[Reader-list] India's new ruling caste

[Rana Dasgupta]

India's new ruling caste

Most ministers in the ruling alliance will be unfit to hold office 
because family connections are more important than ability

http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/may/25/india-new-ruling-caste

Appu K Soman

The largest election in history, involving more than 700 million voters, 
has resulted in the victory of India's ruling alliance, led by Prime 
Minister Manmohan Singh of the Indian National Congress. The verdict 
disproved gloomy predictions of a hung parliament and the further 
strengthening of regional parties. The new government will be far more 
stable than many of its predecessors, so the election results have 
elicited profound relief.

But the fact remains that, like previous governments, the new 
administration will consist mostly of politicians unfit to hold 
ministerial office. While several provincial satraps have been cut down 
to size, new, aspiring ones have garnered significant support. Despite 
the manifest success of Indian democracy, its parliamentary system is 
not succeeding in giving India good governance.

Obviously, India is not a failed state. Lant Pritchett of the Harvard 
Kennedy School has coined a new term for India: a "flailing state" – 
where the government's extremely competent upper echelons are unable to 
control its inefficient lower levels, resulting in poor performance.

But this analysis gives credit where none is due: India's problem is its 
top political leadership's lack of competence. The inability of India's 
current political system to provide effective government places the 
country in a different category: a non-performing state.

The idealism of India's freedom movement quickly evaporated after 
independence in the face of the opportunities for patronage that came 
with power. The way India's political system evolved has made politics 
the surest path to wealth. The money spent to win elections (often 
including the purchase of a party's nomination) is recouped many times 
over once the winner is in office. Half of India's legislators who stood 
for re-election this time around had tripled their assets in the last 
five years.

Increasing corruption within governments run by the Congress party, 
which led India to independence and monopolised political power for 
decades, showed what a lucrative career politics had become. Given 
India's religious, caste, and linguistic divides, politicians saw how 
easily they could leverage even a small following into votes.

Soon, Indian political parties began to break up, giving rise to a large 
number of regional and caste-based parties. Most of these parties are 
led by political dynasties that prize loyalty over merit.

Because of the splintering of political parties, India has had only one 
single-party government and eight coalition governments in the last two 
decades. Members of the coalition governments have treated the 
ministries allocated to them as fiefdoms, to be milked for their 
benefit. Over time, India's government has become primarily a tool for 
advancing the personal interests of politicians rather than the entity 
responsible for running the country.

The opportunity for personal gains through public office has made 
electoral politics an automatic career choice for Indian politicians' 
progeny. Record numbers of sons and daughters of political leaders and 
millionaires (and people with criminal backgrounds) contested this 
election. We are seeing the formation of a new Indian caste – a caste of 
rulers different from India's traditional Kshatriya caste – before our 
very eyes.

Like existing castes, the new caste specialises in one occupation: 
political office. Just as someone became a carpenter or a trader in an 
earlier era merely through birth, members of India's ruling caste now 
become leaders of parties, members of legislatures, and cabinet 
ministers solely because of their parentage.

And, as with the older castes, there is no need for any qualification 
for the vocation; birth alone is sufficient. Lack of vocational 
competence never barred Indians from remaining in their caste, and how 
well one performs in political office is, likewise, not a criterion for 
politicians to continue in positions of power.

India's parliamentary system requires ministers to be members of the 
legislature. Party leaders select family members and other loyal 
followers as candidates for elections, with absolutely no consideration 
of their abilities to fulfil ministerial responsibilities, resulting in 
cabinets that are simply not capable of managing the problems 
confronting the country's national and state governments.

Even with the best political leadership, governing India is no easy 
task. Successive governments staffed with unqualified politicians have 
failed dismally to carry out the core governmental functions of 
maintaining law and order, providing the basic services expected of 
modern societies, and promoting economic growth. India's high-performing 
private sector has so far masked the failure of the Indian state.

In its current form, India's parliamentary system can produce only 
non-performing, corrupt governments. It rewards ambition, promotes 
office-at-any-cost politics, and devalues merit.

Taking away the prize of ministerial office from elected representatives 
might discourage wealth-maximising politicians from entering politics. 
It is time, therefore, for India to consider introducing a presidential 
system of government, which would reduce the scope for "horse trading" 
and allow the country's leader to select competent people for cabinet 
positions.

Appu Soman is a fellow of the Belfer Center for Science and 
International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government, 
Harvard University.