations
> To subscribe: send an email to reader-list-request at sarai.net with subscribe in the subject header.
> To unsubscribe: https://mail.sarai.net/mailman/listinfo/reader-list
> List archive: <https://mail.sarai.net/pipermail/reader-list/>


--

http://indersalim.livejournal.com