[Reader-list] AG Noorani "Talkative generals"

[Sanjay Kak]

Forwarding a pretty riveting account of the growing assertion of the
Indian military establishment in the political sphere. Although its
from Frontline, I somehow couldn't get the link, so am providing an
alternative (which is quite a site too!)

Best

Sanjay Kak

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http://indianmilitarynews.wordpress.com/2010/07/30/talkative-generals/

Frontline Magazine Jul 31 - Aug 13

ESSAY: Talkative generals

By A.G. Noorani

President Obama’s dismissal of General Stanley A. McChrystal from his
command in Afghanistan, for speaking to the media in intemperate
language, is in the sound tradition of democratic governance. It flows
from the fundamental principle of civilian supremacy over the
military. Even in Communist China, Chairman Mao Zedong pithily
prescribed that the party directed the gun. This tradition has been
followed by India but not without serious breaches in the past and in
recent years. Debate in the country has been uninformed and
simplistic. The nuances of the principle have been ignored. The
penchant for idolising the Army, accentuated since Kargil, has not
helped in the discussion nor helped that splendid institution that has
served the nation nobly, the Army.

Since the records are locked up in foreign archives, few know that
there was a time when a Chief of the Army Staff (COAS) discussed the
possibility of a military coup in India with the British High
Commissioner and, for good measure, with the Defence Minister. And
that, at the Minister’s initiative. Another COAS, when he presided
over the Eastern Command, revealed to the U.S. Consul-General in
Kolkata the strength of the forces under his command – which, the
Consul-General told his bosses, he already knew – and claimed to have
told off the Defence Minister and to have wielded clout enough to
change India’s policy on Vietnam, if only the listener had spoken to
him earlier. One wonders about the range of his candour if it was an
Ambassador who had lent him an ear. One wonders, no less, how voluble
must these two COAS have been in instances not known to us. The habit
and the trait in these times are very evident.

In recent years, one Army chief successfully thwarted the government’s
policy on a sensitive issue with his calculated pronouncements on the
eve of successive diplomatic parleys and well-advertised briefings to
the media on precisely such occasions. More recently, we have heard
comments by the COAS and a corps commander on the Armed Forces Special
Powers Act, 1958, (AFSPA) in crass ignorance of the law and with scant
respect for its critics. They included a former judge of the Supreme
Court. The trend is glaringly evident. When will it be arrested? And
by whom? The government can go only thus far and no further. For, it
faces not only the media but an opposition party (the Bharatiya Janata
Party) that is out to break all the rules in its mad craze for power.

Read this: “The rise of the Hindu Right to power was anticipated by
the systematic infiltration of the highest levels of the Army
apparatus. While the bulk of the Army leadership remains avowedly
apolitical, the BJP has made methodical efforts to subvert this
tradition, dragging a section of senior officers on to expressly
partisan terrain. The decision of Director General Military Operations
[DGMO] N.C. Vij and Air Vice Marshal S.K. Malik to brief the BJP
national executive on the Kargil war on May 6 [1999] is just one
example of this process. Infantry Division commander Major General
[V.S.] Budhwar helped provide logistical support for the RSS-organised
Sindhu Darshan festival at Leh in 1998. [L.K.] Advani and ideologue
Tarun Vijay were among those who attended. In 1999, he again attended
the Sindhu Darshan, organised with official aid, and graced by [Atal
Bihari] Vajpayee, [George] Fernandes and Advani. Asked by a journalist
whether it was appropriate for him to associate with political
organisations, Budhwar claimed not to understand the question”
(Praveen Swami; The Kargil War; LeftWord Books; page 95).

Large sections of the public view the armed forces with an awe that
suspends judgment. They chafe at the law of contempt as laid down by
the Supreme Court. Presidents have not been immune to criticism, as
A.P.J. Abdul Kalam discovered. The Army remains the one institution
that is not subject to criticism. It strongly resents that, yet
pronounces freely on matters beyond its legitimate domain. It regards
itself unaccountable and above the law, a law unto itself.

Before one considers the record on which these comments are based, the
constitutional position must be borne in mind. The position in Indian
law is no different from that in British law. “The chiefs of staff are
the professional heads of the armed forces; they give professional
advice to the government on strategy and military operations and on
the military implications of defence policy.… Major questions of
defence policy cannot be decided in purely military terms without
reference to the government’s financial and economic policies, which
affect the size, disposition and equipment of the armed forces.

“The chain of command within the police stops with the chief
constable, and neither local police authorities nor Central Government
may give him instructions on the operational use of the police. This
is not the case with the armed forces. In the case of the army, for
example, the line of command runs upwards from the private soldier,
through his commanding officer and higher levels of command to the
Chief of the Defence Staff and the Secretary of State for Defence.
During active operations many immediate decisions have to be taken by
soldiers in the field. But the tasks which are undertaken by the armed
forces, the objectives which they are set and the manner in which they
carry out these tasks are matters for which the government is
accountable to Parliament – whether it be the activities of the troops
in Northern Ireland… the making of a controversial public speech by a
high-ranking army officer, the sinking of the Argentinean ship General
Belgrano during the Falklands conflict in 1982, or the conduct of the
armed forces during the Gulf hostilities…. The full range of
parliamentary procedures which are available in respect of other
branches of central government may be used in respect of defence and
the armed forces. Thus the Public Accounts Committee has often
investigated case of excessive spending by the services” (A.W. Bradley
and K.D. Ewing; Constitutional and Administrative Law; 12th Edition;
page 376; emphasis added throughout). The government is accountable if
any officer of the armed forces shoots off his mouth.

Now for the record, past and present. On April 7, 1966, D.A. Scott of
the British High Commission reported to London: “It so happens that
just before your letter was received the High Commissioner had a talk
with the Chief of Army Staff on this very subject, and I enclose a
note of their conversation. The fact that General [J. N.] Chaudhuri
was prepared to discuss such a delicate topic shows that it is not so
far below the surface in the minds of the government and of the Army.
(This is confirmed by a speech made by [K.] Kamaraj, the Congress
president, in Madras on 17 March in which he said that if violence
continued on the scale recently seen in the Punjab and Bengal, the
military might conclude that democracy was unworkable and themselves
take over the government.) We have accordingly set in hand a rather
more detailed study of the subject and hope to be able to let you have
it before the High Commissioner goes on leave on 22 April. [John]
Freeman [the High Commissioner] would, of course, be prepared to
discuss the subject with you and with anyone else who is interested
when he is in London.”

Chaudhuri did reject the idea of a coup. But it was a nuanced
rejection, not an unqualified one. General S.H.F.J. Manekshaw takes
the cake. Here is the record (see box). In a talk with the U.S.
Consul-General in Kolkata, he opined freely on Kashmir and
India-Pakistan relations; belittled the politicians’ capacity to
achieve a settlement; with revealing lack of realism and the
constitutional position, he held that civil servants and soldiers
would accomplish it; mentioned the strength of the troops he had in
his command; criticised his bosses, the Defence Minister as well as
the Army chief, to a foreign official; criticised the government’s
policy on Vietnam, criticised its policy of purchasing arms from the
Soviet Union for which he held Generals Chaudhuri and P.P.
Kumaramangalam responsible, not the government; discussed his chances
of promotion as COAS; and the like.

Not all were amused by his comment, half in jest, that Pakistan would
have won the war if he were its Army chief. It belittled the jawan.
But more reprehensible was his repeated claim, made, significantly,
after her death, that he had told Prime Minister Indira Gandhi that he
“ could” lead an Army coup; that he reaffirmed it when she contested
the claim, whereupon she graciously conceded that he “ would” not. And
he magnanimously accepted that. That the blatant falsehood passed
muster for so long reflects poorly on retired officers of the Army and
indeed on our defence “experts”. That fine soldier and gentleman Lt.
Gen. Satish Nambiar is an outstanding exception. He publicly
criticised Manekshaw.

Now for the realities. Army commanders do not owe their job to the
Army chief. Both are appointed by the same authority, the government.
Since they do not owe the chief anything beyond a proper respect and
obedience, there is no reason to believe that they would have complied
with any such sordid game. Still less the chiefs of the Navy and the
Air Force. Air Chief Marshal P.C. Lal was a man of strong moral fibre.
The survival of India’s Constitution owes nothing to the forbearance
of General Sam Manekshaw. Henry Kissinger sized him up correctly after
they met in 1971 and told Richard Nixon, on October 7, 1971, that “he
was so cocky, he thought he could defeat everyone in sight, all at the
same time”. This is not the impression which the Prime Minister would
have liked her Army chief to give to the U.S. in mid-1971.

In this regard, one of his recent successors, Gen. J.J. Singh, set a
record. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh pledged himself publicly to a
settlement of the Siachen question. Differences have so narrowed as to
lend themselves easily to a political decision. The dispute entails
heavy loss in men and material and an environmental degradation
without any strategic gain. Soldiers of high eminence have advocated a
settlement in these last 25 years. Just when the prospects seemed
bright, Gen. J.J. Singh intervened publicly and repeatedly to thwart
the government’s policy. On May 20, 2005, talks on the Siachen issue
were resumed in Islamabad. That very day, Gen. J.J. Singh said in New
Delhi that India’s interests would be served only when the
110-kilometre-long Actual Ground Position Line, from NJ 9842 to the
upper Saltoro range, was authenticated. The Army had given its views
to the government. “We are awaiting the outcome of the talks.” They
ended in failure the next day.

On June 12, 2005, Manmohan Singh addressed the Army jawans at the
Siachen base camp, the first Prime Minister to do so. He was
familiarising himself with the realities in a constructive spirit.
“Siachen is called the highest battlefield where living is very
difficult. Now the time has come that we make efforts that this is
converted from a point of conflict to the symbol of peace.” He assured
the jawans that in the talks with Pakistan, “your well-being and the
security of our nation would be kept in mind”. But he left no one in
doubt that he sought a change. “How long shall we allow such
conditions to prevail?” But, how else could that be achieved except
through a compromise acceptable to both?

Gen. J.J. Singh was not one to let that happen. On June 21, 2005,
mediapersons asked him to comment on the Prime Minister’s speech. He
did not tell them that it was not his place to do so but replied all
too readily. He had already given his views to the government, he
said, and reiterated that the Army wanted that Pakistan should
“recognise” the new buzzword – the existing ground position. In short,
the Army disagreed with the Prime Minister and he wanted the public to
know that.

A pronouncement avowedly on behalf of the Army, soon after the Prime
Minister had spoken, has few precedents, if any, in India. Trust is a
political judgment that is entirely for the political leadership to
make, albeit after hearing the Army’s views. As Lt. Gen. P.N.
Kathpalia, former Director General, Military Intelligence, said on
November 12, 1988: “A soldier always over-assesses…. If you know this
character of the Army, it is for the civilian government to make a
correct judgement and put the actions right.” He spoke specifically in
the context of the Siachen trap.

Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri, former Foreign Minister of Pakistan, is a
committed friend of India who bravely incurred criticism in his
country for his staunch commitment (vide his interview to the writer,
Frontline, December 5, 2008, pages 59-63). But even he could not
resist a telling comment on one of the general’s statements
calculatedly timed for the occasion. Arriving in New Delhi for talks
with India’s leaders, he was appalled to read in the day’s papers one
of Gen. J.J. Singh’s pronouncements. He tartly told mediapersons that
while Pakistan was criticised in India for letting the Army shape
policy, things were no different in India itself, evidently.

The virus has seriously infected others. Unrest in Kashmir finds
expression in stone-pelting because avenues of democratic peaceful
protest are banned to the youth.

Last year, the violence declined steeply. The young, freed from the
fear of the gun, wielded alike by the security forces and the
militants, began to voice their protests peacefully on the streets, a
fundamental right recognised in all democracies. But not by the
General Officer Commanding-in-Chief (GOC-in-C) of the Northern
Command, Lt. Gen. B.S. Jaswal. Manmohan Singh’s visit to Jammu and
Srinagar, on October 28 and 29, 2009, and his statements had raised
high hopes. Immediately thereafter, on October 31, Lt. Gen. Jaswal
told the media at Udhampur: “Violence in Kashmir was on the decline
since 2006, with just 26 incidents of violent incidents reported this
year as compared to 276 in 2006. However, the ‘agitational terrorism’
was a cause for worry.” He admitted that “militancy is down” but “my
orders are to the troops – not only fight insurgents but also
insurgency because that is the root cause of the whole trouble” (
Rising Kashmir and Greater Kashmir, November 1, 2009).

The insurgent is a human; insurgency is a movement, motivated by an
idea. It is one thing to use the gun against a violent insurgent,
another to use it against those who peacefully propagate an idea in
meetings or processions. Jaswal equates that with terrorism, coining
the expression “agitational terrorism”.


In 2005, this writer interviewed Lt. Gen. J.R. Mukherjee, GOC-in-C of
the 15 Corps, in Srinagar (“A report on Kashmir”, Frontline, September
1, 2000). I had to interrupt him to stop the flow of his river of
irrelevant rhetoric in spate in order to raise issues of the moment.
For, his oration was devoted to the preposterous thesis that Kashmiris
are not in a majority in Kashmir. He sought to establish it with
slides and tables. The point is not that he was wildly off the mark.
It is that he had no respect for the people or their feelings. Can you
imagine the reaction to such a statement about Marathi-speaking people
in Mumbai? After retirement, Mukherjee argued his thesis in a Kolkata
daily, reflecting the depths of his disdain for Kashmiris.

Jaswal, endowed with a talent for “elegant” phrasing, spoke recently
of the AFSPA as a “pious” document. One has heard of holy books, not
pious ones. It is rather hard for an inanimate thing to achieve piety.
He declaimed in Srinagar on June 14, 2010: “Don’t touch this pious
document or provisions of the Act giving the similarity [sic ] to a
religious book.” The AFSPA is beyond reason and discourse. “I would
like to say that the provisions of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act
are very pious to me and I think to the entire Indian Army” (Kashmir
Times, June 15, 2010).

His claim about the entire Army was perhaps not wrong. For, on June
25, Army chief Gen. V.K. Singh said that the “AFSPA is a misunderstood
Act and all who ask for its dilution/withdrawal do so for narrow
political gains.”

That would include presumably Union Home Minister P. Chidambaram, who
has been working on the amendments for nearly a year. Since they are
before the Cabinet, the COAS’ duty is not to go public with his views
but communicate them to the Defence Minister. His attribution of
motives is unworthy of a respected soldier like him. Would he care to
recall Chidambaram’s statement in Itanagar, Arunachal Pradesh, on
April 3 this year? He said: “There was a statement by the Prime
Minister that he will take steps to replace the AFSPA with a more
humane law” ( Asian Age, June 26, 2010). Is the Prime Minister also
politically motivated? And so also Justice Jeevan P. Reddy, a former
judge of the Supreme Court?

For, a committee to “review” the Act was set up by the BJP government
on November 19, 2004. It was headed by Justice B.P. Jeevan Reddy
(retd) and comprised Lt. Gen. V.R. Raghavan, former DGMO; Dr S.B.
Nakade, former Vice-Chancellor and jurist; P. Shrivastav, Indian
Administrative Service (retd) former Special Secretary, Union Home
Ministry; and Sanjoy Hazarika, a journalist. The terms of reference
cited the “concerns of the people of the north-eastern region” and
studiously ignored those of the people of Kashmir. The committee held
no hearings there. Its recommendations cannot be so restricted. They
were explicit. “ The Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958, should
be repealed. Therefore, recommending the continuation of the present
Act, with or without amendments, does not arise” (Part IV; page 74 of
the report).

The COAS’ charge of political motivation reflects arrogant rejection
of reasoned discussion. All such laws prescribe “reasonable use of
force”. But the AFSPA contains a carte blanche, unheard of in any
statute whether in India or abroad. Section 4(a) of the Act enables
any officer of the armed forces to “ use force, even to the causing of
death”. This is a juridical obscenity, a licence to kill with
impunity. No COAS has any right to dismiss concerns about abuse of the
AFSPA in the way Gen. V.K. Singh did.

The COAS is not bereft of rights. He has not only a right but a duty
to speak up publicly, depending on the circumstances, besides, of
course, his right to voice his fears and objections to the government
in private. He is perfectly entitled to take the people into his
confidence if he is asked to achieve the impossible. A recent instance
suffices to establish this since it has been a subject of comment
though it falls into a settled tradition.

It bears recalling that the GOC-in-C 15 Corps in Srinagar, Lt. Gen.
Krishna Pal, said on March 8, 1998, that a military solution was not
possible in Kashmir and a political solution must be sought. That was
12 whole years ago. On September 11, 2000, Army chief Gen. V.P. Malik
said in Mohali, “ultimately there has to be a political solution to
the [Kashmir] problem,” adding that it was imperative “to counter the
alienation of the local population” (Asit Jolly, Asian Age, September
12, 2000). Such candour is rare.

Not by the Army alone

His successor, the new COAS, General S. Padmanabhan, said at a press
conference in Srinagar on October 5, 2000: “We have no magical
solution to any problem of this nature. In the history of mankind, no
insurgency has been solved by any army.” He explained that “the Army’s
duty is to hold insurgency within acceptable levels so that the
government here continues to function”. Ergo, it is then for the
government, which won the reprieve, thanks to the armed forces, to
take advantage of it and reach out to the militants politically and
thus establish peace, not use the peace to perpetuate its power.

Gen. Padmanabhan said that all the organs of the state had to work
together to address the causes of the insurgency. He knew the
realities having served as GOC Northern Command and as commander of
the 15 Corps (1993-95) when he played an important role in resolving
tactfully the crisis when militants occupied the Hazratbal dargah in
1993. It was a turning point in the decline of the insurgency (Showkat
A. Motta, Greater Kashmir, October 6, 2000).

What sins, then, did the present COAS Gen. V.K. Singh commit when he
reiterated in honest candour these very views in a press interview? He
said: “I feel there is a great requirement for political initiatives
which take all the people forward together. Militarily, we have
brought the overall internal security situation in J&K firmly under
control. Now the need is to handle things politically” (Rajat Pandit,
The Times of India, June 30, 2010).

On July 11, after the troubles had erupted fiercely, he remarked “that
when the security situation had improved, the State administration
should have reached out, but instead has frittered the opportunity
away” ( Indian Express, July 12, 2010). This is a restatement of what
Gen. Padmanabhan said 10 years ago in 2000. Gen. V.K. Singh was within
his rights on both occasions, June 30 and July 11.

Asked to comment on Gen. V.K. Singh’s statement of June 30, Gen. V.P.
Malik defended him on a wrong notion in his interview to the BBC’s
Urdu Service on June 30. The COAS, he asserted, was a
“politico-military adviser”. That, he is not. He is a military
adviser.

It is another matter that his advice will have political implications.
They are for the politicians in power to assess. Unless the
distinction is fairly maintained, the military will not only assess
threats but also decide on the response. Israel provides warning
enough. Kobi Michael of Ben-Gurion University of the Negev in Israel
has described the grim situation there in an erudite and insightful
article entitled, “Who Really Dictates What an Existential Threat Is?
The Israeli Experience” ( The Journal of Strategic Studies, October
2009, pages 687-713).

Amir Oren wrote in the respected Haaretz of January 24, 2008: “In the
dispute between the system’s leaders, the CGS (Chief of General Staff)
is still the most powerful (actor) in comparison to the Head of the
Mossad, Head of GSS (General Security Service) and even (the) Minister
of Defence and Prime Minister – because nobody dares to decide against
the position. The military echelon in Israel is the ultimate knowledge
authority on the definition of security threats and shaping the
responses for tackling them.”

Kobi Michael rightly asserts: “National security is the clear domain
of political leadership. Therefore, the responsibility for defining
existential threats and their appropriate responses is the political
leadership’s responsibility. The meaning of this responsibility is the
supremacy of the political thought from which grand strategy is
derived… when military strategy becomes hegemonic, existential threats
will be defined on the basis of conceptual systems from the world of
military thought, whose weaknesses are a bias towards conservative
realism, anti-intellectualism, and worst-case scenarios.”

The military claims superior access to information and also to
assessment. Most politicians yield to both claims because they know no
better and there is an “absence of alternative knowledge
infrastructure” to military ones.

Both soldier and politician collaborate to propagate the “religion of
security”. Joseph McCarthy used security as a political tool. So does
the BJP. Hence its fondness for the Prevention of Terrorism Act
(POTA). “A vacuum is created and the public looks for the military’s
professional advice.” The public is seduced by the worst-case
scenarios painted by the irresponsible opposition, which preys on its
fears.

The talkative generals have done no little harm. It speaks for the
strength of our democratic system that it survived those of the past
even as it condones the trespasses of the recent ones. But the trend
is clear and it must be arrested – now. Only the moral and
intellectual authority of the political leadership can nip the
creeping menace in the bud.